Damn. Maybe the PLA should hire you for advice. You seem to know warfare very well behind that keyboard of yours.
Infantry Combat Equipment (non-firearm): Vests, Body Armor, NVGs, etc.
- Thread starter by78
- Start date
Maybe the PLA should stop holding back their potential just to pander to this " We're all about peace and no violence " that is false, it's blatantly obvious they have ridiculous policies they must follow that is outright unnecessary.
Delusional, unfounded claim.
These arent sold due to nice looking ads, that's something only civilians care about.
PLA inf equipment is rugged, light and functional. That hits the trifecta for use in modern battlefields, hence why both Russia and Ukraine are big customers.
Compare this to heavy US made night vision gear. Looks good for airsofters and colonial policemen, essentially both different types of cosplayers. When you're under artillery and air strikes, you don't want to be wearing 20 kgs of cosplay material.
That's every army besides the Russian and Ukrainian ones. And apparently the armies with combat experience like PLA gear, so right back at you.
It doesn't pass the smell test that countries that in general make worse tools with worse manufacturing tolerances and worse base materials would magically have better infantry equipment, which in the end is simply another type of tools.
PLA gear is aimed at the type of war they're going to fight. Obviously flimsy looking NODs will break more easily under fire and need to be replaced more often (something China can easily do). And from the Russians, we have heard that PLA armor is highly durable and lightweight, but must be often replaced after they've been damaged (also something China can easily do).
The trade off is that a relatively unburdened soldier will more easily dodge enemy fire. Expensive and heavy does not necessarily translate to better survivability in real combat conditions.
How many western troops have the experience of:
1. Glide bombed.
2. Shelled by 120mm+ artillery
3. Under fire by incendiary
4. Fired at by atgm of Javelin generation or better
There is nothing wrong to acknowledge that armies which don't have the above experiences do not fit the criteria of having undergone intensive warfighting and as such may have institutional deficiencies
Of course such institutional deficiencies can be countered if the command is humble, willing to learn and open minded.
Do you however think that is a description that fits the prevailing military culture in those countries?
You first made claims that those equipments at the show are useless as PLA hadn’t fought in wars for a longtime. Then you made the above accusation. All based on what? How/where did you get all those inside informations? Care to share…
?????
US made or US derivative infantry gear is widely used all over the world. I don't see very much PLA gear being used at all, except the occasional holosun optic. In the modern age, the PLA is perfectly capable of producing high quality, high end, high durability gear, AS WELL AS producing tons of it. For example, argus, ADNV, etc. As you've seen in the ukraine war, whilst drones, artillery, and high caliber weapons do most of the work, when it comes to infantry fighting, you still need well equipped infantry with superior capabilities to hold trenches, attack fortifications, and plug gaps in the line.
I would definitely argue that having higher quality infantry gear (Thermals, thermal fusion, NVGs) in particular is worth the tradeoff in weight. You don't see videos of soldiers escaping a hail of gunfire by doing rolls or fancy corner peeks, or any specific movement tricks.
The PLA is perfectly capable of fielding a large quantity of very well equipped infantry, it has the budget, the technological ability, and the manufacturing capability. And it can choose to do so whilst also developing the air force and navy. I just hope they realise soon enough that infantry capability is still important in the modern battlefield. Because there is definitely a lack of institutional knowledge, by far the most obvious for the ground force, which will take time to develop, unlike the issuing of high end gear to every grunt.
US made or US derivative infantry gear is widely used all over the world. I don't see very much PLA gear being used at all, except the occasional holosun optic. In the modern age, the PLA is perfectly capable of producing high quality, high end, high durability gear, AS WELL AS producing tons of it. For example, argus, ADNV, etc. As you've seen in the ukraine war, whilst drones, artillery, and high caliber weapons do most of the work, when it comes to infantry fighting, you still need well equipped infantry with superior capabilities to hold trenches, attack fortifications, and plug gaps in the line.
I would definitely argue that having higher quality infantry gear (Thermals, thermal fusion, NVGs) in particular is worth the tradeoff in weight. You don't see videos of soldiers escaping a hail of gunfire by doing rolls or fancy corner peeks, or any specific movement tricks.
The PLA is perfectly capable of fielding a large quantity of very well equipped infantry, it has the budget, the technological ability, and the manufacturing capability. And it can choose to do so whilst also developing the air force and navy. I just hope they realise soon enough that infantry capability is still important in the modern battlefield. Because there is definitely a lack of institutional knowledge, by far the most obvious for the ground force, which will take time to develop, unlike the issuing of high end gear to every grunt.
They won't "realize" that because they know a few dozen VLO tactical aircraft or a few hundred BMs they could buy instead of that are infinitely more consequential.
GWOT and the zero casualty policy (because these wars were hard to justify, to start with) Western govts adhered to really distorted people's view on how much investment the infantry should get. The statistics from World War I to the Russian-Ukrainian war are available. Small arms cause very few casualties compared to artillery, air power and AFVs. And most of the time it is the machine guns doing most of the job. Rifle engagement distances are really close. The second figure is for WW2 and it is about the maximum distance men fired at. ~85% reported that they never fired their rifles at ranges greater than 300 yards in daytime offensive action. So I don't see why 3rd gen analog night vision is a must or everyone needs thermals.
Stacking on more equipment doesn't compete with having less/flimsier equipment. It competes with the soldier's stamina.
Looking at the elite units in the Ukraine war, you find none that go around in full GWOT colonial police cosplay.
In the vast majority of cases, soldiers are killed by artillery, mines and vehicle machine guns. I think PLA have studied this phenomenon well, and are willing to make kit decisions based on reality, not pride.
Given the current status quo of (nearly) all major militaries lacking institutional experience, those armies that are more open minded will have a relative advantage.
Looking at the elite units in the Ukraine war, you find none that go around in full GWOT colonial police cosplay.
In the vast majority of cases, soldiers are killed by artillery, mines and vehicle machine guns. I think PLA have studied this phenomenon well, and are willing to make kit decisions based on reality, not pride.
Given the current status quo of (nearly) all major militaries lacking institutional experience, those armies that are more open minded will have a relative advantage.
by78
General
I actually think it does pass the smell test, because we aren't talking about whether the PLA's procurement of its tools are a reflection of the PRC's manufacturing prowess, but rather about the PLA's procurement priorities in context of their needs.
Very few, and this is exactly the point which I am making.
Western military forces during GWOT had significantly refined their infantry, small unit and air support tactics and procedures in permissive environments, while allowing their high end air-naval-missile warfare capabilities and high end ground warfare (artillery, fires) to wither (or at least, to not advance at the same extent).
Over the last few years I've written things along the lines of "who cares about infantry gear" in relation to the PLA, and that isn't only because PLA infantry gear remains relatively backwards.
It is because we know what the PLA is prioritizing instead of infantry gear.
At the marco, military level they are prioritizing the cream of the crop in terms of technology and systems and training for air, naval, and missile forces, versus ground forces. At the individual service level for the PLAGF, they are prioritizing long range fires (large rocket artillery, tube artillery), ISR and networking, and logistics, followed by certain AFVs, and at the very last, individual infantry gear.
The idea that the PLA would procure individual infantry gear like NODs may be less viable or capable than foreign counterparts, makes a lot of sense when we consider the reality that infantry gear is at the bottom of the list of priorities for the PLAGF, when the PLAGF is at the bottom of the PLA's military services as well.
Then if we consider that funding for a military service also influences the ability for you to robustly train, upskill, do capable R&D, versus western military forces who spent nearly a couple of decades conducting war focused on infantry gear (to the detriment of funding their high end air/naval/missile/ground warfare capabilities) --- then yes it is not only reasonable to me, but it is the only conclusion that should be logical, to believe that the PLA's relative lack of prioritization for infantry gear, as well as relative lack of funding for infantry gear, means that procurement will be relatively suboptimal and unrefined and below other leading military forces with substantial infantry gear.
We are specifically talking about PLA infantry gear and the factors that feed ingo the procurement of such.
The PLA has not been focusing to fight a war requiring ultra high end infantry, and they have not been funded in a manner where they can do R&D, procurement and organization where infantry are placed at higher priorities to enable it. All of that in turn will limit what they can actually develop for themselves and limit what they can buy.
In other, more important domains (air, naval, missile, and also certain aspects of ground warfare like artillery, ISR, networking, logistics) they have put in heaps of money and we are seeing the results of that in terms of both fielded hardware and improving service/institutional capability.
It is not a surprise that the relative underfunding of infantry equipment is resulting in the relative lack of institutional focus and modern procurement for infantry which we see today.
It may seem like I'm criticizing PLA infantry as "bad" but what I'm actually saying is that the PLA has finite funds and putting infantry at the very bottom of the pile makes a load of sense for the kind of war that the PLA is gearing up to fight.