Equation
Lieutenant General
Are you only good for trolling?
India incursion and Chinese standoff at Dolam, Bhutan
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Jura The idiot
General
What is the long-term benefit of China attacking India for a piece of barren land that has no practical strategic use?
India claims, It makes it easier for China to seal of India from her north eastern territories by road.
manqiangrexue
Brigadier
Xi takes islands surrounded by rich fishing waters and natural gas in the SCS and militarized them even with the US as opposition. Modi "took" half a NY apartment sized worth of barren mountain land that he knows he's going to have to spit back out soon. You figure out whom >> whom.
In 1962, India had 9 months to talk like you before they choked on their own blood. If China's still as patient, then you have another half a year to be happy!
Are you familiar with the story of Hercules vs. the Hydra? The Hydra is a powerful enemy that Hercules must fight carefully, but to distract his concentration, Hercules' enemies sent a crab to pinch at his foot during the battle. Had Hercules turned his blade to crush the crab, the Hydra would have engulfed him with his back turned. The US and its current provocations in Korea is the Hydra. China is Hercules and India is the crab. The crab better quit and scurry home before the Hydra eases off if it doesn't wanna end up in the wok as a celebration meal.
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Dizasta1
Senior Member
India would do well to mend relations with China. Both countries suffered at the hands of colonial powers and both countries used to flourish prior to that. If ever China, India, Russia, Pakistan & Iran were to form a military and economic alliance. It would rival or surpass NATO. All countries, in particular China and India, would benefit from working together. And China was the first one to recognize this, when it welcomed India into the SCO. And the SCO has the potential to really prosper and benefit all member countries.
By that I hope you mean China counter-attacking India's attack across a historically mutually recognized border.
For China, the Doklam area is at the end of a very long (and vulnerable) supply chain all the way across the Tibetan Plateau.
In comparison, the Indian side of Doklam backs onto populated lowland areas, and they have stationed an entire army corps there.
From a military point of view, it doesn't really matter if China controls Doklam or not. What matters is that China establishes air superiority. That is what will give China the ability resupply its troops, cut the Indian transport routes to the Northeastern states and also attack the Indian army units at will.
A few KM of road in Doklam is useful for moving troops, but not a big deal.
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In comparison, the SCS does matter to China, and we've seen what China is capable of doing there.
Though commentary from China's government has resurfaced this week, thankfully, it appears China is showing continued restraint that may last an additional week or two. China is also clever in utilizing all of the tools in its drawer including making a huge bribe of $10 Billion to Bhutan (population 800,000, remember China's pledge of $20B to India) in developmental assistance. This makes economic sense given a war would be far costlier, and I wouldn't be surprised if China increased its offer substantially.
Even if Bhutan were to relent and declare its diplomatic independence from India by establishing relations with China, I still don't see a conclusion to the stand off on the ground. The question remains as to what India will actually do if Bhutan were to establish diplomatic relations with China by signing a border treaty presumably favorably placing Doklam plateau within Chinese territory. Will India adhere to Bhutan's wishes, or will it do the opposite by trying to annex Bhutan.
Per the situation in Doklam, the commentary from China's news outlets now suggest that a definite resolution may only occur after the BRICS summit (although I don't see the supposed relevance of the BRICS meeeting). However, I do not believe China is going to perpetually kick the can down the road until winter arrives. The commentary from China has explicitly stated that the longer this standoff drags on, the greater India benefits. The large scale military deployment on the border by the PLA incurs a significant cost as well.
From the military angle, I think it is quite reasonable to reason what China's strategy is. A sizable mobile force is stationed in central southern Tibet south of Lhasa near China's transportation infrastructure that can respond to and meet any Indian advance into Tibet. Meanwhile, Ladakh would be the staging ground for a ground assault, if the situation presents itself. This make sense because such a location would be further from India's own supply lines, on terrain more suitable for mechanized warfare, and be closer to PLA airbases in Xinjiang, and supply line to central China more safely protected / repairable on flatter ground. Of course, we all know where the real prize is if war comes to it.
Even if Bhutan were to relent and declare its diplomatic independence from India by establishing relations with China, I still don't see a conclusion to the stand off on the ground. The question remains as to what India will actually do if Bhutan were to establish diplomatic relations with China by signing a border treaty presumably favorably placing Doklam plateau within Chinese territory. Will India adhere to Bhutan's wishes, or will it do the opposite by trying to annex Bhutan.
Per the situation in Doklam, the commentary from China's news outlets now suggest that a definite resolution may only occur after the BRICS summit (although I don't see the supposed relevance of the BRICS meeeting). However, I do not believe China is going to perpetually kick the can down the road until winter arrives. The commentary from China has explicitly stated that the longer this standoff drags on, the greater India benefits. The large scale military deployment on the border by the PLA incurs a significant cost as well.
From the military angle, I think it is quite reasonable to reason what China's strategy is. A sizable mobile force is stationed in central southern Tibet south of Lhasa near China's transportation infrastructure that can respond to and meet any Indian advance into Tibet. Meanwhile, Ladakh would be the staging ground for a ground assault, if the situation presents itself. This make sense because such a location would be further from India's own supply lines, on terrain more suitable for mechanized warfare, and be closer to PLA airbases in Xinjiang, and supply line to central China more safely protected / repairable on flatter ground. Of course, we all know where the real prize is if war comes to it.
Jura The idiot
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