How many fighters does China have?

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
They do have a top gun like exercise Do visit CDF and you see all kind of photo and article on PLAAf training I am not going to waste my time researching it Do it yourself

I don't know waht article are you talking about Let me guess blog, half baked article written by author who doesn't speak or read Chinese and always regurgitating the old cliche and condescending attitude of arm chair general.

Somehow denial will become reality. For many of us who has been following the PLAAF from reputable sources know better.
Read RAND study
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RAND researchers note that although China's air forces have traditionally emphasized defensive operations, that is no longer the case, and will pose an aggressive opponent in the event of a conflict. These attacks, moreover, will be carried out not by China's air force operating in isolation but in coordination with conventional ballistic and cruise missiles.

As a result, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, U.S. air forces would not be able to regard their western Pacific bases as sanctuaries safe from enemy attack in a conflict.

Other key findings:
•If the United States intervenes in a conflict between mainland China and Taiwan, it should expect attacks on its forces and facilities in the western Pacific, including those in Japan.
•U.S. forces should expect their information systems to be subjected to network intrusions or denial-of-service attacks.
•During a conflict with China, the U.S. armed forces should prepare to deal with electronic jamming on a scale larger than it has seen in any conflict since the end of the Cold War.

PLAAF training and academy You have to be member and don't spout BS you get banned
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Vini_Vidi_Vici

Junior Member
Please stop being ridiculous. Please prove to me you are personally privy to the training practices of the PLAAF and PLANAF before you make any more ridiculous statements which YOU cannot back up. It is the providence of the ignorant to assume that because they never personally experienced or saw something, that that thing does not or could not possibly happen. I make no claim about a Chinese Top Gun, but YOU are the one making a claim that Chinese pilots do not train to dogfight. Therefore it is up to you to "find claims to back it up". So go ahead. Back up it. Or stop BSing like we already know you are. Either works for me TBH.

Remember the exercise in Turkey? The only time in recent history that the PLAAF exercised in a dogfight with foreign air-force. They lost!
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
Nothing but bunk there is no confrontation exercise It is friendly exchange There is no turkish official announcement other than rumor spread in the internet
 

Hendrik_2000

Lieutenant General
Don't ever dream of quick victory because China is not Iraq. US has to overcome the Tyranny of distance and remember the adage Amateur talk about weapon and strategy but professional talk about logistic Read the RAND report/
This study was done in 2007 today China is ten fold stronger than in 2007.
With limited and unprotected bases coupled with short legged fighter Those bases are vulnerable to first strike . Plus Chinese bases are spread out numbering in hundreds and most of them are protected

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China could potentially defeat the United States in a future military conflict over Taiwan by using strategies designed to limit U.S. military access to the area, according to a report issued today by the RAND Corporation.

The report examines scenarios in which China might employ what are known as “antiaccess” strategies – actions that would impede the deployment of U.S. forces into a combat zone, limit the locations from which American forces could operate, or compel the U.S. military to conduct operations farther from the conflict than it would prefer.

RAND researchers have identified a number of measures that U.S. forces can take in order to neutralize possible antiaccess strategies. These include: deploying air and missile defense systems near critical facilities; moving vulnerable ships out of port at the first sign of conflict; and reducing vulnerabilities in communications and computer systems.

Since China could also use political and diplomatic strategies aimed at jeopardizing access to forward bases in places such as Japan, researchers also recommend that U.S. strategists strengthen both the alliance relationships with such countries and their military and technological capabilities.

“The most likely conflict between the United States and China would be over Taiwan,” said lead study author Roger Cliff. “Although the United States currently has an overwhelming conventional military advantage, China could accomplish the objective of forcing Taiwan to surrender by employing an antiaccess strategy of preventing enough U.S. forces from getting to the region in time.”

Cliff and his fellow researchers noted that, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. strategists have become increasingly concerned that an adversary might adopt and attempt to employ strategies designed to interfere with the U.S. military's ability to deploy or operate in overseas conflicts.

Potential foreign adversaries like China are likely to use such strategies because it is improbable they could defeat the United States in a traditional military combat, the study says. Additionally, the absence of a single dominant adversary means the United States will have relatively few forward-deployed forces in the vicinity of a conflict before it erupts.

The study says potential Chinese antiaccess strategies include:
•Pressuring American allies such as Japan to limit or deny the United States the use of bases on their territory in a conflict.
•Striking or jamming information and computer systems to delay the deployment of U.S. military forces or to deny the United States access to information about enemy locations.
•Disrupting U.S. logistics systems to prevent the timely delivery of supplies and delay the arrival of critical reinforcements.
•Attacking air bases and ports to prevent or disrupt an influx of forces and supplies.
•Attacking naval assets such as aircraft carriers to limit the U.S. ability to launch aircraft from the sea.

“The net result of these strategies is that China could actually defeat the United States in a conflict — not in the traditional sense of destroying the U.S. military, but in the sense of China accomplishing its military and political objectives while preventing America from achieving some or all of its objectives,” Cliff said.

“The Chinese People's Liberation Army is well aware of its own shortcomings and the United States' military superiority,” Cliff said. “Instead of engaging U.S. forces head-on, they would attempt to take advantage of what they perceive to be American weaknesses – including the need to deploy and operate forces thousands of miles from home.”

Researchers for RAND, a nonprofit research organization, examined Chinese military publications to determine what types of antiaccess strategies Chinese military analysts are considering employing. Most previous antiaccess studies relied on “mirror imaging” techniques, in which American analysts simply imagine what they would do if they were in China's position.

---------- Post added at 04:57 PM ---------- Previous post was at 04:55 PM ----------

Don't ever dream of quick victory because China is not Iraq. US has to overcome the Tyranny of distance and remember the adage Amateur talk about weapon and strategy but professional talk about logistic Read the RAND report
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China could potentially defeat the United States in a future military conflict over Taiwan by using strategies designed to limit U.S. military access to the area, according to a report issued today by the RAND Corporation.

The report examines scenarios in which China might employ what are known as “antiaccess” strategies – actions that would impede the deployment of U.S. forces into a combat zone, limit the locations from which American forces could operate, or compel the U.S. military to conduct operations farther from the conflict than it would prefer.

RAND researchers have identified a number of measures that U.S. forces can take in order to neutralize possible antiaccess strategies. These include: deploying air and missile defense systems near critical facilities; moving vulnerable ships out of port at the first sign of conflict; and reducing vulnerabilities in communications and computer systems.

Since China could also use political and diplomatic strategies aimed at jeopardizing access to forward bases in places such as Japan, researchers also recommend that U.S. strategists strengthen both the alliance relationships with such countries and their military and technological capabilities.

“The most likely conflict between the United States and China would be over Taiwan,” said lead study author Roger Cliff. “Although the United States currently has an overwhelming conventional military advantage, China could accomplish the objective of forcing Taiwan to surrender by employing an antiaccess strategy of preventing enough U.S. forces from getting to the region in time.”

Cliff and his fellow researchers noted that, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. strategists have become increasingly concerned that an adversary might adopt and attempt to employ strategies designed to interfere with the U.S. military's ability to deploy or operate in overseas conflicts.

Potential foreign adversaries like China are likely to use such strategies because it is improbable they could defeat the United States in a traditional military combat, the study says. Additionally, the absence of a single dominant adversary means the United States will have relatively few forward-deployed forces in the vicinity of a conflict before it erupts.

The study says potential Chinese antiaccess strategies include:
•Pressuring American allies such as Japan to limit or deny the United States the use of bases on their territory in a conflict.
•Striking or jamming information and computer systems to delay the deployment of U.S. military forces or to deny the United States access to information about enemy locations.
•Disrupting U.S. logistics systems to prevent the timely delivery of supplies and delay the arrival of critical reinforcements.
•Attacking air bases and ports to prevent or disrupt an influx of forces and supplies.
•Attacking naval assets such as aircraft carriers to limit the U.S. ability to launch aircraft from the sea.

“The net result of these strategies is that China could actually defeat the United States in a conflict — not in the traditional sense of destroying the U.S. military, but in the sense of China accomplishing its military and political objectives while preventing America from achieving some or all of its objectives,” Cliff said.

“The Chinese People's Liberation Army is well aware of its own shortcomings and the United States' military superiority,” Cliff said. “Instead of engaging U.S. forces head-on, they would attempt to take advantage of what they perceive to be American weaknesses – including the need to deploy and operate forces thousands of miles from home.”

Researchers for RAND, a nonprofit research organization, examined Chinese military publications to determine what types of antiaccess strategies Chinese military analysts are considering employing. Most previous antiaccess studies relied on “mirror imaging” techniques, in which American analysts simply imagine what they would do if they were in China's position.
 
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hmmwv

Junior Member
China's problem is not lack of fighters, but lack of pilot quality. There's a lot of evidences indicating Chinese pilot's annual flight hours are still a lot less than NATO counterpart, although it is improving. Another common problem is that China's doctrine of "keeping everything safe". I noticed there aren't that many real combat simulations, especially lacking dangerous maneuvers and dogfights. Somehow the PLAAF fighter jet exercises gave me impressions of bombers and airlines, just fly around between military airfields. All they seem to do is take off and land, nothing exciting in between.

That may be true in the 1990s, but it's no longer the case after the modernization drive of the 2000s. From what I know, note I cannot back this claim up with hard evidence, PLAAF's front line regiment pilots get around 100-150 flight hours a year, still far less than USAF's 200 hour level but whole lot better than the early 90s. They focused on pilot training so much that in the early 2000s when there weren't enough Flankers to go around several pilots will share plane and take turns to fly them, that's why the first few batches of Su27SKs are already retired after air frame hours have been exhausted. Also started in the 2000s are realistic "confrontational training" in front line regiments, meaning the regiment will split into red and blue forces (many occasions the regiment commander flying as the aggressor) and play it out in the sky. On CDF there is a HUD recording of a recent dogfight recorded during such training. Outside the local unit each MR holds regular exercises between regiments under its command, and MR will send their team to compete in nation wide PLAAF exercises. Units equipped with J10As are known to have scored better in those combat exercises, the recent upset was when a J11A unit beat a J11B unit. Inter services exercises are not frequent but exist, such as between PLAAF and PLAN-AF units. The other way to look at things is that although PLAAF is flying a lot more than before, accident rate and pilot loss are actually down, which in some way indicates pilots are more experienced now so they handle emergencies better.
 

Franklin

Captain
China's problem is not lack of fighters, but lack of pilot quality. There's a lot of evidences indicating Chinese pilot's annual flight hours are still a lot less than NATO counterpart, although it is improving. Another common problem is that China's doctrine of "keeping everything safe". I noticed there aren't that many real combat simulations, especially lacking dangerous maneuvers and dogfights. Somehow the PLAAF fighter jet exercises gave me impressions of bombers and airlines, just fly around between military airfields. All they seem to do is take off and land, nothing exciting in between.

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Lion

Senior Member
Remember the exercise in Turkey? The only time in recent history that the PLAAF exercised in a dogfight with foreign air-force. They lost!

The Chinese send one of their most lousy fighter (Su-27SK) to participate the exercise. Turkey countepart don't even get the chance to see real Chinese ammunition like PL-8 or PL-12 BVRAAM which Chinese Su-27SK can't equipped.

The Chinese paricipate in this exercise is more of diplomatic friendship rather than emphasizing on the result of the exercise.

PLAAF had step up large amount of dangerous exercise like mass night joint attack conducted by JH-7A bomber. Just this year alone, already reported 2 such exercise. In the past, this kind of exercise seldom conducted. You can conclude PLAAF has step up their exercises and training..
 

franco-russe

Senior Member
I will start this post with an assumption: This new mystery plane will go into service with plaaf and planaf and will become a part of four tier system within plaaf. Heavy twin engined fighter (j20), medium twin fighter (this new plane) and j10b will be the cheap, non VLO platform for lower intensity situations. Alongside that, jh7 and its direct successor will round up the quartet.

That is a wild assumption, i know. But that's besides the point. This is what interests me:
Since so far we have seen jh7a being produced in xian, 190 airframes from 2002 to 2011. That averages out to 19 planes per year.
J11b has been produced by shengyang, so far some 140 airframes from 2006 to 2011. that averages out to 23 planes per year.
j10 has been produced by chengdu, some 210 airframes from 2003 to 2011. That is some 26 planes per year.

If we further assume that chengdu will go on producing j10b at similar pace, starting in 2013; add to that a conservative prediction of 12-16 j20s per year from 2018 onwards; assume that shenyang will be able to produce 23 newmystery plane airframes from 2020 and that xian will produce 19 next gen jh7 replacements per year, starting 2025, this is what plaaf/planaf composition may look like:

2020:
210 j10b
210 j10a
390 jh7/a
160 j11b
160 j16/j15 (probably 42-48 j15, 112-118 j16)
40 j20
plus the remaining older models, roughly:
150 j8 h/f
100 j11a
100 su30mkk
250 j7 e/g

total: 1770

It seems possible that chengdu would use some of its production capacity previously used for j10b to increase production of j20. Say 20 j20s and 16 j10bs per year. Also, jh7a replacement may be in production since 2025.

In 2030:
210 j10a
370 j10b
240 j20
410 jh7a
100 nextgen strike planes
160 j11b
190 j15/j16 (75-80 j15)
200 new mystery planes/carrier variants

total: 1880

New single engined plane may be in service from 2031., replacing j10b production, reverting back to 12-16 j20s, rest single engined planes.

In 2040:
370 j10b
200 nextgen single engined fighter
380 j20
210 jh7a
290 next gen strike planes
190 j15/j16
430 mystery planes/carrier variants

total: 2070


Of course, it is a little weird that in time when everyone cuts the number of their forces china would increase the number of its fighters. Thus it is very possible that by 2040. overall number will actually be closer to 1500 planes, meaning the production rates of all these new planes will be closer to 12 j20, 20 mystery planes, 24 j10b/single engined planes, 16 next gen strike planes etc.

Yeah, all this doesnt make much sense, other than to illustrate realistic production rates and total numbers in future fleets as a result of those production rates. :)

This seems quite reasonable to me, though I would not want to make prognoses going 30 years into the future.

What supports your basic assertion, that PLAAF will continue to grow in numbers, is the 2011-12 reorganisation that disbanded the MR Training Bases and dispersed their assets to operational brigades and regiments, adding about ten regiments to the operational order of battle. They obviously do not plan to go on flying J-7B in all eternity, so they must be expecting a lot of new planes to enter the inventory up to say 2020.

Not to quibble, PLAAF acquired five JH-7 regiments and PLANAF four regiments between 2003 and 2012, a total of 216 or an annual average of close to 22.
 
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