Future PLAN naval and carrier operations

Jura said:

Andy I'm curious if you still uphold your prediction from two years ago of like one-hundred Chinese destroyers in service?

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Yes

3 aegis destroyers per year with a 35 year lifespan means 100 in a steady state fleet. The key drivers are:

A. That is simply parity with the US navy in terms of construction rate and overall fleet size.

B. Offensive missiles are better off carried and launched from destroyers rather than by aircraft from carriers.

C. China can afford such a fleet from a financial perspective. Also, the shipyards recently cranked up to 6 destroyers per year. Heck, the Chinese navy and economy likely could sustain 6 per year indefinitely. That would imply a fleet of 200 destroyers in total.

So 100 Chinese destroyers does not seem like a stretch

AndrewS said:

Yes

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thanks for answering

AndrewS said:

3 aegis destroyers per year with a 35 year lifespan means 100 in a steady state fleet. The key drivers are:

A. That is simply parity with the US navy in terms of construction rate and overall fleet size.

B. Offensive missiles are better off carried and launched from destroyers rather than by aircraft from carriers.

C. China can afford such a fleet from a financial perspective. Also, the shipyards recently cranked up to 6 destroyers per year. Heck, the Chinese navy and economy likely could sustain 6 per year indefinitely. That would imply a fleet of 200 destroyers in total.

So 100 Chinese destroyers does not seem like a stretch

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I'll leave it to others to possibly comment, just checked it (= 100 destroyers) would more or less match the USN projected numbers:



source is and "LSCs" (the 3rd column) numbers are sums of cruisers and destroyers

all I add is it's going to be interesting to follow what the actual numbers are, for both the PLAN and the USN

Jura said:

thanks for answering


I'll leave it to others to possibly comment, just checked it (= 100 destroyers) would more or less match the USN projected numbers:


source is

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and "LSCs" (the 3rd column) numbers are sums of cruisers and destroyers

all I add is it's going to be interesting to follow what the actual numbers are, for both the PLAN and the USN

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Yes, it will be interesting to see what happens.
But remember that a few years ago, the midshipmen at Annapolis had to listen to a graduation speech which said that by the time they were admirals, the US Navy would no longer rule the waves.

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I reckon a low-end estimate is for a fleet of 100 Chinese AEGIS destroyers.
:Based on parity with the US Navy and China's previous construction rate of 3 per year, along with a modest level of Chinese military spending (2% of GDP)

Whilst the high-end estimate could be 200 Chinese AEGIS destroyers.
:Based on (US Navy x2) and the current Chinese construction rate of 6 per year. But that is dependent on US-China relations getting much worse, China's GDP growing from 30% larger today to 80% larger, and China deciding to match the US in terms of % of GDP spent on the military.

Bltizo said:

[Just saw this part that wasn't quoted in my original reply for some reason]

If you do believe the PLAN has the money and requisite technology for 100k ton nuclear carriers, then I would be interested as to why you believe a smaller 80k ton conventional carrier would be their final design that they settle on instead.

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I thought I was making myself very obvious. Because it's potentially too many eggs in one basket, or rather too much money in one platform. Losing an 80kt carrier represents less money lost if it gets sunk Also, if the PLAN can have 4 conventional 80kt carriers for the price of 2 nuclear 100kt carriers (or whatever), and these 4 carriers achieve the objectives that the PLAN desires, they may very well go for the 4 rather than the 2. This is exactly the impetus that is having the USN mulling over searching for alternatives to the 100kt Ford carrier.

Iron Man said:

I thought I was making myself very obvious. Because it's potentially too many eggs in one basket, or rather too much money in one platform. Losing an 80kt carrier represents less money lost if it gets sunk Also, if the PLAN can have 4 conventional 80kt carriers for the price of 2 nuclear 100kt carriers (or whatever), and these 4 carriers achieve the objectives that the PLAN desires, they may very well go for the 4 rather than the 2. This is exactly the impetus that is having the USN mulling over searching for alternatives to the 100kt Ford carrier.

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Right, that's what I thought it probably was, but the part of my post #8 that you quoted me from and the part which you didn't quote (below) confused me as to whether it was primarily related to monetary costs or not.

IMO the primary benefits of having a smaller, conventionally powered carrier of say about 80,000 tons vs a larger, nuclear powered carrier of say about 100,000 tons can be boiled down to:
- lower procurement cost
- possibly lower lifetime operating cost
- lower technological R&D cost
- less technological R&D risk

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I certainly agree that the decision between a conventionally powered smaller carrier vs a nuclear powered nuclear carrier would depend as to what the monetary costs are, of course in turn balancing that with capabilities.

@Bltizo Based in your emphasis, I will focus on the following statement

"Essentially, the future PLAN CSG will be a mobile "fire, maneuver and recon" complex that will provide support and information for the rest of the PLA's sensor kill chain, to enable the use of "long range artillery" (AShBM/HGV and long range bombers with HGVs) to destroy the enemy in support of the PLAN CSG's own combat against the opfor CSG."

What is your basis to assume that the PLAN will risk moving its CSG into the second island and not be destroyed by similar means from US actions? In the first place, I don't even understand the strategic rationale and objective for moving into the second island chain.

Brumby said:

@Bltizo Based in your emphasis, I will focus on the following statement

"Essentially, the future PLAN CSG will be a mobile "fire, maneuver and recon" complex that will provide support and information for the rest of the PLA's sensor kill chain, to enable the use of "long range artillery" (AShBM/HGV and long range bombers with HGVs) to destroy the enemy in support of the PLAN CSG's own combat against the opfor CSG."

What is your basis to assume that the PLAN will risk moving its CSG into the second island and not be destroyed by similar means from US actions? In the first place, I don't even understand the strategic rationale and objective for moving into the second island chain.

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Because not moving into the second island chain would enable the US to station CSGs there and conduct gradual bombardment against Chinese forces within the first island chain and the Chinese mainland in a manner whereby China lacks strategic initiative and more importantly deny China the ability to reliably "shoot the archer" (in this case being US CSGs as well as Guam).


As for the "risk" of moving into the second island chain, I wrote in post #40:

As I wrote multiple times, such a battle would be fought around the second island chain, meaning there would be various other assumptions made about other preceding operations to enable this to happen, namely that the PLA would have secured air and sea control in and around its immediate periphery in the first island chain and greatly degraded the first island chain's ability to operate as an "A2AD chain" whether it's via a combination of geopoliticking or selective use of military force or both.

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Bltizo said:

Because not moving into the second island chain would enable the US to station CSGs there and conduct gradual bombardment against Chinese forces within the first island chain and the Chinese mainland in a manner whereby China lacks strategic initiative and more importantly deny China the ability to reliably "shoot the archer" (in this case being US CSGs as well as Guam).


As for the "risk" of moving into the second island chain, I wrote in post #40:

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What makes you think the Chinese CBG will survive inside the second island chain to fulfill its sea and air control objective?

Brumby said:

What makes you think the Chinese CBG will survive inside the second island chain to fulfill its sea and air control objective?

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The same reasons you think US assets will survive to do the same.

Brumby said:

What makes you think the Chinese CBG will survive inside the second island chain to fulfill its sea and air control objective?

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In the same way that any military conops may or may not survive to achieve the objectives it was designed to achieve.

I think I've been giving you some pretty forthcoming answers to your questions prior to this, but your last few posts basically amount to "what if they lose" and I'm not sure what kind of answer you can expect from asking that.