Future PLAN naval and carrier operations

I think US CSGs can be expected to pass Guam in the Second Island Chain.

Guam is a large fixed airbase which is some 3000km from mainland China
That is beyond the range of the vast majority of weapons and aircraft launched from mainland China.
Plus Guam can be resupplied and repaired, so it should be able to conduct air operations, despite Chinese suppression efforts

But US CSGs venturing to the 1500km midpoint between mainland China and Guam would be at great risk.
At that distance mainland China airbases should be able to maintain an air superiority CAP against anything Guam + US carriers can launch

As for a small Chinese CSG force, I think they can definitely be expected to operate at 1200km from mainland China, because they will be safely under the umbrella of long-range CAP from mainland airbases.
But Chinese CSGs will also generate their own CAP and ISR patrols which can reach another 1800km all the way to Guam.

That will extend the distance that US carriers have to operate from, and push US carriers almost all the way back to Guam itself.

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If there is only say 2 Chinese carriers available, this probably isn't enough power to reduce Guam plus the US carriers nearby.
That would limit Chinese CSGs to occasional raids against Guam and hunting for US CSGs.

But looking forward to 2040 like CSBA does, I reckon there will be a minimum of 6 carriers + 80 AEGIS destroyers in the Chinese Navy.
Such a force could credibly defeat Guam plus the supporting US CSGs, and then operate past the Second Island Chain.
With maritime superiority, I guess the next objective would be to operate in the open ocean and blockade the sea/air traffic to Japan.



NB.
But such a small Chinese Navy is premised on China seeing a benign security environment and deciding to stick with the current modest levels of military spending.

A China that actually felt really threatened would likely double military spending from 2% to near 4% of GDP literally overnight.
But 4% is simply what Russia and the USA routinely spent over the past 2 decades.

AndrewS said:

But looking forward to 2040 like CSBA does, I reckon there will be a minimum of 6 carriers + 80 AEGIS destroyers in the Chinese Navy.
Such a force could credibly defeat Guam plus the supporting US CSGs, and then operate past the Second Island Chain.
With maritime superiority, I guess the next objective would be to operate in the open ocean and blockade the sea/air traffic to Japan.

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I think you are forgetting that 6 carriers means only 1 or sometimes 2 will be immediately available at any one time (whereas 11 carriers means about 3 will be immediately available at any one time), and "80" Aegis-type destroyers means only 20-30 will be available at one time.

Iron Man said:

I think you are forgetting that 6 carriers means only 1 or sometimes 2 will be immediately available at any one time (whereas 11 carriers means about 3 will be immediately available at any one time), and "80" Aegis-type destroyers means only 20-30 will be available at one time.

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You're talking about leisurely peacetime deployments, with a global operating profile.

That simply will not happen, as the Chinese navy will still mainly be focused on the Western Pacific rather than distant seas.

In a 2040 Western Pacific scenario with a low-estimate Chinese Navy, there would probably be:

a) 1-2 carriers on active deployment with another 3+ ready to surge at short notice.
b) Say 25 destroyers on active deployment with another 40+ ready to surge at very short notice.

So I imagine the Chinese Navy could permanently operate a CSG comprised of the following off the coast of Guam
a) 2x carriers
b) Say 10x Type-52D Destroyers
c) Say 10x Type-55 Destroyers/Cruisers

That's a total of 1760 VLS cells, and I imagine at least 800 would be loaded with land-attack or anti-ship cruise missiles, which could all be launched within 2minutes.

Then there would be another similar CSG resulting from a surge, which would arrive within 7days.

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Again, remember this is my low-end estimate for the Chinese Navy.
The higher-end estimate is about double the size.

Bltizo said:

This is simply semantics now.

Sure -- whether it "will" or "can" is an assumption just like whether it "won't" or "cannot" are also assumptions.

Just like how any statement or argument is predicated on assumptions in general.

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At least we can finally agree it is an assumption.

Bltizo said:

I don't know how much more I can explain my "underlying basis" than I already have.

The above really makes me agree with weig2000's post previously, that the fact you ask for a further "underlying basis" of my so-called "assumption" suggests that you believe the very idea of a future Chinese CSG having the ability to "operate up to the second island chain and beyond with even a fighting chance" (quoting weig2000) is such a difficult to comprehend prospect that it requires explanation or justification.

If that is the case then I don't think I can provide to you an explanation of the "underlying basis" because it can only mean we have fundamentally different views of what the balance of overall military power is like such that there would be a major divergence in opinion over something like a future PLAN of the medium to long term future being able to wage a conflict in the 2nd island chain or beyond to seek and contest air and sea control.

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I did not ask for a "further underlying basis" simply because there was no underlying basis that you shared to begin with. Whatever that is with weigh2000 and you is strictly between the two of you. Please don't drag me into that,

Fundamentally the difference is I view positions grounded on a cocktail of assumptions, conjectures, and inferences as highly questionable.

I view questionable the following ;
1)That Chinese carrier development and production will continue successfully when 003 is still early days. In other words there is no proven product to speak of. It is an assumption that there will be sufficient numbers built by 2035-40 to prevail against USN current inventory of 11. This is notwithstanding the long history of USN experience and practices operating with multi carriers. This is not even counting the "Lightning" carriers of 10.
2)That Chinese carrier aviation will prevail against F-35Cs that will dominate the USN carrier wing by that period considering that no known development and associated capabilities of what PLAN can deliver by that period. It is both a quality and quantity consideration that is not favorable to the Chinese side
3)That Chinese carrier aviation will develop to the extend that it can prevail against a much larger pool of experience USN carrier aviators considering the problem it is facing with lack of J-15 numbers and no naval trainer.as a starting base
4)The Chinese carriers will prevail against Guam and the logistics footprint that arise by operating far from base.

and yet the underlying assumption is simply somehow the Chinese CSG will achieve sea and air control regardless :

AndrewS said:

You're talking about leisurely peacetime deployments, with a global operating profile.

That simply will not happen, as the Chinese navy will still mainly be focused on the Western Pacific rather than distant seas.

In a 2040 Western Pacific scenario with a low-estimate Chinese Navy, there would probably be:

a) 1-2 carriers on active deployment with another 3+ ready to surge at short notice.
b) Say 25 destroyers on active deployment with another 40+ ready to surge at very short notice.

So I imagine the Chinese Navy could permanently operate a CSG comprised of the following off the coast of Guam
a) 2x carriers
b) Say 10x Type-52D Destroyers
c) Say 10x Type-55 Destroyers/Cruisers

That's a total of 1760 VLS cells, and I imagine at least 800 would be loaded with land-attack or anti-ship cruise missiles, which could all be launched within 2minutes.

Then there would be another similar CSG resulting from a surge, which would arrive within 7days.

---
Again, remember this is my low-end estimate for the Chinese Navy.
The higher-end estimate is about double the size.

Click to expand...

Uhh, no. If you are talking about the USN, there are no "leisurely peacetime deployments". Speaking of surging, I'm sure how much you understand of the concept or where you pulled the number "7days" out of, but surging requires a fair bit of time. You can't just call up a naval base and tell them to send over that carrier within the week. As far as the USN goes, surging a carrier requires up to a MONTH advance notice, which I suspect is not what you had in mind when you said " very short notice". Surging the next carrier after that requires up to 3 months notice.

Here's a quote from RAND:
"In a given cycle, a ship may be deployed, in maintenance, or not deployed but able to provide additional forward presence as requested by theater commanders (i.e., able to “surge”). An aircraft carrier's surge readiness depends on the carrier and crew's level of training. When training for deployment is complete, the carrier can be surged within 30 days. Aircraft carriers undergoing basic training immediately after a maintenance period are at a lower readiness level and normally can be surged in 90 days."

In other words, a carrier is either deployed, in maintenance, in training, or in readiness, with readiness (training complete) meaning "can surge within 30 days", and training meaning "can surge within 90 days". The current 32-month operating cycle of a USN carrier consists of approximately 20% deployed, 40% readiness, 15% training, and 25% maintenance, though in real life the actual numbers can vary somewhat. In addition at least one carrier will always be in drydock undergoing MLU and not part of the operating cycle at all. So for a force of 6 carriers, something like 1 and sometimes 2 carriers will be actively deployed, 2 or sometimes 1 carrier will be surgeable within 30 days, 1 will be in training (surgeable within 90 days), 1 will be in maintenance (not surgeable), and 1 will be in drydock (not surgeable).

Brumby said:

At least we can finally agree it is an assumption.

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Only in so much as that assumptions underlie everything we speak of.

I did not ask for a "further underlying basis" simply because there was no underlying basis that you shared to begin with. Whatever that is with weigh2000 and you is strictly between the two of you. Please don't drag me into that,

Fundamentally the difference is I view positions grounded on a cocktail of assumptions, conjectures, and inferences as highly questionable.

I view questionable the following ;
1)That Chinese carrier development and production will continue successfully when 003 is still early days. In other words there is no proven product to speak of. It is an assumption that there will be sufficient numbers built by 2035-40 to prevail against USN current inventory of 11. This is notwithstanding the long history of USN experience and practices operating with multi carriers. This is not even counting the "Lightning" carriers of 10.
2)That Chinese carrier aviation will prevail against F-35Cs that will dominate the USN carrier wing by that period considering that no known development and associated capabilities of what PLAN can deliver by that period. It is both a quality and quantity consideration that is not favorable to the Chinese side
3)That Chinese carrier aviation will develop to the extend that it can prevail against a much larger pool of experience USN carrier aviators considering the problem it is facing with lack of J-15 numbers and no naval trainer.as a starting base
4)The Chinese carriers will prevail against Guam and the logistics footprint that arise by operating far from base.

and yet the underlying assumption is simply somehow the Chinese CSG will achieve sea and air control regardless :

Click to expand...

If you take those four points and replace the use of the word "will" with the word "can," then that would be consistent with my beliefs which "underlie" my conops, yes.
I didn't think explanation to such a degree would be necessary because it would have been reasonable to interpret such information without my clarification.

Given my conops is talking about a force that would be existing by the mid 2030s to 2040 I think that is a fair timeline.

Edit: I'll go into a bit more detail on I am back at a computer but yes I do have answers for each of your points.

Brumby said:

At ...

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Brumby you seem not to understand what Bitzo has been describing which I think is something like the USN Plan Orange in the interwar period that, in several simple words, was a strategy how to counter Japanese moves in the Pacific, first of all against then-US Philippines, by seeking a decisive battle fought by battleships arriving from Pearl, and planning accordingly (emphasis on battleship squadrons), decades in advance; well it was proposed by a gentleman named Rogers (clearly influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahan) at the time when there were no aircraft carriers

LOL! in the meantime noticed Trump fired Bolton, so I'll be brief:

did Japanese attack? yes
did the USN proceed with the Orange? obviously not, as Pearl had been preempted
I mean only God knows the future, but a navy has to have its doctrine

hope it helps the discussion here

Jura said:

Brumby you seem not to understand what Bitzo has been describing which I think is something like the USN Plan Orange in the interwar period that, in several simple words, was a strategy how to counter Japanese moves in the Pacific, first of all against then-US Philippines, by seeking a decisive battle fought by battleships arriving from Pearl, and planning accordingly (emphasis on battleship squadrons), decades in advance; well it was proposed by a gentleman named Rogers (clearly influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahan) at the time when there were no aircraft carriers

LOL! in the meantime noticed Trump fired Bolton, so I'll be brief:

did Japanese attack? yes
did the USN proceed with the Orange? obviously not, as Pearl had been preempted
I mean only God knows the future, but a navy has to have its doctrine

hope it helps the discussion here

Click to expand...

By all accounts, the US did proceed with War Plan Orange in terms of overall strategy.
Although carriers and submarines played a much more important role than was previously wargamed.

Iron Man said:

Uhh, no. If you are talking about the USN, there are no "leisurely peacetime deployments". Speaking of surging, I'm sure how much you understand of the concept or where you pulled the number "7days" out of, but surging requires a fair bit of time. You can't just call up a naval base and tell them to send over that carrier within the week. As far as the USN goes, surging a carrier requires up to a MONTH advance notice, which I suspect is not what you had in mind when you said " very short notice". Surging the next carrier after that requires up to 3 months notice.

Here's a quote from RAND:
"In a given cycle, a ship may be deployed, in maintenance, or not deployed but able to provide additional forward presence as requested by theater commanders (i.e., able to “surge”). An aircraft carrier's surge readiness depends on the carrier and crew's level of training. When training for deployment is complete, the carrier can be surged within 30 days. Aircraft carriers undergoing basic training immediately after a maintenance period are at a lower readiness level and normally can be surged in 90 days."

In other words, a carrier is either deployed, in maintenance, in training, or in readiness, with readiness (training complete) meaning "can surge within 30 days", and training meaning "can surge within 90 days". The current 32-month operating cycle of a USN carrier consists of approximately 20% deployed, 40% readiness, 15% training, and 25% maintenance, though in real life the actual numbers can vary somewhat. In addition at least one carrier will always be in drydock undergoing MLU and not part of the operating cycle at all. So for a force of 6 carriers, something like 1 and sometimes 2 carriers will be actively deployed, 2 or sometimes 1 carrier will be surgeable within 30 days, 1 will be in training (surgeable within 90 days), 1 will be in maintenance (not surgeable), and 1 will be in drydock (not surgeable).

Click to expand...

I have a hypothetical question if China could achieve higher readiness by "saving" their carriers simply by not using them in prolonged missions (like the USN constantly bombing Iraq and 'stan for more than a decade) and resulting deferred maintenance?

OK numbers: out of hypothetical six modern carriers (of course not the Soviet Navy Riga LOL and her follow up) two always ready to deploy

Brumby said:

I view questionable the following ;
1)That Chinese carrier development and production will continue successfully when 003 is still early days. In other words there is no proven product to speak of. It is an assumption that there will be sufficient numbers built by 2035-40 to prevail against USN current inventory of 11. This is notwithstanding the long history of USN experience and practices operating with multi carriers. This is not even counting the "Lightning" carriers of 10.
2)That Chinese carrier aviation will prevail against F-35Cs that will dominate the USN carrier wing by that period considering that no known development and associated capabilities of what PLAN can deliver by that period. It is both a quality and quantity consideration that is not favorable to the Chinese side
3)That Chinese carrier aviation will develop to the extend that it can prevail against a much larger pool of experience USN carrier aviators considering the problem it is facing with lack of J-15 numbers and no naval trainer.as a starting base
4)The Chinese carriers will prevail against Guam and the logistics footprint that arise by operating far from base.

and yet the underlying assumption is simply somehow the Chinese CSG will achieve sea and air control regardless :

Click to expand...

1: considering my conops timespan is for 2035-2040 coming into fruition, yes, the underlying "assumption" is that Chinese carrier development and production will continue successfully going forwards. I believe that to be a reasonable "assumption". I project China to build a number of carriers (6-8) and have a deployment pattern that prioritizes keeping them at home at readiness with the capability to surge as many of them as possible in event in a high intensity conflict in the western pacific. The US would of course still have a force of more carriers than China, however I expect the US to continue their global peacetime deployments. That is to say, in event of a high intensity conflict in the western pacific, the overall cumulative carriers that each side would be capable of bringing to the theater would be about even.

2: again, considering this is by 2035-2040 I do not think the belief of qualitative carrier aviation near parity is an unreasonable one

3: see 2 above, but for carrier aviation competency.

4: my conops before spoke primarily of using it to seek air and sea control vs opfor carriers and it would be done so in a joint manner. Against guam, the operation would be similarly joint but likely rely much more heavily on long range strike systems because Guam is a fixed location that doesn't require the mobile fire-maneuver-recon complexes of a CSG to achieve a kill chain against an opfor CSG.


Reading these objections you have and which you describe as being "questionable" basically confirms the notion that I described in my previous post #61:
"we have fundamentally different views of what the balance of overall military power is like such that there would be a major divergence in opinion over something like a future PLAN of the medium to long term future being able to wage a conflict in the 2nd island chain or beyond to seek and contest air and sea control."