Future PLAN naval and carrier operations

Brumby said:

There is a lot said but they are predominantly statements of vision. Such statements need to be tested against operational reality and capabilities as to how it is expected to work out in terms of desired end effects. For example, you seemed to infer that a Chinese CSG with two carriers will be sufficient to dominate any adversary's CSG even out to the second island chain. I would like to understand how did you arrived at such a conclusion and what type of capabilities and sizing of airwing you were contemplating? .

Click to expand...

Of course; I think I made it fairly clear that what I described was my own personal vision and conops proposal.
It would for the long term, circa mid 2030s at the earliest.

No, I didn't suggest that a Chinese CSG would be able to dominate any adversary's CSG out to the second island chain -- what I wrote was that the mission of a future Chinese CSG would be to act as a fire-maneuver-recon complex to enable a robust regional ISR/sensor/kill chain for long range strike systems from land.
It would be the combination of the CSG and the land based long range strike system that would seek to create a favourable balance of forces to be capable of defeating opfor CSGs in the region.

I don't think you guys have any idea what tonnage sizing China is aiming for. The 100,000 tons is floated because the USN's carriers are of that tonnage. However in the case of the USN, such a tonnage evolved over time to where it is today. It is driven by a number of factors including the intention to generate at least 100 sorties a day on a sustainable basis. However this may change because of evolving capabilities and the threat dynamics. In the case of China, there are too many unknowns given the opaque nature of China's intention. That said, I believe China will go for nuclear powered carrier at some stage as China has global power projections intention and nuclear propulsion would be inevitable.

Click to expand...

None of us have are claiming to know the exact numerical tonnage of carrier that China may or may not be aiming for.
However we've had consistent rumours over the years that a nuclear powered carrier similar to USN super carriers was the long term ambition and continues to be active and progressing forwards.

Those rumours end up providing the benchmark (USN CVNs) that we use for discussions when we talk about future Chinese nuclear carriers. No one is claiming to know the exact displacement of notional future Chinese nuclear carriers, but I think for the purposes of discussion the USN CVN benchmark is perfectly appropriate.

Bltizo said:

Of course; I think I made it fairly clear that what I described was my own personal vision and conops proposal.
It would for the long term, circa mid 2030s at the earliest.

No, I didn't suggest that a Chinese CSG would be able to dominate any adversary's CSG out to the second island chain -- what I wrote was that the mission of a future Chinese CSG would be to act as a fire-maneuver-recon complex to enable a robust regional ISR/sensor/kill chain for long range strike systems from land.
It would be the combination of the CSG and the land based long range strike system that would seek to create a favourable balance of forces to be capable of defeating opfor CSGs in the region.

Click to expand...

I am afraid in a post INF world, China will have to deal with the same A2AD issues as the USN.

Bltizo said:

The rumours for WS-15 are what has kept us abreast of its development and progress over the years -- and that's exactly because the rumours for WS-15 have panned out because every couple of years we get indications and updates as to what its status is.


[Incidentally I also don't know what rumours suggested WS-15 would have emerged 5-7 years ago?? I don't think any rumours that were considered credible at the time suggested that.]




This basically comes down to the problem of being able to identify "more accurate" rumours vs "less accurate rumours".

There are many thousands of voices and blogs on the Chinese language blogs and forums, but only some of them are worth listening to -- the ones not worth listening to is "unsubstantiated cheap talk".
If you do not know which ones are worth listening to then you can simply defer to other people here who can identify the users who are worth listening to.



But from J-20 to carrier 003 and all the projects in between, the rumour cultivation method has repeatedly demonstrated its value in providing up to date dynamic information for a project, faster than other ways and giving us more reliable information as well.

The entire reason why Sinodefense Forum is so unique is because it provides an English language place for people to analyze and disseminate rumours to provide projections, faster than mainstream defense media and mainstream defense analysts who don't have access to rumours and don't have the ability to interpret rumours.

Few other English language forums does this, and it is one of SDF's only real claims to fame.
Consider showing more respect to the method for what makes SDF different to the other English language defense forums for PLA watching.

Click to expand...

I have great respect for SDF, what you must be referring to are the many anecdotal accounts of PLA activities, by those who are witnessing these activities...

Honestly the many outstanding pictures of Chinese military aircraft, naval vessels, and military equipment and development in general as well as the outstanding and honestly prescient observations are what make SDF great..

SDF has some outstanding posters who accurately and honestly give us their best. analysis of the real information at our disposal

Like Iron Man I believe those who deliberately and repeatedly post inaccurate and misleading information ought to be "called out"

My issue is with those who traffic in deliberately dishonest "rumors"

Air Force Brat said:

I have great respect for SDF, what you must be referring to are the many anecdotal accounts of PLA activities, by those who are witnessing these activities...

Honestly the many outstanding pictures of Chinese military aircraft, naval vessels, and military equipment and development in general as well as the outstanding and honestly prescient observations are what make SDF great..

SDF has some outstanding posters who accurately and honestly give us their best. analysis of the real information at our disposal

Like Iron Man I believe those who deliberately and repeatedly post inaccurate and misleading information ought to be "called out"

My issue is with those who traffic in deliberately dishonest "rumors"

Click to expand...

I'm not sure what individuals you're talking about who are deliberately posting inaccurate or misleading information, but on SDF the vast majority of the well received users who try to share and analyze rumours do so in good faith.


My point is that rumours most certainly are not just "unsubstantiated cheap talk".

Instead I would say that rumours are the only thing that this forum has making it unique and useful for PLA watching compared to other English language forums that aren't able to interpret and analyze rumours.

Brumby said:

I am afraid in a post INF world, China will have to deal with the same A2AD issues as the USN.

Click to expand...

Of course. But just as China's "A2AD" systems doesn't make the USN's carriers obsolete, neither do I believe US "A2AD" systems would make Chinese carriers obsolete.

Not to mention that the US will have to find useful places to host their missiles in the first place, with countries that agree to field them. On the Chinese side, it goes without saying that as part of the overall multi domain operations in the region that their job would be to track US missiles during peacetime and strike them and/or degrade the US ISR net once battle is joined.
That is perhaps the biggest difference between the US "A2AD" ambition and China's "A2AD" potential -- it is that China theoretically has the whole country to deploy, move and hide its missiles in, whereas the US at present in the western pacific only has Guam. The difference in ISR demands at those mutually long ranges from each other to track each side's missiles and the ease of striking them is rather different. If the US is able to convince many other countries in the region to host US long range missiles then that's a different matter however even then I suspect host nations won't let US missiles freely move around their entire territory but rather keep them relegated to a particular part of their nation or even a particular island (which would make tracking and targeting much easier).


So yes, in theory what we would see is a combination of each side's CSG+long range strike system vs the other side's CSG+long range strike system. However in practice, the geography that the US has to work with in terms of basing its long range strike systems in the region vs the geography that China has to work with to base its own long range strike systems are far from equal.

Bltizo said:

... the opposing carrier group.

Click to expand...

cool posts #8 and #16


I think if the USN CSG operated in the Philippine Sea

(like in charts you reposted in #5, presumably to attack continental China and/or act as a screen in case of a hypothetical Taiwan defense)

and Chinese "future CSG" (point #6 in #8)

was sent there for the purpose you described, the USN/USAF would throw everything at it

Bltizo said:

Of course. But just as China's "A2AD" systems doesn't make the USN's carriers obsolete, neither do I believe US "A2AD" systems would make Chinese carriers obsolete.

Not to mention that the US will have to find useful places to host their missiles in the first place, with countries that agree to field them. On the Chinese side, it goes without saying that as part of the overall multi domain operations in the region that their job would be to track US missiles during peacetime and strike them and/or degrade the US ISR net once battle is joined.
That is perhaps the biggest difference between the US "A2AD" ambition and China's "A2AD" potential -- it is that China theoretically has the whole country to deploy, move and hide its missiles in, whereas the US at present in the western pacific only has Guam. The difference in ISR demands at those mutually long ranges from each other to track each side's missiles and the ease of striking them is rather different. If the US is able to convince many other countries in the region to host US long range missiles then that's a different matter however even then I suspect host nations won't let US missiles freely move around their entire territory but rather keep them relegated to a particular part of their nation or even a particular island (which would make tracking and targeting much easier).


So yes, in theory what we would see is a combination of each side's CSG+long range strike system vs the other side's CSG+long range strike system. However in practice, the geography that the US has to work with in terms of basing its long range strike systems in the region vs the geography that China has to work with to base its own long range strike systems are far from equal.

Click to expand...

I agree that China has home field advantage the closer the fight is to China's shore but that advantage will diminish the deeper the fight is into the second island chain.

I also do not dispute that due to China's geographic land mass, targeting mobile missiles will be both problematic and challenging. That said, in the event of hostilities with the US, the availability of land basing for the US will likely increase because the US can then trigger mutual defense pact articles with treaty countries for land access Under such a scenario China will be subject to equally multi vector and multi domain threats in its attempt to gain sea and air control. For sake of simplicity I will fence off the discussions on multi axis threats.



With that covered, I would like to go back to your original theme and that is the following which I quote :
"achieve air control and sea control (surface and subsurface) as well as superiority in the EW domain up to and beyond the 2nd island chain, in conjunction with the rest of the PLA (land based PLAAF, land based PLARF, etc) as part of multi domain operations." and

"Putting the above into a concept of operations, basically I envision the PLAN fielding one to two "future CSGs," with each future CSG having two carriers to provide mutual support for one another, with the future CSG escorts to include over a dozen major surface combatants (large destroyers, destroyers and frigates) and multiple nuclear attack submarines."

Essentially you are positing a view that sea and air control up to the 2nd island chain and beyond can be achieved via a CSG comprising of 2 carriers and escorts with support from land bases.

I prefer not to preempt your thoughts beyond what you have said. As such can you please explain the strategic or operational objectives of the CSG and how the resources that are available to ot can actually achieve those objectives. Can you also confirm the period under consideration i.e. 2030

Brumby said:

I also do not dispute that due to China's geographic land mass, targeting mobile missiles will be both problematic and challenging. That said, in the event of hostilities with the US, the availability of land basing for the US will likely increase because the US can then trigger mutual defense pact articles with treaty countries for land access Under such a scenario China will be subject to equally multi vector and multi domain threats in its attempt to gain sea and air control.

Click to expand...

That can't just be assumed. Access to this geography is politically contingent, while China's access to its own territory is assured. Depending on the circumstances of the conflict - principally, against whom is China fighting and why - and who America's allies judge the likely victor to be, they might opt to abrogate their treaties with the US and deny it access to curry favour with China.

Brumby said:

I agree that China has home field advantage the closer the fight is to China's shore but that advantage will diminish the deeper the fight is into the second island chain.

I also do not dispute that due to China's geographic land mass, targeting mobile missiles will be both problematic and challenging. That said, in the event of hostilities with the US, the availability of land basing for the US will likely increase because the US can then trigger mutual defense pact articles with treaty countries for land access Under such a scenario China will be subject to equally multi vector and multi domain threats in its attempt to gain sea and air control. For sake of simplicity I will fence off the discussions on multi axis threats.

View attachment 53679

Click to expand...

I'm familiar with that diagram, however the likelihood of having those nations be willing to host missiles in a manner designed to operate in conjunction with US forces is one that I consider tenuous at present.

More importantly, my working assumption is one where shorter range PLA strike forces and land based air forces (of course along with naval forces) would be capable of significantly degrading the effectiveness of the first island chain as an "A2AD" chain by virtue of the relatively small size of many of the islands in the region in hosting land based weapons systems (in particular the direction to the ECS).
That is to say, obviously for PLAN CSGs to move in the second island chain or beyond it would require the smashing of the first island chain as an effective "A2AD" chain.

With that covered, I would like to go back to your original theme and that is the following which I quote :
"achieve air control and sea control (surface and subsurface) as well as superiority in the EW domain up to and beyond the 2nd island chain, in conjunction with the rest of the PLA (land based PLAAF, land based PLARF, etc) as part of multi domain operations." and

"Putting the above into a concept of operations, basically I envision the PLAN fielding one to two "future CSGs," with each future CSG having two carriers to provide mutual support for one another, with the future CSG escorts to include over a dozen major surface combatants (large destroyers, destroyers and frigates) and multiple nuclear attack submarines."

Essentially you are positing a view that sea and air control up to the 2nd island chain and beyond can be achieved via a CSG comprising of 2 carriers and escorts with support from land bases.

I prefer not to preempt your thoughts beyond what you have said. As such can you please explain the strategic or operational objectives of the CSG and how the resources that are available to ot can actually achieve those objectives. Can you also confirm the period under consideration i.e. 2030

Click to expand...

My potential timespan would be 2035-2040 at the earliest.

My conops and required equipment to achieve that conops is one for what I think will give the PLAN the highest likelihood of success for achieving air and sea control into the 2nd island chain and/or beyond, given what array of forces the opfor may field in that time.
The full conops is back here: https://www.sinodefenceforum.com/future-plan-carrier-operations.t8587/#post-568336

The single smallest unit size for a future PLAN CSG would be two carriers, a dozen to a dozen and a half major surface combatants, and a number of nuclear submarines. Whether a particular conflict would require one single future CSG (two carriers total) or two future CSGs (four carriers total) would depend on the scale of the conflict.
[In terms of fleet size I believe the PLAN would seek the ability to surge two future CSGs (four carriers total) at least in westpac, which obviously would mean they would require a certain number of carriers and escorts in their overall order of battle as well as to arrange their peacetime routine carrier deployments in a manner that would allow them to surge carriers near in westpac at the cost of deploying in other areas of the world in a more permanent manner etc.]


Obviously the exact result of an actual military conflict so far into the future using such hypothetical systems that haven't even been built yet isn't something that I dare to make let alone what the geopolitical dynamics of the region and the world may be like which would shape pre-conflict options for each side and how dispersal of forces might occur.



To clarify -- I'm not drawing up a conflict scenario.
Rather I'm putting out a concept of operations for a set of capabilities that I think would provide the most robust chances of success of achieving a specific aim (contesting and/or securing air and sea control up to and/or beyond the 2nd island chain).

Bltizo said:

I'm familiar with that diagram, however the likelihood of having those nations be willing to host missiles in a manner designed to operate in conjunction with US forces is one that I consider tenuous at present.

More importantly, my working assumption is one where shorter range PLA strike forces and land based air forces (of course along with naval forces) would be capable of significantly degrading the effectiveness of the first island chain as an "A2AD" chain by virtue of the relatively small size of many of the islands in the region in hosting land based weapons systems (in particular the direction to the ECS).
That is to say, obviously for PLAN CSGs to move in the second island chain or beyond it would require the smashing of the first island chain as an effective "A2AD" chain.

Click to expand...

During peacetime, many states would likely behave in a neutral manner. However in states of hostility regardless of its source, the dynamics will change quickly and mutual defense treaties will kick in. Naturally any final decision is dependent on prevailing political considerations active at that time. I rather not go into speculations beyond stating the facts that mutual defense treaties do exist. .

Bltizo said:

My potential timespan would be 2035-2040 at the earliest.

My conops and required equipment to achieve that conops is one for what I think will give the PLAN the highest likelihood of success for achieving air and sea control into the 2nd island chain and/or beyond, given what array of forces the opfor may field in that time.
The full conops is back here: https://www.sinodefenceforum.com/future-plan-carrier-operations.t8587/#post-568336

The single smallest unit size for a future PLAN CSG would be two carriers, a dozen to a dozen and a half major surface combatants, and a number of nuclear submarines. Whether a particular conflict would require one single future CSG (two carriers total) or two future CSGs (four carriers total) would depend on the scale of the conflict.
[In terms of fleet size I believe the PLAN would seek the ability to surge two future CSGs (four carriers total) at least in westpac, which obviously would mean they would require a certain number of carriers and escorts in their overall order of battle as well as to arrange their peacetime routine carrier deployments in a manner that would allow them to surge carriers near in westpac at the cost of deploying in other areas of the world in a more permanent manner etc.]


Obviously the exact result of an actual military conflict so far into the future using such hypothetical systems that haven't even been built yet isn't something that I dare to make let alone what the geopolitical dynamics of the region and the world may be like which would shape pre-conflict options for each side and how dispersal of forces might occur.



To clarify -- I'm not drawing up a conflict scenario.
Rather I'm putting out a concept of operations for a set of capabilities that I think would provide the most robust chances of success of achieving a specific aim (contesting and/or securing air and sea control up to and/or beyond the 2nd island chain).

Click to expand...

The idea of sea and air control in my view do not exist during peacetime because the seas outside of territorial waters is global commons. Therefore a conversation about sea and air control without referencing to specific scenario is meaningless. For example, China has all the intentions to exercise air and sea control over the SCS but the other nations notably the US just ignores any attempt of such nature principally through FONOPs.

I simply cannot associate the idea of air and sea control up to and beyond the 2nd island chain without referencing to any objectives absent of any conflict scenario. For example, in order to exercise air and sea control, China has to deal with the Guam issue. Either you invade Guam or nullify completely its offensive capabilities. In my view, it is the same issue Imperial Japan had with Midway island. .