Future PLAN naval and carrier operations

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
@Bltizo I see the next Diplomat article...


I want to make a point about cost to put things in perspective. Today China's PPP adjusted GDP (which is the better way to measure military spending since the overwhelming bulk of said spending is domestic) is $27.3 trillion. If we presume that the Chinese economy quadruples in the next 30 years - which is pretty conservative considering China grew 16x over the past 30 - it will have a GDP of $110 trillion and a per capita GDP of $75,000; still below the US which would have a per capita GDP of $100,000+ in 30 years. If China maintains an anemic 1.4% of GDP military spend (or 1.9% according to SIPRI), we're looking at a military budget of $1.5 - $2.1 trillion. That is a frightening number.

It's better to think in relative terms.

So let's say GDP per capita ends up at $75K in China versus $100K in the USA.
If this was some 30 years in the future, then China would have around 3x the population.

That works out as a Chinese economy some 2.25x larger.

But note that the Australian Treasury and the latest Defence White Paper are working to the projection that China will have a GDP twice the size by 2030-2035

---

In such a world, we could realistically expect:

1. In a minimal scenario. A demilitarised China which only seeks to match the US.
2. In a maximal scenario. An insecure cold war China which could seek to build a military 2x bigger.

@Iron Man

In scenario 1 - with a benign security environment - nuclear carriers are advantageous for long-range global power projection and don't have to worry about a high-intensity conflict.

In scenario 2 - with a hostile security environment - China could theoretically build the equivalent of 2 US Navies with a total of 22 nuclear supercarriers. That should be more than enough to obtain maritime superiority in the Western Pacific waters near Chinese coast. Then their task would be distant power projection which favours nuclear propulsion.

So all roads eventually lead to the Chinese navy building nuclear carriers.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
It's better to think in relative terms.

So let's say GDP per capita ends up at $75K in China versus $100K in the USA.
If this was some 30 years in the future, then China would have around 3x the population.

That works out as a Chinese economy some 2.25x larger.

But note that the Australian Treasury and the latest Defence White Paper are working to the projection that China will have a GDP twice the size by 2030-2035

---

In such a world, we could realistically expect:

1. In a minimal scenario. A demilitarised China which only seeks to match the US.
2. In a maximal scenario. An insecure cold war China which could seek to build a military 2x bigger.

@Iron Man

In scenario 1 - with a benign security environment - nuclear carriers are advantageous for long-range global power projection and don't have to worry about a high-intensity conflict.

In scenario 2 - with a hostile security environment - China could theoretically build the equivalent of 2 US Navies with a total of 22 nuclear supercarriers. That should be more than enough to obtain maritime superiority in the Western Pacific waters near Chinese coast. Then their task would be distant power projection which favours nuclear propulsion.

So all roads eventually lead to the Chinese navy building nuclear carriers.

I think going down the path of predicting the future size of China's GDP is useful for illustrative purposes but risks having the discussion focus too much on future GDP comparisons which can become a contentious topic.


Instead, I think it would be generally agreed that future military expenditure will depend on future economic growth, and the degree of future military expenditure will shape the amount of money the PLAN will be willing to spend for future carrier development and procurement.

I think most of us would agree that larger nuclear carriers (100k ton) would cost more to develop, cost more to run (initially), and have more technological risk (again relating to cost) than smaller conventional carriers (80k ton).
So ultimately the decision for larger nuke carriers vs staying with smaller conventional carriers will depend on future economic growth, overall industry capability growth, and also govt and military tolerance for risk vs benefit.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
@Bltizo

I'll have a look at the CSBA carrier report when I have some more time.

But my first thoughts are that all these diagrams show carrier operations being conducted really far offshore.

However, the potential key battlegrounds are the landmasses along the 1st Island Chain eg. Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, Korea
And all these locations are close to the Chinese mainland with its aircraft and missile forces.
Which means Chinese forces could isolate and blockade these land territories - and achieve something close to air and sea superiority.

So US naval forces probably don't have the luxury of safely standing far offshore and sniping away at their leisure.
They're going to have to get far closer to mainland China to generate enough sorties to make a difference.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
@Bltizo

I'll have a look at the CSBA carrier report when I have some more time.

But my first thoughts are that all these diagrams show carrier operations being conducted really far offshore.

However, the potential key battlegrounds are the landmasses along the 1st Island Chain eg. Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, Korea
And all these locations are close to the Chinese mainland with its aircraft and missile forces.
Which means Chinese forces could isolate and blockade these land territories - and achieve something close to air and sea superiority.

So US naval forces probably don't have the luxury of safely standing far offshore and sniping away at their leisure.
They're going to have to get far closer to mainland China to generate enough sorties to make a difference.

Well, the US strategy in such a scenario whereby China was able to secure the first island chain, would be to basically try to keep Chinese air and naval forces within the first island chain by operating at a distance and launching long range strike sorties enabled by longer range aircraft of the future (specifically future large unmanned UCAVs, large manned fighter aircraft, and existing manned fighter aircraft supported by aerial refuelling UAVs), to strike Chinese air and naval forces and bases within the first island chain and within the Chinese mainland.


That is to say, the goal in that paper is explicitly proposing future air wings in which US carriers can reside at greater stand off distance from mainland China while still having sufficiently large airwings with larger aircraft that can conduct effective sorties at that distance.



For China of course, the goal would be to engage those US carrier groups through multi domain warfare of their own -- if China just sits back and allows US carrier groups to whittle away at its "stationary" defenses then they will gradually be worn down. Instead, China will be required to have the capability to move forwards to engage US carrier groups in multi domain warfare, preferably with the goal of destroying them, but if it causes them to be unable to effectively conduct their mission to conduct air operations against China and the first island chain then that would be a useful effect too.

I believe China's multi domain warfare would have to involve a carrier force that is at least qualitatively and quantitatively equal in that theatre of conflict, while supported by more extensive land based long range strike capabilities and regional ISR and kill chain assets.
The combination of those forces will be to create a situation where the PLA has overall fire power superiority and ISR/situational awareness superiority in the region when looking at it from a multi domain point of view.

But to reliably do so, it would require China to send its own large carrier strike groups into the second island chain to try to locate and skirmish with US carrier groups and create situations whereby they can provide robust targeting solutions for long range strike systems and the Chinese CSG's own anti surface capabilities to destroy the opposing carrier group.
 
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ZeEa5KPul

Colonel
Registered Member
It's interesting how much the US military is becoming like the PLA and vice versa as the balance of power shifts. Concepts like "distributed lethality" and withdrawing from the INF to develop mobile, ground-launched intermediate range missiles shows that the US is adopting something like a guerrilla mentality of fighting successfully without enjoying the overwhelming dominance it historically had, while we see the PLA adopting power projection and sea control capabilities like (possibly nuclear) supercarriers as its strength grows.

I think most of us would agree that larger nuclear carriers (100k ton) would cost more to develop, cost more to run (initially), and have more technological risk (again relating to cost) than smaller conventional carriers (80k ton).
How much more is the crucial question. If it's as much as 2x or 3x more than a conventional CATOBAR then I can definitely see the merit of @Iron Man's way of thinking. In that case I would think that the carrier mix should definitely favour conventionals since a far larger fleet can be put out to sea. If, on the other hand, it's just 25% or even 50% more expensive then I think the mix would be heavily weighted toward nuclear supercarriers for their greater capability and improved endurance.

But to reliably do so, it would require China to send its own large carrier strike groups into the second island chain to try to locate and skirmish with US carrier groups and create situations whereby they can provide robust targeting solutions for long range strike systems and the Chinese CSG's own anti surface capabilities to destroy the opposing carrier group.
How far away from the Chinese mainland can this strategy work before the fight is out of reach of shore-based fire support like AShBMs? Because then the fight would be even and that means it becomes a grinding war of attrition (in fact, I think the best strategy for the US would be to try to lure a Chinese CSG out into the middle of the Pacific).

A bit OT, but since the pictures you posted were of the Island Chains, I'm sure you're aware of that Australian report that claimed the PLA can shut down US bases there with missile fire. Well and good, the missiles shut down the bases for a few days, now what? The PLA has no follow through. It's like an MMA fighter who can take down an opponent but has no ground-and-pound game. The PLA's got to work on its ground-and-pound game: air strikes and amphibious landings to seize those bases. I remember you told me that the PLA's CAS was effectively nonexistent; that's got to change. Taking those bases would extend the PLA's "naval artillery" out farther into the Pacific and give the US another set of problems to address.

Thinking about it now, this island hopping would be much better than playing Battleship in the middle of the Pacific. Mass the PLAN CSGs for an attack on Guam and take it. Look how much of the Pacific you can hold with DF-26s
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there.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
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How far away from the Chinese mainland can this strategy work before the fight is out of reach of shore-based fire support like AShBMs? Because then the fight would be even and that means it becomes a grinding war of attrition (in fact, I think the best strategy for the US would be to try to lure a Chinese CSG out into the middle of the Pacific).

A bit OT, but since the pictures you posted were of the Island Chains, I'm sure you're aware of that Australian report that claimed the PLA can shut down US bases there with missile fire. Well and good, the missiles shut down the bases for a few days, now what? The PLA has no follow through. It's like an MMA fighter who can take down an opponent but has no ground-and-pound game. The PLA's got to work on its ground-and-pound game: air strikes and amphibious landings to seize those bases. I remember you told me that the PLA's CAS was effectively nonexistent; that's got to change. Taking those bases would extend the PLA's "naval artillery" out farther into the Pacific and give the US another set of problems to address.

Thinking about it now, this island hopping would be much better than playing Battleship in the middle of the Pacific. Mass the PLAN CSGs for an attack on Guam and take it. Look how much of the Pacific you can hold with DF-26s
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there.

I don't have clear answers for any of those off the top of my head, apart from adding on further speculation to my previous conops proposal.

Whether the PLA would seek to assault and occupy various islands in the first and second island chains during a conflict to be used as bases during the conflict is certainly a whole other dimension to consider, but it is quite a different track to the topic of future PLAN carrier operations of this thread.
 

Air Force Brat

Brigadier
Super Moderator
Don't be so certain on your alleged "requirement" for nuclear carriers. The US ruled the world's oceans with conventional carriers long before there were naval reactors, and is even now thinking of scaling back on full-size carriers due to their perceived present and future vulnerability, and thinking of ways to distribute firepower to smaller carriers and to escorts and unmanned platforms. The future of warfare and especially naval warfare may not involve nuclear carrier groups slugging it out toe to toe on the high seas. Don't be so narrow in your thinking here.

Exactly right Iron Man, and your point about rumors is likely to be lost here, but it is very well stated, rumor is nothing more than unsubstantiated cheap talk. If all these rumors panned out we would have had the WS-15 5 to 7 years ago!

While the US will continue to operate nuclear carriers, we may pull them back slightly and operate less valuable assets "danger close".... but it is a biit strange to assume that development will progress in a linear manner, it never has yet, it runs in "fits and starts"!
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
Exactly right Iron Man, and your point about rumors is likely to be lost here, but it is very well stated, rumor is nothing more than unsubstantiated cheap talk. If all these rumors panned out we would have had the WS-15 5 to 7 years ago!

The rumours for WS-15 are what has kept us abreast of its development and progress over the years -- and that's exactly because the rumours for WS-15 have panned out because every couple of years we get indications and updates as to what its status is.


[Incidentally I also don't know what rumours suggested WS-15 would have emerged 5-7 years ago?? I don't think any rumours that were considered credible at the time suggested that.]




This basically comes down to the problem of being able to identify "more accurate" rumours vs "less accurate rumours".

There are many thousands of voices and blogs on the Chinese language blogs and forums, but only some of them are worth listening to -- the ones not worth listening to is "unsubstantiated cheap talk".
If you do not know which ones are worth listening to then you can simply defer to other people here who can identify the users who are worth listening to.



But from J-20 to carrier 003 and all the projects in between, the rumour cultivation method has repeatedly demonstrated its value in providing up to date dynamic information for a project, faster than other ways and giving us more reliable information as well.

The entire reason why Sinodefense Forum is so unique is because it provides an English language place for people to analyze and disseminate rumours to provide projections, faster than mainstream defense media and mainstream defense analysts who don't have access to rumours and don't have the ability to interpret rumours.

Few other English language forums does this, and it is one of SDF's only real claims to fame.
Consider showing more respect to the method for what makes SDF different to the other English language defense forums for PLA watching.
 

Iron Man

Major
Registered Member
The US studies show that large nuclear carriers have a large advantage in terms of cost versus capacity.

That comes from relatively compact nuclear reactors providing unlimited range, whilst also freeing up space for more aircraft and supplies.
Remember that when carriers are operating, they need to resupply every 1-2weeks.

That frequency of resupply will still happen with smaller carriers, and applies in general to any naval warship.

For a global navy in the high seas (far from land bases and resupply), greater endurance AND greater air sortie capacity is going to be a key advantage.

Whilst the carriers or their aircraft may not be the primary delivery platforms for anti-ship weapons - the aircraft will be key to finding opposing ships and also preventing the opposing recon aircraft from doing the same.
Cost vs capacity isn't even nearly the only factor to consider when talking about carriers, especially in today's age of increasing carrier vulnerability to multiple forms of attack. I'd like to see which studies you can come up with that conclude 100kt nuclear carriers will still be the most effective use of military resources decades from now after specifically accounting for their increasing vulnerability to attack.

It's better to think in relative terms.

So let's say GDP per capita ends up at $75K in China versus $100K in the USA.
If this was some 30 years in the future, then China would have around 3x the population.

That works out as a Chinese economy some 2.25x larger.

But note that the Australian Treasury and the latest Defence White Paper are working to the projection that China will have a GDP twice the size by 2030-2035

---

In such a world, we could realistically expect:

1. In a minimal scenario. A demilitarised China which only seeks to match the US.
2. In a maximal scenario. An insecure cold war China which could seek to build a military 2x bigger.

@Iron Man

In scenario 1 - with a benign security environment - nuclear carriers are advantageous for long-range global power projection and don't have to worry about a high-intensity conflict.

In scenario 2 - with a hostile security environment - China could theoretically build the equivalent of 2 US Navies with a total of 22 nuclear supercarriers. That should be more than enough to obtain maritime superiority in the Western Pacific waters near Chinese coast. Then their task would be distant power projection which favours nuclear propulsion.

So all roads eventually lead to the Chinese navy building nuclear carriers.
There are absolutely no roads which lead inevitably to Chinese 100kt nuclear carriers. China may or may not end up with such a nuclear carrier, but this is by no means a certainty or even near certainty. Using a purely economic argument to justify the inevitability of Chinese nuclear carriers is about as silly as saying that since China's economy will be 2.25x larger, China will inevitably have 2.25x as many civilian nuclear reactors, or 2.25x as much pollution, or 2.25x as much of anything else, for that matter. This is a complete non sequitur, as in the conclusion does not even remotely follow from the premise. China may or may not need or even want a military as large as the US military, which BTW the US currently cannot afford without massive deficit spending. And even if it does it may or may not even want power projection at the level the US employs today. And even if it does China may find other ways to achieve power projection besides 100kt nuclear carriers. The future of warfare is uncertain enough that as carriers become more and more vulnerable to attack (and they undeniably are), the cost vs capacity argument could easily be sidelined to the point where it is not even seriously entertained next to the need to diversify power projection assets even at the expense of cost-effectiveness.
 

Brumby

Major
IMO, the PLAN's future carrier force in a high end pacific theatre war would optimally seek to have the ambition to be able to achieve air control and sea control (surface and subsurface) as well as superiority in the EW domain up to and beyond the 2nd island chain, in conjunction with the rest of the PLA (land based PLAAF, land based PLARF, etc) as part of multi domain operations.

To achieve the above mission, I believe the PLAN's future carrier strike group should seek to have a number of capabilities:
  1. the ability to independently conduct air superiority missions and air defense missions, the ability to independently conduct surface strike missions, the ability to independently conduct EW missions, the ability to independently conduct AEW&C and ISR missions, the ability to independently conduct ASW missions.
  2. the ability to also conduct the above missions in a joint manner to support, enable and/or increase the effectiveness of other friendly services (such as PLAAF, and PLARF). In particular, focus should be placed on having carriers have aircraft that can conduct widespread dynamic and redundant ISR, to provide targeting information for land based long range AShBMs as well as land based long range bombers who will provide long range strike support against opfor carrier and surface forces to greatly supplement the PLAN's CSG's own anti surface forces (in the form of carrier based strike fighters and strike UCAVs as well as AShMs from escorting destroyers, frigates, and nuclear attack submarines).
  3. the range of the above missions should seek to have large footprints -- aka the aircraft conducting those missions should have long range so as to maximize the area of effect that they can have and thus to better reduce the risk the carrier itself faces from opfor threats, by virtue of having longer distance. This range should be no less than 500 nmi and should optimally aim to achieve 1000 nmi or above to match future potential US aircraft operating footprints.
  4. to achieve the above missions, a combination of manned aircraft and unmanned aircraft will make up the airwing, and must be sufficiently large to provide adequate range/endurance (or to have tanker aircraft that can allow an aircraft to achieve the above range.
  5. to achieve adequate sortie rate, each carrier itself should be capable of sustaining a competitively sized airwing.
  6. the future CSG should be capable of operating at distances of up to and slightly beyond the second island chain for an extended period in terms of endurance (namely, fuel and consumable stores).


Putting the above into a concept of operations, basically I envision the PLAN fielding one to two "future CSGs," with each future CSG having two carriers to provide mutual support for one another, with the future CSG escorts to include over a dozen major surface combatants (large destroyers, destroyers and frigates) and multiple nuclear attack submarines.

Each future CSG will be a mobile fire-maneuver-recon complex capable of conducting independent air control, sea control and EW missions at a range of over 1000 nmi by virtue of its airwing that will combine large manned and unmanned aircraft, and capable of operating at distances of up to and beyond the second island chain.

These future PLAN CSGs will seek to maneuver and locate opfor CSGs -- however the process of seeking to locate opfor CSGs means there will inevitably be a high chance of PLAN CSG airwings and escorts having to skirmish with opfor CSGs and escorts, which requires PLAN CSGs to be capable of independently fighting an opfor CSG on "even terms" and surviving the encounter.
However during the process of seeking to maneuver and locate and skirmish with opfor CSGs, PLAN CSG ISR aircraft will also seek to actively identify the location of the opfor CSG and provide cuing information for other PLA targeting/ISR assets in the region (whether it's space based, large land based aircraft, or OTH radars or a combination).

This will allow a robust, multi domain accurate targeting solution against opfor CSGs across multiple domains that is more dynamic, survivable and robust than only relying one on or two domains. In particular, having a CSG's own organic airborne ISR aircraft being capable of identifying and tracking an opfor CSG should substantially reduce the amount of work that the PLA's other land based, space based and large airborne targeting/ISR systems. This will create a robust kill chain that can suffer some losses but which can still be operationally effective.

The robust kill chain will then enable land based long range strike systems (land based long range AShBMs with HGVs, land based long range bombers equipped with HGVs) to target the opfor CSG either independently, or in a joint strike mission where the PLAN future CSG conducts a strike mission against the opfor CSG (with its own strike aircraft, strike UCAVs, and/or AShMs from escorting ships/submarines).
There is a lot said but they are predominantly statements of vision. Such statements need to be tested against operational reality and capabilities as to how it is expected to work out in terms of desired end effects. For example, you seemed to infer that a Chinese CSG with two carriers will be sufficient to dominate any adversary's CSG even out to the second island chain. I would like to understand how did you arrived at such a conclusion and what type of capabilities and sizing of airwing you were contemplating? .

A larger carrier vs a smaller carrier for the goals stated above is also rather obvious in the sense that a larger carrier allows for accommodation of more and larger aircraft than a smaller carrier. In terms of ambition, I do not believe the PLAN would be risky enough to seek a significantly larger carrier than what the USN has proven and demonstrated to be an effective sized super carrier in their Enterprise, Nimitz and Ford class carriers -- that is to say, even though I believe that a larger carrier is superior than a smaller carrier in terms of accommodation of an airwing relevant to the mission, I don't think the PLAN would be so ambitious as to consider say some sort of 150,000 ton carrier, because that would be much larger than what I think has been demonstrated by the US to be a viable carrier size.


IMO the primary benefits of having a smaller, conventionally powered carrier of say about 80,000 tons vs a larger, nuclear powered carrier of say about 100,000 tons can be boiled down to:
- lower procurement cost
- possibly lower lifetime operating cost
- lower technological R&D cost
- less technological R&D risk


Now, whether the PLAN will ultimately go for 100,000 ton nuclear powered carriers or if they will stick with 80,000 ton conventionally powered carriers is something that we will have to wait and see, and will be dependent on a whole host of factors that have yet to emerge.
But IMO if the PLAN had the money for it and if they had the requisite technology and industry able to support it, I believe they would choose to procure 100,000 ton nuclear powered carriers for their medium and long term future carrier force.

I don't think you guys have any idea what tonnage sizing China is aiming for. The 100,000 tons is floated because the USN's carriers are of that tonnage. However in the case of the USN, such a tonnage evolved over time to where it is today. It is driven by a number of factors including the intention to generate at least 100 sorties a day on a sustainable basis. However this may change because of evolving capabilities and the threat dynamics. In the case of China, there are too many unknowns given the opaque nature of China's intention. That said, I believe China will go for nuclear powered carrier at some stage as China has global power projections intention and nuclear propulsion would be inevitable.
 
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