Future PLA combat aircraft composition

Suetham said:

It doesn't work the way you think. This 24/7 rotating CAP is not how air forces work.

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would you care to expand on this a bit please?

lets say if you expect large imcoming aeril attack from a direction and you have high value assets to protect, what would you do?

SAM is obviously not enough because they cannot concentrate enough to counter a large attack

emergency air interception? may not make it in time, especially when your high value assets in placed forward.

Totoro said:

All in all, end of 2030 tally might look like this:
550 J20
150 J31 (notional, of all variants)
345 J15/16
960 J10 (all variants)
24 Su-35
220 J-11B
220 JH-7A
Total: 2450 aircraft (700 of which stealthy ones)

(list does not adjust for various accidents over the years nor does it mention any potential additional new aircraft types)

For comparison, by the end of 2030 US looks to be on track to have some 3000-3100 aircraft. Of which 1500 stealthy types. (neither side here estimated to manage to produce additional new stealthy types in said timeframe)

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wow, that looks like parity to me in west pac

caohailiang said:

would you care to expand on this a bit please?

lets say if you expect large imcoming aeril attack from a direction and you have high value assets to protect, what would you do?

SAM is obviously not enough because they cannot concentrate enough to counter a large attack

emergency air interception? may not make it in time, especially when your high value assets in placed forward.

Click to expand...

In an emergency 'Alert' situation, normally 2 fighters are in the air in a CAP with 2 more fighters in 'High Readiness' state, this last element can be shuffled in 5 minutes to take off to join the other 2 fighters already in air patrol in case hostile aircraft are spotted. Otherwise, the 'Ready' aircraft in the hangar will relieve and replace the CAP aircraft as soon as the first fighters are out of time.

This scenario occurs in a real war situation in which there is a perception by the Chinese that the enemy is acting to pierce the no-fly zone established by the PLAAF/PLANAF, in this no-fly zone the CAP is carried out as well as in a more hold ahead. All this apparatus will be supported by RPAs and probably by AWACS if necessary, which will be acting even further ahead of the fighters providing early warning.

In the USAF, when there is no such imminent danger of an enemy attack or air incursion, although there is minimal danger for such enemy action, the USAF implements MQ-1 Predators and MQ-9 Reapers that can and are able to implement CAP 24/ 7/365 depending on the local/regional situation.

RPAs (Remotely Piloted Aircraft) are maintained by operators who can range across up to 30 career fields in the force, each playing a key role in supporting all combat air patrols. Patrols allow combatant commanders (CoCom) access to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance resources at all times and in all locations.

A combat air patrol is essentially having an aircraft in the air, providing CoComs with dominant ISR capability and real-time munitions capability. Today, RPAs fly a total of 60 CAPs in a 24-hour period, requiring thousands of aviators, from pilots and sensor operators to maintainers, intelligence personnel and meteorologists.

For example. To keep 6 RPAs in the air at all times on CAP 24/7, that means the USAF needs to have about 273 operators, both civilian and enlisted, at all times. Within this line of organization, each new area of operation may require additional preparations, such as airspace control orders, air operations guidelines, establish new engagement criteria, among others, and that the squadron commander is aware that he would need to operate in combat 24/7/365 if requested.

What makes this possible is because of the long endurance of an RPA that can operate continuously for a period without requiring major sacrifices from the workforce and fighter support of an Air Force unduly, a set of RPAs can remain in CAP indefinitely.

Let's look at NATO.

NATO air policing is a routine, long-running mission to safeguard the integrity of airspace, a central task for NATO's collective defence. Air policing is not a response to any specific threat, but an essential component of how NATO provides security for its members.

According to public NATO regulations, allied air forces must have at least two fighter jets on standby 24/7, and at any given time, dozens of fighter jets are in high readiness across Europe.

NATO air-policing fighter jets take to the skies in response to military or civilian aircraft in distress, or aircraft that do not follow international flight regulations and approach NATO members' airspace. These aircraft are often unable to properly identify themselves, communicate with air traffic control, or file flight plans.

This function is so important to the US that they have what is called CAP-USAF. Even the US Air National Guard makes use of RPAs for CAP, the Air National Guard has 7 CAPs permanently operating overseas 24 hours a day, all squadrons operating MQ-9 Reaper.

Take for example India. After the clashes in the Galwan Valley, the IAF deployed nearly all of its frontline fighters, such as the Sukhoi 30 MKI, Jaguar and Mirage 2000 aircraft, to major frontier air bases in eastern Ladakh and elsewhere along the LAC. The IAF carried out night combat air patrols over eastern Ladakh in an apparent message to China that it was ready to deal with any eventualities in the mountainous region.

If India had sufficient numbers of RPAs, these fighters could remain on the ground in high readiness ready to take off in a few minutes with the RPAs providing these 24/7 air patrols rather than just being a night patrol with the fighters, if that is assumed. CAP doctrine, from time to time the commander could send the aircraft to show presence or have a deterrent effect, but this will depend on how degrading the scenario is.

In China, as I see the PLAAF following this line of doctrine and operation through the various long-resistance drone projects, it becomes possible for the PLAAF as well as the PLANAF (following the US Navy through the MQ-4C Triton RPAs) to follow this line of keeping CAPs with RPAs permanently rather than doing rotating air patrols with fighters that cannot offer the long endurance of an RPA.

That is, it is not the philosophy of any air force to maintain CAPs with fighters because no air force in the world has the ability to maintain CAPs with fighters. This is unfeasible. No matter how many aircraft an air force owns, even the USAF does not have that willingness to maintain CAP 24/7 with fighters, all CAP-USAF is maintained by RPAs worldwide at any given time.

Is that clear or do you need to expand further?

thanks for your explanation, some follow up

Suetham said:

A combat air patrol is essentially having an aircraft in the air, providing CoComs with dominant ISR capability and real-time munitions capability.

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this is very precise summary.

i guess the real question is, without ENOUGH real-time munitions capability, is it possible for the defender to stop standoff weaon from being released?

of course the answer depend heavily on the range of the weapon, the observability of the bomber, etc, etc

i just think a very large scale CAP is still the most effective defense when in high risk environment against potent bomber+missile combination - although i understand how much of a toll it takes on the fighter units.

Suetham said:

That is, it is not the philosophy of any air force to maintain CAPs with fighters because no air force in the world has the ability to maintain CAPs with fighters. This is unfeasible. No matter how many aircraft an air force owns, even the USAF does not have that willingness to maintain CAP 24/7 with fighters, all CAP-USAF is maintained by RPAs worldwide at any given time.

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lets say hyperthetically PLA gives its H6 fleet a 400nm range AShM, and escort a H6 regiment with a full brigade of J20, making a move against US fleet.
if the fleet commander expect such incoming at any time in the next few days, what would he do in defense?

Suetham said:

In the USAF, when there is no such imminent danger of an enemy attack or air incursion, although there is minimal danger for such enemy action, the USAF implements MQ-1 Predators and MQ-9 Reapers that can and are able to implement CAP 24/ 7/365 depending on the local/regional situation.

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CAP, per definition, is normally associated with hostile air incursions.

MQ series can't properly engage, much less pursue air threats. In the future - maybe (air defense is indeed something that can and should be automated as much as possible), but at very least - not those two.

caohailiang said:

lets say hyperthetically PLA gives its H6 fleet a 400nm range AShM, and escort a H6 regiment with a full brigade of J20, making a move against US fleet.

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USN has prepared to deal with almost exactly this threat for much of the CW (this exact threat evolved since the late 1950s).
Historical answer evolved into OAB (outer air battle).

With the current NAVAIR A/C composition, it is probably impossible.

Gloire_bb said:

CAP, per definition, is normally associated with hostile air incursions.

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You're right. Normally. But most of the time this does not happen "normally", it becomes very rare for the CAP to follow the establishment of operation 24/7 when there is no danger of air incursion, for example, "normally", the CAP-USAF is all associated with the low-intensity conflicts that the US is involved in, when it was still in Afghanistan and Iraq. Currently, it appears that there is a 24/7 CAP by NATO RPAs established in Eastern Europe because of the current crisis in Ukraine.

Gloire_bb said:

MQ series can't properly engage, much less pursue air threats. In the future - maybe (air defense is indeed something that can and should be automated as much as possible), but at very least - not those two.

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RPAs are not platforms to engage, but rather to perform functions like ISR, the only and unique function of an RPA like the MQ series within a CAP is to provide a reconnaissance and surveillance network for the Air Force, its role for engagement if an air incursion begins is totally limited and will only put the platform at risk if it remains unsupported. Everything will depend on how degrading the scenario is, if an aerial incursion is almost possible, the RPAs will have to be complemented by fighters and AWACS platforms occasionally, but in no air force is a CAP 24/7 established with fighters.

caohailiang said:

i guess the real question is, without ENOUGH real-time munitions capability, is it possible for the defender to stop standoff weaon from being released?

of course the answer depend heavily on the range of the weapon, the observability of the bomber, etc, etc

i just think a very large scale CAP is still the most effective defense when in high risk environment against potent bomber+missile combination - although i understand how much of a toll it takes on the fighter units.

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You are forgetting a lot of details. For example, a large movement of enemy aircraft would be detected via satellite viewing the airfields, as is the case with the current scenario in which Maxar provides us with photos of the large concentration of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border, with China the same can be done. made using spy satellites and unique terrestrial viewing function that are even more accurate than these commercial satellites. China would know in advance how degrading and dangerous the real scenario is brewing or has already formed, this could raise the alert that such an operation would take place and this could put the entire PLA on high alert.

An RPA with ISR function within an established CAP, the likely air incursion would be detected, there is not much to do in this scenario, depending on the escalation of the situation and information provided by satellites, China could occasionally send some fighter jets on that CAP along to the RPAs, in this way the PLAAF/PLANAF would even have to limit the deployment of ammunition in the face of a major air incursion. As I said, the scenario varies depending on the situation. But what you need to keep in mind, a CAP has to be done with RPAs providing dedicated ISR and keeping the aircraft in high readiness on the ground, if the call is made that the air raid is brewing, the fighters in readiness will take off.

caohailiang said:

lets say hyperthetically PLA gives its H6 fleet a 400nm range AShM, and escort a H6 regiment with a full brigade of J20, making a move against US fleet.
if the fleet commander expect such incoming at any time in the next few days, what would he do in defense?

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There's no reason for some CSG's rear admiral to put their CVNs at risk. A CVN will act far from the kill zone, this depends on the range of the embarked aircraft, it will normally send its fighters 800-1,000 km away from the CVN, these distances are more than enough to minimize any risk of any air incursion on a CSG .

And even if such an aerial incursion occurs and that for some reason, the fleet commander did not expect an initiative from the enemies, the concept of operation of the "AirSea Battle" is to integrate in a viable way the aircraft of the USAF and the USN, therefore, even in this In this scenario, a CSG is safe if there is a CAP established by the USAF through RPAs in a likely neutral zone where the CSG is "parked".

Suetham said:

There's no reason for some CSG's rear admiral to put their CVNs at risk. A CVN will act far from the kill zone, this depends on the range of the embarked aircraft, it will normally send its fighters 800-1,000 km away from the CVN, these distances are more than enough to minimize any risk of any air incursion on a CSG .

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sorry but i dont understand, how is it possible a weapon system, even as precious as CSG, never be put in risk??
even as you said, 1000km away (i assume you mean from Chinese coast here), they are still well with the range of PLA land based maritime strike.

Suetham said:

And even if such an aerial incursion occurs and that for some reason, the fleet commander did not expect an initiative from the enemies, the concept of operation of the "AirSea Battle" is to integrate in a viable way the aircraft of the USAF and the USN, therefore, even in this In this scenario, a CSG is safe if there is a CAP established by the USAF through RPAs in a likely neutral zone where the CSG is "parked".

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sorry again but i dont understand what you mean here. do you mean USAF to provide a CAP with RPA instead? How does that provide a solution to the question i raised?

caohailiang said:

sorry but i dont understand, how is it possible a weapon system, even as precious as CSG, never be put in risk??
even as you said, 1000km away (i assume you mean from Chinese coast here), they are still well with the range of PLA land based maritime strike.

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A CSG dealing with threats that imposes a limiting factor of approximate operation of a CVN in the theater of operations, so as not to jeopardize a CVN or the entire CSG - considering the task force ships for AAW/ASW, the CW will have to count with the long-range aircraft to assign the task of contesting enemy airspace, this has a serious disadvantage, sorties will decrease.

Thus, in a scenario of high-intensity warfare in the SCS, the CVN will act 500-1000 km away from the territorial boundary of the First Chain of Islands, well away from the Chinese coast, therefore, the only effective means of the PLA to actually sink a CVN or neutralize it is to rely on IRBMs missiles like the DF-26 in the anti-ship role, the DF-21D will not have the necessary range to engage the CVN that will act far from the Chinese coast, at least in the initial moments of the war. That could change. The PLA may eventually station the DF-21D on islands in the First Island Chain, which will bring the CVN within range of China's mid-range ASBMs, but in this case, the CSG will act even further afield because of this threat.

caohailiang said:

sorry again but i dont understand what you mean here. do you mean USAF to provide a CAP with RPA instead? How does that provide a solution to the question i raised?

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You took the following approach:

"Let's say the PLA hyperthetically gives its H6 fleet a 400nm range AShM and escorts an H6 regiment with a full brigade of J20, making a move against the US fleet.
if the fleet commander expected such an arrival any time in the next few days, what would he do in defense?"

I replied as follows:

There is no reason for some CSG Rear Admiral to put their CVNs at risk. A CVN will act far from the kill zone, this depends on the range of the embarked aircraft, it will normally send its fighters within 800-1000 km of the CVN, these distances are more than enough to minimize any risk of any aerial incursion on a CSG.

And even if such an air incursion takes place and that for some reason the fleet commander did not expect an initiative from the enemies, the "AirSea Battle" concept of operation is to feasibly integrate USAF and USN aircraft, so even in this In this scenario, a CSG is safe if there is a CAP established by the USAF through RPAs in a likely neutral zone where the CSG is "parked".



You hypothesized that the CSG fleet commander expected a major attack imminent within the next few days. It could be today, tomorrow or 8 days from now. There is no established criterion for when this will occur. It's a shot in the dark.

Well then.

How will a CSG fleet commander react?

It will simply put the entire CSG in a neutral zone, away from such a threat.

For what reason?

The CW cannot sustain 24/7 fighter coverage (CAP). Even in a high-intensity operation, the crew needs rest, there is no way to effectively sustain the pace of a CW 24/7 CAP, in addition to the E-2C/D aircraft themselves cannot sustain themselves anymore than 5 hours of flight time and as they do not have the ability to refuel, the CAP cannot be sustained by a CW. What the CAG (Commandant Air Group) can effectively accomplish is to put some fighters and E-2 aircraft on alert, when something unforeseen arises.

When operating in a contested area and with support from the USAF, they are the ones who can be tasked with protecting the CSG and CVN from air damage. Having a few F-15Cs is much better than having to put up with multiple legacy Hornets and their more limited endurance. Complementing by USAF RPAs can effectively reduce the E-2C/D's work on a CAP, maintaining normalized pace on a CW of a CVN even in the face of a threat of an imminent major attack, this keeps the crew fresh and prepared when the enemy attack actually occurs.

For this very reason, 2 CSGs are better than 1 CSG. When there are two or more aircraft carriers in an area, they can split time, supporting the entire deck task force (minus the tanker support which usually helps a lot). But even in this battle formation, when there are more than 2 CSGs, the USAF will be acting, even if it is in the rear area of a CSG, because all the CW of the CSGs will be acting on the front line and on the flanks.