I would also call the F-22 short-ranged.
Okay, I suppose it's all relative.
I understand where you're coming from, but geography negates this reasoning.
Do a cost-benefit calculation for a future 8000km range hypersonic missile ($40M?) launched from mainland China, which can reach all the way to Hawaii or Seattle.
A single missile can blanket a base with 17gram Mach 5 submunitions so that every large aircraft is hit.
So it makes sense to devote multiple missiles with submunitions, if there is even a single large expensive aircraft as a target.
Think any:
B-2 stealth bomber ($700M+)
B-1 conventional bomber ($423M)
KC-46 tanker ($150M)
E-3 AWACS ($270M)
P-8 MPA ($125M)
ISR, ELINT/SIGINT, etc etc
There are literally only a handful of force-multiplier aircraft available for deployment from US carriers.
In comparison, there are over 1000 large force-multiplier aircraft available which use land bases.
No, my reasoning is that relying only on long range missiles as the means of destroying opfor aircraft on the tarmac (regardless of whether they're single large force multipliers or bombers or whether they're distributed force multipliers or distributed UAV systems), you still have to account for an enemy that is able to bring their air force into play.
By all means, one should invest heavily into the ability to destroy opfor aircraft on the ground through the means of OCA (offensive counter air). But if you have not invested in a robust capability to also be able to defeat the enemy's aircraft while they are in the air, then you are screwed if your OCA fails or if the enemy finds a way to defend or mitigate the effects of your OCA.
To properly honor the threat requires you to consider the possibility that your first line optimal solution might fail, and that your backup plan needs to be as strong if not stronger to guarantee success.
If everyone is limited to smaller aircraft, China has many secure rear bases to put up many more aircraft of all types.
In comparison, the US has no secure land bases and only a very limited number of aircraft carriers to work with.
While it is true that China has more air bases in the region, many of its own air bases will also be subject to OCA in the same way that US bases in the region will be subject to OCA.
Operating on the assumption that the PLA will enjoy an air base advantage or a sortie rate advantage in event of a future conflict IMO is rather dangerous.
Plus how will the carriers be resupplied, if the supply ships are being attacked in Hawaii or the West Coast?
That is why I think the US will have a far harder time bringing force-multiplier aircraft to the Western Pacific in the future.
Today, they've already stopped sending large aircraft to Guam for example.
They've stopped sending bombers to Guam, but that's also because they've found they are able to still achieve bomber range effects from CONTUS.
And it will be a long time until the PLA has a
robust capability to target and properly deny USN supply lines from Hawaii or the West Coast.
After taking a look at the cost-effectiveness comparisons and where the technology is going, I'm firmly of the view that UCAVs will become the primary platforms for the deployment of sensors and weapons.
And that manned aircraft will be the secondary platform for these functions, whilst they will (initially at least) be the primary C&C platform.
In such a world, the optimal force balance becomes a very large number of UCAVs, but only a modest number of manned stealth fighters.
I agree with you.
But the ratios still matter.
Taking a very simplistic approach, let's say air forces will seek a ratio of 1 manned 5th gen aircraft to 6 UCAVs, which air force is superior?
500 5th gens to 3000 UCAVs?
versus
2000 5th gens to 12,000 UCAVs?
That is what I mean when I ask "what if the competition has not only a larger fleet of 5th gen fighters than you, but also a commensurately larger fleet of loyal wingmen UCAVs than you as well?"
So let's take your example of a competitor with a larger fleet of 5th gen fighters and commensurately larger fleet of loyal wingmen UCAVs.
Geography forces these aircraft to be based close to the Chinese mainland, and makes them vulnerable to ground-attack.
In comparison, China has super hardened bases and secure rear area bases to use.
So China can accept a smaller fleet of 5th gen manned stealth fighters and UCAVs, but build a bigger missile force for land-attack.
You end up with more opposing aircraft destroyed for the same money.
I have nothing against investing in OCA capabilities with the aim of trying to defeat opfor aircraft on the tarmac.
I'm just saying that relying on your OCA to succeed (and/or that the enemy won't be able to use OCA to degrade your bases) is a very dangerous strategic assumption to make, and that you need to also plan your aviation capabilities around an assumption where the enemy's combat air capability may still be significantly or majorly intact.