Falklands War, 1982, Thread

[Obi Wan Russell]

No British Submarine was sent to the South Atlantic prior to the Argentine Invasion in April 82. One did leave Gibraltar... heading home to the UK. However as subs usually travel submerged it would be hard to know which way it was going after leaving port

 

[b787]

No British Submarine was sent to the South Atlantic prior to the Argentine Invasion in April 82. One did leave Gibraltar... heading home to the UK. However as subs usually travel submerged it would be hard to know which way it was going after leaving port

It was at this point that the Junta decided to bring forward their existing plans to invade the Falkland Islands. What they did not want was for the British to bring military assets to the region to deal with the escalating crisis in South Georgia but which might then be diverted to thwart any Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. In particular, they were apprehensive about suggestions that the British might send a submarine to the area to enforce Argentine evacuation and support the activities of Endurance. The British were indeed contemplating sending the submarines but it would be a while before any could arrive. This made timing a severe issue for the Argentine Navy. The Navy had always been the most hawkish of the three armed services when it came to military intervention over the islands, and that desire was not diminished now. If it was going to launch an invasion, it had to be done whilst the islands were relatively undefended. HMS Endurance was a research vessel with a couple of 20mm cannons - a submarine would be a far more severe threat to an invasion force. With demonstrations breaking out on the streets of Argentina, the military Junta took the gamble to launch an invasion - before any submarine might arrive in the area. They agreed to launch the invasion at a meeting on the 26th of March. Leave was cancelled as soldiers and sailors were told to report to various depots and ports. The invasion was on. Ostensibly, it was claimed that the ships were leaving for a major naval exercise but the fact was that they had taken live ammunition and supplies and had only one goal in mind.


On the 29th March, the British took the decision to send RFA Fort Austin to the South Atlantic to allow Endurance to stay on station longer. They also decided to send two submarines,

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and

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, but it was going to take a few more days to get them ready for the long voyage south. By a happy coincidence, the new detachment of

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was en route to taking up its post in the Falkland Islands. The 1981 detachment was still in post awaiting its relief from the new team. Arrangements were made to get the new 8901 team to Port Stanley without having to use the Argentine Air Service that operated out of Stanley Airport.

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ferried the new 8901 troop from Montevideo to Stanley arriving on the 25th. The old detachment was ordered to stay in place until a resolution of the situation in South Georgia was satisfactorily achieved. Of course, some soldiers had been despatched to South Georgia under

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on the Endurance leaving a total of 67 troops on the Falklands themselves. Nevertheless, this was still clearly a tiny force against a fully fledged invasion force. 8901 had only ever been designated as a 'trip wire' force along the prevailing Cold War doctrine of the era. The idea being that they would offer resistance to prove dispute to any forced landing and to trigger an excuse for the despatch of a larger force. No one was under any illusions that the force could in any way prevent an invasion. Its purpose was to demonstrate sovereignty and illustrate a determination to defend the islands and give political justification for a future force to come to the aid of the islands.

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[Obi Wan Russell]

Prior to the Argentine Invasion the British Government was most certainly NOT contemplating sending Submarines, most of the Government had never even heard of the islands. The Subs were deploying either to the North Atlantic or headed home. It would take two weeks sailing from Gibraltar for an SSN to reach the Falklands at best. The Invasion caught the British Government completely flat footed. It was Admiral Leach who organised the Task Force and had it ready to sail in just two days. This was at Easter and many members of the Armed Forces were heading home on leave, and had to be recalled in a hurry. Prior to the Invasion, there was NO British Military response because they had no idea anything was happening. The few intelligence reports that were received were given no weight and not taken seriously. Argentina was not perceived as a threat to the UK, more as an ally and trading partner, though by no means a major one on either count.

 

[b787]

Prior to the Argentine Invasion the British Government was most certainly NOT contemplating sending Submarines, most of the Government had never even heard of the islands. The Subs were deploying either to the North Atlantic or headed home. It would take two weeks sailing from Gibraltar for an SSN to reach the Falklands at best. The Invasion caught the British Government completely flat footed. It was Admiral Leach who organised the Task Force and had it ready to sail in just two days. This was at Easter and many members of the Armed Forces were heading home on leave, and had to be recalled in a hurry. Prior to the Invasion, there was NO British Military response because they had no idea anything was happening. The few intelligence reports that were received were given no weight and not taken seriously. Argentina was not perceived as a threat to the UK, more as an ally and trading partner, though by no means a major one on either count.

March 29th – a British nuclear powered submarine, HMS Spartan, is directed to embark stores and weapons at Gibraltar while the Admiralty order the support vessel, RFA Fort Austin, from Gibraltar to resupply HMS Endurance. Defence Secretary John Nott advises the Prime Minister that it will take a week to ready a “viable” naval force, then three more weeks to get them to the Islands; although a group of 7 destroyers and frigates, on exercises near Gibraltar, could be in the South Atlantic in two weeks.

In Buenos Aires, newspapers refer to the cancellation of all military leave, and report that 5 Argentine warships are heading towards South Georgia. Ambassador Williams writes; “I am receiving gestures of sympathy … but I fear that in general, the Argentine Government will not only gain in popularity by playing the jingoist drum, but be accepted as doing the right thing in taking even the most extreme measures.”
March 30th – while demonstrations in Buenos Aires’Plaza de Mayo call for democracy, four more Argentine warships are reported as sailing from Puerto Belgrano. The FCO telegram Argentina’s Foreign Minister; “ .. The potentially dangerous position which has now developed has in no way been of our seeking. .. A confrontation, which could have far-reaching consequences and which would seriously prejudice our attempts to resolve the whole Falklands issue through peaceful negotiation, is in neither of our interests. ..”

In London, the Defence Operations Executive receives intelligence of an Argentine task force lying 800 miles north off the Falklands; consisting of an aircraft carrier, 4 destroyers and an amphibious landing craft. Reports suggest that the Junta do not believe it likely that Britain will send naval reinforcements.

A further British nuclear powered submarine, HMS Splendid, deploys from Faslane while a third, HMS Conqueror, is readied – indiscreetly made public by the International Television News (ITN) service.

March 31st – all the Argentine fleet are reported to be at sea.

Now aware of the submarines heading towards the South Atlantic, Foreign Minister Costa Mendez is widely quoted as saying that; “Argentina would not give way to threats of force, ..” and that the workers at Leith are; “.. Argentine workers working on Argentine soil.”

Intelligence reports being received in London indicate that April 2nd has been appointed as the Junta’s ‘day of action’ and that an infantry brigade has been readied for an invasion. Evidence suggests an unusual level of co-operation between the three Argentine military services. GCHQ Cheltenham reports Argentine radio traffic ordering the submarine Sante Fe, to take reconnaissance troops to Mullet Creek, near Stanley.

Defence Secretary John Nott seeks an urgent meeting with the Prime Minister; “ … John gave the MOD’s view that the Falklands could not be retaken once they were seized. This was terrible, and totally unacceptable. I could not believe it: these were our people, our islands. I said instantly: “if they are invaded, we have got to get them back.”

Admiral Sir Henry Leach advises the British Prime Minister that Britain could and should send a task force if the islands are invaded; ”Because if we do not, or if we pussyfoot in our actions and do not achieve complete success, in another few months we shall be living in a different country whose word counts for little.”

Governor Hunt, informed of the probability of an invasion, orders HMS Enduranceback to Stanley – while the British Prime Minister contacts President Reagan requesting his intervention with General Galtieri.

April 2nd – at 3.25 am Falklands’ time, Governor Hunt declares a state of emergency.

At 4.30am, Operation Rosario commences with Argentine special forces landing at Mullet Creek for a surprise attack on Moody Brook Barracks. The noise of automatic gunfire alerts the population in Stanley.

Argentine marines come ashore in amphibious vehicles at York Bay while a C-130 transport plane loaded with Argentine troops, lands at Stanley airfield. The Argentine troops move onto the road towards Stanley but are engaged by a section of Royal Marines commanded by Lt. Trollope. Two missiles hit an Argentine Amoured Personnel Carrier before the section retires. After finding Moody Brook empty of British troops, Argentine special forces attack Government House. They encounter well placed British defences, and suffer the first casualties of the war. Three Argentine prisoners are taken.

At 8.30 am, the main invasion force arrives off Port Stanley

9.15am: Surrounded, Governor Hunt negotiates a ceasefire with Rear-Admiral Carlos Bussers.

10.30am: Governor Rex Hunt formally surrenders the Falklands to General Osvaldo Garcia. Hunt refuses to shake Garcia’s hand, telling the General that; “This is British property and you are not invited”. Garcia responds; “It is very ungentlemanly of you to refuse to shake my hand” to which Hunt replies; “It is very uncivilised of you to invade my country.”

Brigadier General Mario Menendez is appointed governor of the ‘Islas Malvinas’. Rex Hunt, in full regalia, together with his family and the surrendered Marines, are airlifted to Montevideo.

At 4.30pm, the Governor’s telex-operator has a conversation with an operator in London.

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Britain was pondering the Submarine fleet before the cancellation of Davidoff’s contract, but they only had few ships in that area, of course you want to make believe total naivety of England a country that had more than 500 years in colonial wars, come on

 

[b787]

The No 2 VAV-8B, modified by McDonnell Douglas from a British-built AV-8A Harrier, was fitted with leading-edge root extensions (LERX) of the type already test-flown on a Harrier GR Mk 3 under MoD contract. The LERX serve to increase the turn rates of the AV-8B from a figure of about 14 deg/sec to at least 16 deg/sec

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Mirage III was more agile 17.5 deg/sec

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Conclusion Mirage was more agile but had inferior missiles

 

[Obi Wan Russell]

Britain was pondering the Submarine fleet before the cancellation of Davidoff’s contract, but they only had few ships in that area, of course you want to make believe total naivety of England a country that had more than 500 years in colonial wars, come on

Take a look at the 1981 Defence Review. Bulwark Paid off immediately. Hermes for scrap 1983. Invincible sold to Australia (transferring dec 82, only two years old), LPDs Fearless and Intrepid paid off, Intrepid to be sold to ARGENTINA! (Nobody at the Foreign Office questioned what they wanted with a Landing ship). An end to all mid life refits of British Warships, leaving the early type 42s (the oldest being only six years old at the time) lumbered with obsolete 1950s and 60s radars and weapons. Hardly the actions of a country preparing for a 'Colonial War'.

When informed by Admiral Leach that a Task Force was being made ready to sail, PM Thatcher had no idea that our last conventional Carrier HMS Ark Royal had been scrapped two years previously by her own government!

The Naivety of the British Political class has been proven beyond a shadow of a doubt. In the 60s 70s and 80s the British Political classes were obsessed with getting out of imperial entanglements, not prolonging them. That's why they abandoned conventional carriers in the first place.

Sadly, our politicians have only gotten worse since then...

 

[Miragedriver]

Mirage with all due respect you are not seeing what many analysis see.
The Malvinas war was and is an extension of the wars between Spain and England, Spain kicked the British from the Malvinas in 1770, by military force, in 1741 Blas de Lezo defeated the British in Cartagena de Indias (Colombia) you have to see Malvinas was part of the vice royalty the La Plata.

you can read about him

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England you know attacked Buenos Aires in 1807, you know their history of attacks to the Spanish world is old.

Galtieri did what he did because England dispatched a nuclear submarine in 1982 before the war started this forced the Argentine army to take the Islands earlier than planned.

Galtieri knew the war was not winnable with the US siding with England, he knew the war could be winnable only if a diplomatic solution was available before England could involve NATO in the war and only with American help to Argentina, England was NATO, you were a tiny nation of barely less than 30 million in 1982, you had no Chances, unless you would had done what Egypt did in 1956, asking the Soviets to threat England over the Suez channel; or what Cuba did in 1961 by deploying ICBMs in Cuban soil.


Chile and Argentina are not enemies but feudal remains of the vice royalty of la Plata and the Capitania de Chile obeyed more to geography than politics, keeping two Brothers angry at each other was essential for the British to control since 1821.

Galtieri did right, he did not renounced to the sovereignty of Malvinas, he did not involve Argentina with the Soviets, he brought Argentina`s main rival Brazil as an ally, he got our support to the Argentine claims, remember who did support you Speak Spanish, not English, in Fact Cuba was offering to Argentina, Soviet help, if Argentina would had accepted it, the risk of a really bad war or a crisis similar to 1961 Cuban crisis was real, so he knew, Mirage, he was not a fool, but he played his cards within the limits of possibilities well

First: Believe me my friend I do understand what you are saying. However, outside South America (and a few closed rooms in the UN) no one will entertain the thought of the island belonging to Argentina via inheritance form Spain. There are Britons on the island currently and they make up the population of the island. There is no sense or logic in taking the island and the only option would be a negotiated settlement. Which would have been possible at one time, but not after the 1982 war. I am a nationalist patriot, but I am also pragmatic. The well with the British has been poisoned and it will be a long time before they forget what happened, since it was a close fought war and their nation pride was hurt.


At this point the only logical option is to work with the British and hope that in a couple of generations of goodwill and cooperation the issue of joint administration can be tabled again as it was in 1978.


Second: Galtieri knew about the submarines and he had at least a week or two to move equipment by sea. Had plans been in place to move large amounts of equipment by sea, the islands might well have been made impenetrable to any task force the British might have raised. The Navy fleet was hardly large enough to go face to face with the Royal Navy, but it had plenty of time to escort merchant shipping to the islands without any possible opposition. Further, even after RN subs arrived on station, the modern Type 42 destroyers, and the anti-submarine assets of the ARA could have given respectable defense to convoys dashing back and forth. It would have been high risk, but no more high risk than having three World War II era ships ( ARA Belgrano and escorts) blindly sailing around to the South Atlantic with virtually no defense against modern submarines.


Third: Yes the Chileans are our enemy and always will be. They have had their eyes on the Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego for decades. See my post #5 https://www.sinodefenceforum.com/history-of-south-american-nation-inter-rivalry-and-arms-buildup.t6905/


This just adds more fuel to the fire in the animosity between Argentina and Chile:
'Without Chile's help, we would have lost the Falklands'

The man who acted as the clandestine go-between for Chile and Britain during the Falklands War has spoken for the first time about helping the SAS, reporting to Thatcher – and avoiding Pinochet
Chile's support for Britain during the Falklands War has been revealed for the first time by the man who was dispatched, with only hours notice, to secure a South American ally.

Sidney Edwards, now aged 80, was then a 47-year-old official in the RAF. In conditions of upmost secrecy, he was to play a key role in the conflict, awarded an OBE for his efforts – and believes that Chile's support was vital to the British victory.
Margaret Thatcher, the then-prime minister, was reportedly so reliant on his intelligence updates she nicknamed them "Sidgrams".

"My personal opinion – and I think one which was shared by my bosses at the Ministry of Defence and by Margaret Thatcher – is that the help we received from Chile was absolutely crucial," he said.
"Without it, we would have lost the war."

Publicly, Chile adopted a position of "strict neutrality" – a policy dictated by its need to defer to Latin American solidarity with Argentina and its own dispute with Argentina over the Beagle Channel.

Chile's support for the British campaign had been rumoured for many years, and was confirmed by the 2012 release of government documents under the 30 year rule.

But it is the first time that someone so intimately involved in the negotiations has told the full story.
Mr Edwards was chosen for the highly-sensitive mission because of his fluent Spanish – he had been seconded to Madrid with the RAF – and his experience of coordinating intelligence-sharing with other countries.
Arriving in Santiago, the Chilean capital, in the morning, he was meeting with Fernando Matthei – head of the Chilean air force – by the afternoon.

"General Matthei warmly shook my hand," said Mr Edwards. "He offered me his total cooperation, within the limits of practicality and what was diplomatically possible.

"He emphasised that it was essential to keep it a secret."
For reasons of security Mr Edwards was told to destroy all notes, he told Juan Pablo Garnham, a reporter for Chilean news magazine Que Pasa. But he insisted his memory was clear, and has written a book about the period, My Secret Falklands War, which is due to be published shortly.

One of his tasks was to coordinate the long-range radar, which was able to observe movements of Argentine forces in Ushuaia, Rio Gallegos, Rio Grande and Comodoro Rivadavia.

He also coordinated the arrival in Santiago of SAS troops, and the use of a Chilean airport on the island of San Felix – where several British planes were stationed, disguised in Chilean colours.
"The most important result was the early warnings of aerial attacks," he said. "Without these – when you have a naval force with only a small air defence, as we had – we would have had to maintain extremely expensive fighter patrols all the time, ready to intercept any intrusions."

Mr Edwards never met General Augusto Pinochet, the Chilean dictator, who ruled the country at the time.
"That was a deliberate decision," he said, adding that they crossed paths in corridors frequently. "He wanted to have a sort of escape clause, so that he could deny knowledge of my involvement.

"It seemed to me that if anything went wrong, he could say 'It was Matthei's fault, I didn't know what he was doing.'"
When an SAS mission involving a British Sea King helicopter went wrong, Mr Edwards was forced to hurriedly organise a press conference with a cover story that the helicopter had crashed on a routine journey.

When a Chilean reporter continued doggedly to pursue the story, Pinochet's officials dealt with him.
"When I asked Patricio Perez (an air force official) about the journalist, he smiled and said 'Don't worry – he is alive, but very shaken up,'" Mr Edwards said.

"I felt really bad for that reporter."

When the war was over, on June 14, Mr Edwards went to celebrate at a famous Chilean nightclub, Las Brujas – Chile's 1980s answer to Studio 54.

"Lots of our Chilean colleagues were there," he recalled. "And they seemed as happy about the victory as we were."

 

[FORBIN]

P.S.: By failing to improve the runway at Stanley, Argentina ensured that they would have to fight for air superiority over the islands. The distance from the mainland was such that virtually every advantage their Mirage and Dagger fighters had was squandered by the need to fly long distances just to reach the islands. Rather than being able to position a combat air patrol over Stanley and force the British Harriers to fly long distance strikes against them, they instead allowed the Royal Navy to operate relatively closely to the islands (and by staying about 100 miles east of the islands, they made it even harder for the Argentina's air assets to reach their task force). Harriers would have sufficient fuel to operate over the islands for as much as an hour at a time, whereas Argentine aircraft would have only enough time to drop munitions and dash, or they run out of fuel. The long range also meant that the Daggers and Mirages could not use their afterburners, and effectively reduced these Mach 2 interceptors to roughly the same speed as the Harriers.

Exact also Sea Harrier more agile to low altitude and armed with AIM-9L the more modern missile

 

[Miragedriver]

Additional info from my previous post for my Friend B787:

Further, the threat of war with Chile over the Beagle crisis meant that many of Argentina’s best units (volunteer army) were unavailable to serve in the Falkland/Malvinas. So instead of forces trained for cold wet climates in remote areas, units from northern, tropical Argentina were sent to the islands. Further, because of a lack foresight to move eqipment, virtually all troops were flown into the Falkland/Malvinas. This meant that while large numbers of troop units were on hand, very few of those units had the vehicles, clothing and equipment they needed. In essence, it was an unbalanced force. Large numbers of infantrymen without transport or heavy supporting arms are almost more a liability than an effective combat force. This is because they are not trained as infantry, but as mobile forces. Without the element of mobility these troops are now static and cannot be fully utilized.

 

[b787]

Exact also Sea Harrier more agile to low altitude and armed with AIM-9L the more modern missile

Harrier are not more agile.


The highest turn rate of a Mirage at sea level is 17.5 deg/sec, at sea level the early generation Harrier deployed in the Falklands/Malvinas the tightest turn is 14 deg/sec these are instantaneous turn rates.
Deltas bleed energy quicker than other wings true, but ITR means the delta can point the nose at the beginning of the fight at the enemy faster.

But AIM-9L is a missile that could be fired on a head to head encounter, it does not need to look at the jet nozzle infra red signature, the missiles of the Mirage or Nesher needed to see the nozzle, dogfighting means fuel burning something the Mirage could not do, add the AIM-9L, the FAA saw there was not point to fight harriers.
If Argentina would had received AIM-9Ls even the skyhawks would had downed Harriers.

A MiG-21 with AA-11 will trash any harrier armed with AIM-9Ls only thanks a better missile, Argentina lost because it did not have better missiles and the Mirage III had radars with limited radars with no lock down shot down capability.
This means the harrier could hide against the sea background forcing the Mirage to a low altitude fight where speed is more limited and acceleration has limitations high altitude means faster speeds