Interested in opinions and feedback.
I enjoyed it so much I almost feel bad for what I'm about to do. But like Aeschylus tells us in
Agamemnon: "
...we must suffer, suffer into truth." and this thread doesn't seem to have a devil's advocate.
Allow me.
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Let's start with America:
- The nature of American defense industry requires by law to focus on the company's fiduciary interest which is the delivery of shareholder value and not the delivery of the product to the end user which is the US government's armed forces. As far as the fundamental workings of the market are concerned the US legal system puts shareholders over consumers.
- The history of F-22 development needs to be analyzed in conjunction with the the consolidation of the defense industry in 1990s and the reduction of military spending following the end of the Cold War - from 4.9% GDP in 1991 to 3.1% GDP in 2000.
- The history of F-22 development needs to be analyzed in conjunction with the development of F-35 as the two programs are directly connected and form a comprehensive attempt of Lockheed to re-enter the fighter market which it lost after the problematic F-104.
Because of [1],[2] and [3] the development process will necessarily reflect attempts to maximize shareholder value in a changing environment and not robust product delivery.
This should be contrasted with conditions in China in terms of those three factors:
- Chinese defense industry is by default a consolidated entity in terms of control and ownership. It is controlled by the CPC which also directly controls the PLA - the end user of the product.
- The period following 1991 is characterized rapid growth in military spending in nominal terms. American military spending from 1991 to 2010 grows by 150% from $300bn to $750bn majority of which is consumed by war. Chinese military spending from 2000 to 2010 grows 1160% by from $10bn to $116bn none of which is consumed by war. The increase in real value is a separate question.
- The development of J-20 is a single process not influenced by the decisions of two established manufacturers with ongoing large orders for J-11/15/16 and J-10 respectively. J-20 was not an existential matter for CAC in the same way that F-22 and F-35 were for Lockheed.
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Here are some important dates and numbers to illustrate the conditions which Lockheed had to consider while
delivering shareholder value through ATF and JSF programs.
In
1986 the initial plans for the ATF call for
750 fighters at cost of $26.2 bn with
production beginning in 1994. The cost of $35m for ATF airframe is comparable to the 1990 program cost of a F-15E with a lantrin pod.
In
1986 (October) Lockheed (partnered with Boeing and General Dynamics) and Northrop (partnered with McDonnelDouglas) are selected for the final stage competition.
In
1990 a "Major Program Review" led by US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney reduces the number of ATF to
648 fighters - a
reduction of 13,6% compared to the previous figure. This review also cancells McDonnelDouglas/General Dynamics A-12 and reduces the orders for Northrop B-2 from 132 to 75 and for McDonnelDouglas C-17 from 210 to 120. B-2 orders will be reduced in 1992 from 75 to just 20 - the so called "death spiral".
In
1991 (April) Lockheed is awarded the contract for production of F-22 prototype and Pratt&Whitney is awarded the contract for the F119.
In
1991 (September) Lockheed enters in a
secret partnership with Yakovlev to
restrict access to Yak-141 technology to competitors as a protective measure for their own proprietary technology for the lifting fan. The funding provided by Lockheed was revealed to be approximately $400 million.
In
1993 Lockheed acquires from General Dynamics the F-16 manufacturing plant in Fort Worth. Lockheed at the time has no large-scale manufacturing facility for fighters as following the failure of F-104 it only manufactured specialized aircraft (F-117 - 64 airframes between 1981 and 1991) and large transport jets (C-5, C-130)
In
1993 JAST (Joint Advanced Strike Technology) is formed by USAF and USMC under inspiration from Lockheed. The lifting fan in the USMC variant is replaced by fuel tank for USAF variant which is found acceptable.
In
1994 JAST merges with CALF (Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter) formed by USN to create Joint Strike Fighter. The US Navy was forced into the JSF program through a series of cuts to F-14D as well as A-12 and NATF (naval F-22). The F/A-18E/F was approved in 1992 as a cheaper alternative to the F-14D and had its first flight in 1995. It was however always considered by USN as an interim fighter replacing preferred solutions for budgetary reasons.
In
1995 (March) Lockheed merges with Martin Marietta after a year of negotiations started in March of 1994.
In
1996 (November)the contract for the prototype for JSF is awarded to Lockheed and Boeing.
In
1997 the number of ATF Fighters - now officially F-22 - is further reduced to
339 fighters - a
reduction of 47,6% compared to the 1990 figure.
In
2001 (October) Lockheed is awarded the contract for the F-35.
No order for production of specific number of planes.
In
2003 the number of F-22 is further reduced to
277 fighters - a reduction of 18,2%.
In
2004 the number of F-22 is further reduced to
183 fighters - a reduction of 33,9%. This number is a formal
order for F-22. USAF makes a formal request for 381 fighters which is amended by Congress. The cost of the program in FY06 dollars is estimated at 62 bn. - approximately 339 million per airframe.
In
2009 (April) an
order for 2443 F-35 is announced.
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I think that knowledge of the timeline of business decisions influencing the development process is fundamental to understanding how unique both the F-22 and F-35 were as military procurement programs.
Contrary to what many might suspect it had very little to do with delays in the development of engines or radars which were provided separately from the airframe and integration by experienced world-leading manufacturers in their respective fields.
The F-22 was Lockheed's attempt to gain entry into the fighter market which at the time was dominated by McDonnelDouglas (F-15, F/A-18), General Dynamics (F-16) and Grumman (F-14). Interestingly the YF-17 was made by Northrop which further underscores the lagging position of Lockheed.
Lockheed was chosen as the lead company primarily because of its political connections and participation in the U-2, SR-71 and F-117 programs which absolutely meant that it was closest in connection to the intelligence community. Those connections and the resulting influencing of decision-makers and not the industrial capability or ongoing performance are the foundation of the company's financial success in the later decades. Understanding of it is also necessary to understand why it took so long for Lockheed to reach certain milestones both with the F-22 and F-35.
It was not
just the nature of the market but also the nature of the main player in the market.
If we look at F-22 and F-35 then between 1990 and 2010 we have a difficult shrinking market being cornered by a company that gained orders on the promise of delivery while it was acquiring the necessary know-how and production capability on the fly through leveraged acquisitions.
Comparison to an established state-owned manufacturer with an ongoing large-scale production will not yield meaningful conclusions. Almost everything about the production of J-20 will be different from F-22. From the overall market conditions (shrinking market vs growing market) through business decisions (shareholder value vs product delivery) to the specific development choices ( production of "complete F-22" vs production of J-20 with AL-31 and WS-10)
A more meaningful view of J-20 milestones would be gained from analysis of earlier programs - F-15, F-16, F/A-18 and the F-14 as a placebo group.
All of them were introduced in conditions of an expanding market with stable funding, none were "closed systems" like F-22 (see: F-16 and engines) and without consolidation affecting the planning of production. They were all revolutionary aircraft at their time in no way inferior in terms of technology to the F-22 at its time.
Fundamentally all economic activity is about predicting and managing human behaviour. Technology is just a by-product.
Stealth is not a game-changer. It is however the only proprietary technology and the only thing that Lockheed has to show for in the 1980s. What did Lockheed have - apart from thick envelopes for the right pockets - that made it the lead company in a team with General Dynamics and Boeing???
Just smile and wave boys. Smile and wave.
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A parting note: let's not get distracted into comparing F-35 to J-20. The only thing that these two programs have in common is that there's an aircraft involved somewhere. They couldn't be more different in their scope, goal or character.
