CV-18 Fujian/003 CATOBAR carrier thread

TK3600

Major
Registered Member
Carriers are capable combat platforms, but it also is a powerful political symbol. It signals China can be at anywhere ready to respond. Country feel more at ease relying on China diplomatically.

However a carrier is not something to rush for a war. It takes a long time to train good crew. It takes a long time to build. Carriers are long term projects. Doing it on a whim because "OMG WARZ COMING 2027" and you get a useless ship not ready for combat if war actually starts.

China's slow approach is wise.
 

kwaigonegin

Colonel
Carriers are capable combat platforms, but it also is a powerful political symbol. It signals China can be at anywhere ready to respond. Country feel more at ease relying on China diplomatically.

However a carrier is not something to rush for a war. It takes a long time to train good crew. It takes a long time to build. Carriers are long term projects. Doing it on a whim because "OMG WARZ COMING 2027" and you get a useless ship not ready for combat if war actually starts.

China's slow approach is wise.
I see where you're coming from however if I'm a naval planner I would completely disagree with your assessment.
Why?
For the simple reason that if you wait until a good time to build something, then youll never build anything.
PLAN has obviously reached the conclusion that they are now ready for deep blue water naval aviation and as such is aggressively building carriers and standing up the crew, airwing etc.
Once you stop that momentum, it'll be much harder to get it back on track.
Your assertion that PLAN should only build surface combatants because of existing threats to China is short sighted and naive. In the firseeable future I believe China will face even more threats including more assertive ones.
If that is the reason to not build carriers, then PLAN will have to settle on just 3 carriers for a very long time.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
I see where you're coming from however if I'm a naval planner I would completely disagree with your assessment.
Why?
For the simple reason that if you wait until a good time to build something, then youll never build anything.
PLAN has obviously reached the conclusion that they are now ready for deep blue water naval aviation and as such is aggressively building carriers and standing up the crew, airwing etc.
Once you stop that momentum, it'll be much harder to get it back on track.
Your assertion that PLAN should only build surface combatants because of existing threats to China is short sighted and naive. In the firseeable future I believe China will face even more threats including more assertive ones.
If that is the reason to not build carriers, then PLAN will have to settle on just 3 carriers for a very long time.

The discussion isn't about whether the PLAN should only build surface combatants and not build carriers.

The discussion is about whether it made sense for the PLAN to buy an additional CATOBAR carrier right after they built CV-18 Fujian.
The position that myself and some others have, is that not buying an additional CATOBAR carrier after CV-18 made sense, due to the anticipated strategic environment and tensions and their own capabilities in the timespan that an additional carrier may be combat effective by (2030) and the resources it would take to get it there and the opportunity cost of it.

That is done with an understanding that if they waited to buy follow on carriers, they would become combat capable in an environment where the PLA was on the whole more capable and better equipped to not only defend the carriers but to have a regional geostrategic balance that is more in their favour overall.
 

abc123

Junior Member
Registered Member
I think you're completely missing the point.
Money that is Not spent on building another CATOBAR carrier will instead be put to building other platforms for example destroyers, cruisers, or frigates. Nobody is suggesting the PLAN "saves" the money.

Asking, "Do you want 1 CATOBAR carrier or 2" is the Wrong question. A more appropriate question would be, "You must choose 1 of the 4 options (A, B, C, or D): what is it going to be?"

A) "Do you want 2 carriers?"
B) "Do you want 1 carrier and 8 cruisers?"
C) "Do you want 1 carrier and 12 destroyers?"
D) "Do you want 1 carrier and 20 frigates?"
No, question is: do you want to win the war or not? If yes, then you cannot keep peacetime spending at 1-2% of GDP when your enemy spends 3-4-5% for decades allready. China simply must turn on it's manufacturing capabilities on maximum, whatever is possible to build, it needs to be built.
 

ZeEa5KPul

Colonel
Registered Member
The discussion isn't about whether the PLAN should only build surface combatants and not build carriers.

The discussion is about whether it made sense for the PLAN to buy an additional CATOBAR carrier right after they built CV-18 Fujian.
The position that myself and some others have, is that not buying an additional CATOBAR carrier after CV-18 made sense, due to the anticipated strategic environment and tensions and their own capabilities in the timespan that an additional carrier may be combat effective by (2030) and the resources it would take to get it there and the opportunity cost of it.

That is done with an understanding that if they waited to buy follow on carriers, they would become combat capable in an environment where the PLA was on the whole more capable and better equipped to not only defend the carriers but to have a regional geostrategic balance that is more in their favour overall.
I want to expand on this and your previous observation about opportunity costs of conventional carrier acquisition. The primary capability the PLAN wants to get asap and what would be in contention with another carrier is SSNs. Recent progress on the 09-IIIB and possible 09-V, along with the expansion at Huludao, is very encouraging but China is still woefully underdeveloped in this area. This gap needs to be addressed quickly before and during the "period of maximum strategic danger" in 2025-2030.

Acquiring capable SSNs is a no-brainer for several reasons:
1. SSNs play a critical if not starring role in every naval operation from defense of China's coast to launching attacks on the US mainland.
2. China can buy a lot of them for the price of one carrier, and it needs a lot of them now.
3. Although the 09-IIIB is not the "final form", it's still more than adequate for a wide range of missions. It's quiet enough that it can't be passively detected; everything past that threshold is gravy.

By contrast, Fujian is fundamentally compromised by its propulsion. We're rightly very impressed by it and it does represent a massive leap in the PLAN's capability at this point in time, but in the grand sweep of the PLAN's history in the 21st century it's an L. Liaoning and Shandong are even bigger Ls. It's an L the PLAN will have to eat for half a century.

The carrier buildup should and I think will commence once a heavier, more capable, and most importantly nuclear-powered design is ready and when the PLAN's SSN fleet is respectable.
 

ZeEa5KPul

Colonel
Registered Member
Where does the "period of maximum strategic danger" in 2025-2030" originate?
In paper's like this?
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
No, that's Western cope. The period is most dangerous because it's when the power shift will happen. Before that and China is too weak, after that it's too strong. The transitional period is the most unstable.

There's a delusional idea in the US that somehow it will regain its military primacy over China in the 2030s, so China has a "closing window of opportunity" after which it will be too late. That's the opposite of the truth. What makes the period dangerous is that the US will come to the realization that it's now or never - either launch a war to put China in a box or accept that it will be forced out of the western Pacific.
 

gelgoog

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
You can tell that by looking at the gap that will show up in the US Navy once a lot of the older ships start getting retired. The US Navy will shrink more over the next 5 years at least. The Ticos and Los Angeles attack submarines are getting pretty long in the tooth by now.

They are going to retire like two Los Angeles attack submarines a year, but they build like one Virginia class attack submarine a year. The Ticos have no proper replacement. They claim they will increase Virginia production, but they also claim they will build the Columbia class at the same time. Good luck.

The LCS and Zumwalt hulls they built are also pretty much useless.

Their expectation is that they will be able to solve the production issues with existing ships, and introduce the Constellation class frigates next decade. But remains to be seen really.
 
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MarKoz81

Junior Member
Registered Member
@Blitzo is right but context is necessary to explain the real cost and benefits of carriers because without that information it seems like it's a mistake to not build them.

Carriers are capable combat platforms, but it also is a powerful political symbol.

Carriers are not a political symbol. USN carriers are a political symbol because that's how the US government decided to project its power and influence after 1991. But the reason for it is more complex.

During the cold war USN carriers were just a capital ship and their perception was countered by Soviet naval presence, particularly nuclear submarines. USN carrier deployment in the Gulf War was perceived in the same manner as during the cold war. I'm old enough to remember both well. Conversely when Kirovs entered service USN restored Iowas and they were presented as equivalent even though these two classes are nothing alike.

When funding cuts in the 1990s forced the reduction of the fleet it caused retirement of many nuclear-powered ships. All CGNs were retired. Thresher and Sturgeon SSNs were retired after only ~25 years of service. That threatened an entire cost-intensive industry so in order to protect it lobbying was intensified for CVN use as political tools. At the time USN had only 7 CVNs and (1993) only 12 carriers total (14 in late 80s and 15 in 1991). Truman - under construction at the time - initially was named "United States" so that it wouldn't be defunded! In the 2000s law was passed that mandated at minimum 11 carriers in service (as well as 31 amphibious ships).

CVNs were iconic and safe (no threat of Vietnam syndrome) so they were used as marketing props to sell interventionism to the public. And it stuck in public consciousness largely because there was no counter to it. People imagine that a carrier is an invincible superweapon when it is just a floating airfield that requires tremendous naval support to not become a target. Every CVN operates as part of a Carrier Strike Group composed of several escort ships all of which are Ticonderoga CGs or Arleigh Burke DDGs as well as 1-2 SSNs. So whenever you think of a "carrier" it really means a fleet that is larger and more powerful than the entire fleet of most countries as well as an air wing that is equal or larger than the air force of most countries. That's why a "carrier" really works.

But that was the 90s and early 00s when US had the stocks from the cold war and most of the world was underdeveloped. Right now CSG is not as potent in full spectrum warfare against most potential opponents. The technology gap has closed significantly. But the myth persists because people don't know better.

Carriers are offensive weapons. They project power beyond the reach of own shore. US needs it because it's separated geographically from the rest of the world by thousands of km. Even coasts of Colombia and Venezuela are ~2000km away from Florida.

The Soviet Union never developed carriers not because it couldn't do it but because from their geographical position it was easier to develop a land base in the region of interest and so committing resources to carrier development was inefficient. That's what the US did after 2014 with its strategy to counter Russia - they didn't move carriers to Europe but developed a series of bases for USAF in allied countries.

In 2017 in Syria an airbase of questionable quality was struck by ~50 cruise missiles. It was back in operation after two weeks of questionable quality engineering work. If you struck a carrier with just 10 cruise missiles it would be out of commission permanently. If you destroy an airbase it's still there to be restored. If you destroy a carrier it sinks and years of work are wasted. The logic of tradeoffs is different.

Country feel more at ease relying on China diplomatically.

So many misconceptions.

The reason why US could unilaterally influence politics had nothing to do with their military power and everything to do with their economic power. Countries didn't want to go to war against the US because it meant being cut off from the only source of economic growth in real terms. The military power of the US is grossly exaggerated while the economic influence is grossly underappreciated. And it's not about economic warfare that most focus on. Most economic warfare by the US doesn't work. What works is the "why fight when you can trade" incentive. All business is carrot and stick but stick only works because of the carrot. All stick and no carrot is what ended the Soviet Union. As soon as US runs out of carrots its stick will be useless. The thing that most anti-US people don't see is that the in most cases US is still offering plenty of carrots in secret for each public display of the stick.

Naval expansion always followed economic expansion and naval expansion is always followed by economic decline. Empires were built by high profit margins and were felled by unaffordable overheads. Spain built its fleet after it gained access to Americas with minimal effort and then stagnated into ruin. Britain took over Dutch colonial empire after it went bankrupt in European wars and expanded its fleet in 19th century as it grew then ran into Germany. USN only matched RN after WW1 when economic power moved across the Atlantic, and then it expanded again in WW2 on credit that was paid by Bretton Woods. Without those economic expansions USN has no sustainment and will shrink which is what's happening now after three decades of ~1% GDP funding. If funding collapses so does the navy - see RN. Fleet and power projection must be economically sustainable or it becomes a strategic trap like what happened to USN.

When the USSR was building its sphere of influence instead of building expeditionary fleets it expedited military technology and ideology. Instead of carriers it carried AK-47s, T-55s and MiG-21s to whoever was willing to pay lip service to Marxism-Leninism. They could build carriers but that would be less efficient. Loans for Chinese aircraft and airbase construction are more efficient than Chinese carriers in spreading influence.

To project power Americans need to cross the oceans so once they do they continue. China doesn't need to do the same.

It signals China can be at anywhere ready to respond.

That's late stage imperialism.

It's what the US has been doing in its decline phase. When US was in its ascent phase it rarely intervened directly.

Korea and Vietnam were about China in the unstable era under Mao. As soon as China stabilizes and relations normalize the US withdraws.

US intervenes in Middle East only after Bretton Woods collapse because they needed petrodollar recycling. Gulf War was about the dollar swings in the 80s due to Reagonomics and to constrain Japan. GWoT was about China.

WW2 happened because of WW1 and the economic disaster in the 30s. And WW1 was an accident, a mistake that nobody is willing to make again - except Russia. Cold War was cold even when US had the advantage in nukes and bombers and everyone thought nuclear weapons have no environmental effects. It was cold when Vietnam gutted US military in Europe and Soviets had complete overmatch.

Get your history straight and the logic of Chinese military strategy will become clear, CMC will say "no carriers now" and you will respond "excellent idea comrade".

Not really OT but EOT.

--------

Context of CVN strategy from older posts:



East Asia - i.e. coastal China, Japan, Korea, SCS and soon likely Indonesia - are regions where carriers are not a priority for tactical reasons. India and Siberia are just across the border with core regions away from coast. The Gulf is not much further away.

Parting note:

In the immediate future if Chinese carriers run into American carriers in open sea they will lose. US has more of them and it has better skills. That's a fact. Carrier and submarine ops are the two areas where US has skill advantage that can't be neutralised by building more things. That gap needs to close first before it's practical to build more. Otherwise it's just sending people to die unnecessarily.
 
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vincent

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Moderator - World Affairs
@Blitzo is right but context is necessary to explain the real cost and benefits of carriers because without that information it seems like it's a mistake to not build them.



Carriers are not a political symbol. USN carriers are a political symbol because that's how the US government decided to project its power and influence after 1991. But the reason for it is more complex.

During the cold war USN carriers were just a capital ship and their perception was countered by Soviet naval presence, particularly nuclear submarines. USN carrier deployment in the Gulf War was perceived in the same manner as during the cold war. I'm old enough to remember both well. Conversely when Kirovs entered service USN restored Iowas and they were presented as equivalent even though these two classes are nothing alike.

When funding cuts in the 1990s forced the reduction of the fleet it caused retirement of many nuclear-powered ships. All CGNs were retired. Thresher and Sturgeon SSNs were retired after only ~25 years of service. That threatened an entire cost-intensive industry so in order to protect it lobbying was intensified for CVN use as political tools. At the time USN had only 7 CVNs and (1993) only 12 carriers total (14 in late 80s and 15 in 1991). Truman - under construction at the time - initially was named "United States" so that it wouldn't be defunded! In the 2000s law was passed that mandated at minimum 11 carriers in service (as well as 31 amphibious ships).

CVNs were iconic and safe (no threat of Vietnam syndrome) so they were used as marketing props to sell interventionism to the public. And it stuck in public consciousness largely because there was no counter to it. People imagine that a carrier is an invincible superweapon when it is just a floating airfield that requires tremendous naval support to not become a target. Every CVN operates as part of a Carrier Strike Group composed of several escort ships all of which are Ticonderoga CGs or Arleigh Burke DDGs as well as 1-2 SSNs. So whenever you think of a "carrier" it really means a fleet that is larger and more powerful than the entire fleet of most countries as well as an air wing that is equal or larger than the air force of most countries. That's why a "carrier" really works.

But that was the 90s and early 00s when US had the stocks from the cold war and most of the world was underdeveloped. Right now CSG is not as potent in full spectrum warfare against most potential opponents. The technology gap has closed significantly. But the myth persists because people don't know better.

Carriers are offensive weapons. They project power beyond the reach of own shore. US needs it because it's separated geographically from the rest of the world by thousands of km. Even coasts of Colombia and Venezuela are ~2000km away from Florida.

The Soviet Union never developed carriers not because it couldn't do it but because from their geographical position it was easier to develop a land base in the region of interest and so committing resources to carrier development was inefficient. That's what the US did after 2014 with its strategy to counter Russia - they didn't move carriers to Europe but developed a series of bases for USAF in allied countries.

In 2017 in Syria an airbase of questionable quality was struck by ~50 cruise missiles. It was back in operation after two weeks of questionable quality engineering work. If you struck a carrier with just 10 cruise missiles it would be out of commission permanently. If you destroy an airbase it's still there to be restored. If you destroy a carrier it sinks and years of work are wasted. The logic of tradeoffs is different.



So many misconceptions.

The reason why US could unilaterally influence politics had nothing to do with their military power and everything to do with their economic power. Countries didn't want to go to war against the US because it meant being cut off from the only source of economic growth in real terms. The military power of the US is grossly exaggerated while the economic influence is grossly underappreciated. And it's not about economic warfare that most focus on. Most economic warfare by the US doesn't work. What works is the "why fight when you can trade" incentive. All business is carrot and stick but stick only works because of the carrot. All stick and no carrot is what ended the Soviet Union. As soon as US runs out of carrots its stick will be useless. The thing that most anti-US people don't see is that the in most cases US is still offering plenty of carrots in secret for each public display of the stick.

Naval expansion always followed economic expansion and naval expansion is always followed by economic decline. Empires were built by high profit margins and were felled by unaffordable overheads. Spain built its fleet after it gained access to Americas with minimal effort and then stagnated into ruin. Britain took over Dutch colonial empire after it went bankrupt in European wars and expanded its fleet in 19th century as it grew then ran into Germany. USN only matched RN after WW1 when economic power moved across the Atlantic, and then it expanded again in WW2 on credit that was paid by Bretton Woods. Without those economic expansions USN has no sustainment and will shrink which is what's happening now after three decades of ~1% GDP funding. If funding collapses so does the navy - see RN. Fleet and power projection must be economically sustainable or it becomes a strategic trap like what happened to USN.

When the USSR was building its sphere of influence instead of building expeditionary fleets it expedited military technology and ideology. Instead of carriers it carried AK-47s, T-55s and MiG-21s to whoever was willing to pay lip service to Marxism-Leninism. They could build carriers but that would be less efficient. Loans for Chinese aircraft and airbase construction are more efficient than Chinese carriers in spreading influence.

To project power Americans need to cross the oceans so once they do they continue. China doesn't need to do the same.



That's late stage imperialism.

It's what the US has been doing in its decline phase. When US was in its ascent phase it rarely intervened directly.

Korea and Vietnam were about China in the unstable era under Mao. As soon as China stabilizes and relations normalize the US withdraws.

US intervenes in Middle East only after Bretton Woods collapse because they needed petrodollar recycling. Gulf War was about the dollar swings in the 80s due to Reagonomics and to constrain Japan. GWoT was about China.

WW2 happened because of WW1 and the economic disaster in the 30s. And WW1 was an accident, a mistake that nobody is willing to make again - except Russia. Cold War was cold even when US had the advantage in nukes and bombers and everyone thought nuclear weapons have no environmental effects. It was cold when Vietnam gutted US military in Europe and Soviets had complete overmatch.

Get your history straight and the logic of Chinese military strategy will become clear, CMC will say "no carriers now" and you will respond "excellent idea comrade".

Not really OT but EOT.

--------

Context of CVN strategy from older posts:



East Asia - i.e. coastal China, Japan, Korea, SCS and soon likely Indonesia - are regions where carriers are not a priority for tactical reasons. India and Siberia are just across the border with core regions away from coast. The Gulf is not much further away.

Parting note:

In the immediate future if Chinese carriers run into American carriers in open sea they will lose. US has more of them and it has better skills. That's a fact. Carrier and submarine ops are the two areas where US has skill advantage that can't be neutralised by building more things. That gap needs to close first before it's practical to build more. Otherwise it's just sending people to die unnecessarily.
Carriers are useful in a Taiwan Island blockade scenario. One at the north and one at the south can provide air cover to the blockading ships so land based aircrafts don’t have to fly over the island to get to the east side.
 
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