Those are all reasonable points, and I personally do think that four carriers (including two 003s) by the late 2020s could still very much have a useful role even though it would likely be well below the ideal minimum number of carriers and even if it may suffer from a questionable degree of subsurface escort capability.
But redirection of the available military funding to other measures with less risk of being a potential liability or being more cost effective for the 2025-2030 period is also something to consider -- SSKs, aircraft, land based missiles, or even procuring capabilities so that the PLA can conduct a Taiwan contingency more effectively (like SAR pods, PGMs, medium amphib ships).
If we do indeed take pop3's information seriously and interpret it to mean that the fourth carrier will be the CVN, I think we should consider the variety of scenarios and possible rationales that could underlie the scenarios, and one of those scenarios is that it is a possibility that it is only slated to enter service after 2030 (meaning China will remain at three carriers throughout the mid to late 2020s), and it isn't a miniscule possibility either.
Now, IMO it is too early to make a concrete call, but I think we should definitely keep our minds open.
The biggest question for the fourth carrier (i.e.: first CVN) now for us, is when it is expected. It's basically a ticking clock now. Because if fabrication work on it doesn't begin before 2025, then there is absolutely zero chance of it even being ready to "enter service" before 2030, let alone achieving anything resembling combat effectiveness.
Shouldn't we better move the last pages of discussion in a new thread for the forth carrier?