CV-18 Fujian/003 CATOBAR carrier thread

[Gloire_bb]

Since 16 and 17 would be made obsolete much quicker by newer design when they still have considerable service life left, it wouldn't be too out of a question even if it trade some of other performance characteristic for a catapult.

Please define obsolescence for a class of two carriers.

 

[Daniel707]

A Super-Carrier indeed

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1426162975686107141

 

[plawolf]

I suspect a lot of folks expressing sentiments like these are underestimating both the time and cost required to modify CV-16 and CV-17 for catapult operations. It could well be half the cost of a new 003-type carrier and take almost as long as it would to build a new 003. Add to this that operating costs would be similar over a defined period, and the case for take an existing carrier out of service for an extended period of time, modifying it, and then returning it to service begins to lose its appeal against the alternative of simply building more carriers, faster.

Where the hell did you pull that ‘half the cost of a new 003’ figure from?

Loosing the skip jump is a major structural change, but hardly significant as it is always far easier to chop bits off than to try and add on major parts, and pretty much on par with the bridge cut down exercise China did on the Liaoning when the hull first arrived.

Adding the catapult channels and associated power supply will also be major jobs, but will only affect surface levels so again comparatively minor compared to something like a propulsion change which will need you to effectively gut the ship to get at the relevant parts.

The overwhelming majority of the cost of a warship comes from its electronics, weapons and propulsion with the hull only being a tiny fraction. Thats the materials and labour costs to build the entire hull. A structural upgrade at surface level is only to cost a tiny fraction of the tiny fraction of the hull fabrication cost.

None of the major systems needs any changes (although the radar and other electronics may also be upgraded during a MLU, but that would not be costs associated with a catapult upgrade). So pray tell how you can possibly arrive at such a ludicrous figure

Given the timeline of Chinese EMCAT development and standard Chinese planning practices, it is very likely that 002 already have structural design features baked into the design to allow it to be later retrofitted for EMCATs, which would make any modifications need far less costly and time consuming.

The principle benefit of having catapults is to allow the carrier to launch fighters with significantly enhanced loads and ranges; massively expand the types of aircraft it can accommodate to include critically important support assets like AWACS, dedicated tankers and maybe future EW planes; drones and future naval fifth gen fighters.

You also gain the benefit from logistics of being able to streamline your carrier air wings and don’t need to continue supporting legacy non-CATOBAR J15s, which can be retired or relegated to training roles until their airframe hours are exhausted. This will also allow easy cross deck operation and deployment of carrier air wings, where any carrier air wing can operate off of any carrier.

The overall benefits are so overwhelming it’s essentially a no-brainer.

 

[Suetham]

Not sure it this has been discussed previously in this thread, is 003 purely IEP as in main engine/s only generate electricity or partially IEP?

I also wanted to know. I saw an article talking about FEP too. To this day I don't know the particularities of each system, such as IEP, FEP, IFEP, IPS and IPES.

 

[xiabonan]

Another way to get catapults onto CV16 and CV17 is just to install them on the angled deck. You don't even have to get rid of the ski jump. Even just 1 catapult will help a lot.

 

[xiabonan]

A lot of the Chinese destroyers underwent bigger structural changes than installing a catapult on the angled deck I would imagine. Think the 167 and the Sovremny class.

 

[Lethe]

Queen Elizabeth build cost 3.1 billion pounds each.

Estimated cost of proposed CATOBAR conversion 2 billion pounds i.e. 1 billion pounds each.

So CATOBAR conversion for the QE's was pegged at 30% of the cost of a new-build ship and abandoned.

This in a ship where allowances had already been made in the initial design to accommodate catapults if desired, that involved intervening in an in-progress (as opposed to finished) construction program, and where the ramp was not a structural component of the ship as it is on Liaoning/Shandong.

Given these factors, 30% of a new-build carrier cost should be considered as minimum for an equivalent undertaking for Liaoning/Shandong. And unlike the British example, PLAN would be removing one or two of its carriers from service for an extended period of time in an era of great strategic uncertainty, the end result would still be inferior to a new-build carrier, and similar operating costs between old and new (003-type) carriers would further diminish the cost-effectiveness of such a program.

The strategic argument alone (i.e. taking carriers out of service when one can ill afford to do so) should be enough to sink a major conversion proposal for CV-16/CV-17 unless it can be demonstrated that such a conversion can be achieved both rapidly and inexpensively.

 

[Gatekeeper]

Queen Elizabeth build cost 3.1 billion pounds each.

Estimated cost of proposed CATOBAR conversion 2 billion pounds i.e. 1 billion pounds each.

So CATOBAR conversion for the QE's was pegged at 30% of the cost of a new-build ship and abandoned.

This in a ship where allowances had already been made in the initial design to accommodate catapults if desired, that involved intervening in an in-progress (as opposed to finished) construction program, and where the ramp was not a structural component of the ship as it is on Liaoning/Shandong.

I'm not sure you got thus right.its more correct to say it's 25% than 30%. Thr reason as you stated the design did incorporate catapult from the start. And it the catapult version that was ordered. It was subsequently cut back due to pressure on the U.K. finances. So it should be looked at as £4b carrier cutting back to a £3b carrier. A 25% reduction. I know this is semantic, but it is important when you are using it to justify not conversion on the strength of the proportion of the original cost. Sorry that's the accountant in me speaking.

So as we can see, it's already down from originally half (50%) claimed by you to 30% claimed by you to 25% as per my claim. That's a massive reduction in anyone's book.

 

[subotai1]

The main physical limitation on likely service life of 001, 002, and 003 would be they will be the only boiler powered warship in PLAN, indeed they may become the only boiler powered ship of any kind under Chinese flag, before long. So they will likely be disproportionately expensive to support and maintain in another 2-3 decades.

I would actually argue the opposite. There is one thing you can do with conventionally powered warships much easier than you can do with nuclear powered ones. That is "mothball" them. Its not too hard to take one of those conventional ships and lay if up for years before you reuse it. And I suspect the days of needing a fairly unsophisticated, flat-topped warship just to launch and retrieve drones is almost here. So those old hulks will have a use.

 

[Volpler11]

Queen Elizabeth build cost 3.1 billion pounds each.

Estimated cost of proposed CATOBAR conversion 2 billion pounds i.e. 1 billion pounds each.

So CATOBAR conversion for the QE's was pegged at 30% of the cost of a new-build ship and abandoned.

This in a ship where allowances had already been made in the initial design to accommodate catapults if desired, that involved intervening in an in-progress (as opposed to finished) construction program, and where the ramp was not a structural component of the ship as it is on Liaoning/Shandong.

Given these factors, 30% of a new-build carrier cost should be considered as minimum for an equivalent undertaking for Liaoning/Shandong. And unlike the British example, PLAN would be removing one or two of its carriers from service for an extended period of time in an era of great strategic uncertainty, the end result would still be inferior to a new-build carrier, and similar operating costs between old and new (003-type) carriers would further diminish the cost-effectiveness of such a program.

The strategic argument alone (i.e. taking carriers out of service when one can ill afford to do so) should be enough to sink a major conversion proposal for CV-16/CV-17 unless it can be demonstrated that such a conversion can be achieved both rapidly and inexpensively.

From this:

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Research by the National Audit Office reveals an exceptionally lax assessment had been done of the true cost of CATOBAR conversion in 2010. Part of the problem was the ‘adaptable carrier’ just had some empty spaces that could theoretically be used to take CATOBAR equipment but no detailed design work had ever been done. The specifics of the commercial contract are not public but it is unclear just how mature the CATOBAR elements were supposed be. There is some suggestion the MoD had effectively paid for a ‘feature’ that the ACA had ignored, once STVOL configuration had be decided on.

The head of the MoD at the time, Sir Bernard Gray said that General Atomics had significantly raised the price of the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) , Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) and related equipment by more than £200M to £577M between 2010-12 and the costs of technical assistance had added another £150M. This is at odds with the fact that US Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, Sean J Stackley wrote to Defence Procurement Minister, Peter Luff pricing equipment at £458 million and promising the US would underwrite any further cost risk. The USN was keen to help the RN rejoin the CATOBAR club.

The cost of conversion work quoted by the Aircraft Carrier Alliance had also risen by over £100M. Original estimates did not make any allowance for UK industry testing and commissioning It was also ‘discovered’ that as a Foreign Military Sale, the purchase of EMALS would be subject to absurd Treasury rules that added VAT amounting to around £130M.

It was not really in BAE Systems’ commercial interest to fit cats and traps as it could potentially allow a much wider choice of carrier aircraft than just the F35B in which they had a significant stake. Some have speculated that the ACA, of which BAES was a major shareholder, was quite happy to see the quotes inflated. This is pure speculation and either way, it is clear the project was subject to genuine significant cost rises.

The other data point is the conversion cost of INS Vikramaditya at 2.4b but that involves more work. Neither are really applicable here due to different efficiency and cost of shipyards.