Note: Half of the Post Translated; The Remaining Half is Speculative
Complete Original of the Post (in Russian) Can Be Found at Eugene-DF LiveJournal
In the disseminated intercept, the place from which the missile was allegedly launched is clearly indicated: the checkpoint at the settlement of Chernukhino.
Pay close attention at the Alleged Map of the MH17 Catastrophe.
As you can see, the distance from the point of launch to the point of the fall is 37 kilometres. At the same time, the elevation of the plane was 10-11 kilometres. For the Russian BUK M2 this distance is, in fact, achievable (although with a very important caveat discussed below).
However, Ukraine does not, and cannot, have modern digital high-tech Anti-Aircraft systems in its arsenal. What it does have, at best, is the older version BUK M1. The system itself is not too bad, and could even fit the stated distance. Except for the caveat that was mentioned.
The thing is that most short to medium range Anti-Aircraft systems work extremely poorly in a “pursuit” mode. There are a number of reasons for this, and I do not intend to belabor the point, but you can take it as an axiom that when the launch is made in “pursuit” of the target, the maximum distance of the launch that successfully hits the target is at least half of the advertised maximum distance (in reality, it even worse, but let’s leave aside the sad part). Accordingly, the real distance of a “pursuit” launch for BUK M1 is 16 kilometres. What’s more, the last 3 kilometres are purely “God willing” and “without guarantees.”
And, so, we have the background. Let’s see how the picture unfolds:
The launch is alleged to have been made from Chernukhino. The maximum distance of the launch is 16 kilometres. The aircraft fell between Snezhnoye and Torez. That’s 37 kilometres, which is 20 kilometres more than the maximum possible point at which the plain could have been hit. You know, even a plane with turned-off engines can’t glide like that. But the trouble is that the aircraft was not whole.
According to the pattern of the spread of fuselage fragments and bodies, the plane was ruptured practically with the first shot. Here it must be mentioned that the high-explosive/fragmentation warhead of the rocket has a mass of approximately 50 kilograms (by the way, Ukrainians have an outdated modification, which is only 40 kilograms).
Overall, that’s not too little; however, it must be understood that it detonates not when it sticks into an airplane, but when it is still at a certain, and fairly significant distance. Moreover, the main strike factor is not the blast wave, but far more significantly – the stream of fragments. These fragments are previously prepared rods (and in the earlier versions – little cubes, if I recall correctly). And yes, for a jet fighter, that, in itself, is more than sufficient.
However, here we are dealing with a huge airliner. Yes, one rocket will rip the casing, cause depressurization, and will kill a lot of passengers. But it will not break up the airliner into pieces. Given certain conditions, the pilots may even be able to land it. And, in fact, there have been precedents (to be provided in future posts). For example – the very same An-28, which is alleged to have been the first victim of a BUK system; even though it was done for, but the crew was able to successfully catapult out. Which, in some way, symbolizes. An An-28, by the way, is far smaller than a Boeing.
Nevertheless, this has relation to the next part of our analysis. For now, let’s accept as a fact the break-up of the aircraft in the air, at a significant height (which is, in essence, what was observed. Allow me to remind you: “fragments spread over a radius of 15 kilometres.” The key here is that this means the following: the aircraft (or, more precisely, the core of the aircraft) fell literally at the point where the rocket impacted it. Clarifying: as soon as the aircraft turned into a host of fragments of different mass, the separation of these fragments began due to air resistance and the difference in inertia. The densest fragment flew a further 3-6 kilometres, falling more and more steeply. The lightest – spread out and, due to gliding and air currents, fell somewhere within a 10 kilometre radius. The medium ones (primarily pieces of casing with high sail-effect and the victims’ bodies) – fell almost vertically.
In other words, the rocket caught up to the plane no closer than 25 kilometres away from Chernukhino. Which is absolutely impossible for a BUK system.
By the way, we can’t overlook the fact that, at maximum distances, BUK can be used only provided there is support from an external radar installation for location and guiding purposes. In other words, even if a rockets flies far, BUK’s mobile radar does not cover its entire distance.
Accordingly, if SBU’s video above is not fake, then, to our surprise, we discover that it was literally impossible for the aircraft to be shot down by the rebel’s BUK. By the way, what exactly this BUK was doing in Chernukhino with the Cossacks is pretty much inexplicable. It is 60 kilometres whether you go to Donetsk or to Lugansk from there, and this BUK would be unable to protect the skies over either of the key cities. Nor are there any hostilities in the area. It’s also strange for the Militia to expect enemy planes there – it’s not like the pilots are their own enemies to make such detours over the enemy’s territory, is it? Well, all right. As I already stated, let’s accept, for the moment, that the intercept is not fake.
