RedMercury
Junior Member
Um. 100mm AAA brought down F117? Pardon me while I find this unbelievable.
Chinese SAM
- Thread starter tphuang
- Start date
The article below says that Russian air-defense system sold to Syria and Iran doesn't work against incoming aircraft. My question is: China's SAM tech is largely based on Russian model, or even imported from Russia. Does this mean that China doesn't have formidable air-defense? This article makes me think twice about the air-defense system. This article seems to be balanced, realistic, and well-supported. Please educate me on this issue, especially you guys who knows much about SAM and the current strength of Chinese air-force.
PS: Sorry it's too long, but it's worth it
Tale of the Tape
The USAF vs. China.
by Stuart Koehl
10/15/2007 3:00:00 PM
China's Buk-M1-2 SAMIN ASSESSING THE Chinese military buildup there is a tendency to swing from one extreme to the other--either to minimize the threat or to blow it entirely out of proportion. An example of this can be found in a an October 11 article in the New York Times by David Lague, "China Announces Gain in Air Defense." Drawing on press releases by the Chinese Ministry of Defense, Lague writes:
A senior officer from Chinese Air Force headquarters, Fang Lei, said a seamless network of all-weather air defense radars had been installed to cover all Chinese airspace, according to a report on the Web site of the official military newspaper, the Liberation Army Daily.
The network's detection and surveillance capability was "very close" to those deployed in developed countries and could also assist Chinese forces in offensive operations, the report quoted Mr. Fang as saying.
Lague cites sources that point to China's air defense buildup as a response to Taiwan's development of an long-range land-attack cruise missile (LACM) with the potential to hit Chinese targets as far off as Shanghai. He also notes that the new air defense capability supplements China's already potent offensive missile force (consisting of both LACMs and short-to-medium range ballistic missiles) and growing numbers of modern tactical fighters.
In addition to having a direct effect on the security of Taiwan (by diminishing its ability to respond to a Chinese attack), Lague also notes that it has implications for the United States:
China's arms buildup could also pose challenges to the United States if it is drawn into a conflict with Beijing over Taiwan. The commander of American forces in Japan, Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright, told The Associated Press earlier this month that China's air defenses were now almost impenetrable to the American F-15 and F-16 aircraft stationed in Asia.
Only the stealthy F-22 or the Joint Strike Fighter still under development could carry out missions over China, he said. "Our planes are much older than the planes they would be matched against," Mr. Wright said, the Associated Press reported.
"For the first time in history, we are seeing another nation, in this case China, with newer fighters than we have."
All of which sounds extremely ominous--but just how ominous is it?
China has indeed been building up its air defenses for the past decade, acquiring the latest in Russian air defense missiles and developing some interesting weapon systems of their own. Among these are:
S-300P (NATO Designation SS-10), a mobile long-range area defense missile with a range of more than 100 km (against high altitude targets). Designed to engage the U.S. supersonic Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM) using the same sort of "track via missile" guidance as the MIM-104 Patriot, it is widely considered one of the most capable Russian air defense systems because of its mobility, speed, accuracy and flexibility.
S-300V (NATO Designation SS-12), a very long-range missile that uses the same launcher and control station as the SA-10, but with radar systems optimized to detect and track tactical ballistic missiles. Combining aspects of the U.S. Patriot PAC-3 and the Theater-Area High Altitude Air Defense System (THAADS), the SA-12 system encompasses two different missiles--the SA-12A Gladiator and the SA-12B Giant.
9M331 Tor M1 (NATO Designation SS-15 Gauntlet), a mobile, short-range, low-to-very low altitude air defense systems consisting of a self-propelled tracked Transporter-Erector-Launcher-and-Radar (TELAR) with eight vertically-launched missiles. Highly maneuverable, with a range of 1-12 km and capable of engaging targets at tree-top height, the Tor system was designed to engage helicopters, UAVs, cruise missiles and low-flying attack aircraft.
BUK M1-2 (NATO Designation SA-17 Grizzly), a medium-range, radar-guided missile similar to the U.S. Army's HAWK or the Navy's Standard MR-2 missiles, has a range of about 50-75 km and is capable of engaging targets from 25 to 25,000 meters.
China has also initiated a number of indigenous air defense missile programs, among which are:
Kaishan 1, a medium-range, semi-active homing missile apparently derived from the U.S. Army's HAWK missile system.
Lie Ying (LY)-60, a short-range low-altitude semi-active missile based on the U.S. AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missile of the Vietnam War era.
FT-2000, apparently a derivative of the Russian S-300P, but equipped with an anti-radiation guidance system that allows it to home in on airborne radar sets.
Of these, the last is the most interesting and presents the most serious threat. The first known ground-to-air anti-radiation missile (ARM), it is apparently designed to counter U.S. airborne early warning (AEW) systems such as the E-2C Hawkeye and E-3 AWACS, upon which U.S. air forces rely for "situational awareness." So integral have these AEW systems become to U.S. air warfare that it is difficult to imagine how our forces would operate in their absence. Given the range of the basic SA-10, at the very least the existence of such weapons would force an increase of the "stand-off" range at which we would deploy such aircraft, thereby reducing proportionally the distance they could look into Chinese airspace. The FT-2000 would also be extremely effective against the E-8 JSTARS ground surveillance aircraft, which provides critical targeting data for U.S. long-range precision strike systems.
In addition to these, the Chinese People's Liberation Army is liberally provided with shoulder-fired short-range missiles similar to Stinger, as well as 14.5mm, 23mm and 57mm anti-aircraft guns, which are still deadly to low-flying aircraft.
At face value, then, the Chinese forces have acquired some very formidable air defense systems, but a deeper looks shows that there is much less here than meets the eye. An air defense system is more than a mere aggregation of radars, missile launchers and control stations. To be effective, they must be netted together in an integrated system, so that all the elements can be coordinated, so that potential gaps are covered, and so that the strengths of one system compensate for the weaknesses of another. In such integrated air defense systems, the command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) system has always proven to be the weakest link. By jamming or destroying area surveillance radars, knocking out command centers, or neutralizing communications links, the system devolves into a collection of independent batteries and battalions, each of which is much less effective than when acting as part of an integrated system.
To avoid this, modern air defense systems such as those developed in Yugoslavia, Syria, and Iraq have placed most of their critical command structure underground and installed buried, triply-redundant fiber-optic communications networks. Note that the Chinese press release states that the Chinese air defense systems "is very close" to those deployed by "developed" nations.
But even those systems have not proven immune from attack, and even if they can't be totally knocked out, their effectiveness can be degraded by neutralizing relay nodes and by "poking out its eyes" by destroying surveillance radars. This is one reason why the U.S. developed the F-117 Nighthawk and other "stealth" fighters, as well as conventional land-attack cruise missiles.
Stealth doesn't really render an aircraft or missile "invisible" to radar, but rather limits the range at which it can be detected. By degrading radar detection range, the stealth aircraft or missile creates "holes" in radar coverage that allow it to approach close enough to targets to engage without being spotted.
If the stealth systems are supported by active jamming aircraft, radar effectiveness is even more degraded. Knocking out radars and missile batteries is one of the key functions of stealth systems. This enlarges the holes in the air defense umbrella, unmasking other critical targets and also making the remaining air defense elements more vulnerable. A coherent "Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses" (SEAD) campaign can exploit the weaknesses in any integrated air defense system and either "roll it back" by incrementally destroying its individual batteries, or simply neutralizing the entire system for a given period of time.
The Israelis totally demolished the Syrian air defense system in and around the Bekaa Valley in 1982--even though it was a fully integrated system equipped with state-of-the-art Soviet weapons (the failure of the Syrian air defenses was reportedly a turning point in the Cold War, since it convinced Soviet military planners that their own air defenses in Eastern Europe could not neutralize NATO airpower).
More recently, we have seen Israeli aircraft penetrate Syrian airspace (now protected by the same types of Russia systems deployed by the Chinese), apparently without even being detected until after their attack (See Rick Moran's article "Russian Air Defense System Leaves Much to be Desired"). Remember, the Israeli air force did this using the same sort of F-15 Strike Eagle aircraft as flown by the U.S. Air Force.
Which brings us to USAF Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright's statement that China's air defenses were "almost impenetrable" to U.S. aircraft, and that only the stealthy F-22 or the Joint Strike fighter could carry out missions over China. This is almost assuredly hyperbole, intended mainly for the ears of lawmakers on Capital Hill pondering the Air Force FY 2009 Budget Request. It is almost certain that, with proper planning and tactics, the U.S. could make short work of the Chinese air defense system, using systems already in the inventory, including jamming aircraft, cruise missiles, UAVs, decoy systems, anti-radiation missiles, and precision-guided bombs. Certainly there would be losses in doing this, but in the context of a war with China, these would certainly be in the acceptable range.
Does this mean that the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter are needless fripperies? Hardly--they are in fact vital, but not for the reason given by General Wright. There are two pressing reasons to procure both aircraft now, and in quantity. First is the general age of the U.S. tactical fighter force, which is now in excess of 20 years. Given our high operational tempo, these planes are wearing out faster than anticipated, and as they age, the cost of maintaining them will skyrocket, while readiness rates will fall--this is inevitable as a fleet ages (owners of used cars understand this, but probably not Congressmen). The second is the fact that the F-15 and F-16 (and to a lesser extent, the FA-18) are all 1970s-vintage technology, and to some extent outclassed by the last generation of Russian fighters, particularly the Su-27/30 Flanker family of fighters now being produced in China.
Last year, the USAF staged a joint exercise with the Indian air force, another Flanker operator--and our F-15s were beaten (or at best, barely held their own). The Flanker can be armed with an array of long-range missiles equivalent or better than the AIM-120 AMRAAM, as well as short-range dogfight missiles that can be launched more than 120 off-boresight (i.e., at a target over the pilot's shoulder). They are also equipped with helmet-mounted sights that allow the pilot to lock onto a target merely by looking at it, and not by maneuvering his aircraft. The Flanker also has extraordinary maneuverability thanks to its advanced aerodynamic features, high power-to-weight ratio, and 2-dimensional thrust-vectoring engines. All of these features will be included on the F-22 and F-35, but they are not standard on the F-15 and F-16, and it would be difficult and expensive to retrofit them. At present, pilot quality might redress the imbalance in technology, but that is a tenuous link on which to place one's hopes. Indian air force pilots are excellent, and there is no reason why Chinese pilots could not become as proficient, given the economic resources available to China. If the pilot quality gap closes even a bit, it could mean the difference between victory and defeat in the air.
It is curious, therefore, why General Wright should choose to focus on the Chinese air defense system, which at best might prove an annoyance, and is ignoring the rapid expansion and qualitative transformation of the Chinese air force, which represents both a defensive and offensive threat to U.S. forces and our allies.
Stuart Koehl is a senior fellow at Johns Hopkins University's Center for Transatlantic Relations.
PS: Sorry it's too long, but it's worth it
Tale of the Tape
The USAF vs. China.
by Stuart Koehl
10/15/2007 3:00:00 PM
China's Buk-M1-2 SAMIN ASSESSING THE Chinese military buildup there is a tendency to swing from one extreme to the other--either to minimize the threat or to blow it entirely out of proportion. An example of this can be found in a an October 11 article in the New York Times by David Lague, "China Announces Gain in Air Defense." Drawing on press releases by the Chinese Ministry of Defense, Lague writes:
A senior officer from Chinese Air Force headquarters, Fang Lei, said a seamless network of all-weather air defense radars had been installed to cover all Chinese airspace, according to a report on the Web site of the official military newspaper, the Liberation Army Daily.
The network's detection and surveillance capability was "very close" to those deployed in developed countries and could also assist Chinese forces in offensive operations, the report quoted Mr. Fang as saying.
Lague cites sources that point to China's air defense buildup as a response to Taiwan's development of an long-range land-attack cruise missile (LACM) with the potential to hit Chinese targets as far off as Shanghai. He also notes that the new air defense capability supplements China's already potent offensive missile force (consisting of both LACMs and short-to-medium range ballistic missiles) and growing numbers of modern tactical fighters.
In addition to having a direct effect on the security of Taiwan (by diminishing its ability to respond to a Chinese attack), Lague also notes that it has implications for the United States:
China's arms buildup could also pose challenges to the United States if it is drawn into a conflict with Beijing over Taiwan. The commander of American forces in Japan, Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright, told The Associated Press earlier this month that China's air defenses were now almost impenetrable to the American F-15 and F-16 aircraft stationed in Asia.
Only the stealthy F-22 or the Joint Strike Fighter still under development could carry out missions over China, he said. "Our planes are much older than the planes they would be matched against," Mr. Wright said, the Associated Press reported.
"For the first time in history, we are seeing another nation, in this case China, with newer fighters than we have."
All of which sounds extremely ominous--but just how ominous is it?
China has indeed been building up its air defenses for the past decade, acquiring the latest in Russian air defense missiles and developing some interesting weapon systems of their own. Among these are:
S-300P (NATO Designation SS-10), a mobile long-range area defense missile with a range of more than 100 km (against high altitude targets). Designed to engage the U.S. supersonic Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM) using the same sort of "track via missile" guidance as the MIM-104 Patriot, it is widely considered one of the most capable Russian air defense systems because of its mobility, speed, accuracy and flexibility.
S-300V (NATO Designation SS-12), a very long-range missile that uses the same launcher and control station as the SA-10, but with radar systems optimized to detect and track tactical ballistic missiles. Combining aspects of the U.S. Patriot PAC-3 and the Theater-Area High Altitude Air Defense System (THAADS), the SA-12 system encompasses two different missiles--the SA-12A Gladiator and the SA-12B Giant.
9M331 Tor M1 (NATO Designation SS-15 Gauntlet), a mobile, short-range, low-to-very low altitude air defense systems consisting of a self-propelled tracked Transporter-Erector-Launcher-and-Radar (TELAR) with eight vertically-launched missiles. Highly maneuverable, with a range of 1-12 km and capable of engaging targets at tree-top height, the Tor system was designed to engage helicopters, UAVs, cruise missiles and low-flying attack aircraft.
BUK M1-2 (NATO Designation SA-17 Grizzly), a medium-range, radar-guided missile similar to the U.S. Army's HAWK or the Navy's Standard MR-2 missiles, has a range of about 50-75 km and is capable of engaging targets from 25 to 25,000 meters.
China has also initiated a number of indigenous air defense missile programs, among which are:
Kaishan 1, a medium-range, semi-active homing missile apparently derived from the U.S. Army's HAWK missile system.
Lie Ying (LY)-60, a short-range low-altitude semi-active missile based on the U.S. AIM-7 Sparrow air-to-air missile of the Vietnam War era.
FT-2000, apparently a derivative of the Russian S-300P, but equipped with an anti-radiation guidance system that allows it to home in on airborne radar sets.
Of these, the last is the most interesting and presents the most serious threat. The first known ground-to-air anti-radiation missile (ARM), it is apparently designed to counter U.S. airborne early warning (AEW) systems such as the E-2C Hawkeye and E-3 AWACS, upon which U.S. air forces rely for "situational awareness." So integral have these AEW systems become to U.S. air warfare that it is difficult to imagine how our forces would operate in their absence. Given the range of the basic SA-10, at the very least the existence of such weapons would force an increase of the "stand-off" range at which we would deploy such aircraft, thereby reducing proportionally the distance they could look into Chinese airspace. The FT-2000 would also be extremely effective against the E-8 JSTARS ground surveillance aircraft, which provides critical targeting data for U.S. long-range precision strike systems.
In addition to these, the Chinese People's Liberation Army is liberally provided with shoulder-fired short-range missiles similar to Stinger, as well as 14.5mm, 23mm and 57mm anti-aircraft guns, which are still deadly to low-flying aircraft.
At face value, then, the Chinese forces have acquired some very formidable air defense systems, but a deeper looks shows that there is much less here than meets the eye. An air defense system is more than a mere aggregation of radars, missile launchers and control stations. To be effective, they must be netted together in an integrated system, so that all the elements can be coordinated, so that potential gaps are covered, and so that the strengths of one system compensate for the weaknesses of another. In such integrated air defense systems, the command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) system has always proven to be the weakest link. By jamming or destroying area surveillance radars, knocking out command centers, or neutralizing communications links, the system devolves into a collection of independent batteries and battalions, each of which is much less effective than when acting as part of an integrated system.
To avoid this, modern air defense systems such as those developed in Yugoslavia, Syria, and Iraq have placed most of their critical command structure underground and installed buried, triply-redundant fiber-optic communications networks. Note that the Chinese press release states that the Chinese air defense systems "is very close" to those deployed by "developed" nations.
But even those systems have not proven immune from attack, and even if they can't be totally knocked out, their effectiveness can be degraded by neutralizing relay nodes and by "poking out its eyes" by destroying surveillance radars. This is one reason why the U.S. developed the F-117 Nighthawk and other "stealth" fighters, as well as conventional land-attack cruise missiles.
Stealth doesn't really render an aircraft or missile "invisible" to radar, but rather limits the range at which it can be detected. By degrading radar detection range, the stealth aircraft or missile creates "holes" in radar coverage that allow it to approach close enough to targets to engage without being spotted.
If the stealth systems are supported by active jamming aircraft, radar effectiveness is even more degraded. Knocking out radars and missile batteries is one of the key functions of stealth systems. This enlarges the holes in the air defense umbrella, unmasking other critical targets and also making the remaining air defense elements more vulnerable. A coherent "Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses" (SEAD) campaign can exploit the weaknesses in any integrated air defense system and either "roll it back" by incrementally destroying its individual batteries, or simply neutralizing the entire system for a given period of time.
The Israelis totally demolished the Syrian air defense system in and around the Bekaa Valley in 1982--even though it was a fully integrated system equipped with state-of-the-art Soviet weapons (the failure of the Syrian air defenses was reportedly a turning point in the Cold War, since it convinced Soviet military planners that their own air defenses in Eastern Europe could not neutralize NATO airpower).
More recently, we have seen Israeli aircraft penetrate Syrian airspace (now protected by the same types of Russia systems deployed by the Chinese), apparently without even being detected until after their attack (See Rick Moran's article "Russian Air Defense System Leaves Much to be Desired"). Remember, the Israeli air force did this using the same sort of F-15 Strike Eagle aircraft as flown by the U.S. Air Force.
Which brings us to USAF Lt. Gen. Bruce Wright's statement that China's air defenses were "almost impenetrable" to U.S. aircraft, and that only the stealthy F-22 or the Joint Strike fighter could carry out missions over China. This is almost assuredly hyperbole, intended mainly for the ears of lawmakers on Capital Hill pondering the Air Force FY 2009 Budget Request. It is almost certain that, with proper planning and tactics, the U.S. could make short work of the Chinese air defense system, using systems already in the inventory, including jamming aircraft, cruise missiles, UAVs, decoy systems, anti-radiation missiles, and precision-guided bombs. Certainly there would be losses in doing this, but in the context of a war with China, these would certainly be in the acceptable range.
Does this mean that the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter are needless fripperies? Hardly--they are in fact vital, but not for the reason given by General Wright. There are two pressing reasons to procure both aircraft now, and in quantity. First is the general age of the U.S. tactical fighter force, which is now in excess of 20 years. Given our high operational tempo, these planes are wearing out faster than anticipated, and as they age, the cost of maintaining them will skyrocket, while readiness rates will fall--this is inevitable as a fleet ages (owners of used cars understand this, but probably not Congressmen). The second is the fact that the F-15 and F-16 (and to a lesser extent, the FA-18) are all 1970s-vintage technology, and to some extent outclassed by the last generation of Russian fighters, particularly the Su-27/30 Flanker family of fighters now being produced in China.
Last year, the USAF staged a joint exercise with the Indian air force, another Flanker operator--and our F-15s were beaten (or at best, barely held their own). The Flanker can be armed with an array of long-range missiles equivalent or better than the AIM-120 AMRAAM, as well as short-range dogfight missiles that can be launched more than 120 off-boresight (i.e., at a target over the pilot's shoulder). They are also equipped with helmet-mounted sights that allow the pilot to lock onto a target merely by looking at it, and not by maneuvering his aircraft. The Flanker also has extraordinary maneuverability thanks to its advanced aerodynamic features, high power-to-weight ratio, and 2-dimensional thrust-vectoring engines. All of these features will be included on the F-22 and F-35, but they are not standard on the F-15 and F-16, and it would be difficult and expensive to retrofit them. At present, pilot quality might redress the imbalance in technology, but that is a tenuous link on which to place one's hopes. Indian air force pilots are excellent, and there is no reason why Chinese pilots could not become as proficient, given the economic resources available to China. If the pilot quality gap closes even a bit, it could mean the difference between victory and defeat in the air.
It is curious, therefore, why General Wright should choose to focus on the Chinese air defense system, which at best might prove an annoyance, and is ignoring the rapid expansion and qualitative transformation of the Chinese air force, which represents both a defensive and offensive threat to U.S. forces and our allies.
Stuart Koehl is a senior fellow at Johns Hopkins University's Center for Transatlantic Relations.
RedMercury
Junior Member
Shallow analysis. Blissfully ignorant to equate Syrian failures to Chinese capabilities. Equipment roll call out of date. Ignores Chinese emphasis in training and doctrine on networked air defenses and combat under heavy jamming.
Mr. Koehl should stick with Transatlantic Relations.
Mr. Koehl should stick with Transatlantic Relations.
Roger604
Senior Member
The article is totally silly. This one of those "we won the Cold War so we are unbeatable... since all our potential adversaries today have some Soviet technological influence, and we proved ourselves better than Soviet technology."
Chinese gear is not just Russian exported gear. Russian exported gear today is not Cold War era Soviet level, either. And to think Russia's capabilities are equivalent to the capabilities of its export-clients (Syria, Serbia, etc.) is ridiculous.
Simply put, there is no link between the capabilities of Syria, Serbia, Iraq, etc. and those of Russia or China.
The author also assumes the recent Israeli incursion into Syria was a success. To the contrary, the fact that they hit no targets suggests they bugged out early to save their skins. Spare me the lies about them hitting some North Korean something or another.
That's nice. But FT-2000 is not SA-6.
Chinese technology is FAR beyond late Cold War Soviet level now.
Chinese gear is not just Russian exported gear. Russian exported gear today is not Cold War era Soviet level, either. And to think Russia's capabilities are equivalent to the capabilities of its export-clients (Syria, Serbia, etc.) is ridiculous.
Simply put, there is no link between the capabilities of Syria, Serbia, Iraq, etc. and those of Russia or China.
The author also assumes the recent Israeli incursion into Syria was a success. To the contrary, the fact that they hit no targets suggests they bugged out early to save their skins. Spare me the lies about them hitting some North Korean something or another.
That's nice. But FT-2000 is not SA-6.
Chinese technology is FAR beyond late Cold War Soviet level now.
That article was all together not so impressive even to guys like me who really doesen't know much about air defence systems other than the basic stuff that can be learned via public sources. Also it seemed more like some individuals post in some forum rahter than any deep analyze in some respectfull publication.
First few minor context-mistakes: China doesen't have Buk-M1-2 nor S-300V systems in service. S-300V isen't the anti-ballistic missile version of the S-300P, but like the V as for Voyska (or something very similar) tells, the army level system designed to be used by the land forces airdefence units rather than the air defence forces (PVO) that uses the S-300P. It has anti-ballistic missile feature and capability from the outset however.
To me it seemed that the guy who wrote this "article" didn't even knew the very basic princible of how the Soviet airdefence arm was divided and what systems belonged to whom. So how can he then draw conclusion of the efficiency of the systems?
Also his logic of why the chinese airdefence network is a papertiger is as vague as the logic usually used by internet fanboys when tehy are explaining why their favorite country kicks ass.
...If the system A operated by country 1 from era a was destroyed by the country 2 and the system B in service in the country 3 from the era b destroyed by the country 4, then system C operated by the country 5 from era c can also be destroeyd be the country 2..ohh..3,4 ?? Sorry I've tripped to my own strings...
So really, we should get so exited about this "article".
First few minor context-mistakes: China doesen't have Buk-M1-2 nor S-300V systems in service. S-300V isen't the anti-ballistic missile version of the S-300P, but like the V as for Voyska (or something very similar) tells, the army level system designed to be used by the land forces airdefence units rather than the air defence forces (PVO) that uses the S-300P. It has anti-ballistic missile feature and capability from the outset however.
To me it seemed that the guy who wrote this "article" didn't even knew the very basic princible of how the Soviet airdefence arm was divided and what systems belonged to whom. So how can he then draw conclusion of the efficiency of the systems?
Also his logic of why the chinese airdefence network is a papertiger is as vague as the logic usually used by internet fanboys when tehy are explaining why their favorite country kicks ass.
...If the system A operated by country 1 from era a was destroyed by the country 2 and the system B in service in the country 3 from the era b destroyed by the country 4, then system C operated by the country 5 from era c can also be destroeyd be the country 2..ohh..3,4 ?? Sorry I've tripped to my own strings...
So really, we should get so exited about this "article".
RedMercury
Junior Member
Since interceptor stops 7.62x39, the AK-47 is completely useless.
China does not have SA-12. Russians never exported that particular system...
Chinese doesn't have BUK either...
BS. Bad performance of older generation SAMs(state of the art my ass
) used by Syrians most certainly didn't convinced Soviets that SAMs are ineffective against NATOs airpower. Author should check Soviet doctrine of that time or simple look at SAMs Soviets interduced during 80s(SA-10/11/12 etc...). Wrong, most modern medium/long range Syrian SAMs are SA-3/SA-5/SA-6(generations behind systems Chinese have) and by now modern ECM are quite effective against them. Only modern system Syrians have is Pantsyr-S1, point defense air defense system that has to limited detection and combat range to be effective if not used as part of modern multi layer air defense system...
Considering ROE during Cope India that was expected. Flankers are great fighters and Indian pilots are much better then most of other Su-27 users but USAFs F-15s still aren't so inferior to Flanker as some would like to believe...
And that was only moder thing about them... Yugoslav SAMs were state of the art during 1970s, Syrian also and only relatively modern SAM Iraqis had was Roland...
I agree with isthvan's points about the article's inaccuracies.
I forget which other thread it is where I recently mentioned that the PLA appears to lack sufficient mobile mid-range SAM capabilities and someone pointed out that the truck-mounted KS-1 batteries have been officially designated the PLA's mobile mid-range SAM unit. Can anyone confirm this?
Assuming this is the case, I think they need to mount the KS-1 batteries on tracked platforms in order to escort mechanized or armor formations. The air defence provided by the SPAAG+SA-7 and SP HQ-7 units are probably barely enough to distract (not even defend against) helicopter gunship formation attacks. HQ-7 units can probably use some cross-country mobility as well.
I forget which other thread it is where I recently mentioned that the PLA appears to lack sufficient mobile mid-range SAM capabilities and someone pointed out that the truck-mounted KS-1 batteries have been officially designated the PLA's mobile mid-range SAM unit. Can anyone confirm this?
Assuming this is the case, I think they need to mount the KS-1 batteries on tracked platforms in order to escort mechanized or armor formations. The air defence provided by the SPAAG+SA-7 and SP HQ-7 units are probably barely enough to distract (not even defend against) helicopter gunship formation attacks. HQ-7 units can probably use some cross-country mobility as well.
