Explanation of differences between Soviet and NATO IFVs.
In comparatively analysing technologies and doctrines, one can see that doctrines beget new technologies which effect changes in those doctrines, thus creating a perpetual cycle. Once a doctrine has been identified, specific features of a weapon-system designed to serve that doctrine can be discerned. As such, analysing a weapon-system with respect to its user’s doctrine is usually much more telling than a straight-up comparison of specifications.
To understand the purpose and nature of different ‘infantry fighting vehicles’, consider the M2 Bradley and BMP-2 – two contemporaneous designs with comparable armaments (automatic cannons) but differing significantly in stature and mass. Oftentimes, these differences are attributed to the different habits of their respective designers. However, if the Tu-160 and B1 Lancer are to prove anything, it’s that designers are never afraid to imitate elements of adversaries’ designs if the doctrine calls for it. What, then, caused such a wide divergence in the designs of the BMP-2 and M2? Firstly, two mission-types must be distinguished; 冲击 and 突击..
The first means ‘assault’; usually entailing a short breaching operation against enemy lines, measurable in hours, spans only 30-40km across uniform terrain and involves extremely concentrated firepower on both sides.
The second means ‘breakout’; an operation immediately following a successful 'assault', conducted over duration of days, spanning 200-300km across varied terrain, involving relatively sparse firepower and whose aim is to advance further through the breach in enemy lines.
Viewing the M2 and BMP-2, it becomes obvious as to which mission-types for which they were designed. The M2, with its superior firepower and fire-control system, was designed to escort and cover M1 Abrams in the execution of ‘assault’ missions. It has more armour to contend with the concentrated firepower but has diminished mobility and fording capabilities. The BMP-2, emphasising passenger capacity, is meant for ‘breakout’ missions. It has half the mass of the M2, a modest but adequate FCS and armament, superior mobility and fording capabilities but thinner armour that will not last in an ‘assault’ mission.
Thus, in using the M2 Bradley and BMP-2 as comparisons, the effects that doctrines have on weapon-systems design can be clearly perceived.
