Chinese Hypersonic Developments (HGVs/HCMs)
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Hypersonics Research Collaboration Between the United States and the PRC
Published April 15, 2024
China Aerospace Studies Institute
This report is the fourth in CASI series describing the state of research into Hypersonics in the People's Republic of China. The first report detailed the current state of research into hypersonics in China, the second report detailed Collaboration Efforts on Hypersonic Research Between the PRC and Sweden, the third report detailed Collaboration Efforts on Hypersonic Research Between the PRC and the UK, CASI followed those reports with a webinar in May of 2023 on the PRC Hypersonics Research Landscape. This final report details Collaboration Efforts on Hypersonic Research Between the PRC and U.S. institutions.
The purpose of this series of reports is not to "name and shame", but rather to bring to light the extent to which the CCP leverages all avenues of influence, connections, and power to improve the People's Liberation Army. While perhaps unwise, none of the collaborative efforts appear to be illegal, and serve to illustrate how the PRC uses the power of the purse to obtain information, technology, R&D, etc. that the CCP deems important to improving China's "Comprehensive National Power".
Published April 15, 2024
China Aerospace Studies Institute
This report is the fourth in CASI series describing the state of research into Hypersonics in the People's Republic of China. The first report detailed the current state of research into hypersonics in China, the second report detailed Collaboration Efforts on Hypersonic Research Between the PRC and Sweden, the third report detailed Collaboration Efforts on Hypersonic Research Between the PRC and the UK, CASI followed those reports with a webinar in May of 2023 on the PRC Hypersonics Research Landscape. This final report details Collaboration Efforts on Hypersonic Research Between the PRC and U.S. institutions.
The purpose of this series of reports is not to "name and shame", but rather to bring to light the extent to which the CCP leverages all avenues of influence, connections, and power to improve the People's Liberation Army. While perhaps unwise, none of the collaborative efforts appear to be illegal, and serve to illustrate how the PRC uses the power of the purse to obtain information, technology, R&D, etc. that the CCP deems important to improving China's "Comprehensive National Power".
Okay so I've looked around this forum and didn't find evidence of this being raised.
A couple of months back, Ukraine alleged they intercepted a Russian Zircon hypersonic cruise missile. Some links with photos below.
I notice that this layout (see diagram) and the retrieved parts look similar to the DF-100, Hy-Fly (the first to use this layout and design - scramjet intake), Linyun-1.
So from some very basic and possibly untrue speculation of my own, would it be fair to say that Russia's Zircon and China's DF-100 ("high supersonic" ie hypersonic) cruise missiles are both similar in design and dimensions to the Boeing Hy-Fly program's prototypes? The scramjet intakes certainly are similar between all three (four if you include the Chinese Lingyun-1 which seems similar to the DF-100.
For China at least, this platform (DF-100) seems to serve a low end of technology/capability with Chinese HGVs and more exotically propelled hypersonic craft (missiles and launch vehicles) featuring combined cycle engine powered and rotating detonation engine powered vehicles. After all the DF-100 was announced as being in service and lightly revealed back in 2019. Recall this forum referencing a long range, high speed cruise missile in testing and reaching service back in early 2010 if members recall and can link back to those pages. I suspect this could have been the DF-100? With more modern and capable hypersonic cruise missiles preferring those above mentioned exotic propulsions which China will reveal years after as next replacing generation come in to service. Hence timelines sort of fit. 2019 disclosure of DF-100 which has been in finalised testing and reached service some time in early to mid 2010s where 2019 marks the introduction of DF-100's "replacing" or rather supplementing generation of hypersonic cruise missile/ HGV that serve same roles.
The US revealed that China had DF-27 HGV a few years ago. China didn't reveal DF-27 itself. DF-17 revealed in 2019 as DF-27 must've reached service. Timelines and behaviour patterns again align.
A couple of months back, Ukraine alleged they intercepted a Russian Zircon hypersonic cruise missile. Some links with photos below.
I notice that this layout (see diagram) and the retrieved parts look similar to the DF-100, Hy-Fly (the first to use this layout and design - scramjet intake), Linyun-1.
So from some very basic and possibly untrue speculation of my own, would it be fair to say that Russia's Zircon and China's DF-100 ("high supersonic" ie hypersonic) cruise missiles are both similar in design and dimensions to the Boeing Hy-Fly program's prototypes? The scramjet intakes certainly are similar between all three (four if you include the Chinese Lingyun-1 which seems similar to the DF-100.
For China at least, this platform (DF-100) seems to serve a low end of technology/capability with Chinese HGVs and more exotically propelled hypersonic craft (missiles and launch vehicles) featuring combined cycle engine powered and rotating detonation engine powered vehicles. After all the DF-100 was announced as being in service and lightly revealed back in 2019. Recall this forum referencing a long range, high speed cruise missile in testing and reaching service back in early 2010 if members recall and can link back to those pages. I suspect this could have been the DF-100? With more modern and capable hypersonic cruise missiles preferring those above mentioned exotic propulsions which China will reveal years after as next replacing generation come in to service. Hence timelines sort of fit. 2019 disclosure of DF-100 which has been in finalised testing and reached service some time in early to mid 2010s where 2019 marks the introduction of DF-100's "replacing" or rather supplementing generation of hypersonic cruise missile/ HGV that serve same roles.
The US revealed that China had DF-27 HGV a few years ago. China didn't reveal DF-27 itself. DF-17 revealed in 2019 as DF-27 must've reached service. Timelines and behaviour patterns again align.
I had thought something similar when the Zircon stuff was released. However, the DF-100 (or CJ-100) was explicitly described as a supersonic weapon, not hypersonic in the parade where it was revealed. If the DF-100 and the Zircon are similar systems, I think the Russians might have exaggerated the capabilities of the Zircon a little bit, especially if the stuff about the interception was true. It wouldn't be the first time.
I think speculation about novel weapons being deployed by the PLA doesn't make that much sense though, considering that its very difficult to hide systems that are already widely deployed. here's something about the DF-100s units for example.
I recall the DF-100 being described as "high supersonic" which is Chinese for > mach 5 ie "hypersonic" in English. Either the DF-100 or WZ-8 was described using those words which translate literally to mean hypersonic as the equivalent term in English. Then the broadcasters mentioned something about that being incorrect and it is simply supersonic ie < mach 5. In any case, what they announce is just state approved wording. No disputes on DF-17 and DF-27 being hypersonic HGV type weapons but the DF-100 is an interesting and rarely discussed platform whereas the DF-17 takes all the spotlight for one reason being much more "revealed" visually than the DF-100.
Thinking about what we know on the DF-100, it is an extremely long ranged weapon and makes use of a substantially sized rocket boost stage. The grainy photo of DF-100 launch and available photos of the Lingyun-1 make both platform appear like they share an intake design. That intake design implies scramjet since that's just how 1990s scramjet intake designs worked (if not also 2000s and 2010s) but China has since left scramjet propulsion, favouring combined cycle engines and various forms of detonation engines and shcramjets/sodramjets. Plenty of literature even in English on those matters.
So, we have a range well in excess of 2000km according to most sources (isn't impressive for LACM range since even older ground launched CJ-10 variants are approaching that range without being the size of the DF-100). Massive rocket booster. Most likely using a scramjet engine. It isn't hard to be well in excess of mach 4 at this point. Rocket booster is similar in size to SRBMs. It's unlikely to be a glide vehicle given the known shaping of the missile section sans booster. Therefore it is probably using a ballistic trajectory until booster detach and scramjet powered for flight and flying some aerodynamic profile within atmosphere ie using control surfaces for movement.
All of this does seem similar to Hyfly and Zircon. All three are essentially rocket boosted, scramjet powered "cruise missiles", much more lofted than terrain hugging conventional cruise missiles for sure. How else do you maintain that speed and still have thousands of km range - air density, atmospheric pressure, lift balance etc.
I'm confident Zircon is something similar. Ukraine intercept alleged photos does show something not of the standard arsenal. It most likely is Zircon or another Russian platform that uses a scramjet engine since that intake design is surely used by Lingyun-1 and Hyfly - two very publicly known products. Zircon therefore (at least whatever Ukraine shot down) isn't the artist impression wedge like HCM that resembles X-51 which is what so many artist impressions of a HCM design uses, it has become the archetype.
These are useful platforms no doubt. I mean you have at least as much range (if not considerably more only it's not disclosed) than LACM but fly at least 4 times as fast. These types of cruise missiles might be much easier to spot than terrain hugging stealthy LACMs but it's another tool in the box. This also would seem to suggest (at least to me) that the DF-100 would be rocket boosted -> scramjet powered speeds which would suggest at the minimum mach 4 through most of post boost phase flight.
Both China and the US are more about the glide vehicles and more exotically powered cruise missiles / hypersonic aerial vehicles these days since both have long moved beyond testing and flying scramjets when better alternatives seem to exist. For relatively lightweight and affordable mass produced missiles though, simple scramjets are definitely a preferred powerplant. Tengyun and the other Chinese hypersonic reusable program are both combined cycle, heavier engine powered complex craft designed for multi-use. Cheap missiles using scramjet is ideal. Imagine the role of an air defence unit having to find, target, and intercept dozens of mach 4+ DF-100s, CJ-x, YJ-x, KD-x, and who knows how many other artillery and MLRS ordinance.
Yes but consider your source there possibly being Chinese in origin and therefore requiring to agree with the information control framework I alluded to originally. It is NOT very difficult to hide systems that are widely deployed. We're talking about near strategic weapon platforms not a new fighter being inducted in the hundreds and with well identifiable shapes and movements from space. No one can tell the difference between missiles under tarped transport carriers that can carry multiple platforms as long as dimensions permit. It is NOT easy to tell different missiles apart and even if some foreign intel can, it doesn't mean they will tell the public what they know. DF-27 is a great example. The US didn't plan to leak that intel. If the officer didn't leak those pages, the general public would never know China has a HGV that "replaces" DF-17.
If the source isn't gov and/or honest and genuine then it is not worth making those conclusions from anyway. If they are gov based and honest, then the framework I suggested is indeed incorrect but gov based would imply manipulation in their interest so we do not know better than to look at other aspects.
What are those aspects? Well for starters, China revealed DF-17 and DF-100 during 2019 parade. Both platforms in service for unknown x number of years/period of time. That is the nature of those parades. They have only ever showed in service platforms without always mentioning how long they've been in service, e.g. J-11A would sometimes fly above the parade a decade after it's known to be in service. Doesn't mean it was procured the day before. Same with those two missiles. This piece of knowledge tells us little except latest in service date with some certainty.
DF-27 was never mentioned by China officially and never revealed. It took a US intelligence officer's intel leak (which btw was confirmed by the US state) for the public to be aware that PLARF has an even more capable HGV weapon than DF-17. That leak was in 2021 or 2022 I believe and the leak specifically mentioned DF-27 being designed to target moving warships at exceptional ranges - the implication here being how capable the targeting and guidance system is even more so than the flight control and the whole you know hypersonic thing.
This piece of information shows us that China doesn't in fact show and announce stuff it has. DF-17 didn't rock up to service in 2019 we can confidently know this because China has a habit of not showing strategic stuff right after they're in service. When did DF-41 get shown vs when most observers knew it was ready? When did JL-2 get shown vs actual service? When did J-20 attend a parade vs known service? The pattern is many years after.
The US has officially talked about (military side and political side) observing Chinese HGV test flights since early 2010s. It would not be a surprise if the Wu-14 program produced the DF-17 aka DF-ZF back around early 2010 to mid 2010. The exact quote from a US General is that they've been watching China perform "hundreds" of hypersonic flights. Surely most of those for single programs in the later half are not test flights but training shots no different to how China fires half a dozen ballistic missiles (SRBM to IRBM) every few weeks on average just in training. This is just more reason to suspect DF-17 is far older than some 2019 service platform. North Korea was very possibly gift given the DF-17 platform or some product of Wu-14 program for their HGV weapon which looks like one of the dozens of wu-14 program glider shapes being tested in the past. This one being near identical to the vehicle on the DF-17. No one believes North Korea can master HGV before the US.
Timeline I suggest would be circa 2015 -> DF-100 and DF-17 in service. Revealed 2019.
DF-27 in service before 2021. Not officially disclosed by China at all not even in hints. Revealed by US intelligence leaker as part of much greater leak documents set.
DF-100 and Zircon both based on old scramjet design. Useful no doubt. Nothing too special. US cancelled it's own equivalent - Boeing Hyfly. They didn't see much use and want to go HGV and superior HCM than Hyfly - Darpa project family and ARRW.
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The CCTV presenter said "supersonic". Watch
There is no statements about the missile's categorization from any other official souce. The "high supersonic" notion was just a mistake by netizens. It is very common that netzens hear something that they want to hear instead of what was actually said, another example is CV-18 using IEPS (integrated electrical propulsion system) while the official statement was integrated electrical system without mentioning propulsion.
However, I am not rejecting possibility of DF-100 being hypersonic since hypersonic is the higher portion of supersonic, I am just saying that there is no confirmation from reliable source.
Ah yes. The "high supersonic" confusion might have been for WZ-8 where netizens confused the term. So there was no confusion with statement on DF-100 being supersonic. However given the material I posted above, I still think DF-100 would be a scramjet powered (or rather similar ramjet + scramjet transition as Hyfly) missile no different to Hyfly which achieved Mach 6+ in testing. From Ukrainian allegations of shooting down Zircon and photos they've publicised, it's also quite believable that Zircon is of a similar design and size as DF-100 and Hyfly. Timelines of service introduction is not the main intention of the post. DF-100 only had a grainy launch video and photo. However, it is clear from that photo, the nose section appears to feature a scramjet intake design just like Lingyun-1 and Hyfly. Now with the Ukrainian supplied photos, it appears whatever Russian missile was intercepted features the exact same scramjet intake design.
We have a convergence of all three nations applying this scramjet intake design and China and Russia putting some missile applying this into service at least in the later half of the 2010s.
You are kind of wrong here. Seven tests of df-zf were conducted in 2014 to early 2016. Leading to deployment in a year or two. And the leaks were about a test not deployment of df-27 on a depressed trajectory so as to ensure the missile in within Chinese borders.
I don't have access to info but you are right on the leak doc on DF-27 saying test flight rather than deployment. That takes away from my point on disclosing timeline.
As for DF-ZF. Neither side ever directly credited any announced or observed flights to DF-ZF in particular. There are many hypersonic programs (not all of them missiles) in China. The DF-ZF in my understanding is simply what the DF-17 is or rather became.
Speculations on timelines aside, what's your take on DF-100 propulsion? The claimed Zircon interception photos. The relation between those three (DF-100, Hyfly, Zircon) wrt their similar inlet design and overall size (assuming Zircon photos from Ukraine are showing Zircon or Russian equivalent of Hyfly).