Chinese Engine Development
- Thread starter jackbh
- Start date
Schumacher
Senior Member
This must be the WS10* on the J16 maiden flight.
May 14, 2012, 2:45 PM HKT
Is China About to Get Its Military Jet Engine Program Off the Ground?
By Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson
Tensions in the South China Sea—most recently with the Philippines—and Beijing’s unease about Washington’s renewed strategic focus on Asia are likely to strengthen calls from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for more modern fighters and strike aircraft. Russia has historically supplied the high performance military jet engines that power these craft. However, China’s defense industry is working hard to become capable of mass producing Chinese-made military jet engines in order to end dependence on Russia, give China maximum strategic flexibility, and begin to compete with Russian-made combat aircraft in export markets.
But how soon is China’s domestic jet engine effort likely to achieve lift-off?
China’s inability to domestically mass-produce modern high-performance jet engines has been a persistent Achilles heel of the Chinese military aerospace sector. Although Chinese military engineers have made progress is building jet engines, the effort continues to suffer from problems with standardization and a shortage of skilled workers, in addition to an inability to consistently produce high quality turbine blades. Indeed, a recent article in People’s Daily quotes Russian sources saying China can copy most parts of the AL-31 engines that power much of China’s J-10 and J-11 fighter fleets, but still must import turbine blades from Russia.
The problems have likely slowed development and production of the J-15, J-20, and other late-generation tactical aircraft and are now attracting political attention at the highest levels.
In late 2010, President Hu Jintao gave Gan Xiaohua, chief engineer of the Air Force Armament Research Institute, an award in recognition of his 26 years of work on China’s military jet engine programs. High-level leadership engagement is important to help break down bureaucratic barriers that Mr. Gan says have hindered China’s ability to take a more integrated approach to building a jet engine industrial base and production infrastructure.
Despite the increased attention and resources China has focused on the manufacturing of jet engines, Mr. Gan’s concerns appear to remain valid. Engine production facilities remain geographically divided between the cities of Shenyang (Liaoning Province), Xi’an (Shaanxi Province) and Anshun (Guizhou province). This organizational structure produces more micro-level, but less macro-level, “competition” than Western norms. In addition, publicly reported figures concerning numbers of Chinese personnel working on particular programs appear surprisingly low by Western standards—unless there are significant “off balance sheet” resources somewhere else.
With jet engines, “Western standards” would appear to remain relevant, as the world’s few top jet engine producers are all located in the U.S. and Western Europe (with Russia a distant second in quality). Lack of cooperation and coordination among the various branches of the PLA the jet engine end-users, appears to be a problem. Localized bargaining and patronage may produce duplication of effort, mismanagement of resources and increased time-to-market. Dispersing resources among competing research entities to the extent that China does may be counterproductive, particularly at this stage of development.
The Soviet defense industrial base, on which China’s was originally modeled, failed in precisely this area: Talented designers and technicians presided over balkanized “feudal” design bureaus and irregularly-linked production facilities. Lack of standardization and quality control rendered that system less than the sum of its parts, helping the U.S. to win the space race with its superior systems integration—as facilitated by such private corporations as AT&T.
One of China’s great theoretical advantages over earlier Soviet efforts—widespread access to and exploitation of foreign technology—has worked in other areas previously, but it may prove problematic in practice when developing and producing systems as complex and demanding as high performance jet engines.
Standardization and integration, essential for jet engine development, may suffer particularly from an ad hoc, eclectic approach to strategic technology development and acquisition. Without advanced quality management practices such as Six Sigma or Total Quality Management (TQM), sophisticated components and systems design and integration capabilities, and an organizational culture that ensures honest reporting of problems, China’s technology will not add up to high-performance engines in practice. And with jet engines, there is little if any room for error or substandard approaches.
China’s ability to resolve the domestic engine production problem matters because if China’s engine makers can attain the technical capability level that U.S. manufacturers had 20 years ago, China will be able to power its latest-generation fighter and strike aircraft with domestically-made engines.
The new J-20 strike fighter program (first unveiled during Defense Secretary Gates’ January 2011 visit to China), especially needs domestic engine development and production breakthroughs because Russia appears reluctant to sell the high-powered engines that could enable the J-20 to supercruise (sustain supersonic flight without using inefficient afterburners) and thereby match the performance of the world’s most modern fighters such as the Lockheed Martin F-22 and Sukhoi T-50/PAK FA. Such developments would help cement China as a formidable regional air power and deserve close attention from policymakers.
However, evidence still suggests that China’s main military jet engine maker—Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC)—is struggling to maintain consistent quality control as it scales up production of the WS-10 Taihang turbofan that China hopes to use to power more of its fighter fleet. This issue is causing problems with reliability and keeping China’s tactical aircraft heavily reliant on imported Russian engines. China’s July 2011 order of 123 additional AL-31 jet engines supports the view that domestically-made engines still are not good enough to rely on as the mainstay to power Chinese fighters.
The latest jet engine import numbers suggest Chinese engines may now power roughly 20% of the country’s most modern fighters and strike aircraft as well as the JF-17 fighters it is exporting to Pakistan. That means at least 80% of China’s tactical aircraft fleet runs on Russian-made engines and will likely continue to rely substantially on imported Russian engines to support its tactical aircraft programs over the next two years. China’s high-performance jet engine programs are nearing takeoff but they, and China’s development of a more competitive precision manufacturing sector, appear to still have some additional runway ahead of them.
Andrew Erickson is a professor at the U.S. Naval War College and a research associate at Harvard’s Fairbank Center. Co-founder of China SignPost (洞察中国), he blogs at . Gabe Collins is a co-founder of China SignPost and is a J.D. candidate at the University of Michigan Law School.
Is China About to Get Its Military Jet Engine Program Off the Ground?
By Gabe Collins and Andrew Erickson
Tensions in the South China Sea—most recently with the Philippines—and Beijing’s unease about Washington’s renewed strategic focus on Asia are likely to strengthen calls from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for more modern fighters and strike aircraft. Russia has historically supplied the high performance military jet engines that power these craft. However, China’s defense industry is working hard to become capable of mass producing Chinese-made military jet engines in order to end dependence on Russia, give China maximum strategic flexibility, and begin to compete with Russian-made combat aircraft in export markets.
But how soon is China’s domestic jet engine effort likely to achieve lift-off?
China’s inability to domestically mass-produce modern high-performance jet engines has been a persistent Achilles heel of the Chinese military aerospace sector. Although Chinese military engineers have made progress is building jet engines, the effort continues to suffer from problems with standardization and a shortage of skilled workers, in addition to an inability to consistently produce high quality turbine blades. Indeed, a recent article in People’s Daily quotes Russian sources saying China can copy most parts of the AL-31 engines that power much of China’s J-10 and J-11 fighter fleets, but still must import turbine blades from Russia.
The problems have likely slowed development and production of the J-15, J-20, and other late-generation tactical aircraft and are now attracting political attention at the highest levels.
In late 2010, President Hu Jintao gave Gan Xiaohua, chief engineer of the Air Force Armament Research Institute, an award in recognition of his 26 years of work on China’s military jet engine programs. High-level leadership engagement is important to help break down bureaucratic barriers that Mr. Gan says have hindered China’s ability to take a more integrated approach to building a jet engine industrial base and production infrastructure.
Despite the increased attention and resources China has focused on the manufacturing of jet engines, Mr. Gan’s concerns appear to remain valid. Engine production facilities remain geographically divided between the cities of Shenyang (Liaoning Province), Xi’an (Shaanxi Province) and Anshun (Guizhou province). This organizational structure produces more micro-level, but less macro-level, “competition” than Western norms. In addition, publicly reported figures concerning numbers of Chinese personnel working on particular programs appear surprisingly low by Western standards—unless there are significant “off balance sheet” resources somewhere else.
With jet engines, “Western standards” would appear to remain relevant, as the world’s few top jet engine producers are all located in the U.S. and Western Europe (with Russia a distant second in quality). Lack of cooperation and coordination among the various branches of the PLA the jet engine end-users, appears to be a problem. Localized bargaining and patronage may produce duplication of effort, mismanagement of resources and increased time-to-market. Dispersing resources among competing research entities to the extent that China does may be counterproductive, particularly at this stage of development.
The Soviet defense industrial base, on which China’s was originally modeled, failed in precisely this area: Talented designers and technicians presided over balkanized “feudal” design bureaus and irregularly-linked production facilities. Lack of standardization and quality control rendered that system less than the sum of its parts, helping the U.S. to win the space race with its superior systems integration—as facilitated by such private corporations as AT&T.
One of China’s great theoretical advantages over earlier Soviet efforts—widespread access to and exploitation of foreign technology—has worked in other areas previously, but it may prove problematic in practice when developing and producing systems as complex and demanding as high performance jet engines.
Standardization and integration, essential for jet engine development, may suffer particularly from an ad hoc, eclectic approach to strategic technology development and acquisition. Without advanced quality management practices such as Six Sigma or Total Quality Management (TQM), sophisticated components and systems design and integration capabilities, and an organizational culture that ensures honest reporting of problems, China’s technology will not add up to high-performance engines in practice. And with jet engines, there is little if any room for error or substandard approaches.
China’s ability to resolve the domestic engine production problem matters because if China’s engine makers can attain the technical capability level that U.S. manufacturers had 20 years ago, China will be able to power its latest-generation fighter and strike aircraft with domestically-made engines.
The new J-20 strike fighter program (first unveiled during Defense Secretary Gates’ January 2011 visit to China), especially needs domestic engine development and production breakthroughs because Russia appears reluctant to sell the high-powered engines that could enable the J-20 to supercruise (sustain supersonic flight without using inefficient afterburners) and thereby match the performance of the world’s most modern fighters such as the Lockheed Martin F-22 and Sukhoi T-50/PAK FA. Such developments would help cement China as a formidable regional air power and deserve close attention from policymakers.
However, evidence still suggests that China’s main military jet engine maker—Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC)—is struggling to maintain consistent quality control as it scales up production of the WS-10 Taihang turbofan that China hopes to use to power more of its fighter fleet. This issue is causing problems with reliability and keeping China’s tactical aircraft heavily reliant on imported Russian engines. China’s July 2011 order of 123 additional AL-31 jet engines supports the view that domestically-made engines still are not good enough to rely on as the mainstay to power Chinese fighters.
The latest jet engine import numbers suggest Chinese engines may now power roughly 20% of the country’s most modern fighters and strike aircraft as well as the JF-17 fighters it is exporting to Pakistan. That means at least 80% of China’s tactical aircraft fleet runs on Russian-made engines and will likely continue to rely substantially on imported Russian engines to support its tactical aircraft programs over the next two years. China’s high-performance jet engine programs are nearing takeoff but they, and China’s development of a more competitive precision manufacturing sector, appear to still have some additional runway ahead of them.
Andrew Erickson is a professor at the U.S. Naval War College and a research associate at Harvard’s Fairbank Center. Co-founder of China SignPost (洞察中国), he blogs at . Gabe Collins is a co-founder of China SignPost and is a J.D. candidate at the University of Michigan Law School.
Prototype only... I think PLAAF feels no urgent to push J-10 using WS-10A. So far we have not even seen a J-10A or prototype flying with WS-10A. Only a J-10B prototype flying with WS-10A.
If a J-10A prototype is seen testing with WS-10A and then subsequently, we heard news of China order more AL-31FN engine. I will more worry about this situation.
The situation is PLAAF don't even bother to test J-10A with a WS-10A and seems very comfortable of using Russia AL-31FN. It seems that relationship between Russia and China is at a all time high. Probably, tweaking is needed for current J-10A to fit in WS-10A. PLAAF probably wants to save cost and time. SO continue using AL-31FN for J-10A is a economical solution.
While for J-10B, we have seen J-10B prototype testing with WS-10A but so far, none of J-10B has go into service.
The author of that article fail to mention that all the new J-11B , J-15 and J-11BS are all seen using WS-10A. There is no reason to believe WS-10A is still in any trouble. One J-11 flanker takes up 2 WS-10A and not including the spares.. So you can imagine where the priority goes.
Certainly doesn't break new news, but I would think a good summary of where we're at right now.
asif iqbal
Lieutenant General
well thats right, China does need lots of engines for its aircraft and since they use similar engines they cant simply fullfill all the orders
which is why China has ordered
54 x AL31 between 2001-2005
100 x AL31 between 2005-2008
122 x AL31 between 2010-2011
and 123 x AL31 on order for 2011
total 399 AL31 engines
this does not mean WS10A is not operationally good, infact its serving for years with J11 and no incident
which is why China has ordered
54 x AL31 between 2001-2005
100 x AL31 between 2005-2008
122 x AL31 between 2010-2011
and 123 x AL31 on order for 2011
total 399 AL31 engines
this does not mean WS10A is not operationally good, infact its serving for years with J11 and no incident
