I agree with you, I was being sarcastic that China Collapse TM industry has been proven wrong and wrong again and again but yet its hotter than ever. That only tells you the mindset of people who make those theories, they want China to collapse, but they are not willing do anything to actually make it happen, instead they just make fantasy about pie in the sky, China fall on its own without me doing anything.
Chinese Economics Thread
- Thread starter Norfolk
- Start date
I agree with you, I was being sarcastic that China Collapse TM industry has been proven wrong and wrong again and again but yet its hotter than ever. That only tells you the mindset of people who make those theories, they want China to collapse, but they are not willing do anything to actually make it happen, instead they just make fantasy about pie in the sky, China fall on its own without me doing anything.
Jura The idiot
General
Jura The idiot
General
Equation
Lieutenant General
It should be, if it can handle several fully loaded 18 wheeler trucks, than it can handle a row of tanks on a loader.
Sounds like an administrative change -- changing the links in the chain of command, that sort of thing. No privatisation, I think.
Now, just put a high-speed train rail down the middle, and the west will be wide-open!
Equation
Lieutenant General
Actually in most high way construction in anywhere around the world the middle part is usually reserved for high way construction expansion of the two existing traffic flowing lanes.
For example:
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
Actually there is Lanzhou to Urumqi HSR It was inaugurated last year connectiom to Lanzhou to Xuzhou north China almost done
Sorry Haters, Your China Hard Landing Has Been Postponed Again
It's a miracle of science that the talking heads of the financial press who have been predicting China's demise for the past 10 years are getting invited back to predict more of the same. Whatever they forecast, we can fairly safely assess that we know the outcome...they will be wrong about it again.
Aside from China's oversupply issues and shadow lending system and its housing bubble, China is the world's second most important economy, bar none. It is at least as important as the United States to Brazil; it is more important than the United States in all of southeast Asia. It is more important than the United States in Russia. Argentina has Chinese banks; almost as much as American ones. The housing bubble is a generational phenomenon as much as it is an economic one. Millions are leaving poorer rural areas and moving to cities. Also, due to the fact that many Chinese are more accustomed to buying houses for stores of value than they are buying IRAs and putting money into stock funds, real estate is always in demand and will be until China develops a serious, trustworthy product line of investment funds. That's a whole new world for China, and a massive opportunity for wealth management firms.
Meanwhile, the China hard landing is not upon us.
The Chinese yuan has yet to crack 7 to 1 as George Soros and Barclays both predicted.
Make that as much...
Rothman says that the increase is largely due to China's latest rules on controlling capital outflow. But just as important has been the surprising strength of the Chinese renmimbi against the dollar. It's been holding strong at 6.74 for weeks now, up nearly 3% against the dollar after shying away from 7 in January. The shorts lost again.
The direction of the Chinese currency is determined primarily by the strength or weakness of the dollar, rather than the health of the Chinese economy. In 2016, when the dollar index rose 3.6%, the remmimbi fell by 6.4% against the dollar. In the first half of this year, the dollar index weakened by 6.4%, helping the renmimbi gain against the greenback.
Rothman says that capital outflows may accelerate a bit in the coming months as Chinese tourists head abroad and parents pay tuition for children who study overseas. Despite that flow, he expects the dollar to remain "fairly soft" against the Chinese currency.
The China consumer story isn't over yet. Part III is in the works and Part IV is being scripted.
China's economy in the first half showed better than expected growth, at nearly 7% versus forecasts of 6%. Incomes are rising as is consumer spending, and corporate earnings at new industry juggernauts like Baidu surprised to the upside.
"The Chinese economy delivered many surprises in the first half of the year, disappointing -- yet again -- the pundits who predicted a hard landing," says Andy Rothman, a Matthews Asia investment strategist and an old China hand who has lived and worked there for 20 years.
China’s central bank added another $46.3 billion to its coffers in the first half of the year, putting the People's Bank of China's foreign currency reserves to $3 trillion. To put that into perspective, China has more money sitting in reserves than Brazil's entire economy produces annually.
Strong wage growth, low household debt, mild inflation and consumer optimism resulted in real retail sales growth of 9.3% in the first half of the year. U.S. real retail sales growth was 2.3% over the same period. Worth noting, spending by Chinese consumers was equal to only 22% of U.S. retail sales 10 years ago. In 2016, it rose to the equivalent of 87% of American consumer spending and is likely to beat the U.S. within a decade. No wonder no one can truly beat up on China.
We will have to reserve that disdain for the Russians.
Back to the matter at hand...China's per capita urban household income rose 6.5% in the first half, up from a 5.8% growth rate during the first half of 2016.
The rebalancing of the Chinese economy continues a pace, with consumption accounting for 63.4% of GDP growth in the first half of 2017, up from a 44.7% contribution during the same period in 2010, Rothman says.
"The consumer story should remain healthy in the coming quarters, and drive an increasingly larger share of China’s economic growth over the coming years," Rothman predicts. Fox Business News, CNBC and Bloomberg need to talk to Rothman instead of the usual chorus of China naysayers.
China's Piggy Bank Is Way Bigger Than Yours*
China's central bank has $3 trillion sitting in reserves...at least. That means it has more money tucked away to defend its currency and economy from crises than the entire GDP of these significant economies:
UK GDP: $2.6 trillion
France GDP: $2.46 trillion
India GDP: $2.3 trillion
Italy GDP: $1.85 trillion
Brazil GDP: $1.79 trillion
Canada GDP: $1.53 trillion
Russia GDP: $1.2 trillion
Australia GDP: $1.2 trillion
Mexico GDP: $1.04 billion
Saudi Arabia GDP: $646 billion
and even...
Sweden GDP: $511 billion. Sweden!
It's a miracle of science that the talking heads of the financial press who have been predicting China's demise for the past 10 years are getting invited back to predict more of the same. Whatever they forecast, we can fairly safely assess that we know the outcome...they will be wrong about it again.
Aside from China's oversupply issues and shadow lending system and its housing bubble, China is the world's second most important economy, bar none. It is at least as important as the United States to Brazil; it is more important than the United States in all of southeast Asia. It is more important than the United States in Russia. Argentina has Chinese banks; almost as much as American ones. The housing bubble is a generational phenomenon as much as it is an economic one. Millions are leaving poorer rural areas and moving to cities. Also, due to the fact that many Chinese are more accustomed to buying houses for stores of value than they are buying IRAs and putting money into stock funds, real estate is always in demand and will be until China develops a serious, trustworthy product line of investment funds. That's a whole new world for China, and a massive opportunity for wealth management firms.
Meanwhile, the China hard landing is not upon us.
The Chinese yuan has yet to crack 7 to 1 as George Soros and Barclays both predicted.
Make that as much...
Rothman says that the increase is largely due to China's latest rules on controlling capital outflow. But just as important has been the surprising strength of the Chinese renmimbi against the dollar. It's been holding strong at 6.74 for weeks now, up nearly 3% against the dollar after shying away from 7 in January. The shorts lost again.
The direction of the Chinese currency is determined primarily by the strength or weakness of the dollar, rather than the health of the Chinese economy. In 2016, when the dollar index rose 3.6%, the remmimbi fell by 6.4% against the dollar. In the first half of this year, the dollar index weakened by 6.4%, helping the renmimbi gain against the greenback.
Rothman says that capital outflows may accelerate a bit in the coming months as Chinese tourists head abroad and parents pay tuition for children who study overseas. Despite that flow, he expects the dollar to remain "fairly soft" against the Chinese currency.
The China consumer story isn't over yet. Part III is in the works and Part IV is being scripted.
China's economy in the first half showed better than expected growth, at nearly 7% versus forecasts of 6%. Incomes are rising as is consumer spending, and corporate earnings at new industry juggernauts like Baidu surprised to the upside.
"The Chinese economy delivered many surprises in the first half of the year, disappointing -- yet again -- the pundits who predicted a hard landing," says Andy Rothman, a Matthews Asia investment strategist and an old China hand who has lived and worked there for 20 years.
China’s central bank added another $46.3 billion to its coffers in the first half of the year, putting the People's Bank of China's foreign currency reserves to $3 trillion. To put that into perspective, China has more money sitting in reserves than Brazil's entire economy produces annually.
Strong wage growth, low household debt, mild inflation and consumer optimism resulted in real retail sales growth of 9.3% in the first half of the year. U.S. real retail sales growth was 2.3% over the same period. Worth noting, spending by Chinese consumers was equal to only 22% of U.S. retail sales 10 years ago. In 2016, it rose to the equivalent of 87% of American consumer spending and is likely to beat the U.S. within a decade. No wonder no one can truly beat up on China.
We will have to reserve that disdain for the Russians.
Back to the matter at hand...China's per capita urban household income rose 6.5% in the first half, up from a 5.8% growth rate during the first half of 2016.
The rebalancing of the Chinese economy continues a pace, with consumption accounting for 63.4% of GDP growth in the first half of 2017, up from a 44.7% contribution during the same period in 2010, Rothman says.
"The consumer story should remain healthy in the coming quarters, and drive an increasingly larger share of China’s economic growth over the coming years," Rothman predicts. Fox Business News, CNBC and Bloomberg need to talk to Rothman instead of the usual chorus of China naysayers.
China's Piggy Bank Is Way Bigger Than Yours*
China's central bank has $3 trillion sitting in reserves...at least. That means it has more money tucked away to defend its currency and economy from crises than the entire GDP of these significant economies:
UK GDP: $2.6 trillion
France GDP: $2.46 trillion
India GDP: $2.3 trillion
Italy GDP: $1.85 trillion
Brazil GDP: $1.79 trillion
Canada GDP: $1.53 trillion
Russia GDP: $1.2 trillion
Australia GDP: $1.2 trillion
Mexico GDP: $1.04 billion
Saudi Arabia GDP: $646 billion
and even...
Sweden GDP: $511 billion. Sweden!
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
Eh Where is Blackstone He disappear from the face of the earth
What happened to him kidnap by ISIS or Abu Sayaf gang ?
Anyway here is Stephen Roach He the Goldman Sachs guy who has been following Chinese economy for years
First posted by Xinhui
Deciphering China’s economic resilience
The Chinese economy is drawing support from strong sources of cyclical resilience in early 2017. The 11.3% y-o-y gain in exports recorded in June stands in sharp contrast with earlier years, which were adversely affected by a weaker post-crisis global recovery.
By: Stephen S Roach | Published: July 29, 2017 5:01 AM
2
Superimposing the outcomes in major crisis-battered developed economies on China has been the wrong approach in the past; it is wrong again today. (Image: Reuters)
Once again, the Chinese economy has defied the hand wringing of the nattering nabobs of negativism. After decelerating for six consecutive years, real GDP growth appears to be inching up in 2017. The 6.9% annualised increase just reported for the second quarter exceeds the 6.7% rise in 2016 and is well above the consensus of international forecasters who, just a few months ago, expected growth to be closer to 6.5% this year, and to slow further, to 6%, in 2018. I have long argued that the fixation on headline GDP overlooks deeper issues shaping the China growth debate. That is because the Chinese economy is in the midst of an extraordinary structural transformation—with a manufacturing-led producer model giving way to an increasingly powerful services-led consumer model. To the extent that this implies a shift in the mix of GDP away from exceptionally rapid gains in investment and exports, toward relatively slower-growing internal private consumption, a slowdown in overall GDP growth is both inevitable and desirable. Perceptions of China’s vulnerability need to be considered in this context.
This debate has a long history. I first caught a whiff of it back in the late 1990s, during the Asian financial crisis. From Thailand and Indonesia to South Korea and Taiwan, China was widely thought to be next. An October 1998 cover story in The Economist, vividly illustrated by a Chinese junk getting sucked into a powerful whirlpool, said it all. Yet nothing could have been further from the truth. When the dust settled on the virulent pan-regional contagion, the Chinese economy had barely skipped a beat. Real GDP growth slowed temporarily, to 7.7% in 1998-1999, before reaccelerating to 10.3% in the subsequent decade.
China’s resilience during the Great Financial Crisis was equally telling. In the midst of the worst global contraction since the 1930s, the Chinese economy still expanded at a 9.4% average annual rate in 2008-2009. While down from the blistering, unsustainable 12.7% pace recorded during the three years prior to the crisis, this represented only a modest shortfall from the 30-year post-1980 trend of 10%. Indeed, were it not for China’s resilience in the depths of the recent crisis, world GDP would not have contracted by 0.1% in 2009, but would have plunged by 1.3%—the sharpest decline in global activity of the post-World War II era.
The latest bout of pessimism over the Chinese economy has focused on the twin headwinds of deleveraging and a related tightening of the property market—in essence, a Japanese-like stagnation. Once more, the Western lens is out of focus. Like Japan, China is a high-saving economy that owes its mounting debt largely to itself. Yet, if anything, China has more of a cushion than Japan to avoid sustainability problems.
According to the International Monetary Fund, China’s national savings is likely to hit 45% of GDP in 2017, well above Japan’s 28% saving rate. Just as Japan, with its gross government debt at 239% of GDP, has been able to sidestep a sovereign debt crisis, China, with its far larger saving cushion and much smaller sovereign debt burden (49% of GDP), is in much better shape to avoid such an implosion. To be sure, there can be no mistaking China’s mounting corporate debt problem—with non-financial debt-to-GDP ratios hitting an estimated 157% of GDP in late 2016 (versus 102% in late 2008). This makes the imperatives of state-owned enterprise reform, where the bulk of rising indebtedness has been concentrated, all the more essential in the years ahead.
Moreover, there is always good reason to worry about the Chinese property market. After all, a rising middle class needs affordable housing. With the urban share of China’s population rising from less than 20% in 1980 to more than 56% in 2016—and most likely headed to 70% by 2030—this is no trivial consideration. But this means that Chinese property markets—unlike those of other fully urbanised major economies—enjoy ample support from the demand side, with the urban population likely to remain on a 1-2% annualised growth trajectory over the next 10-15 years. With Chinese home prices up nearly 50% since 2005—nearly five times the global norm (according to the Bank for International Settlements and IMF global housing watch)—affordability is obviously a legitimate concern. The challenge for China is to manage prudently the growth in housing supply needed to satisfy the demand requirements of urbanisation, without fostering excessive speculation and dangerous asset bubbles.
Meanwhile, the Chinese economy is also drawing support from strong sources of cyclical resilience in early 2017. The 11.3% year-on-year gain in exports recorded in June stands in sharp contrast with earlier years, which were adversely affected by a weaker post-crisis global recovery. Similarly, 10% annualised gains in inflation-adjusted retail sales through mid-2017—about 45% faster than the 6.9% pace of overall GDP growth—reflect impressive growth in household incomes and the increasingly powerful (and possibly under-reported) impetus of e-commerce.
Pessimists have long viewed the Chinese economy as they view their own economies—repeating a classic mistake that Yale historian Jonathan Spence’s seminal assessment warned of many years ago. The asset bubbles that broke Japan and the United States are widely presumed to pose the same threat in China. Likewise, China’s recent binge of debt-intensive economic growth is expected to have the same consequences as such episodes elsewhere.
Forecasters find it difficult to resist superimposing the outcomes in major crisis-battered developed economies on China. That has been the wrong approach in the past; it is wrong again today.
Author is Faculty member at Yale University and former chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia. Views are personal.
What happened to him kidnap by ISIS or Abu Sayaf gang ?
Anyway here is Stephen Roach He the Goldman Sachs guy who has been following Chinese economy for years
First posted by Xinhui
Deciphering China’s economic resilience
The Chinese economy is drawing support from strong sources of cyclical resilience in early 2017. The 11.3% y-o-y gain in exports recorded in June stands in sharp contrast with earlier years, which were adversely affected by a weaker post-crisis global recovery.
By: Stephen S Roach | Published: July 29, 2017 5:01 AM
2
Superimposing the outcomes in major crisis-battered developed economies on China has been the wrong approach in the past; it is wrong again today. (Image: Reuters)
Once again, the Chinese economy has defied the hand wringing of the nattering nabobs of negativism. After decelerating for six consecutive years, real GDP growth appears to be inching up in 2017. The 6.9% annualised increase just reported for the second quarter exceeds the 6.7% rise in 2016 and is well above the consensus of international forecasters who, just a few months ago, expected growth to be closer to 6.5% this year, and to slow further, to 6%, in 2018. I have long argued that the fixation on headline GDP overlooks deeper issues shaping the China growth debate. That is because the Chinese economy is in the midst of an extraordinary structural transformation—with a manufacturing-led producer model giving way to an increasingly powerful services-led consumer model. To the extent that this implies a shift in the mix of GDP away from exceptionally rapid gains in investment and exports, toward relatively slower-growing internal private consumption, a slowdown in overall GDP growth is both inevitable and desirable. Perceptions of China’s vulnerability need to be considered in this context.
This debate has a long history. I first caught a whiff of it back in the late 1990s, during the Asian financial crisis. From Thailand and Indonesia to South Korea and Taiwan, China was widely thought to be next. An October 1998 cover story in The Economist, vividly illustrated by a Chinese junk getting sucked into a powerful whirlpool, said it all. Yet nothing could have been further from the truth. When the dust settled on the virulent pan-regional contagion, the Chinese economy had barely skipped a beat. Real GDP growth slowed temporarily, to 7.7% in 1998-1999, before reaccelerating to 10.3% in the subsequent decade.
China’s resilience during the Great Financial Crisis was equally telling. In the midst of the worst global contraction since the 1930s, the Chinese economy still expanded at a 9.4% average annual rate in 2008-2009. While down from the blistering, unsustainable 12.7% pace recorded during the three years prior to the crisis, this represented only a modest shortfall from the 30-year post-1980 trend of 10%. Indeed, were it not for China’s resilience in the depths of the recent crisis, world GDP would not have contracted by 0.1% in 2009, but would have plunged by 1.3%—the sharpest decline in global activity of the post-World War II era.
The latest bout of pessimism over the Chinese economy has focused on the twin headwinds of deleveraging and a related tightening of the property market—in essence, a Japanese-like stagnation. Once more, the Western lens is out of focus. Like Japan, China is a high-saving economy that owes its mounting debt largely to itself. Yet, if anything, China has more of a cushion than Japan to avoid sustainability problems.
According to the International Monetary Fund, China’s national savings is likely to hit 45% of GDP in 2017, well above Japan’s 28% saving rate. Just as Japan, with its gross government debt at 239% of GDP, has been able to sidestep a sovereign debt crisis, China, with its far larger saving cushion and much smaller sovereign debt burden (49% of GDP), is in much better shape to avoid such an implosion. To be sure, there can be no mistaking China’s mounting corporate debt problem—with non-financial debt-to-GDP ratios hitting an estimated 157% of GDP in late 2016 (versus 102% in late 2008). This makes the imperatives of state-owned enterprise reform, where the bulk of rising indebtedness has been concentrated, all the more essential in the years ahead.
Moreover, there is always good reason to worry about the Chinese property market. After all, a rising middle class needs affordable housing. With the urban share of China’s population rising from less than 20% in 1980 to more than 56% in 2016—and most likely headed to 70% by 2030—this is no trivial consideration. But this means that Chinese property markets—unlike those of other fully urbanised major economies—enjoy ample support from the demand side, with the urban population likely to remain on a 1-2% annualised growth trajectory over the next 10-15 years. With Chinese home prices up nearly 50% since 2005—nearly five times the global norm (according to the Bank for International Settlements and IMF global housing watch)—affordability is obviously a legitimate concern. The challenge for China is to manage prudently the growth in housing supply needed to satisfy the demand requirements of urbanisation, without fostering excessive speculation and dangerous asset bubbles.
Meanwhile, the Chinese economy is also drawing support from strong sources of cyclical resilience in early 2017. The 11.3% year-on-year gain in exports recorded in June stands in sharp contrast with earlier years, which were adversely affected by a weaker post-crisis global recovery. Similarly, 10% annualised gains in inflation-adjusted retail sales through mid-2017—about 45% faster than the 6.9% pace of overall GDP growth—reflect impressive growth in household incomes and the increasingly powerful (and possibly under-reported) impetus of e-commerce.
Pessimists have long viewed the Chinese economy as they view their own economies—repeating a classic mistake that Yale historian Jonathan Spence’s seminal assessment warned of many years ago. The asset bubbles that broke Japan and the United States are widely presumed to pose the same threat in China. Likewise, China’s recent binge of debt-intensive economic growth is expected to have the same consequences as such episodes elsewhere.
Forecasters find it difficult to resist superimposing the outcomes in major crisis-battered developed economies on China. That has been the wrong approach in the past; it is wrong again today.
Author is Faculty member at Yale University and former chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia. Views are personal.