Chinese Economics Thread

abenomics12345

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@abenomics12345

The key point is whether you agree that Chinese family savings are $4.8 Trillion higher than pre-pandemic, as per the FT/Nikkei.
If you don't agree, then perhaps you can drop a note to James. You'll probably get a response.

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Such a figure represents 25% of Chinese GDP. If you compare this to other countries, you can see this is twice next highest country, namely the USA at 12%. See below.

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I notice that Japan only had 4% extra savings during the pandemic, so Japan wouldn't have seen what a post-COVID spending boom looks like.

The article also shows the sharp explosive increase in consumer sentiment that happens post-COVID

What matters is the marginal propensity to save/consume. Chinese marginal propensity to save has *always* been high. You're conflating stock (cash in bank) vs flow (GDP).

I do not contest with the 4.8trln data point, but that is not the point. Excess deposits sitting in bank account =/= willingness to spend it all. You need to look at the debt side of the balance sheet as well. Household debt/GDP in China went from 56% to 62% from 2020 to 2022 - that is an extra 15trln of debt households took on - so first of all you need to net that vs. the cash in bank to get aggregate 'wealth'.

Next, there is the wealth effect - when 70% of household wealth is in the property market - what happened over the past 3 years with 3RL and property bubble deflation has not been healthy for wealth expectations - Chinese housing market has been the one way trade for the longest time - and whatever propensity to consume before was a function of the growing wealth ("I feel 500k richer because my neighbour's house sold for 50% more last year") - that tailwind is gone.

Whatever savings people invested in stock markets in 2020/2021 is down 10-40% (that is *after* a 50% recovery from Oct 31 2022). Meanwhile you have headlines of banks in Henan going under, and WMPs blowing up. People are saving because of poor expectations - that isn't going to change unless income expectations/wealth effect turns positive again.

Second of all, below is a consumer survey panel - and yes we did see a slight tick up in consumer confidence and income expectations. But it is barely noticeable.

People will only spend their excess cash *if* they feel income expectations improve.

1673893861817.png
The economy is not command and control - people don't do things just because you think they should/will - the data is not corroborating with your thesis at all. I appreciate your confidence in the Chinese economy, but your expectations/confidence is not matching with that of the average Chinese person - what matters here is what most people will do, not what you think *can theoretically* happen.

Yes the recovery will happen, but the notion that people will suddenly spend their cash in a bad economic tape is just not anchored in reality.
 

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ZeEa5KPul

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I mean if you took it to mean that my opinion was that car exports are the sole reason Japan is ramping up military spending and signing up to new alliances, that's not what my intent was. I'll make it clearer, the economic leverage its losing to China is one of the reasons its ramping up military spending.
Economics isn't the reason Japan is raising its military spending, China's increased military spending is the reason Japan is increasing its military spending. Yes, China's spending hasn't gone up as a percentage of GDP, but it's so large that Japan has to double its spending to maintain even a token deterrent capacity.

Japan's security is imploding and this is a desperate attempt to address it. The idea that Japan thinks it can make economic gains by attacking China is ludicrous; Japan is scared shitless.
And it didn't end when the government decided that companies had adequately followed party protocol, all signs point to the fact that much like zero Covid, the recent ending of the tech crackdown was because there was too much economic damage being done and they needed to backtrack in order to revive consumer spending and job creation.
I respectfully disagree as well. What I saw was a lot of badly needed regulation to improve information security and curtail financial speculation. The Chinese government doesn't need to put on theatrical shows to attack political opponents, it can just grab them and toss them in prison as it routinely does with actual opponents.

It's the same with 0-COVID. The reason it was removed is because it had served its purpose, the population was by and large vaccinated and the lethality of the circulating variants was much lower than the original ones.
Also keep in mind, if your argument is that retail sales will be stronger, then net exports in 2023 will mathematically be weaker. You can't have it both ways here.
That's an error of logic. It's true only if capacity utilization is at maximum, then the same article can only be consumed locally or sent abroad. If utilization is below maximum, then both domestic retail and net exports can rise.
What you are doing here is conflating supply addition with demand generation - just because China is building capacity doesn't mean people will use said capacity. And just because people use that capacity, doesn't mean that prices won't deflate as a result of significant oversupply.
While I agree with much of what you wrote and I have no reason to question your 2023 GDP projections, this gets to a philosophical point of why GDP is such a poor measure. In every respect, solar panels are useful and very much needed - they generate clean electricity which China needs, and they displace polluting and geopolitically insecure sources. China should be building as much solar capacity as it can, but that doesn't add to GDP because prices would deflate due to "oversupply" because consumers feel triggered by a housing market correction.

I could buy an EV for $20,000 that is superior in every way to an ICE car with double the price. It could accelerate faster, its fuel could cost less, its maintenance could be easier and cheaper, but the guy who buys the ICE is "wealthier" because he has something worth $40,000.

Ultimately, the solar panels and the electricity they generate is real wealth, not their prices. Real wealth can be measured in a variety of units - megawatts, joules, nanometers, etc. but USD and RMB aren't among them.
 

tphuang

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More great aspects to the China/Russia trade

The pullout of Western companies means that Chinese machinery exports for Russia is likely to continue to increase in 2023 as Chinese companies are further cleared up on how not to get sanctioned.

Another good aspect to this is that Russia now has an excessive refinery capacity. As such, China can import more and flip. In times of conflict, it can now also get refined product imported through rail. Diesel and gasoline can all be transported by rail and truck.
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And on top of this. Supertankers shipping oil to China are owned and operated by Chinese/HK based companies and I'm assure also insured by Chinese companies.
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AndrewS

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There are some 600 projects in China that had consumers stop paying mortgages in July - most pronounced in Zhengzhou - I actually spoke to someone as a part of the team in charge of fixing the problem there and lets just say this will take time to flow through.

Yes. But look at the fundamentals of Zhengzhou. It is the capital of Henan Province with some 100 Mn people with only a 56% urbanisation rate.

I think you're conflating what will happen *IF* consumer confidence comes back overnight with what *is likely* to happen. Mathematically what you are getting is possible but that isn't a base case scenario. The alternative data I track on restaurants and mobility would suggest a strong recovery but not nearly back to 2019 levels. The "Stuff to Service" shift is happening here as well.

Whilst urban areas are effectively at herd immunity, that is not true of rural areas. So there's a smaller 2nd wave still to occur when people go back to their family homes next week for Chinese New Year.

Then there will be another even smaller wave when they return to work in the cities, but I expect this to be very limited.

So I wouldn't expect restaurant or mobility data to be back to 2019 yet. Hence my comment that we'll see large effects after Chinese New Year. Remember that much of consumer sentiment is simply the herd effect, and the herd is moving.

The recovery is not going to be nearly as explosive as we saw in the DM because all the subsidies in China were given to the 'supply side' and virtually none given to the 'demand side'. The rich people aren't impacted, but keep in mind MPC is much lower for rich people than it is for poor people.

Also keep in mind, if your argument is that retail sales will be stronger, then net exports in 2023 will mathematically be weaker. You can't have it both ways here. Additionally, outbound travel will further erode net-exports - as the Top 10% of people in China with passports go to HK/Macao/Japan/Korea/Thailand.

China already has way enough foreign currency reserves,
Net exports are also at record levels.

So China doesn't need or want excessive amounts of foreign currency that it can't spend, and which is liable to confiscation by the US. That is one of the lessons of Russia.

So a reduction in net exports is perfectly acceptable to China.

An increase in imports is also desirable from the Chinese perspective, as it will soothe concerns of trading partners.

Can you break down the composition of solar investment? Not all of it will be counted as GDP (importing energy to make silicon ingots isn't all added to Chinese GDP - what is the *value added* portion of that investment?) - quoting a number like that without decomposing that is really not persuasive.

If solar panels are installed in China, I expect 95%+ of the project value to be Chinese-value add.
The import component is basically sand and maybe a few specialty bits. Everything else (which includes the electricity) is generated or made from domestic sources (coal, solar, wind, nuclear, hydro in China).

At this point, China already has 80% of the global entire solar industry and an even higher percentage of the underlying supply chain from start to finish.

For overseas solar projects, I expect most (but not all) of the project value will be Chinese value-add. My gut says 70% maximum.


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In 2022 China added 120GW of Wind + Solar. The target set by the National Energy Administration literally 2 weeks ago between wind and solar in China is 160 GW for 2023.

Globally, BNEF expects 2023 to be 315 GW of solar addition (vs. 268 GW in 2022) - if you are saying all of that 350 GW of capacity coming online in 2023 - wafer prices will compress some much that part of supply chain will go bankrupt.

What you are doing here is conflating supply addition with demand generation - just because China is building capacity doesn't mean people will use said capacity. And just because people use that capacity, doesn't mean that prices won't deflate as a result of significant oversupply.

We saw this movie in Aluminum and Steel, and we are watching this happen in real time with lithium battery capacity in 2023 - and we are about to see it happen with solar wafers.

I understand what you are saying.

But the big difference with Aluminium and Steel is that they reached the demand limit.
With solar and lithium, we're nowhere near the demand limit.

For example, the average electric vehicle has a higher upfront investment cost but significantly lower operating costs.
But say over a 10 year lifespan, the Total Cost of Ownership of a petrol car is 2x higher.

But once electric vehicles have a lower upfront cost (which is happening), you can see how they will completely displace combustion engine vehicles.
China is currently around 33% electric in terms of new sales. So EV sales (and therefore lithium demand) still has to triple before the Chinese market is saturated.

Once lithium prices come down from the current historic highs, the price of electric vehicles will further drop and stimulate extra demand to soak up that extra lithium capacity.

Consider how BYD currently produces affordable EVs and has a 5? month waiting list. BYD can produce these at a profit. So there is still much demand to fill in China. Then there is the global car market which still needs to go electric and also stationary grid storage in terms of lithium demand.

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You have a similar story with solar panels which compete against coal in China for example.
Once solar electricity gets cheap enough, it will eat into coal power plant demand.

The interesting thing is the interplay between solar and electric vehicles, which is outlined in the Third Industrial Revolution. Tony Seba also goes into this.

In sunny Saudi for example, solar costs 2cents/KWh. In comparison, the cost of coal electricity would be 3x more expensive.
the problem is that you can't store this low-cost electricity, unless you have a battery.

Well, it just so happens that electric vehicles have a battery which can store this electricity for later use. The combination of solar panels being the lowest-cost form of electricity and cheap electric vehicle batteries results in a huge cost advantage over petrol cars.

Furthermore, the average EV car battery is sized for long road journeys, and is way more than what the average daily commuter uses. So this means the battery can also store all the electricity required to run a home for an entire day.

So again, you can see a virtuous relationship where [low-cost solar] + [low-cost EVs] displaces coal/gas electricity in the entire grid.

And the global opportunity is 30,000 TWh of electricity in say 3 years time. Say half of that can be covered by solar and you'll need roughly 15,000? GW of solar panels in total. Then you still have further increases in electricity demand.

So China being able to produce 3 million tonnes of polysilicon (1000GW of solar panels per year) is nowhere near meeting final demand for solar panels.

Remember that at the dawn of the automobile era, it only took 10 years for automobiles to completely replace horses in New York.
 
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Petrolicious88

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My job requires that I be approximately right - how I feel about my estimates is irrelevant - but it occurs to me that you are more interested in venting how you feel than debate the numbers.

What is the contribution of this housing renovation program you talk about? This is the 3rd time I'm asking you - which part of my question do you not understand? I can repeat the question in Chinese and French if you understand those languages better. Let me know.



Housing is for living, not for speculation. - Xi Jinping

If you read the book Structural Reform by Huang Qifan (he was part of the Expert Committee that set the Comprehensive Deepening Reforms as part of the 3rd plenum of the 18th CPC Party Congress) - he lays it specifically how and why real estate will be sustainable at 1bln sqm/year (vs a peak of 1.6bln sqm in 2021) over the long term. Any discussion of Chinese economics with the assumption that "real estate will go back to where it was before" is laughably unrealistic - especially if you actually paid attention to the policies rolled out to deflate the exact problem.

80% of square footage and 60% of the value of Chinese real estate is being sold in Tier 3 and below - and as urbanization continues that is the last place young people want to go to are third tier cities with an excess of apartments (Hegang being the widely cited example).

The problem with Chinese real estate (not my words, but policymakers) is that there is an excess of apartments and a shortage of apartments at the same time - mismatch at the wrong places. One can buy an apartment in Hegang for 100k RMB - and one can buy a single sqm of apartment in Tier 1 cities for the same amount.

So why aren't people moving to Hegang? The city is so close to bankruptcy that they shut down heating this winter because the municipal heating company ran out of cash to buy heating coal. This is the result of cities investing heavily in non-productive roads/bridges by borrowing unsustainable debt - and the central government decided to put a stop to this.

As such, the government wants real estate to be a drag, not a boost to the economy as it had been for the first 21 years of the 21st century. Like sure, if the notion you're presenting here is that the central government should hire 20mln people to build more empty apartments in Hegang to get people paid, then sure you are going to solve the immediate income problem but the debt bubble will be inflated even more - and if you read the readout of the CEWC transcript the Politburo specifically talks about preventing financial risks. Real estate drag is feature, not bug.

If you are suggesting real estate FAI will be 20trln in 2023 - you are literally calling for the return to speculation of real estate and suggesting that the central government/Xi Jinping doesn't know what they're doing by reigning back real estate. While this assertion might be factually accurate, I don't know how you can be bullish the country if you think the central government and head of state doesn't know what they're doing with reforms they've been carrying out since 2013.

Like I've said, majority (~80%) of excess deposits is not as a result of 'people not being able to consume' but rather as a result of increased propensity to save as a result of reduced income expectations and reduced willingness to buy properties (hence weak credit demand / TSF data). In fact, if you decompose the numbers, in rich provinces like Jiangsu/Zhejiang, savings rate is actually lower than trend before pandemic - meaning that they have saved *less* than they otherwise would've. Majority of that 'excess deposit' are in poorer regions that are worried about future economic prospects.

Put this very simply - if you saved up an extra 10k last year but you're worried about losing your job in 2023 - you are not going out there to spend it all, let alone buying a new apartment. Rather, people saved up because they are worried about your job prospects and deferring apartment purchase/marriage/childbirth. You are mixing the independent/dependent variables in your assertion here.

If someone here has a magical plan to revitalize the economy of the Northeastern provinces, give the Politburo a call - they're quite interested in figuring it out.

2trln RMB over 4 years is yawn inducing - not going to move the needle - not to mention that not all of that 2 trln is GDP because of imported raw materials / energy necessary to manufacture polysilicon ingots.

Meanwhile, net exports in 2022 contributed to ~1.5 trln to GDP - this is with a depreciating RMB in 2022 vs appreciating RMB in 2021 - (Meaning FX contribution will be a drag in 2023 vs 2022). 2023 Exports will be lower than 2022 and Imports will be higher (as a result of retail sales / consumption growth)

So heading into 2023 - there will be more than a 1.3% drag already just from net exports being down as opposed to being up 1.5 trln.

View attachment 105220


Look - I don't make up the numbers - arguing about this is akin to US think tanks arguing about the sUpErIoRiTy of US Navy in the 1st island chain - its just ludicrous.
Thanks for sharing. It’s pretty insightful to hear some balanced view points.
 

tphuang

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fyi, Retails figures for 2022 should come out soon. In the first 9 months, it's up 0.7% and I think this might go below 0 when full year is counted. I think Q4 will be very weak.
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in 2021, it was 12.5%
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in 2022, it was down 3.9%
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in 2019, it was 8%
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in 2018, it was 9%
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I don't think need to go further back by then
 

abenomics12345

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While I agree with much of what you wrote and I have no reason to question your 2023 GDP projections, this gets to a philosophical point of why GDP is such a poor measure.

Sure, I don't disagree with your gripes about GDP as a measure as it is used today, but that is a debate about the rules of the game. I play the game as it is given to me, not as I wish it should be played.

Yes. But look at the fundamentals of Zhengzhou. It is the capital of Henan Province with some 100 Mn people with only a 56% urbanisation rate.

Whilst urban areas are effectively at herd immunity, that is not true of rural areas. So there's a smaller 2nd wave still to occur when people go back to their family homes next week for Chinese New Year.


China already has way enough foreign currency reserves,
Net exports are also at record levels.

So China doesn't need or want excessive amounts of foreign currency that it can't spend, and which is liable to confiscation by the US. That is one of the lessons of Russia.

So a reduction in net exports is perfectly acceptable to China.


If solar panels are installed in China, I expect 95%+ of the project value to be Chinese-value add.
The import component is basically sand and maybe a few specialty bits. Everything else (which includes the electricity) is generated or made from domestic sources (coal, solar, wind, nuclear, hydro in China).

At this point, China already has 80% of the global entire solar industry and an even higher percentage of the underlying supply chain from start to finish.

For overseas solar projects, I expect most (but not all) of the project value will be Chinese value-add. My gut says 70% maximum.


I understand what you are saying.

But the big difference with Aluminium and Steel is that they reached the demand limit.
With solar and lithium, we're nowhere near the demand limit.

For example, the average electric vehicle has a higher upfront investment cost but significantly lower operating costs.
But say over a 10 year lifespan, the Total Cost of Ownership of a petrol car is 2x higher.

But once electric vehicles have a lower upfront cost (which is happening), you can see how they will completely displace combustion engine vehicles.
China is currently around 33% electric in terms of new sales. So EV sales (and therefore lithium demand) still has to triple before the Chinese market is saturated.

Once lithium prices come down from the current historic highs, the price of electric vehicles will further drop and stimulate extra demand to soak up that extra lithium capacity.

Consider how BYD currently produces affordable EVs and has a 5? month waiting list. BYD can produce these at a profit. So there is still much demand to fill in China. Then there is the global car market which still needs to go electric and also stationary grid storage in terms of lithium demand.

---

You have a similar story with solar panels which compete against coal in China for example.
Once solar electricity gets cheap enough, it will eat into coal power plant demand.

The interesting thing is the interplay between solar and electric vehicles, which is outlined in the Third Industrial Revolution. Tony Seba also goes into this.

In sunny Saudi for example, solar costs 2cents/KWh. In comparison, the cost of coal electricity would be 3x more expensive.
the problem is that you can't store this low-cost electricity, unless you have a battery.

Well, it just so happens that electric vehicles have a battery which can store this electricity for later use. The combination of solar panels being the lowest-cost form of electricity and cheap electric vehicle batteries results in a huge cost advantage over petrol cars.

Furthermore, the average EV car battery is sized for long road journeys, and is way more than what the average daily commuter uses. So this means the battery can also store all the electricity required to run a home for an entire day.

So again, you can see a virtuous relationship where [low-cost solar] + [low-cost EVs] displaces coal/gas electricity in the entire grid.

And the global opportunity is 30,000 TWh of electricity in say 3 years time. Say half of that can be covered by solar and you'll need roughly 15,000? GW of solar panels in total. Then you still have further increases in electricity demand.

So China being able to produce 3 million tonnes of polysilicon (1000GW of solar panels per year) is nowhere near meeting final demand for solar panels.

Remember that at the dawn of the automobile era, it only took 10 years for automobiles to completely replace horses in New York.

If you've been to Zhengzhou lately, the fundamentals aren't exactly.....great. It's competing heavily with the Shandong coastal provinces as well as Anhui (Hefei) as new urban centers. The exciting industries in Henan are 1) some medical devices companies (Autobio Diagnostics as an example) and 2) Manmade diamond firms (like North Industries Red Arrow) but that is in another town that's not Zhengzhou. I've spoken to company executives and they have trouble retaining talent in Zhengzhou because the research clusters are in Shanghai/Shenzhen. The reason why it is virtually impossible to replace China as a global manufacturing hub is also exactly the reason why it is so difficult for Henan to compete with Yangtze/Pearl River Deltas.

There is a reason why blood/plasma collection companies have their clinics in Henan/Guizhou/Guangxi - people are so poor that they sell their plasma (Have a read of the story of Paysign and Wirecard in the US if you're interested, nasty business).

The scenario you are painting for Q1 - wave 2/3 of Omicron as people travel back home + return to work is actually worse for retail sales on a YoY basis. So if Q1 is a writeoff - 15% growth for 2023 implies something like 20% growth in the last 3 quarters of the year, *with* a negative comp for oil and gas (which grew in the teens in 2022).

I'm not debating about whether China needs FX reserves or not, I'm simply describing the net impact of no longer growing net exports on contribution to 2023 GDP. The fact that net exports are at record levels is precisely why they will be at best neutral and at worst a significant drag to GDP growth in 2023.

As for all of the arguments you're making on the solar industry - I understand all of the long term structural factors and am personally invested in the success of some of the supply chain (have been a shareholder of NextEra Energy since 2015) - but again, we are not discussing the long term outlook but simply the specific implications of 2023 GDP growth. All I will say is that demand growth =/= value growth - supply response is critical in understanding how these cycles work - take a look at the price of cigarettes as demand fell continuously.

In 2014 I could have made the same demand-side argument you are making except for oil and gas demand ("EVs are 5+ years out", "renewables won't offset demand need for oil and gas" - both of which turned out to be true. Oil demand *is* materially higher today than is in 2014; EVs weren't really hitting the S-curve until the past couple of years and renewables growth, despite quite rapid, has not offset fossil fuel demand) - except the supply growth out of US shale caused US E&Ps to go bankrupt because oil went from 100 to 25 in 2 years.

The LCOE progression for solar/batteries has been a result of Wright's Law + relatively muted commodity prices - that we get a significant adoption of batteries will necessitate a supply response from commodities side as we run into shortages (Copper supply in 2024/2025 is looking *very* precarious) - that changes the economics completely. Intermittency issues aside, we're just not there in terms of capacity. I don't doubt the need and long term secular growth of the *volume* of investments necessary, but I don't think you're considering the feedback mechanism of pricing in the markets that inform decision making for the RoW.

Sure we can get into NCM/LFP battery energy density improvements but again - these are *possibilies*, not *certainties* - and they certainly do not matter for 2023.

The book you need to read on understanding capital cycles is Capital Returns: Investing Through the Capital Cycle

Thanks for sharing. It’s pretty insightful to hear some balanced view points.
Anytime - I'm looking to thoughtfully disagree - that is how we learn after all. I'm not interested in echo chambers.
 

Eventine

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If you've been to Zhengzhou lately, the fundamentals aren't exactly.....great. It's competing heavily with the Shandong coastal provinces as well as Anhui (Hefei) as new urban centers. The exciting industries in Henan are 1) some medical devices companies (Autobio Diagnostics as an example) and 2) Manmade diamond firms (like North Industries Red Arrow) but that is in another town that's not Zhengzhou. I've spoken to company executives and they have trouble retaining talent in Zhengzhou because the research clusters are in Shanghai/Shenzhen. The reason why it is virtually impossible to replace China as a global manufacturing hub is also exactly the reason why it is so difficult for Henan to compete with Yangtze/Pearl River Deltas.
To what extent is this problem a replay of the Silicon Valley problem? It sounds quite similar. Ultimately what drives people out of these research/tech. mega centers is the housing price. If they can't afford to live in Shanghai, then they can't work there. Companies have the choice of either paying astronomical salaries for employees to work there, or opening research & development centers else where. The latter is becoming more sensible in the US - especially with work-from-home - due to the cost of living inflation in major tech. centers. I imagine the situation is even worse in China since the price-income ratio is higher in Chinese mega cities compared to Silicon Valley & New York City.

Inevitably, this has to change. Companies can't be profitable if they have to pay employees half a million dollars a year just so they can afford apartments in Shanghai. The Chinese government can facilitate the process by investing more in key infrastructure improvements in second tier cities, by which I don't mean roads or bridges, but quality of life benefits like health care, education, and environment improvements, that would attract highly skilled workers.
 

AndrewS

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If you've been to Zhengzhou lately, the fundamentals aren't exactly.....great. It's competing heavily with the Shandong coastal provinces as well as Anhui (Hefei) as new urban centers. The exciting industries in Henan are 1) some medical devices companies (Autobio Diagnostics as an example) and 2) Manmade diamond firms (like North Industries Red Arrow) but that is in another town that's not Zhengzhou. I've spoken to company executives and they have trouble retaining talent in Zhengzhou because the research clusters are in Shanghai/Shenzhen. The reason why it is virtually impossible to replace China as a global manufacturing hub is also exactly the reason why it is so difficult for Henan to compete with Yangtze/Pearl River Deltas.

There is a reason why blood/plasma collection companies have their clinics in Henan/Guizhou/Guangxi - people are so poor that they sell their plasma (Have a read of the story of Paysign and Wirecard in the US if you're interested, nasty business).

I have been to Zhengzhou, albeit not recently.
Yes, Zhengzhou is competing against other urban centres, but the fact remains that it is the capital of the province and will eventually end up as a megacity with all the institutions and amenities that make a city a nice place to live.

But in the meantime, Zhengzhou have to will compete on cheap labour and cheap land as a manufacturing hub. But once they have a critical mass of companies, universities etc, they should have a self-sustaining cluster that can move up the value chain.

Shanghai and Shenzhen are expensive and have limited land available. In comparison, Zhengzhou sits on a flat plain which allows it to sprawl as much as it wants, which should keep land costs in check.


The scenario you are painting for Q1 - wave 2/3 of Omicron as people travel back home + return to work is actually worse for retail sales on a YoY basis. So if Q1 is a writeoff - 15% growth for 2023 implies something like 20% growth in the last 3 quarters of the year, *with* a negative comp for oil and gas (which grew in the teens in 2022).

Yep, I expect Q1 to be muted at best.

I'm assuming that you were in Japan during COVID and didn't experience the effects of a hard lockdown like in Europe or what Chinese cities just experienced. It's an exhausting experience and the exhaustion/malaise in the population lingers on for weeks afterwards.

That's why I am discounting all the trailing and current indicators on Chinese consumer demand.

Chinese New Year will be the first opportunity for much of the Chinese population to stop working 6 days a week, really rest and then come back recharged.

As for all of the arguments you're making on the solar industry - I understand all of the long term structural factors and am personally invested in the success of some of the supply chain (have been a shareholder of NextEra Energy since 2015) - but again, we are not discussing the long term outlook but simply the specific implications of 2023 GDP growth. All I will say is that demand growth =/= value growth - supply response is critical in understanding how these cycles work - take a look at the price of cigarettes as demand fell continuously.

If we're looking at just solar in 2023, it has just halved from approx $32/kg to $16/kg and I reckon we will see a further halving of polysilicon prices sometime in the next year. At a price of $8?, that is close to the marginal cost of production of $5-6?

So $8 probably represents a healthy floor price for polysilicon to include capital repayments.

There are a bunch of solar projects overseas that have been on hold because solar panel prices were much higher than expected when the bidders won the contracts. It looks like polysilicon halving from $32 resulted in panel prices being reduced by one-third. So a polysilicon dropping by half again would mean another one-sixth drop in prices. The next result is that solar panel prices will be half of what they were in Dec 2022. So we should see increased export demand.

Given that $8/kg for Polysilicon is a healthy figure, it makes sense for Chinese companies/government to use any spare solar panel production at that price. How fast they can deploy is debateable, but since everyone is expecting low prices and spare capacity in the coming year, it makes sense to prepare a lot of shovel-ready projects. Solar projects are capital intensive but also quick and straightforward to deploy. The financial returns should be positive immediately, and I expect the overall economic and social returns to be 5%+ per year.



In 2014 I could have made the same demand-side argument you are making except for oil and gas demand ("EVs are 5+ years out", "renewables won't offset demand need for oil and gas" - both of which turned out to be true. Oil demand *is* materially higher today than is in 2014; EVs weren't really hitting the S-curve until the past couple of years and renewables growth, despite quite rapid, has not offset fossil fuel demand) - except the supply growth out of US shale caused US E&Ps to go bankrupt because oil went from 100 to 25 in 2 years.

The LCOE progression for solar/batteries has been a result of Wright's Law + relatively muted commodity prices - that we get a significant adoption of batteries will necessitate a supply response from commodities side as we run into shortages (Copper supply in 2024/2025 is looking *very* precarious) - that changes the economics completely. Intermittency issues aside, we're just not there in terms of capacity. I don't doubt the need and long term secular growth of the *volume* of investments necessary, but I don't think you're considering the feedback mechanism of pricing in the markets that inform decision making for the RoW.

Sure we can get into NCM/LFP battery energy density improvements but again - these are *possibilies*, not *certainties* - and they certainly do not matter for 2023.

The book you need to read on understanding capital cycles is Capital Returns: Investing Through the Capital Cycle

For Solar yes, it is predominantly Wright's Law and incremental improvements in the design/technology.
But the sheer level of scaling that is required means significant reductions.
Commodity prices (and fluctuations) are less of a factor for solar. The materials are mainly glass, sand, steel and some copper.

For batteries, we are actually seeing significant technological and cost improvements in batteries in addition to Wright's Law.
NCM/LFP battery improvements are not possibilities, but actually certainties for 2023.

What is uncertain are the possibilities from the Sodium and Solid-state batteries being introduced this year in consumer vehicles.

Plus Lithium isn't a fundamentally rare element on the planet. The bottleneck is building enough processing plants to refine the Lithium. Given that Lithium prices are still 10-12x above where they should be and how much lithium contributes to the overall battery cost, modest price reductions and additional supply should be easily mopped up from additional demand, at least for 2023

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A typical 60KWh EV battery only uses 20-26kg of Copper. Copper prices that jump 10x will barely make any dent in the overall cost of a battery pack
 
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AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
What matters is the marginal propensity to save/consume. Chinese marginal propensity to save has *always* been high. You're conflating stock (cash in bank) vs flow (GDP).

I'm not conflating the 2. There is a reason why I stopped with only 40% of excess savings being spent. That leaves 60% still sitting in the bank or being put in an investment somewhere.


I do not contest with the 4.8trln data point, but that is not the point. Excess deposits sitting in bank account =/= willingness to spend it all. You need to look at the debt side of the balance sheet as well. Household debt/GDP in China went from 56% to 62% from 2020 to 2022 - that is an extra 15trln of debt households took on - so first of all you need to net that vs. the cash in bank to get aggregate 'wealth'.

In the US, we also saw household debt/GDP increase by 5% during the pandemic. That is comparable to the 6% China figure you cited.
And it looks like 40-50% of excess savings in the US was ultimately spent
 
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