China's SCS Strategy Thread

antiterror13

Brigadier
WHat was the purpose of rusty F804 sailing from europe far away to Xisha, didn't they know that rusty F804 is 100% sitting duck there ?

Does it have anything to do with Nexperia drama?
 

GulfLander

Brigadier
Registered Member
news from douyin, google translated
Chinese workers detained by Filipino workers, have they been released?

One day to go! 64 people were released last night after a "surveillance" operation.
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...

google translated
All 64 Chinese citizens working at a steel plant in the Philippines have been released, with six others still undergoing release procedures. They had been detained by Philippine law enforcement.
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ACuriousPLAFan

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
PLA watcher's view seem to be they must have gotten the standard anti-ship dry run that USN would get, but due to terrible situational awareness didn't realize how much danger they were in.

Shilao reckon PLA needs a new set of dumbed down intimidation tactics, if you play at too high of a level sometimes people just don't get it.

If absolutely needed, I'd say that the PLA could take a few pages from the 7th episode of 家有神兽's latest story.
 

00CuriousObserver

Senior Member
Registered Member
The ship is in Vietnam for a visit.

kUiAL3c.png
 

elevator

New Member
Registered Member
Totally fair.

Refer back to this post:



The layer deeper than just “The Flying Dutchman” is the broader China-US geopolitical situation in the WESTPAC (including the SCS). It is the overall structure. The Netherlands is part of NATO, operates within a US-led framework, and the ship itself sailed from the Philippines. Even if China ups their tactics in this case, or even against the Philippines (including getting rid of that rust), it does not fundamentally advance the broader China-US geopolitical structure.

A couple of reasons for example (not exhaustive): First, something like the 1IC will still exist. Bases in the Philippines, Taiwan, and the Ryukyus still exist. These are the physical hard power assets that these alliances are built on. Second, showing force against the NL or the PH is not the same as showing force against the US. The Philippines is weak; you need to prove that you can come out ahead in the China-US rivalry, not the "China-Philippines rivalry".

The most obvious "great change" that would affect this geopolitical structure is of course Taiwan. That leads to bigger WESTPAC questions (of course including the SCS). I think many here would agree (though certainly some might not), that the time to fully, wholly, and totally resolve the Taiwan issue will not come for quite a few years.

Some would criticize this as too 下大棋 (too much of a "4D chess"). I think the emotional criticism is valid, but I also think the calculus is logical.

As written in the aforementioned SCSPI article:

I agree that the South China Sea is ultimately part of the broader China-US geopolitical competition. Unless that larger balance of power is addressed, neither the SCS nor the Taiwan issue can be fully resolved.

The real goal should be to establish a new regional balance where China and the US accept some kind of dividing line of influence, likely somewhere between the Second and Third Island Chains. Once that happens, along with Taiwan reunification, the regional order would naturally begin to shift. South Korea and Japan would have to adjust to China’s growing influence, and Southeast Asian countries would likely follow the same path.

That is why China should stay focused on the bigger strategic picture instead of wasting too many resources on smaller players like the Philippines. The Philippines can create friction, but it cannot determine the future regional order on its own. The main issue is still the overall China-US balance in the Western Pacific.

So in that sense, the South China Sea is not really a standalone issue. It is a reflection of the much larger balance-of-power struggle in the Western Pacific.
 

vincent

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Moderator - World Affairs
Totally fair.

Refer back to this post:



The layer deeper than just “The Flying Dutchman” is the broader China-US geopolitical situation in the WESTPAC (including the SCS). It is the overall structure. The Netherlands is part of NATO, operates within a US-led framework, and the ship itself sailed from the Philippines. Even if China ups their tactics in this case, or even against the Philippines (including getting rid of that rust), it does not fundamentally advance the broader China-US geopolitical structure.

A couple of reasons for example (not exhaustive): First, something like the 1IC will still exist. Bases in the Philippines, Taiwan, and the Ryukyus still exist. These are the physical hard power assets that these alliances are built on. Second, showing force against the NL or the PH is not the same as showing force against the US. The Philippines is weak; you need to prove that you can come out ahead in the China-US rivalry, not the "China-Philippines rivalry".

The most obvious "great change" that would affect this geopolitical structure is of course Taiwan. That leads to bigger WESTPAC questions (of course including the SCS). I think many here would agree (though certainly some might not), that the time to fully, wholly, and totally resolve the Taiwan issue will not come for quite a few years.

Some would criticize this as too 下大棋 (too much of a "4D chess"). I think the emotional criticism is valid, but I also think the calculus is logical.

As written in the aforementioned SCSPI article:
Defeat the US militarily and lots of problems will vanish.
 
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