Totally fair.
Refer back to this post:
The layer deeper than just “The Flying Dutchman” is the broader China-US geopolitical situation in the WESTPAC (including the SCS). It is the overall structure. The Netherlands is part of NATO, operates within a US-led framework, and the ship itself sailed from the Philippines. Even if China ups their tactics in this case, or even against the Philippines (including getting rid of that rust), it does not fundamentally advance the broader China-US geopolitical structure.
A couple of reasons for example (not exhaustive): First, something like the 1IC will still exist. Bases in the Philippines, Taiwan, and the Ryukyus still exist. These are the physical hard power assets that these alliances are built on. Second, showing force against the NL or the PH is not the same as showing force against the US. The Philippines is weak; you need to prove that you can come out ahead in the China-US rivalry, not the "China-Philippines rivalry".
The most obvious "great change" that would affect this geopolitical structure is of course Taiwan. That leads to bigger WESTPAC questions (of course including the SCS). I think many here would agree (though certainly some might not), that the time to fully, wholly, and totally resolve the Taiwan issue will not come for quite a few years.
Some would criticize this as too 下大棋 (too much of a "4D chess"). I think the emotional criticism is valid, but I also think the calculus is logical.
As written in the aforementioned SCSPI article: