China's SCS Strategy Thread
- Thread starter lilzz
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Thank you very much for the MIT link. The must-read bombshell is the last paragraph
The China Security Report was much more informative and confirmed my assertion: In the event of a China-US conflict over Taiwan, you're safest being a civilian on the island.
I purchased the China's Maritime Gray Zone Operations (Studies in Chinese Maritime Development) book on Kindle for PC to save money and bookshelf space. I'll provide a quick look in a week or so.
China being passive is not a good sign, one by one, US will scoop em all up. China needs to start investing in the internal affairs of potential rivals. Geopolitics is a ruthless game. Whether China is nice or not, it has been designated as the villain in mainstream Western media. Its own media presence is quite poor (Even Qatar and Russia do it better) so practically there is no counter narrative.
Next stop is India. There are dozens of movements and states that want to break away from India. China can sit and watch as slowly the supply chain splits build pace and shift to 'stable' neighbours or gets stalled due to 'instability'.
In the foreseeable future what will US having more access to filipino military bases really do in the south china sea or in a potential Taiwan operation?
It would have made a lot of sense maybe 10~15 years ago when the South China Sea was still a heavily contested area, but in 2023 i think most players in the SCS already have accepted China's claims in the SCS. The other players are probably now working out resource sharing deals with China, so the other players keep quiet and stop making the SCS an international thing.
I also wouldn't be surprised if the Philippines agreed with China to put their signature on the Code of Conduct at the start of January to wind down this SCS phase and in return informed China they will give the US access to their bases to please both sides of the China-US rivalry.
No they haven't. Indonesia and Vietnam just a few weeks ago agreed on their EEZ zones. Funnily enough, the agreement actually encroaches in the Chinese-claimed SCS
Basically, Vietnam and Indonesia have teamed up and have declared their opposition to China's claims in the SCS by a formally signed document (treaty?)
The battle for SCS has in no way been finished, some could actually say that it is just getting started.
Indonesia-Vietnam together and Philippines involving the Americans in a big escalation
1. No one has accepted Chinese claims. Other small local players are uniting against China. 'Wolf diplomacy' basically has done absolutely nothing for China.
2. What do these new bases add for US in terms of Taiwan op? Are you really saying 'nothing'? See the map.
This is a clear win for US and loss for China. If people keep ignoring this and covering it with copium, you will see alot more of it. China needs to wake up and start destabilizing the regional pets. That's how the game is played, play the game or they will take you off the field. US is playing this very much as a zero-sum game. Asia Pacific is very much part of the theater but in future what could really divert the forces is India.
There is absolutely zero point in being nice. China is already painted as the ultimate bad guy. Soft approach means nothing, rule books mean nothing (see what they did to Russia).
Take of the gloves. Make them understand that there is a price to be paid.
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Depending on the exact degree of US use of Filipino territory, it might amount to a large factor. A few bases in themselves may not be crucial, but they might signify greater US access to Filipino territory in the future.
Most immediate change is that the US gets another axis to project power onto China and Taiwan, from a completely different direction to Japan/Ryukyu.
Also, the proximity of Philippines mean US might be fairly effective in projecting said power, as we're talking about just several hundred miles to cross to the battlefield. (nearby waters, south of Taiwan, part of Chinese coast) Comparing that to Okinawa, which is farther away from Taiwan. And Japan proper is over 650 miles away from Taiwan, which would already eat into US fighter sortie rates and time on station near Taiwan. Guam is really a non-issue for China compared to Japan and Philippines, as it's small and 1650 miles away.
So, the number of US planes around Taiwan may be significantly greater. Number of US planes in SCS and southern China may change from "almost none" to perhaps a strategically impactful number. Besides planes, US will be able to have other assets based there. Like radars, SAM units, anti ship launchers, cruise and ballistic missiles launchers, etc. Impact of those may be significant, depending on their numbers. The size of Philippines also mean those units may have greater survival chances, as it'd be harder for China to find and destroy them, compared to similar units stationed on a small island, for example. And end result might impact both south of Taiwan, as well as southwestern part of the Taiwan strait - for example, obstructing Chinese ships en route to or from Taiwan, as well as obstructing Chinese ships from southern Chinese coastlines to meet up with ones from northern Chinese coastlines.