China's SCS Strategy Thread

[stannislas]

Attacking the US’s assets in the 1st island chain is *not* the same as attacking the US mainland or trying to invade US allies. Especially if China is doing it as a response to US attacks and not a provocation it does *not* trigger nuclear escalation. If you don’t understand this you don’t understand nuclear escalation dynamics. Furthermore, the point is having the ability to contest the US’s positions from the the 1st and 2nd IC vastly decreases the likelihood that the US would try to start a fight at all.

ok I don't understand nuclear escalation dynamics, you are right.
so you can promise if US base in South Korea or Japan got attacked, there won't be nuclear for sure?
ok, who you are by the way? Joe Biden? Jesus Christ？

I guess chinese are all cowards, because they take the threat from US congressman and defence department seriously, they should all believe you, sink a US aircraft carrier will indefinately not occur a nuclear war, great

The US isn’t moving *out* of its closer positions to China, it’s *reinforcing* its presence in Guam. Increases in the latter position is not the same as decreases in the former. *But* insofar as the US continues to use Guam China will need to be able to contest the US position that far out in order to decisively end any potential US-China conflict, which, surprise, will require a decent complement of carriers to do.

yes, you are absolutely right, why I didn't use the word 'reinforce', by moving the major part of the stake in Okinawa (500km to china) to Guam (3000km to china) is definate a reinforce, my bad

so, care to explain to me, what's US weapon that is able to reach in 3000km in guam? trident?

 

[Blitzo]

This is a great discussion we are having on future Chinese carrier fleet size. Btw, I don't think we can use annual operating cost of an USN carrier to infer the cost for Type 003 and its air wing. PLAN crew members are just going to be paid a lot less. PLAN activities will also be less demanding than what's expected out of a USN group. Once China really gets its carrier construction going, I think $4.5 billion might also be an overestimate to production cost.

Having said that, carrier groups obvious cost a lot of money. In the past, people have often suggested that PLAN will eventually settle in with 6 carrier groups, which would work out to be 2 groups per fleet. I'm not sure there is any evidence that's how many groups PLAN planners are looking at. We have seen them having great ambitions than even the most optimistic projections. Their carrier program is progressing at much faster pace than what I would've expected. Their LHD program is also progressing faster than I would've expected. If they do end up with 10 carrier groups, I would not be shocked. It does seem to me that 6 is a more likely number until they can match up more evenly with USN air wing and nuclear submarine fleet. It would take them launching a super carrier every 4 years to just get to 6 carriers in service by 2035(that's assuming CV-16 doesn't retire by then). If we assume that can be reduced to one every 3 years after the first couple of unit, they would not get to 6 CATOBAR capable carriers until 2040 and 8 by 2045.

If USN, with 11 carriers, thinks that it only needs 273 F-35C and a larger number of super hornets, I think it'd be unrealistic to expect more J-35s than that. So, I'd say a production run of 270 J-35s is the most likely we will see. The remaining of the fixed air wing will be KJ-600s, J-15B and J-15BDs (maybe 160 of them in total).

I think the number of J-XYs that the PLAN buys for its carrier fleet may not necessarily be guided by F-35C procurement.

(Keep in mind, this is for late 2030s era, when I expect the PLAN will have 10 carriers, if not all in service, then close to all in service -- perhaps 1-2 in fitting out/sea trials by this time).


For the USN, I think its F-35C procurement scale has to be balanced against their 6th gen/F/A-XX desires, because at the moment they are still hoping F/A-XX will enter service sometime in the 2030s to replace Super Hornet.
An optimistic timescale to be sure, but it is also one which would very much explain why their F-35C procurement intentions at this stage are so relatively small.
I suspect that if/when F/A-XX is delayed, then they will increase the number of F-35Cs that the eventually buy.


In the case of the PLAN, I would be surprised if they have a naval 6th gen fighter ready to enter service in the 2030s (maybe very late 2030s/early 2040s).
Given there will likely lack of a 6th generation fighter until late 30s/early 40s, along with a notional 10 CATOBAR carrier fleet by that time, I think would very much see 300-400 J-XYs built until the end of their production run.
(Heck even if it wasn't 10 CATOBAR carriers and if it was 8 CATOBAR carriers and the 2 current STOBAR carriers instead, the point still stands, especially if J-XY is STOBAR compatible).


I would agree with the idea of under 300 J-XYs being built in total, if the PLAN had a 6th gen naval fighter ready to go sometime in the mid 2030s, but I consider that to be very unlikely.

 

[latenlazy]

ok I don't understand nuclear escalation dynamics, you are right.
so you can promise if US base in South Korea or Japan got attacked, there won't be nuclear for sure?
ok, who you are by the way? Joe Biden? Jesus Christ？

Yes, actually, because if the US retaliated with nukes for attacks on military targets, it would be triggering mutually assured destruction over those bases. Retaliating with nukes when your bases get shelled and triggering a nuclear exchange is not a winning move for the US. There’s a concept in nuclear escalation dynamics called proportionality.

I guess chinese are all cowards, because they take the threat from US congressman and defence department seriously, they should all believe you, sink a US aircraft carrier will indefinately not occur a nuclear war, great

No one’s advocating for sinking anything. The point of building up these capabilities is to create enough deterrence so that you *don’t* have to use them. But sinking an aircraft carrier would almost certainly not incur a nuclear war.

yes, you are absolutely right, why I didn't use the word 'reinforce', by moving the major part of the stake in Okinawa (500km to china) to Guam (3000km to china) is definate a reinforce, my bad

so, care to explain to me, what's US weapon that is able to reach in 3000km in guam? trident?

They aren’t moving troops from Okinawa to Guam. They’re just adding troops to Guam. Okinawa’s deployment hasn’t changed. US bombers can operate out of Guam. Guam is a logistic waypoint for projecting naval and air power into China’s periphery. Any major maneuver the US might do against China leans on Guam to act as a major supply line. Just becomes the US isn’t going to lob missiles from Guam doesn’t mean Guam is an inert factor in a US-China conflict scenario.

 

[Totoro]

So far, PLAN budgeted one carrier to be launched every five or so years. (2011, 2017, 2022)
If that were to continue, further carriers might be launched in 2027, 2032 and 2037.
If the budget doubled, and if for example Dalian made just as many carriers in its own shipyard, with maybe even some construction having started there for a lay down date sometime in late 2022 - then the Dalian launches might be:
2024, 2029, 2034 and 2039.

Not counting the already commissioned carriers, which aren't CATOBAR, and assuming all further carriers are of the same 003 design that can be replicated and built fairly quickly - that makes 8 CATOBAR carriers launched by the year 2039.

Sure, in theory even more workers could be trained in both shipyards and more ships could likely be able to be constructed if money was really not a factor.

But until we see such a move, or even until we see Dalian actually building another 003 type carrier - all those remain really hypothetical, rather than plausible. Doing carriers in two separate shipyards, back to back, with both shipyard utilizing an even bigger workforce and churning out a carrier every 3-4 years rather than every 5 - that'd take a big bite not only out of the workforce but out of berth capacity as well. Who'd be building commercial shipping then?

So, while such a move may be possible and even somewhat likely in a total arms race/war could start any year now situation, where commercial shipping isn't comparably as big a factor - in today's world, despite the current cold war forming - we're still sufficiently far away that such numbers seem likely or even plausible.
It'd literally require, for example - Jiangnan launching carriers in 2022, 2026, 2030, 2034 and 2038, and Dalian launching theirs in 2024, 2028, 2032 and 2036. That's 9 carriers technically but with just two months less than 4 years, it'd be enough to barely reach 10 launched by 2039. For 2038 to reach 10 it'd be even harder, probably taking closer to 3 years per carrier.
JN launches: mid 2022, 2026, mid 2029, 2033, mid 2036
DL launches: 2024, mid 2027, 2031, mid 2034, 2038
And we're talking about launched carriers. Not fitted out, tested nor commissioned. If one wants that as well, then by 2039 it'd likely stay at 9 carriers.

So, before we see THAT kind of ramp up, we'll likely see other, comparatively smaller ramp up. Like either Dalian also getting to occasionally build a carrier at leisurely pace. Or JN (but not DL) increasing their pace, with a worker force and a section of the shipyard dedicated to constantly churning out carriers. (lets say one carrier launched every 3.5 years)

Anything is possible, sure, but 10 CATOBAR carriers within next 16/17 years is... just not likely right now. The US, during actual cold war arms race built 9 conventional CATOBARs in 12 years but then slowed down to 5 nuke CATOBARs in 15 years.

But hey, maybe we ARE in a full fledged cold war arms race that will match the 1950s/1960s one. I guess time will tell.

 

[Maikeru]

But until we see such a move, or even until we see Dalian actually building another 003 type carrier - all those remain really hypothetical, rather than plausible. Doing carriers in two separate shipyards, back to back, with both shipyard utilizing an even bigger workforce and churning out a carrier every 3-4 years rather than every 5 - that'd take a big bite not only out of the workforce but out of berth capacity as well. Who'd be building commercial shipping then?

Not sure you're factoring in the sheer size of these yards, especially Jiangnan. Having a couple of CVs in build would barely dent the commercial work, in fact you'd struggle to notice the carriers among all the bulkers and box ships!

 

[AndrewS]

But hey, maybe we ARE in a full fledged cold war arms race that will match the 1950s/1960s one. I guess time will tell.

If relations get really, really bad we could see Chinese military spending double to 3.4% of GDP, which is still less than the USA or Russia.

If we apply that percentage to the current Chinese GDP of $18 Trillion (in exchange rate terms), that works out as an extra $306 Bn per year.

Note this figure is actually higher than the combined budget of the entire US Navy and entire US Air Force, if you account for the difference in labour costs.

We can see with Jiangnan that it will take them less than 2 years to assemble a Type-003 EMALS carrier. So if we had both Dalian and Jiangnan starting serial production and assembly of carriers from 2025, they could have 10 new supercarriers launched from 2025-2037.

But in reality, I think China will go with a more modest level of military spending, but one which will have sufficient conventional and nuclear forces to persuade the USA that it has no option (even with allies) to use military force against China.

 

[weig2000]

Chinese defense spending now is really peacetime spending. In fact, it's even lower than what you normally expect of a great power during peacetime. China spends less than the minimum threshold of 2% of GDP that NATO asks for its member states. China spends the lowest as percentage of GDP among major powers and big countries except Japan.

So China is really not geared towards big time war, and they want to sustain the period of peace development as long as possible. All these accusations about Chinese expansionism or Chinese agressions are smearing campaigns and propaganda from you-know-where.

But that doesn't mean China can not afford or will not increase their defense spending to deter or defeat aggression against her or military intervention in her internal affairs. All these bragging for numerical advantage of 1,000 stealth aircraft over China in a Taiwan contingency, deploying 70% or more of US Navy and Air Force to Asia-Pacific to "deter" China, or the constant salami-slicing on Taiwan, sooner or later, will prompt China to significantly increase her defense spending. By then, we will no longer talk about 3-4 production lines for J-20, or one CATOBAR every five years. For now, it does not appear that China has kicked it into high gear.

 

[SanWenYu]

Chinese defense spending now is really peacetime spending. In fact, it's even lower than what you normally expect of a great power during peacetime. China spends less than the minimum threshold of 2% of GDP that NATO asks for its member states. China spends the lowest as percentage of GDP among major powers and big countries except Japan.

So China is really not geared towards big time war, and they want to sustain the period of peace development as long as possible. All these accusations about Chinese expansionism or Chinese agressions are smearing campaigns and propaganda from you-know-where.

But that doesn't mean China can not afford or will not increase their defense spending to deter or defeat aggression against her or military intervention in her internal affairs. All these bragging for numerical advantage of 1,000 stealth aircraft over China in a Taiwan contingency, deploying 70% or more of US Navy and Air Force to Asia-Pacific to "deter" China, or the constant salami-slicing on Taiwan, sooner or later, will prompt China to significantly increase her defense spending. By then, we will no longer talk about 3-4 production lines for J-20, or one CATOBAR every five years. For now, it does not appear that China has kicked it into high gear.

Perhaps it was China who is boiling the frog while the frog's trying to slice the salami.

 

[james smith esq]

Chinese defense spending now is really peacetime spending. In fact, it's even lower than what you normally expect of a great power during peacetime. China spends less than the minimum threshold of 2% of GDP that NATO asks for its member states. China spends the lowest as percentage of GDP among major powers and big countries except Japan.

So China is really not geared towards big time war, and they want to sustain the period of peace development as long as possible. All these accusations about Chinese expansionism or Chinese agressions are smearing campaigns and propaganda from you-know-where.

But that doesn't mean China can not afford or will not increase their defense spending to deter or defeat aggression against her or military intervention in her internal affairs. All these bragging for numerical advantage of 1,000 stealth aircraft over China in a Taiwan contingency, deploying 70% or more of US Navy and Air Force to Asia-Pacific to "deter" China, or the constant salami-slicing on Taiwan, sooner or later, will prompt China to significantly increase her defense spending. By then, we will no longer talk about 3-4 production lines for J-20, or one CATOBAR every five years. For now, it does not appear that China has kicked it into high gear.

‘Though, I believe that you are correct, I’d love to see China kick it up one notch, at least!

 

[weig2000]

‘Though, I believe that you are correct, I’d love to see China kick it up one notch, at least!

In China, they are talking about "战略定力“, variously translated into strategic focus, strategic determination, or strategic patience, in a challenging and uncertain strategic environment. It means that China will not be distracted by some noises, and deviate from its long-term strategic plan and direction. At this point, it's believed that the strategic competition with the US is still multidimensional and long-term. It's not some imminent big war. Until it is very clear that it has to kick up the gear.

That doesn't mean China will not take precautionary measures, like the build-up of strategic arsenal, which is a very big deal for China. It's more likely they're doing it more gradually. Plus, Chinese in general are not a loud-mouth, chest-thumping bunch, so we don't know a lot of things until after the fact. But the military gaps between the US and China are fast closing, that much we know.

A lot of media noises these days about war with China on Taiwan etc, are primarily coming from the US side. What they reflect is some deep anxiety, and loss of confidence. These people need to hear the echoes of their voices in order to feel soothed and reassured. American elites are profoundly perturbed and unhinged these days.