China's SCS Strategy Thread

[joshuatree]

Been wanting to post to the non-China SCS thread but since that has been closed, posting here as Taiwan's strategy will also impact China's. If Taiping is determined to qualify for an EEZ and I don't see why it won't, wouldn't this throw the Philippines case out? Since it then becomes an issue of EEZ overlap delineation but since claimants have not even recognized who's sovereignty, it is first and foremost a sovereignty issue which is out of the court's jurisdiction.

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Taiwan flew international media to its largest island holding in the South China Sea yesterday in a bid to reinforce its territorial claims in the disputed and increasingly tense region.

Deputy Foreign Minister Bruce Linghu, who was leading the trip, said he intended to demonstrate that Taiping is an island capable of sustaining human habitation, and not simply a “rock” as the Philippines claims in a case brought before the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Islands are entitled to territorial waters, an exclusive economic zone and other rights not enjoyed by mere rocks.

Two dozen journalists were flown to the island aboard a Taiwanese air force C-130 transport plane that landed on an airstrip on Taiping guarded by coast guard sentries with rifles. They were shown the island’s post office and its fresh water well, and were to later visit the harbor and a traditional Chinese temple.

The Philippines, along with Vietnam, also claims Taiping. Critics say Manila is seeking to have Taiping designated a rock to avoid having to share an exclusive economic zone with its own nearby island of Palawan.

The Philippines “distorted the facts and misinterpreted the law” in its arguments, Linghu told reporters at a pre-trip briefing Tuesday in Taipei, Taiwan’s capital.

Manila’s case, which has been rejected by China, aims to challenge Beijing’s blanket claim to virtually the entire South China Sea. Yet it threatens also to harm relations between the Philippines and fellow pro-U.S. democracy Taiwan.

Taiwan, which lacks diplomatic ties to negotiate with the five other governments with territorial claims in the South China Sea, has increasingly turned to public diplomacy to reinforce its own claims.

 

[joshuatree]

The arbitration court was willing to take into account China's position paper outside of the hearings, it would be shocking if they don't take Taiwan's position paper into account before issuing any ruling. Taiwan did request to send observers to the hearings but even that was declined so it's not Taiwan's fault for not submitting their argument directly in court.

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Some interesting points I took from the paper quoted below.


Anyone able to locate a picture of that map? Would love to see it.

The Unified World Map of the Great Qing Dynasty, published in 1767, the 32nd year of the reign of the Qianlong Emperor, includes Wanli Changsha and Wanli Shitang (ancient terms for the South China Sea Islands) in its territory. This map was reprinted in 1811 during the reign of the Jiaqing Emperor and is now housed at Taipei’s National Palace Museum.

On April 29, 1930, at the Far Eastern Meteorological Conference held in Hong Kong, the Philippine representative for the Manila Observatory suggested that the ROC government set up meteorological observatories in the Shisha and Chungsha Islands to enhance navigation safety, acknowledging the observatory set up by the ROC government in the Tongsha Islands as the most important observatory in the South China Seas. This proposal was put forth for resolution and none of the delegations objected. This shows that countries participating in that conference, including the UK, Japan, and the Philippines, as well as the organization itself, all recognized ROC authority over the South China Sea Islands. On October 27, 1955, at the first conference of the International Civil Aviation Organization on aviation in the Asia-Pacific region in Manila, the 16 member nations present also passed a resolution requesting that the ROC would provide weather reports on the Tungsha, Shisha, and Nansha 22 Islands, and added high-altitude weather observations four times a day from the Nansha Islands. This demonstrates that the organization confirmed ROC sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands.

On September 7, 1955, Donald E. Webster, First Secretary of the US Embassy to the ROC, queried the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding which islands in the South China Sea belong to the ROC. The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded explicitly to the US that all of the South China Sea Islands mentioned above are ROC territory.

In August 1956, First Secretary Webster informed the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a US Air Force crew planned to travel on US naval vessels to survey the Chungsha Islands and five of the Spratly Islands—Minzhu Reef, Shuangzi (N. Danger) Reefs, Jinghong (Sin Cowe) Island, Hongxiu (Namyit) Island, and Nanwei Island—and requested that the ROC government expedite the trip.

On December 21, 1960, the US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) requested permission from the ROC Ministry of National Defense to dispatch personnel to survey Jinghong Island, Nanwei Island and Shuangzi Reefs. These actions confirm that the US was aware of ROC sovereignty over the Spratly Islands.

This would make Marcos' "purchase" of Clomas' right to those features for one Peso resoundingly bogus.

On October 1, 1956, when the ROC naval vessels Taihe and Yongshun were patrolling the South China Sea Islands, personnel boarded and inspected a Philippine ship at Beizi Reef. Captain Filemon Cloma, Chief Engineer Benito Danseco, and other crew members were questioned aboard the Taihe. In addition to turning over carbines and ammunition, Captain Cloma signed an affidavit acknowledging illegal entry into ROC territory and promising no repetition of such action. This incident underscores the fact that the ROC had effective jurisdiction over the region.

 

[confusion]

The Filipino legal strategy is centered on invalidating the nine-dash line. That's the primary focus. I seriously doubt UNCLOS will rule unfavorably against Itu Aba's status as an island.

Been wanting to post to the non-China SCS thread but since that has been closed, posting here as Taiwan's strategy will also impact China's. If Taiping is determined to qualify for an EEZ and I don't see why it won't, wouldn't this throw the Philippines case out? Since it then becomes an issue of EEZ overlap delineation but since claimants have not even recognized who's sovereignty, it is first and foremost a sovereignty issue which is out of the court's jurisdiction.

 

[Blackstone]

Been wanting to post to the non-China SCS thread but since that has been closed, posting here as Taiwan's strategy will also impact China's. If Taiping is determined to qualify for an EEZ and I don't see why it won't, wouldn't this throw the Philippines case out? Since it then becomes an issue of EEZ overlap delineation but since claimants have not even recognized who's sovereignty, it is first and foremost a sovereignty issue which is out of the court's jurisdiction.

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Philippine's legal position all land features in the SCS are "rocks" is only one of two problematic arguments, the other is challenging supposed Chinese maritime claims inside the so-called 9-dash line . It's hard to see what ruling the Permanent Arbitration Court can render vis-a-vis 9-dash line, because no one could pinpoint what claims Beijing has officially made. Keep in mind the court has no charter to rule on historically-based sovereignty disputes, and then there's the tricky problem of one party legally opting out of the law suit.

 

[joshuatree]

Philippine's legal position all land features in the SCS are "rocks" is only one of two problematic arguments, the other is challenging supposed Chinese maritime claims inside the so-called 9-dash line . It's hard to see what ruling the Permanent Arbitration Court can render vis-a-vis 9-dash line, because no one could pinpoint what claims Beijing has officially made. Keep in mind the court has no charter to rule on historically-based sovereignty disputes, and then there's the tricky problem of one party legally opting out of the law suit.

Since China has never explicitly explained what is meant by the nine dashes, the PCA can only rule against one scenario, that if China means the nine dashes to define all waters within as territorial waters, then that would be invalid according to UNCLOS. The Philippines will take this and spin it as some smashing victory. But what will be missed is that the nine dashes can still remain fully intact if it is meant to define all features within to be claimed by China. That would be something UNCLOS has no jurisdiction and subsequently, can't even delineate any overlapping EEZs and territorial seas till issue of sovereignty is considered resolved outside of this venue. Even a previous US analysis of the nine dashes listed out such scenarios of the nine dashes.

I wonder for the current Indonesian/Chinese incident, how far away from Luconia Shoals did it take place? The ramming took place near the territorial seas of the Natuna Islands but that was only after the fishing vessel was towed for some time already. Could the original fishing "violation" have taken place closer to Luconia Shoals?

 

[Blackstone]

Since China has never explicitly explained what is meant by the nine dashes, the PCA can only rule against one scenario, that if China means the nine dashes to define all waters within as territorial waters, then that would be invalid according to UNCLOS. The Philippines will take this and spin it as some smashing victory. But what will be missed is that the nine dashes can still remain fully intact if it is meant to define all features within to be claimed by China. That would be something UNCLOS has no jurisdiction and subsequently, can't even delineate any overlapping EEZs and territorial seas till issue of sovereignty is considered resolved outside of this venue. Even a previous US analysis of the nine dashes listed out such scenarios of the nine dashes.

Since China hasn't officially made any claims on the maritime area inside the 9-dash line, and it legally opted out of the case Philippines initiated, what ruling for or against can the Permanent Arbitration Court make?

 

[joshuatree]

Since China hasn't officially made any claims on the maritime area inside the 9-dash line, and it legally opted out of the case Philippines initiated, what ruling for or against can the Permanent Arbitration Court make?

While legally opting out, the rules still permit the court to take the case filed in areas it deems having jurisdiction even if only one party shows up. And that's what the court assessed last year. As to what it can rule? At the least, the reaffirmation of what a country is theoretically entitled to.

There's some unknowns. It seems the Philippines expect the court can rule on status of features as rocks or islands. I'm not sure, shouldn't that require far more scientific assessment much like how continental shelf extensions are determined via the CLCS, a commission, not a court? Also, maybe rule on interpretation of the nine dash line as a maritime boundary for territorial waters? While China never claimed that, the court could probably eliminate that scenario out of this exercise.

 

[plawolf]

No court can rule on hypotheticals, only the facts of the case brought before them.

Even if the PCA tries to rule on hypothetical definitions of the nine dash line, it would simply and fundamentally have no jurisdiction since the nine dash line is based on inherited historical claims that predates UNCLOS, and China's exercise of the opt out means the PCA simply has no mandate to rule on territorial disputes involving China.

The PCA shouldn't even rule on the status of features in the area, since that is a technical question best left to scientific experts.

The PCA judges are playing a dangerous game by indulging in judicial activism with hearing this case at all.

 

[Hendrik_2000]

The battle of Paracel 1974 Toshi Yoshihara article another China basher selected translation based on Chinese writing and recount by the participant. But still interesting as it mark the beginning of PLAN rise. Reading this article it show Vietnam are the more aggressive party early in this dispute. China has the right to evict the squatter.
This battle show the PLAN the importance of air cover fortunately Vietnam doesn't have overwhelming air superiority. In this battle Vietnam is actually the stronger navy. China only manage to scrounge couple of outdated ship. China win is attributed to superior strategy
“The Paracel Islands serve as China’s natural protective screen and
outpost. Sea and air routes heading to Singapore and Jakarta from China’s coast
must pass through this area, giving it an important status.”
Located about 660
kilometers southwest of the Pratas Islands, 550 kilometers west of Scarborough

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[Blackstone]

While legally opting out, the rules still permit the court to take the case filed in areas it deems having jurisdiction even if only one party shows up. And that's what the court assessed last year. As to what it can rule? At the least, the reaffirmation of what a country is theoretically entitled to.

Theoretically entitled to what? The 9-dash line is just reference marks on some maps, nothing more. It has no legal bearing, nor has China ever claimed it did. How does any international court rule for or against a set of lines on some maps that no one accepts as legal, not even China?

There's some unknowns. It seems the Philippines expect the court can rule on status of features as rocks or islands. I'm not sure, shouldn't that require far more scientific assessment much like how continental shelf extensions are determined via the CLCS, a commission, not a court? Also, maybe rule on interpretation of the nine dash line as a maritime boundary for territorial waters? While China never claimed that, the court could probably eliminate that scenario out of this exercise.

The Permanent Arbitration Court ruling on rocks vs. islands is believable, because there are legal definitions of them, even if they're not very clear. But the 9-dash line? What interpretation will the arbitration court use? What legal ruling can the court make? If it says 9-dash line isn't legal territorial boundary, so what? Beijing ever claimed it was.

The bottom line is unless all claimants are willing to subject themselves to International Court rulings, the only way forward is diplomacy. Anything else wouldn't get the job done, and most pundits say time is on China's side to dominate the SCS.