China's SCS Strategy Thread

[solarz]

"Start a war" reminds me something. I had watched an UNABRIDGED live-shooting video about the conflict in 1988. Chinese and Vietnam naval personnels were in confrontation, all in a sudden a gunfire came out and PLAN had one man down. Then other Chinese soldiers shouted "they open fire!" while dragging the wounded back. I replayed it again and again to get more detail, and I felt not only intensity and astonishment from their voice, they were also some sort of···delighted. It was kind of like "oh thank the Almighty finally they give us a perfect excuse to unleash our power···".

I type "UNABRIDGED" in capital because I had viewed an “edited” version in Youtube. It was filled with miserable scenes how Chinese coldbloodedly tore up Vietnam soldiers with heavy fire, and of course all comments were condemning China's expantionism, hegemony, psychopath commies, dictatorship,tyranny, and soon tibet&ETM&FLK···all jumped out finally the they made the conclusion that China should be evicted (well I shouldn't had expected anything else).

The big guy smashs a dwarf directly into the ground not means he is a bully. There is a possiblity that the dwarf for a hell-know reason bite the giant's calf.

Do you have a link to this video?

 

[Phoenix_Rising]

Do you have a link to this video?

[video]http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMTY2NTgzOTM2.html?from=y1.2-1-84.3.6-2.1-1-1-5[/video]
I failed to find the origin audio which was without that DPRK-style announcer.
It was actually a trap.
In March 1987, the UNESCO authorized China to build 5 Observe Posts for the global sea-level monitor network on SCS islands/reefs. That made our advance into Xisha(Paracel) and Nansha(Spratly) right and proper.
During the confrontation, Viets poked a banner into the center of the reef right in front of our men. Provocation must be retelliated, so 4 PLAN sailors moved forward. Du Xianghou（杜祥厚） held the banner with one hand while his other hand was keeping the flag-bearer away. Zhang Qing（张清） paced up and grasped the underwater part of the banner, then seized it after a trial of strength. A Viet soldier aimed his rifle towards Zhang. Just at the time he pulling the trigger, Yang Zhiliang(杨志亮) pushed at the bottom of the barrel. Zhang was saved, but Yang's arm was wounded by the bullet.
So the Vietnam man successfully promoted a wristle into a close-quater gunfight, and this is the game we Chinese exactly master on.
Yang's injury was the only Chinese loss. Two Vietnam ships were sunk, their largest naval asset, a 4100ton landingship, was forced tobe stranded due to heavy damage, along with 200 casualties, abnd 9 captured.

 

[joshuatree]

Interesting info on other claimant's forces. I'm actually surprised Vietnam has 60 medium tanks deployed on those islands. It really diminishes the charge that China is the only aggressive claimant in those waters and makes their existing outposts look puny and underarmed (not taking the recent reclamation into the calculation since we haven't seen what will be deployed yet).

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Vietnam: Military build-up on nine islands

From the early 1970s to the early 1990s, Vietnam occupied 29 islands and reefs in the Spratlys and strengthened their defensive infrastructure in the region.

Vietnam has used two defensive strategies. The first is to set up defensive positions comprising habitable and permanent defensive structures which can also serve in battle, forming a strategic defensive infrastructure. The second is establishing military outposts and guard houses on stilts, to widen the area of defense. The former are concentrated on nine islands and reefs including Spratly Island and Southwest Cay. The living conditions in these bases are reasonably comfortable, so more soldiers are stationed there. The islands of Spratly and Namyit are the core defensive strongholds of the Vietnamese army in the South China Sea.

Vietnam has 2,200 soldiers stationed in the Spratlys mainly armed with guns, tanks, anti-tank missiles and dynamic armed helicopters, but they do not have any ground-to-ship missiles, due to the complicated support system and permanent firing structure that they require which none of the islands can facilitate.

A photo set featured in the Hanoi-based Vietnam Pictorial shows nine of the main nine islands and reefs administered by Vietnam have 23mm anti-aircraft guns; six of them have 37mm anti-aircraft guns, five have 85mm cannons and two of them have 122mm howitzers and 130mm cannons; six of the islands have Russian made T-54/55 medium tanks, four have the Russian-made PT-76 amphibious light tank, totaling around 120 guns and 60 medium tanks. On Spratly Island and Namyit Island the Vietnamese army have a 122mm howitzer battalion, an 85mm cannon company, an 130mm cannon company, two to three 23mm or 37mm anti-aircraft gun companies and a tank company. Military helicopters can take off from and land on at least five of the islands and reefs.

From this configuration it is likely that when attacked Vietnam will make use of its large-caliber artillery to engage enemy warships in a long-range gunfight. The 130mm cannon has a range of 27 kilometers, a similar range to the gun on China's destroyers. The range of guns deployed by the Vietnamese troops is in preparation for long-distance, medium range and close-range defense against landing troops. To take Spratly as an example, the island has four guns with a range of over 16km, 21 guns with a range over 14km, 31 guns with a range of over 10km and 48 guns with a range of over 2km. The army can also make use of its helicopters to launch air attacks.

In addition to the nine larger islands, the Vietnamese army also has guard posts stationed at islands and reefs that are more vulnerable to attack, but these usually consist of a makeshift concrete or shacks on stilts with soldiers only armed with individual weapons.

Several special units of the Vietnamese army are said to have trained in amphibious warfare in the Spratlys and the 126th rapid response battalion, set up in 2005, is said to be Vietnam's answer to the US Navy Seals.

 

[Geographer]

The U.S. State Department issued a report on December 5, 2014 about China's territorial claims in the South China Sea. It looks at three possible interpretations of the line: they represent claims to the islands enclosed within, the represent territorial waters, or they represent a historical claim. The report analyzes each specific "dash" with respect to the distance to other countries and islands. Apparently most of the dashes are closer to other countries than disputed islands.

I agree that the the lines represent claims to the islands, not waters, enclosed within. However, each of those islands gets a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) which would cover much, but not all, of the nine-dashed line claim.

The report looks at the islands through the legal lenses of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea, talking about the continental shelf and other geographic features that put the islands outside of China's legal reach.

But Hawaii and Guam are not part of the North American continental shelf yet remain U.S. territory. National territory is not subject to the law of the sea. Maritime jurisdiction is derived from national territory, not the other way around. The report doesn't address this. What am I missing?

The report:

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[solarz]

The U.S. State Department issued a report on December 5, 2014 about China's territorial claims in the South China Sea. It looks at three possible interpretations of the line: they represent claims to the islands enclosed within, the represent territorial waters, or they represent a historical claim. The report analyzes each specific "dash" with respect to the distance to other countries and islands. Apparently most of the dashes are closer to other countries than disputed islands.

I agree that the the lines represent claims to the islands, not waters, enclosed within. However, each of those islands gets a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) which would cover much, but not all, of the nine-dashed line claim.

The report looks at the islands through the legal lenses of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea, talking about the continental shelf and other geographic features that put the islands outside of China's legal reach.

But Hawaii and Guam are not part of the North American continental shelf yet remain U.S. territory. National territory is not subject to the law of the sea. Maritime jurisdiction is derived from national territory, not the other way around. The report doesn't address this. What am I missing?

The report:

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You're not missing anything. Criticisms of China's SCS claims are always based on the fallacy that China is claiming territorial waters.

Note that there is a big difference between territorial waters and EEZ. Territorial waters means foreign vessels are not allowed to enter without permission. EEZ means it is still international waters, but only the nation with the EEZ has the right to exploit resources located there.

 

[Geographer]

I reread the section on the interpretation that the nine-dashed-line represents claims to islands contained within. I think this is the most likely and reasonably interpretation. This section does NOT take a position on ownership of the islands, other than to say the ownership is disputed. They reiterated that EEZs and territorial waters can be derived from the disputed islands.

Is there anything in the Law of the Sea that speaks to territorial disputes? It says submerged features cannot be claimed as territory, and EEZs cannot be derived from submerged features or reclaimed land. But the oft-stated argument about continental shelves seems to apply to maritime jurisdiction rather than territorial disputes.

 

[Zetageist]

Scholars from China have put up: China’s ‘Nine-Dash Line’ Claim: US Misunderstands – Analysis :

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The US Department of State’s Paper on China’s Maritime Claims in the South China Sea was published on 5 December 2014. It has confused China’s “dash-line” claim.

By Ye Qiang and Jiang Zongqiang*

China’s controversial “nine-dash line” claim in the South China Sea has triggered long-running misunderstanding in the United States government due to its perennial anxiety and repeated cross-examinations. This misunderstanding basically originates from the different thoughts over territorial and maritime legal matters between China and the West.
This has been reflected in the recent US DoS Paper on China’s Maritime Claims in the South China Sea, put out by the Department of State, which focuses on the coordinates of the dashes, and on the terminologies regarding the maritime laws and Notes Verbales of China, and comes to confusing conclusions.

The localised dimension

However, the US government ignored the inconvenient truth that the “dash-line” should not be seen as stricto sensu – that is, in the strict sense – a frontier in the Chinese context of the 1940s. That means it would be pointless to interpret the implications of the line from the perspective of modern international law. Therefore, any research, in the first place, should be confined to the localisation context of China; and the direction of end-point should go down the path of globalisation. These are two inseparable dimensions to understand China’s “dash-line” claim.
The localisation context refers to the Chinese traditional territorial and maritime legal thought in and before the 1930s and 1940s. In traditional Chinese thought, oceans cannot be monopolised by anyone and are open to all countries and peoples. Before the 20th century, China had never claimed any maritime sovereignty. This was unlike what the West did.
From the 13th century onwards, European countries have been embroiled in an increasingly fierce race for influence at sea. These countries imposed taxes and levies, and prohibited foreigners from fishing and sailing in the maritime zones they controlled, which broke the established maritime order. This situation was obviously not conducive to the interests of the Dutch, which was a maritime trading power at that time.
As a result, the Dutch jurist Grotius published The Mare Liberum in 1609, proposing the famous notion of the freedom of the seas. But Grotius was refuted and attacked by many British scholars headed by John Selden, who published The Mare Clausum in a bid to defend maritime sovereignty. Selden’s ideas prevailed in the 17th century, and European countries actively embarked on the policy of maritime sovereignty.
In the centuries-long debate about oceans, China has always maintained an open maritime policy. For the last thousands of years, China has been conducting economic activities, such as fishing, in the South China Sea, and has been living in peace with neighbouring countries in the process of developing and utilising oceans.
More than two thousand years ago, China opened up a maritime silk road and shared the prosperity of maritime trade with West Asian and European countries. Even in the Ming Dynasty, when Zheng He’s fleet pushed China’s navigation achievement to the peak, China never controlled sea lanes or impaired the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

What did the “dash-line” of the 1940s enclose?

In the second half of the 17th century, the principle of freedom of the seas was generally espoused, which was actually inseparable from the need of European countries to expand global trade and open up overseas market. When the vessels of all countries enjoyed the freedom of navigation across the world’s high seas, China still viewed land as the pillar of its economy and coastal defence remained lacking. Since the late Qing Dynasty, China has always been a victim in terms of the idea of territorial sovereignty, including the insular features.
After the middle of the 20th century, China gradually achieved national liberation and independence, and was able to take part in the international affairs as an equal actor. After the Second World War, China gradually recovered the lost sovereign rights and maintained its jurisdiction over major insular features in the South China Sea.
Therefore, it is easy to understand that, in February 1948, the Chinese government released a Map of the Location of South China Sea Islands, with the main purpose of clarifying China’s inherent territorial sovereignty under the post-war international order. Therefore, when publicising the map with the “dash-line”, China claimed the sovereignty over all the insular features rather than the maritime jurisdiction.

The globalisation dimension

The path of globalisation indicates that, according to modern law of the sea, China is entitled to maritime jurisdiction in certain maritime zones in light of Chinese sovereignty. That is the reason why China claims “sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters” and “sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof” in the 2009 Notes Verbales.
Ironically, these maritime rights and jurisdictions are not created by China. These new concepts originate from Western-dominated law of the sea. China has claimed and exercised maritime jurisdiction in light of the four conventions established in 1958 during the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the 1982 UNCLOS. The maritime jurisdiction currently claimed by China follows the claims and practice of the international community, especially Western countries, and has never gone beyond the mainstream of the international community.
In addition, it refers to the development and evolution of the principles and rules of modern law of the sea. For example, the free sea is a relative idea. Along with the progress of the times, acts at sea are bound to meet with more and more regulations. This helps to promote maritime safety and sustainable development, conforms to the principle of balance between generations, and serves the common interests of mankind. This is especially true in the enclosed and semi-enclosed seas.
Therefore, China believes, on the one hand, that it enjoys all kinds of rights provided for in the Law of the Sea Convention as well as the customary international law within the “dash-line” other than the territorial sovereignty over insular features. On the other hand, it has been carefully evaluating whether or not to exercise each specific right, and the scope of the rights as well as the manner to exercise.
These are the reasons why China has not yet clarified the title of rights within the “dash-line”, and has not yet claimed specific maritime rights through an accurate frontier composed of coordinate points.

* Ye Qiang and Jiang Zong-qiang are Research Fellows at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, China. They contributed this specially to RSIS Commentary

 

[joshuatree]

I reread the section on the interpretation that the nine-dashed-line represents claims to islands contained within. I think this is the most likely and reasonably interpretation. This section does NOT take a position on ownership of the islands, other than to say the ownership is disputed. They reiterated that EEZs and territorial waters can be derived from the disputed islands.

Is there anything in the Law of the Sea that speaks to territorial disputes? It says submerged features cannot be claimed as territory, and EEZs cannot be derived from submerged features or reclaimed land. But the oft-stated argument about continental shelves seems to apply to maritime jurisdiction rather than territorial disputes.

I find the paper incomplete. It spends a lot of time on discussing the nine dashes and finding flaw in it but does not cover in detail claims laid by the other states which would have made the paper more objective and well rounded. Both Vietnam's and the Philippine's claim extend well beyond their 200 nm EEZ limits as well. An analysis and breakdown on those extensions would be a fair assessment. For instance, in referring to legal precedence that EEZ overlap resolution usually give lesser weight to smaller territory facing a larger coastline of the opposing claimant, how does the Philippines justify its own EEZ lines drawn with respect to Taiwan's just because of the Batanes outcrop considering there has been no official demarcation?

Furthermore, the paper brings up the scenario of only the land features as being claimed by China within the nine dashes but does not go into detail on assessing what territorial waters and EEZs the features can respectively generate. It clearly avoided looking at Taiping/Itu Aba and the Paracels which can both generate an EEZ. In not doing so, it did not assess whether the bulk of the clashes on the seas occurred within those EEZs. Granted, in the dispute, one can point out the clashes occurring in another state's overlapping EEZ but presenting this complex situation would rather blunt the picture that China and China alone has gone rogue. China wasn't the only one that filed with the UN in 2009 that others protested. The same happened with filings from Vietnam, Malaysia, and Philippines respectively.

 

[Zetageist]

with the end of each world war, the winning powers acquired new territories and redrew national boundaries. China (ROC) at the end of WWII acquired new territories as well. According to the Wikipedia: Japan and ROC (Taiwan) signed Treaty of Taipei in 1952, marked the formal aggression between Japan and ROC:

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Under pressure from the United States, Japan signed a separate peace treaty with the Republic of China to bring the war between the two states to a formal end with a victory for the ROC. Although the ROC itself was not a participant in the San Francisco Peace Conference due to the resumption of the Chinese Civil War after 1945, this treaty largely corresponds to that of San Francisco.

Article 2
"It is recognized that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco in the United States of America on September 8, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the San Francisco Treaty), Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands."

This is Treaty of Taipei was signed after the formation of PRC in Mainland China, and was

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by the Japanese government on Sept. 29, 1972 after Japan switched diplomatic recognition from ROC to PRC.

I don't know how accurate are the stuff put up on Wikipedia, but it seems like U.S. and Japan recognized ROC at that time the sovereignty over Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. I get the feeling that Dashed Lines are not national boundaries since usually it is the solid lines that mark the national boundaries. Therefore, the Nine Dashed Lines or the original Eleven Dashed Lines are only meant the land features within those dashed lines. Rumor has it that since it is Taiwan (ROC) now holding all the secret documents to up hold the claims over Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands, China (PRC) would like to acquire from Taiwan while U.S. wants Taiwan to destroy those secret document.

Since Taiwan (ROC) knows perfectly well that East China Sea is like the head to Taiwan and SCS is the tail to Taiwan, and the ultimate goal of China (PRC) is to annex Taiwan, it is safer for Japan to be in control of Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and denies China to have total control over SCS. Therefore, Taiwan (ROC) refused to cooperate with China in revealing those secret documents for the benefit of China (PRC) as the story goes.

I think the U.S. is more concerned about its own freedom of operating it own military aircrafts and naval vessels in the SCS rather than who owns the Spratly Islands. Paracel Islands are already within China (PRC) solid control so there is not much dispute about that.

 

[Zetageist]

EEZ was first defined in 1982 UN Law of the Sea. So, back in 1946 when ROC first drew the Eleven-Dash-Line, there was no concept of EEZ at all, only a some concept of continental shelf. Therefore I think the Eleven-Dashed-Line only claimed the land features outside of those SCS littoral states' continental self at 200 meter depth. Since this concept clashed with the current EEZ, China (PRC) remains murky on what their Nine-Dash-Line means.