Wow I didn't know that my reply would be quite well received. Thanks guys.
If you mean an air force and ground force analysis for a 'Falklands' type of operation, then here it goes...
Ground Forces
The ground forces projection assumes several things:
1) Enemy strength is inferior
2) or Enemy troops are numerically superior but technologically or capability-wise inferior
3) A full brigade of PLA marines could be lifted
4) The marines will be under air attack
5) The island has at least one port facility for handling medium sized ships
6) The target place is an island group far from China (beyond the Western Pacific)
As discussed before, the PLAN if utilizing tankers and large civilian freight ships in the same manner as the RN in the Falklands war, would be more than capable of transporting a brigade of PLA marines to the far side of the pacific or indian ocean. Each brigade will have 7000-8000 men.
Now assuming PLAN could commit six LSTs of the Yuting type, with a tanker in support, then these ships could transport a total of 1500 troops, 60 tanks/APCs, and other vehicles, and considering each Yuting LST carries 4x personnel cushion transports (each able to transport 10 troops at high speeds from the LST's small dock) then you got 24 LCVPs at their disposal. This group will form the initial assualt force, which is quite considerable. In addition, if the PLAN could somehow find ways to keep their helicopters from blowing off the LST's decks when out on deep ocean, then each Yuting can also carry two medium choppers. I do not see this as a problem, considering the Yutings could store these helicopters in disassembled parts, and can be reassembled on the tank/heli deck prior to the assault. This gives about 12 medium sized helicopters and 24 LCVPs for quick personnel transport.
The second group will comprise of long range civilian freighters that would carry substantially more troops and heavy equipment. But these would require the port to be secured.
In the Falklands, the initial landings were conducted by helicopters and troops off paddle craft, which is quite an achievement. Moreover, these were landings conducted purely by infantry, only to be complemented by light vehicles and artillery much later on.
PLA Marines could easily land a small unit of frogmen (units which they have) to survey possible landing sites. Following this, the LCVPs and helicopters could easily deploy around 360 troops (assuming the LCVPs carry their full load of 10 men, the assault helicopters carry 15-20 men each, and this force wouldbe complemented by some armed helicopters that would serve as escorts rather than assault transports. Assuming the LSTs would be deploying these assets far from the ocean (30-50 km offshore), the return rate of these transports won't take too long, and thus another wave of 300-400 men could be followed up within hours. We are assuming here as well that the type of coast being assaulted are rocky, cliff types, not very well suitable for tank landings.
Within the first six hours, around 700 men would be operating, establishing a foothold on vital landing zones and taking the enemy by surprise by attacking from behind the lines etc. Within 24 hours, as many as 1200 troops could probably be on the island with some limited logistical support, and by this time the LSTs would have proceeded close enough to deploy amphibious tanks and APCs once a flat coast has been secured. At this time, the enemy has been taken by surprise.
Day two onwards would be trying to secure that vital port facility and possibly capture the airport of the island. And the rest is a matter of eliminating the enemy on the island cautiously. By this time the marines may come under constant enemy air attack, in an effort to push the marines back to the sea. However, the PLA marines by this time would have at least deployed portable SAMs and AA guns, which would provide some defense.
The marines of the PLA should not be underestimated. They are a good fighting force, perhaps not as hyped as a US or Royal Marine, but they are quite elite in the PLA structure. They are equipped with the best equipments for infantry and armour alike, and are probably quite well prepared to sustain operations even without proper logistical support for days if not weeks. If they were facing a full infantry division of regular infantry, the PLA marine could probably prevail in terms of skill, training, and that the PLAN task force has successfully blockaded the island from any supplies flowing in to the enemy. If the marines were facing a marine or special forces detachment however, it maybe more of a difficult battle.
In conclusion, the PLAN is more than capable of deploying elements of a brigade far from the mainland's coast. If properly executed, this operation is more than able to succeed. I personally have confidence that the PLAN Marines will win supremacy in a land battle once they are properly established.
But the mission from stage one to the final phase could well easily fail too. Given someone said that in such long range operations PLAN has only one shot at it...that is so true. For instance...1) If the PLAN task force does not secure the local seas, then the landing will not proceed 2) if the LSTs (being vulnerable) were found and attacked by submarines or aircraft without proper escort, the landing would end in disaster 3) bad weather may cancel landings, and if bad weather persist, logistics may become too difficult forcing the landing to be cancelled 4) if too many LCVPs and helicopters are lost in the opening landing, then the ability to establish a beach head is quite difficult.
Air Force Analysis
In such a far off operation, it is increasingly hard to see PLAAF or PLANAF actually able to do much in support. Unlike the RN and RAF in the Falklands, the PLA probably will not enjoy the luxuries of having a 'mid-Atlantic' base for aircraft. PLAAF could use bases and airports of many nations on the way, depending on Chinese diplomatic pressure, but as the world has not witnessed China fight a war far from its shores like the US invasion of Iraq, even diplomatic negotiations between PRC and other nations for use of military bases has not been tried before.
In flight refueling is a classic solution. RAF's Nimrod bombers undertook one of the world's longest combat sorties, flying nonstop from Britain to the mid-Atlantic base, and then to the Falklands, and depending very much on numerous inflight refuels. Such operation for PLAAF has not been tried before, nor practised or exercised.
The H-6U and ordered IL-78 tankers are capable of sustaining limited operations far from the mainland. Eg, assuming there would be at least a dozen tankers at PLAAF disposal, a sustained operation for one or two odd sorties could be well arranged. The Su-30KK aircraft will be the most versatile, but they can only take on the IL-78 probe. So in this operation, we will assume the PLAAF uses Su-30MKK and utilizing its 8 newly acquired IL-78 tankers.
The Su-30MKK by far is a very good platform, capable of air-to-air, air-to-ground and anti-ship combat. It could carry a large weapons load, has a large internal fuel tank and probably with external tanks would have quite a lot of range, therefore reducinthe number of inflight refuels. However operating beyond 4000 km from China is a major problem Loiter time and mission time of the Su-30s over the targets won't be very long, and the pilots would suffer fatigue etc as PLAAF pilots probably have not exercised in such long international flights. Operations would probably be limited to six aircraft at the maximum, because the tankers cannot support so many aircraft at once. The tankers themselves would have to support each other, flying and refueling on the way in order to keep the Su-30s in the air.
Therefore, a strike sortie will be most likely rather than practical air cover for the fleet (since it is highly unlikely that a call for air cover from the PLAN task force would be achieved until many hours later!) Such long distance strike will require proper timing and coordination to ensure that the Su-30MKKs would not be jumped by other fighters.
In fact, there is little more to say. PLAAF air operations beyond 4000 km from the mainland are impossible at this rate, until those IL-78 tankers are delivered. Even so, it would require years of training and an expansion of the Su-30 and IL-78 force to give PLAAF even a slight overseas operational capacity. Therefore the task force and marines theoretically would be operating without the luxury of air power.
This is why there is this imperative for an aircraft carrier, or successful diplomatic negotiations for using foreign airfields. One practical mission for the PLAAF in long distance flight (and this is not impossible) is use of IL-76 or Y-8 transports to conduct air drops, or make use of any captured airfield on the island. The PLA air borne troops are quite well equipped to do so, and I regard them probably PLA's most prepared force to be sent on any over-seas deployment.
(About the pic at the bottom, that is the Italian San Giorgio class...my favourite LST type of ship. Its designed with a good layout ensuring it could operate aircraft and carry a huge load too. Its not a terribly large ship too, and is probably well within China's shipbuilding capabilities. Wish PLAN LSTs had taken on this design concept...)
