if needed the option is also open to hit US bases in the middle east, heavens forbid it escalates to that point. while those US assets do not directly threaten China, hitting them could cause US dominance in the region to unravel, creating vacuums for its foes to exploit, especially those who has beef with israel. the flight path from western China goes through Afghanistan and Iran, neither of which would have any interest nor ability to intercept the missiles mid-course. to make such strategy work China will need thousands of DF-26s.
China IRBM/SRBM (and non-ICBM/SLBM) thread
- Thread starter Blitzo
- Start date
And that's the wrong way to make calculations and assumptions - Similarly to how China will never park their MRLS/BM/HM TELs right on the Chinese coastline when engaging targets in the 1IC and 2IC, especially during wartime.
Plus, we've already seen how porous Russian AD systems are in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. I certainly wouldn't count on the Russians to effectively assist in the defense of Northeastern China from aerial strikes conducted from the Sea of Japan or the Japanese home islands.
Hokkaido isn't the only place where SM-3s and any newer anti-ballistic/hypersonic missiles (AB/HMs) are/will be deployed. And there isn't just shore-based platforms to base those AB/HMs. (Also, all the SM-3s in the Pacific region are deployed onboard AEGIS DDGs.)
Besides, it's always wiser to assume that the enemy can perform better than what they are doing in reality (higher available numbers, higher readiness rate, higher interception rate, etc.).
Refer my statements above.
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Interestingly, 3IC is not the end.
If DF-27 indeed have a effective range of ~8000km. Naval Station Bremerton opens up as a prospective target. The number of immobile SSN, SSBN and AC berthed at Bremerton for maintenance and overhaul exceed even that of Pearl Harbor.
USN cannot take it for granted that the mainland will remain a safe strategic rear area.
Distance between Northeastern China and Bremerton, WA is approximately 7500km. The overfly path trace well outside of hostile territories during boost and midcourse phase.
If DF-27 indeed have a effective range of ~8000km. Naval Station Bremerton opens up as a prospective target. The number of immobile SSN, SSBN and AC berthed at Bremerton for maintenance and overhaul exceed even that of Pearl Harbor.
USN cannot take it for granted that the mainland will remain a safe strategic rear area.
Distance between Northeastern China and Bremerton, WA is approximately 7500km. The overfly path trace well outside of hostile territories during boost and midcourse phase.
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Only if the DF-27 travels largely in a straight line, which is similar to the Hawaii example previously mentioned.
Also, are there/will there be no AB/HM systems stationed in Alaska and CONUS?
Key thing is having sufficient sustained firepower to tie down or destroy AB/HM systems there as well.
You are right. No weapons systems are silver bullets on their own.
By placing ever more U.S assets under threat, long range IRBMs/HGVs like DF-27 has the potential to vastly complicate U.S missile defense planning.
Each PAC-3 MSE battery cost in excess of 1 billion dollar. Each THAAD battery cost in excess of 1.8 billion. This is not to mention their highly questionable interception rate/ engagement envelope when facing high speed HGVs in terminal phase. Future un-funded improvements like THAAD-ER promises more capability but will come at even more eye-watering cost.
And of course, one more battery forcibly relocated to the North American Continent is one less based in the Western Pacific. Facing ever more threats to all its military installations. The U.S will be forced to spread its forces thin. And when you attempt to defend everywhere, you end up defending nowhere.
Fair point. Though, I'm still not exactly as optimistic. We're in the Cold War Arms Race 2.0 now.
Either way, provided that the DF-27 is capable of effectively striking 3IC and even the northwestern CONUS under permissible conditions - We'd need something that's better than the DF-27 for true intercontinental-range (>8000 kilometers) strikes against targets that are deeper into the CONUS, if not to guarantee greater envelope of strike maneuvering for missions against the 3IC.
A three-stage missile based on the DF-26 with a HGV mounted in place of the conventional warhead seems to be the way to go with (DF-31/41 would be more expensive than affordable). The MGM-134 Midgetman ICBM (at ~14 tons, which is actually lighter than DF-26's ~20 tons) should be a good reference material for such endeavors.
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Disagree on this being Cold War 2.0. The mentality is there but not the competence or urgency.
During Cold War 1.0 the US was able to carry out the 41 for Freedom project where 41 SSBNs were built within 9 years. Also see space program and interstate highway system. Even Amtrak started with high promises.
Just look at the state of their infrastructure today. All the low hanging fruit has been picked while the basics are decaying. All the generative AI stuff is nowhere near the transformative power of the Cold War era advances. It doesn't even work for propaganda because it makes an easy mental excuse to safely dismiss all adverse information as AI generated fake news.
The Midgetman is so light because it's nuclear. You'd need good throw weight for this conventional weapon, otherwise such CONUS salvos would be even more pointless.
Sure, heavier conventional warhead will be needed to make good of strike efforts against (critical/significant) targets at intercontinental distances.
However, it should be noted that the warhead for the "three-stage missile based on the DF-26" which I've suggested above is to be mounted in a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), not a conical-shaped re-entry vehicle (RV) typically seen on many ballistic missiles (of which the aforementioned Midgetman ICBM is).
That largely balances out the drawbacks from the larger mass of warhead, as the HGV can actually glide for much greater distances utilizing the Qian Xuesheng and/or Sanger trajectories, instead of a (mostly fixed) ballistic trajectory for a conical RV.
The (actual) strike ranges of DF-16 vs DF-17 and DF-26 vs DF-27 are good examples of this.
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