China IRBM/SRBM (and non-ICBM/SLBM) thread
- Thread starter Blitzo
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Daily routine of DF-26 Factory.
We saw 71 DF-26 TEL in Oct 2023
now 59 DF-26 TEL in Sept 2024.
If we assume the factory shipping out DF-26 on a yearly or rolling basis, it is estimated that the factory will produce one DF-26 missile every 4.2 days. Close to 80 - 90 DF-26 per year.
Source:
We saw 71 DF-26 TEL in Oct 2023
now 59 DF-26 TEL in Sept 2024.
If we assume the factory shipping out DF-26 on a yearly or rolling basis, it is estimated that the factory will produce one DF-26 missile every 4.2 days. Close to 80 - 90 DF-26 per year.
Source:
As impressive as this is, more is still needed. I've said this many times, but even a thousand IRBMs will get soaked up in the blink of an eye in any HIC. You can never have enough of them and more importantly the role they're expected to fulfill should be kept modest for that reason.
In particular, against Guam, they're a great first wave tool but if being relied on to keep the bases suppressed the munition requirement could quickly become impractical so they shouldn't be substituting airpower in that regard. Imo beyond the initial strike they're great for use on time sensitive/prompt targets it would take aircraft too long to prosecute, as well as against shipping.
In particular, against Guam, they're a great first wave tool but if being relied on to keep the bases suppressed the munition requirement could quickly become impractical so they shouldn't be substituting airpower in that regard. Imo beyond the initial strike they're great for use on time sensitive/prompt targets it would take aircraft too long to prosecute, as well as against shipping.
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The front and rear halves of the first quoted sentence seem to be contradictory - The DF-27 is an intermediate-range HGV missile, not a ballistic missile.
The distance between Mudanjiang (in eastern Heilongjiang) and Oahu is ~7000 kilometers.
In order to hit USN CVNs moored/docked at Pearl (or just about any US military targets in Oahu), the DF-27 would have to travel in a largely straight line from Heilongjiang. Adding all the necessary maneuvers while overflying Hokkaido and the NorthPac in order to evade enemy ABM and AHM systems - The allocated range for the DF-27 (which is said to be 8000 kilometers maximum, assuming the information is accurate) could potentially be used up rather quickly.
Which is why I don't really expect the DF-27 to be extensively used against targets as far flung as the 3IC, apart from certain strategic, surgical strikes against targets of critical significance to the war effort (e.g. HQ of the USINDOPACOM). The DF-27 would be more useful being employed against targets in and around the 2IC and 2.5IC* "belt".
(*2.5IC hereby refers to an island chain line running along (from north to south) Attu and Kiska, Midway, Wake, Marshall and Melanesia (Solomon, Vanuatu, New Caledonia etc.) islands.)
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they are not only going to be firing off DF-26s against Guam. DF-26s are probably expected to aim at critical defense structures like radar site and SAMs. But you are going to use cruise missiles and drones for most of the targeting.
Launchers give you greater breadth. They certainly need to stock up more missiles, but PLA seems to be pretty aware of this. I wouldn't worry too much about it.
This seems quite silly. You have prime targets in carriers sitting defenseless at the start of a conflict. Yet, you are worried about islands that have nothing on them.
That's only when looking from the angle of conducting pre-emptive strikes.
I'm talking about conducting strike missions during (if not throughout) a hypothetical IndoPac-scale war.
It's wrong to assume that the 2.5IC have nothing on them, and even more so to assume that such present states will remain true into the future. Wake Island (which is not part of both 2IC and 3IC) is one good example.
In fact, I don't see how the US would refrain from conducting similar actions on those other islands along the aforementioned 2.5IC in the coming years, especially as the dynamic balance of power further shifts throughout much of the WestPac (specifically, along both 1IC and 2IC) in the coming years and decades.
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That's kind of the point right. You gotta hit where the ships are. A lot of ships are going to be in Pearl Harbour or they are going to get worked up there.
It's also home to this that you'd want to take out in the beginning of a conflict.
DF-27 are probably going to be expensive and deadly. So they need to be used to hit the most worthwhile targets. That means your carriers or LHDs or even more importantly the oiler/replenishment ships. You invest in these huge constellations to track these ships in the ocean so that you can hit them.
For something like Wake island, you can hit them with 093B VLS launched LACM or even LACMs from 055s and such (if you are comfortable putting a carrier group about 500 km to the East of Taiwan.
Guam is home to Andersen Air Force Base that can house strategic bombers, airlift, tankers, etc. It is also a logistics hub and a naval base that can service submarines. Keeping these facilities from operating at full capacity would be key in any potential conflict. Its why the US is building out some extremely dense air defense infrastructure to protect it. To get through those defenses and keep the facilities at Guam pressured, you're going to need to hit Guam at volume, constantly. If you think any target that's destroyed in the opening shots of the war is going to stay that way, you're delusional.
By the way, the distance from Pearl to the closest point to China is actually under 6600km, and it doesn't overfly Hokkaido, it's a few hundred km north into Sakhalin. (Plus I doubt there would be enough SM-3s/other interceptors based in Hokkaido to pose a major midcourse threat anyway, anytime soon.) And I doubt there would be much maneuvering required over the Pacific. So I think the DF-27 is quite capable of bombarding Hawaii, on top of its considerable utility striking Alaska/Australia & holding at risk vessels in the Pacific beyond DF-26 range. How much value it can contribute mainly depends on how many they can build, quickly enough. I definitely think it should be prioritized, since these are all largely capabilities nothing else can provide, at least until a substantial H-20 fleet.
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