China ICBM/SLBM, nuclear arms thread

[CMP]

The most important point of having nukes is to discourage others from using them against you

If China make it clear to the US she will nuke Hawaii and/or Guam with city busters if US ever use nukes (regardless of size) against China, it will make the US weight the risk of MAD against whatever advantage it has on tactical nukes.

The nuclear threshold, once crossed, will cause unknown consequences. China just need to make sure the US know it risks MAD if it ever use nukes.

They would not be even slightly deterred by capabilities and threats against Hawaii or Guam. If they can take Shenzhen/Chongqing/Beijing/Shanghai/etc. off the board in exchange for Guam and Pearl Harbor, they will have already won the game for the rest of time. The only way to successfully deter them is to ensure that you have the guaranteed capabilities to take every single mid-size and major city on CONUS off the board entirely.

The mindset that all it takes to guarantee China's safety and security is to hold Guam and Hawaii at risk is completely out-of-date. That would once be true when China had an economy 1/4 to 1/3rd the size of the US, and held no challenge for the US dollar, US technology leadership, etc. A very 90s/early-mid 2000s-dated form of strategic thought. Long since obsolete.

 

[vincent]

They would not be even slightly deterred by capabilities and threats against Hawaii or Guam. If they can take Shenzhen/Chongqing/Beijing/Shanghai/etc. off the board in exchange for Guam and Pearl Harbor, they will have already won the game for the rest of time. The only way to successfully deter them is to ensure that you have the guaranteed capabilities to take every single mid-size and major city on CONUS off the board entirely.

The mindset that all it takes to guarantee China's safety and security is to hold Guam and Hawaii at risk is completely out-of-date. That would once be true when China had an economy 1/4 to 1/3rd the size of the US, and held no challenge for the US dollar, US technology leadership, etc. A very 90s/early-mid 2000s-dated form of strategic thought. Long since obsolete.

Hawaii and Guam are just the retaliatory strike for whatever small tactical nukes US may used on PLA targets as in the scenario specified by Boltzmann. If US fires nukes against Chinese cities, then it's MAD.

 

[Biscuits]

They would not be even slightly deterred by capabilities and threats against Hawaii or Guam. If they can take Shenzhen/Chongqing/Beijing/Shanghai/etc. off the board in exchange for Guam and Pearl Harbor, they will have already won the game for the rest of time. The only way to successfully deter them is to ensure that you have the guaranteed capabilities to take every single mid-size and major city on CONUS off the board entirely.

The mindset that all it takes to guarantee China's safety and security is to hold Guam and Hawaii at risk is completely out-of-date. That would once be true when China had an economy 1/4 to 1/3rd the size of the US, and held no challenge for the US dollar, US technology leadership, etc. A very 90s/early-mid 2000s-dated form of strategic thought. Long since obsolete.

Yeah but destroying Hawaii with strategic nukes would be a fair response if US destroyed a carrier group or destroyer fleet with tactical nukes. Destroying US mainland cities will straight up guarantee MAD immediately, it's disproportionate vs just a few ships being destroyed on China's side.

Destroying large military targets utterly, without killing too many US civilians can still work as an escalate to deescalate play.

 

[tankphobia]

Yeah but destroying Hawaii with strategic nukes would be a fair response if US destroyed a carrier group or destroyer fleet with tactical nukes. Destroying US mainland cities will straight up guarantee MAD immediately, it's disproportionate vs just a few ships being destroyed on China's side.

Destroying large military targets utterly, without killing too many US civilians can still work as an escalate to deescalate play.

I don't think the US will ever resort to tactical nukes against Chinese naval assets, there's too many other ways they could threaten Chinese assets before having to use the big red button, furthermore with how far apart ships actually sit in a taskforce it's unlikely anything small yield is going to do much anyhow.

Tactical nukes were born in a time where the west were expected to stop massive Soviet tank armies running through Europe, since that is now an exceedingly unlikely scenario, anything short of city wiping strategic nukes to enforce no first use should just be a waste of money as any nuclear weapon usage on either side will trigger MAD in short term, there is no way back down after the button is pushed, we have gone non-nuclear far too long to allow this.

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

How do you figure? China's fires advantage is overwhelming in the western Pacific. And I'm talking about using weapons on exclusively military targets, not even dual use ones like air ports or harbors, lethal platforms only. So long as they're not detonated at ground level the fallout is negligible.

Relying on fast escalation to strategic strikes for deterrence is all well and good until the time comes to actually back up that commitment. Responding to a destroyer getting vaporized by flattening Guam or Honolulu is not going to make the Americans back down or buy much of a short term tactical advantage for China. They're just going to respond with strategic level attacks of their own.

Low yield is less efficient than high yield in kt/kg. Flattening a minor outpost is exact the correct response as a warning shot with the understanding that the next salvos won't be on a minor outpost.

And if they both initiate first use then don't back down after retaliation, then it means they value the distant possibility of a tactical advantage in a war of choice over a high risk to national survival.

 

[Reclaimer]

I agree that a limited nuclear war is not in the favor of China (and it should be clear that fast escalation to MAD is guaranteed to occur if anyone considers a tactical strike)

However, even in a scenario of maximum nuclear retaliation, having the capability to launch small-yield nuclear missiles from a large number of 4th gen multi-role fighters can saturate enemy anti-ballistic defenses, giving the larger payload missiles a better chance at striking their target. Even larger platforms like H-6s and eventually H-20s could also carry many more missiles to overwhelm anti-ballistic defenses.

Finally, this capability doesn't have to be publicized.

 

[tankphobia]

I agree that a limited nuclear war is not in the favor of China (and it should be clear that fast escalation to MAD is guaranteed to occur if anyone considers a tactical strike)

However, even in a scenario of maximum nuclear retaliation, having the capability to launch small-yield nuclear missiles from a large number of 4th gen multi-role fighters can saturate enemy anti-ballistic defenses, giving the larger payload missiles a better chance at striking their target. Even larger platforms like H-6s and eventually H-20s could also carry many more missiles to overwhelm anti-ballistic defenses.

Finally, this capability doesn't have to be publicized.

Would it not be cheaper to just build more MIRV missiles? Don't even have to abide by treaty and just stuff many warheads into one.

 

[Reclaimer]

Would it not be cheaper to just build more MIRV missiles? Don't even have to abide by treaty and just stuff many warheads into one.

It's not just about what's cheaper. It's about having as many delivery platforms as possible, so that adversaries must consider something as insignificant as a J-10 sortie as one that could contain a nuclear package. Having both MIRV missiles and many small-yield nuclear missiles will add more credibility to China's nuclear deterrence.

 

[tankphobia]

It's not just about what's cheaper. It's about having as many delivery platforms as possible, so that adversaries must consider something as insignificant as a J-10 sortie as one that could contain a nuclear package. Having both MIRV missiles and many small-yield nuclear missiles will add more credibility to China's nuclear deterrence.

If it's cheaper, you can build more. It is much cheaper to intercept a cruise missile with a nuclear warhead launched from a plane rather than pepper the entire interior of your country with ABM to counter a sky full of MIRVs, not to mention land based launchers can also be used in fractional bombardment, further complicating defense.

Land based launchers are also less fussy about mass so you can maintain pure enriched uranium warheads.

 

[Deleted member 24525]

I know that low yield nukes wouldn't actually be that useful. I mean, they need a <100m CEP to even be a significant threat to tanks, obviously they could only hope to sink a single ship. For practical purposes they would be limited to either expensive standoffs against ships operating outside the range of China's air defense complex, or a torpedo from an SSN that managed to get in close, and would be in enormous danger afterward.

I'm not trying to endorse them as a really useful munition in their own right. I'm trying to make a point about the political elements of escalation.

If China's nuclear capability is exclusively strategic, then the Americans may reason they can use their tactical nuclear arsenal to obtain leverage in the conflict. This is especially true if they were losing. The thinking would be that if the US uses nuclear weapons in a tactical capacity then that imposes an obligation on China to either escalate or capitulate. Its only escalation option is basically MAD, so then maybe, just maybe, tactical nukes could be used to force negotiations on American terms.

Obviously Chinese leaders wouldn't back down. Even if they wanted to, the popular will for nuclear retaliation would be totally overwhelming. They wouldn't have a choice, and so then goes the strikes on Guam or Honolulu. American leaders likewise could not back down, though more from elite than popular pressure, and from there trades of cities would occur that would likely escalate to mutual destruction.

So if the US is losing conventionally and turns to tactical nukes in desperation for leverage, and China lacks tactical nuclear capability of its own, then mutual annihilation would be basically unavoidable. My point here is that having a robust tactical arsenal provides a way out of this death spiral by allowing China to retaliate to nuclear use in a way that both satisfies popular anger and avoids immediate escalation to a strategic exchange. And by making it clear to the US that such brinkmanship would get it nowhere, it makes a first use scenario less likely to happen in the first place.