I thought that N-15 used RDX additives.
China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread
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If one takes the US DoD report's suggestion of 300 ICBM launchers in active service right now for granted - how would one go about trying to dissect that number? The DoD report gives nothing in that regard, but still. For the life of me, I can't come even close to that figure.
Even if there are 36 DF-5 operational right now
Even if there are 48 DF-41 operational right now
Even if there are 80-ish DF-31 operational right now
Even if there are 90 JL-2/3 operational right now (let's say they have more than silos available)
That's STILL not close to 300. And 99% of people would say some of these numbers above are too wild and unrealistically high. With most people agreeing the current tally is closer to 200.
Yes I know one should not just take the figure for granted, there's a chance it's just a mistake on their part but still - i'd like to hear other people try to reach the 300 figure.
Even if there are 36 DF-5 operational right now
Even if there are 48 DF-41 operational right now
Even if there are 80-ish DF-31 operational right now
Even if there are 90 JL-2/3 operational right now (let's say they have more than silos available)
That's STILL not close to 300. And 99% of people would say some of these numbers above are too wild and unrealistically high. With most people agreeing the current tally is closer to 200.
Yes I know one should not just take the figure for granted, there's a chance it's just a mistake on their part but still - i'd like to hear other people try to reach the 300 figure.
What would be the explosive yield of each of these 1600-2000 warheads?
Besides, is it possible for China to produce as much nuclear warheads as the US and Soviet did during the Cold War, i.e. 20-30 thousand nuclear warheads?
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It was said that they produced 3,500 tonnes of HMX annually as of 2001, still significantly higher than my prediction. I agree that the number didn't add up even if one assumes it would be 2,000 tonnes annual production in Gansu after expansion.
A 2011 journal suggested that one production line accounts for 1,000 tonnes of annual production and China built its HMX back in earlier 2000s. The official news said the two rounds of expansion increased the production rate by respectively 53.7% in 2016, 42.55% in 2017, 5.43% in 2019 and 53.94% in the first half of 2020.
The 50%/30 million yuan expansion could have meant to be the expansion of 2016, at least 53.7% is closer to 50%. If it is that case, the current production would be around 2,500 tonnes annually.
Are these plants in China dedicated HMX plants? RDX production also produces HMX as a byproduct. The ratio is usually 8-12%. For example in the US figure for 1969, around two thirds of the HMX production was the result of RDX production. China should be producing a lot of HMX as the byproduct of RDX production.
Honestly I don't know. The official news use very vague language to describe RDX/HMX.
What I know is that RDX is called as Product 801, Reduced Sensitivity RDX (RS-RDX) is probably called as Product 8701, both of them were manufactured by 3rd plant.
HMX is called as Product 101, manufactured by 4th plant, and there is another new dedicated production line called as "Important Product manufacturing line", which I believe to be a product line of HMX as well but use DADN as intermediate.
Is Zhang Hui and Yang Zhang the same person?
Either way, I found this article from a post dated 2002 (and re-quoted in another article just yesterday). No idea about its reliability and authenticity.
Roughly translated:
The English translation may not be totally accurate, so for anyone who can understand the article better, feel free to rectify.
Is this bogus or no?
Either way, I found this article from a post dated 2002 (and re-quoted in another article just yesterday). No idea about its reliability and authenticity.
Roughly translated:
The English translation may not be totally accurate, so for anyone who can understand the article better, feel free to rectify.
Is this bogus or no?
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Chinese warhead production is probably close to 20 pits per year according to a slide from Sandia NL, perhaps 9th Academy will ramp up warheads pit production recently as Decker claims there is new expansion of facility but I don't know where.
I really don't know "arm control nerds" keep coping about muh plutonium stockpile.
China can gradually ramp up plutonium pits production rate by using current stockpile, and the CFR-600 will come online next year providing enough material for 200 kg/yr. And it is the most expensive part of warheads, HEU and Lithium-6 Deuteride is comparably much cheaper than plutonium.
Let's check the very "think tankie" reports quoted by Pentagon, indicating additional 1,000 warheads from reprocessing fast breeder fuel.
The 662 is an ex DF-4 BGD which had four ROTLs and one (DF-4) "silo" (elevated launch concept).
Now this unit will/has become a DF-5 unit. Definitely 12 silos (puls one trg) are under construction.
The four ex ROTL sites are looking finished and might be operational already.
Moreover there are definitely TWO new BGD (634 & 637). One of them (I think designation is 634) is similiar to the 662 and has 12 (plus one trg) silo construction of the type the 662 is getting.
But there is another BGD (I think designation is now 637) which has four new silo constructions of the type the 662 is getting.
They are at the former ROTL sites of the Tongdao (ex DF-4) unit. I've looked around this area but wasn't able to find (eight plus one) more silos to bring this field to a similiar configuration as with the 662 / 634.
So the purpose of these 4 new silo configuration is somewhat questionable for me. Maybe a further Training field / BGD?
I don't want to go into details for the 634 because I promised to wait until Decker Eveleth will come out with his new report and an updated map.
But the bottom line is that we have 30 [2x(12+1) + 4) new build DF-5 silos of which 4 are already without construction tents.
Together with the 3x6 old DF-5 silos we have 48!
Regarding the impressive ICBM figures of the 2022 Pentagon Report I have my doubts.
Their overall ICBM figure greatly depends on the guess of how many of the "sandy" silos (already without construction tents) of the Hami, Yumen and Ordos fields can be considered really OPERATIONELL!
Most of the silos are hardly recognizable and are covered with a kind of layer of sand. Most of the support facilities are also not yet completed. There are hardly any telltale activities at the silos. So I'm not sure if you can really classify every silo that doesn't have a construction tent as operational. I think that's just anticipated at the moment. In my opinion it will take another year or two before these sites are really operational.
In the days of the "Soviet Military Power" Publications, I attributed great precision to Pentagon publications.
But these days I'm not so sure if the information given in these yearly releases is really accurate.
I think there is also a certain proportion of "educated guesses" in there.
And for me it seems that only after Decker Eveleth and Hans Kristensen have found and unveiled these fields they finally included this information in the 2022 Pentagon Report.
The reported number (6) for the Type 093 submarines also seems a bit too small to me.
Elsewhere in the report they mention 9 SSN. However, the last three type 091 are not all available (if at all).
It's also a pity that they give so few details about the DF-17 (at least two BGDs and probably corresponding reduction of DF-11) and DF-100 BGD (in exchange for DF-10?).
Of course they know to do better, but it seems to me that they simply do not want to disclose this in the report itself.
In so far the figures of the Report must be viewed with caution.
Cheers
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