China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[canniBUS]

As I said before, the ABM system was developed to deal with missiles with single warheads, obviously its accuracy is confidential, the little information available on the internet gives it a 50% hit rate which implies at least two missiles per target to guaranteeing a hit...

If we assume the probability to hit for each interceptor missile is independent then the probability of hit using n missiles is 1 - ( (1-h) ^ n ). Where h is the hit rate and 1-h is the miss rate. So when hit rate is 50%, miss rate is also 50% and the probability of hit with 2 missiles is 1- (.5^2) = .75. A 50% hit rate requires 4 missiles to exceed 90% hit rate, 1 - ( .5^4). A hit rate of 50% seems too low for a viable ABM system.

Whether or not the assumption of independent hit probability for each missile is true is up for debate.

 

[Suetham]

If we assume the probability to hit for each interceptor missile is independent then the probability of hit using n missiles is 1 - ( (1-h) ^ n ). Where h is the hit rate and 1-h is the miss rate. So when hit rate is 50%, miss rate is also 50% and the probability of hit with 2 missiles is 1- (.5^2) = .75. A 50% hit rate requires 4 missiles to exceed 90% hit rate, 1 - ( .5^4). A hit rate of 50% seems too low for a viable ABM system.

Whether or not the assumption of independent hit probability for each missile is true is up for debate.

Based on public testing of the GBI and SM-3, the intercept success rate remains just above 50% for the GBI and an even higher rate for the SM-3. In fact, I believe just the opposite, a 50% hit rate is still a rate above what the real prospects of war can create, public tests are all set up for the interception to succeed, everything is pre-planned for give the missile a better chance of kill, this situation is far from ideal in a real world with a salvo of ICBM and SLBM being launched. For example, if you search public sources you will find that the chances of intercepting a Patriot are above 75-80%, but a source I know who is in one of the US armed services claims that the Patriot's hit rate it's about 40% and American troops don't feel protected with that system.

 

[Suetham]

A guy on haohan methodically used the 5 psi overpressure rings on nukemap on basically every major city in the US to calculate how many warheads China needs for coverage of 50% of urban areas. His results were that 334 650kt and 631 150kt warheads (965 total) are needed to destroy 50% of the urban areas in CONUS. Which he argues implies a requirement of at least 1500 warheads to survive and be launched after a US counterforce first strike (dubious imo). This doesn't even factor in how many are needed to destroy cities in India or any other countries. Anyway China needs a lot, and fast.

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This is an approach that should be carefully considered. I would say that based on this analysis of 334 650 kt and 631 150 kt warheads are needed to destroy 50% of the urban areas of CONUS, we can say that each ICBM can contain 1-6 650 kt warheads in yield and somewhere between 1 -12 650 kt warheads for each missile. This puts us in the position of 55-334 ICBMs for yields of 650 kt and 52-631 ICBMs for yields of 150 kt. This would need to be implemented by a nuclear force of 107-965 ICBMs.

Based on his assessment that 1500 warheads would need to be delivered to successfully destroy 50% of the urban areas of CONUS, I would say that he would need 517 650 kt warheads and 978 150 kt warheads, which would put us in a position that would need to stock somewhere between 86-517 ICBMs with 650 kt yield warheads and somewhere between 81-978 ICBMs with 150 kt yield warheads, which translates to a nuclear force between 167-1495 ICBMs.

He probably must have researched taking into account the number of US anti-ballistic missiles, in SM-3 numbers based on a US Navy budget analysis on SM-3 orders where the number is at 71 units per year, the number in stock should be 300-380 missiles. Considering a 50% success rate of SM-3 missiles, this would give an intercept of 150-190 missiles/warheads, and considering the GBI also at 50% hit chances, which would add another 22 intercepted missiles, so something between 172-212 missiles/warheads successfully shot down.

Note: The above scenario is a very hypothetical situation.

If the Aegis ships are positioned close enough to shoot down the still ascending ballistic missile in space before releasing the payload, this translates to an ABM component force multiplier and certainly has to be taken into account, but given that not all Aegis ships will be operational at the time of a launch, this could represent a significant reduction in the capacity of the ABM naval component.

On an average based on the previous analysis, China would need 400 ICBM/SLBMs, which is a little more than half of what the US has. Just for comparison, the USAF currently has 440 Minuteman III and about 336 Trident II active - the number of SLBMs will be reduced to 280 missiles from 2023 with 20 Trident II for each Ohio submarine according to New Start, this gives the USA a nuclear force of 720 ICBM/SLBMs.

 

[clockwork]

This is an approach that should be carefully considered. I would say that based on this analysis of 334 650 kt and 631 150 kt warheads are needed to destroy 50% of the urban areas of CONUS, we can say that each ICBM can contain 1-6 650 kt warheads in yield and somewhere between 1 -12 650 kt warheads for each missile. This puts us in the position of 55-334 ICBMs for yields of 650 kt and 52-631 ICBMs for yields of 150 kt. This would need to be implemented by a nuclear force of 107-965 ICBMs.

Based on his assessment that 1500 warheads would need to be delivered to successfully destroy 50% of the urban areas of CONUS, I would say that he would need 517 650 kt warheads and 978 150 kt warheads, which would put us in a position that would need to stock somewhere between 86-517 ICBMs with 650 kt yield warheads and somewhere between 81-978 ICBMs with 150 kt yield warheads, which translates to a nuclear force between 167-1495 ICBMs.

He probably must have researched taking into account the number of US anti-ballistic missiles, in SM-3 numbers based on a US Navy budget analysis on SM-3 orders where the number is at 71 units per year, the number in stock should be 300-380 missiles. Considering a 50% success rate of SM-3 missiles, this would give an intercept of 150-190 missiles/warheads, and considering the GBI also at 50% hit chances, which would add another 22 intercepted missiles, so something between 172-212 missiles/warheads successfully shot down.

Note: The above scenario is a very hypothetical situation.

If the Aegis ships are positioned close enough to shoot down the still ascending ballistic missile in space before releasing the payload, this translates to an ABM component force multiplier and certainly has to be taken into account, but given that not all Aegis ships will be operational at the time of a launch, this could represent a significant reduction in the capacity of the ABM naval component.

On an average based on the previous analysis, China would need 400 ICBM/SLBMs, which is a little more than half of what the US has. Just for comparison, the USAF currently has 440 Minuteman III and about 336 Trident II active - the number of SLBMs will be reduced to 280 missiles from 2023 with 20 Trident II for each Ohio submarine according to New Start, this gives the USA a nuclear force of 720 ICBM/SLBMs.

Wait can USN ships intercept ICBMs in boost or midcourse phase? Either with current or planned capability? If so as you say this might pose a great threat to China's ICBM force, but many of those should be launched from deep inside the interior, providing protection during the boost phase at least.
Intercepting earlier on would also enable them to neutralize China's HGVs.

 

[Suetham]

Wait can USN ships intercept ICBMs in boost or midcourse phase?

In the midcourse phase, post-boost phase to be more precise. The definition I gave may have caused confusion.

ICBMs are easily intercepted in the booster phase and with minimal post-boost difficulty, the booster phase of an ICBM can be used at a distance of up to 1000 km, which is precisely why Chinese ICBMs need to be based in the mainland of China. , because even if an Aegis ship is in the First Chain of Islands, the distance to reach the interior of the Chinese territory does not give the necessary range for the American ABM missile to intercept, the chance of intercepting the Chinese ICBMs can only happen in the post-boost phase , at this stage when the warheads are released, that is, the SM-3 that proposes to neutralize a Chinese nuclear attack, would need to be positioned close to the Chinese mainland and would only be able to shoot down the ICBM in the post-boost phase, which in theory, would put a big question mark on the US ability to neutralize a massive Chinese attack with its maritime interceptors. Exactly for that reason, the Chinese need to expel the entire American naval presence from the First Chain of Islands, pushing the American naval presence to the Second Chain of Islands will give even more nuclear strategic advantage to the Chinese.

The same does not apply to North Korea, for example, an Aegis ship in South Korean waters would already have enough range to shoot down a North Korean ICBM still in the boost phase as well as the THAAD in South Korea.

Either with current or planned capability? If so as you say this might pose a great threat to China's ICBM force, but many of those should be launched from deep inside the interior, providing protection during the boost phase at least.

Planned capacity. The number in service of the SM-3 missile must not exceed 200 units currently. And again, the problem is in the post-boost phase, Aegis ships in the First Island Chain are still a relative danger to Chinese ICBMs in the post-boost phase.

Intercepting earlier on would also enable them to neutralize China's HGVs.

This is unlikely. The SM-3 can only intercept a missile at minimum altitudes of 150 km, the HGV jumps into the atmosphere between altitudes of 40-100 km, the only available means of hypersonic anti-missile defense is the THAAD which approaches the intercept at precisely these altitudes, but its scope condemns it as a null requirement on credible interception capability. Even THAAD in South Korea would still not be viable for adequate protection against Chinese HGVs because of its short range.

 

[clockwork]

In the midcourse phase, post-boost phase to be more precise. The definition I gave may have caused confusion.

ICBMs are easily intercepted in the booster phase and with minimal post-boost difficulty, the booster phase of an ICBM can be used at a distance of up to 1000 km, which is precisely why Chinese ICBMs need to be based in the mainland of China. , because even if an Aegis ship is in the First Chain of Islands, the distance to reach the interior of the Chinese territory does not give the necessary range for the American ABM missile to intercept, the chance of intercepting the Chinese ICBMs can only happen in the post-boost phase , at this stage when the warheads are released, that is, the SM-3 that proposes to neutralize a Chinese nuclear attack, would need to be positioned close to the Chinese mainland and would only be able to shoot down the ICBM in the post-boost phase, which in theory, would put a big question mark on the US ability to neutralize a massive Chinese attack with its maritime interceptors. Exactly for that reason, the Chinese need to expel the entire American naval presence from the First Chain of Islands, pushing the American naval presence to the Second Chain of Islands will give even more nuclear strategic advantage to the Chinese.

The same does not apply to North Korea, for example, an Aegis ship in South Korean waters would already have enough range to shoot down a North Korean ICBM still in the boost phase as well as the THAAD in South Korea.

Planned capacity. The number in service of the SM-3 missile must not exceed 200 units currently. And again, the problem is in the post-boost phase, Aegis ships in the First Island Chain are still a relative danger to Chinese ICBMs in the post-boost phase.

This is unlikely. The SM-3 can only intercept a missile at minimum altitudes of 150 km, the HGV jumps into the atmosphere between altitudes of 40-100 km, the only available means of hypersonic anti-missile defense is the THAAD which approaches the intercept at precisely these altitudes, but its scope condemns it as a null requirement on credible interception capability. Even THAAD in South Korea would still not be viable for adequate protection against Chinese HGVs because of its short range.

As long as they can make an interception at any point in the flight when the warheads are still on the bus, this is very dangerous because they need an order of magnitude fewer interceptors/successful intercepts, vs. intercepting e.g. 10 MIRVs per missile individually.

If sea-based boost or midcourse interception is a potential problem, China should both base ICBMs as far in the interior as possible (this also helps protect against standoff cruise missile counterforce attacks from aircraft off the coast as well as gives a bit more warning time for SLBM depressed trajectory surprise attacks), and launch them on FOBS trajectories in alternate directions to try to avoid flying over any Aegis ships.

 

[Suetham]

As long as they can make an interception at any point in the flight when the warheads are still on the bus, this is very dangerous because they need an order of magnitude fewer interceptors/successful intercepts, vs. intercepting e.g. 10 MIRVs per missile individually.

If sea-based boost or midcourse interception is a potential problem, China should both base ICBMs as far in the interior as possible (this also helps protect against standoff cruise missile counterforce attacks from aircraft off the coast as well as gives a bit more warning time for SLBM depressed trajectory surprise attacks), and launch them on FOBS trajectories in alternate directions to try to avoid flying over any Aegis ships.

Exactly.

 

[ougoah]

Based on public testing of the GBI and SM-3, the intercept success rate remains just above 50% for the GBI and an even higher rate for the SM-3. In fact, I believe just the opposite, a 50% hit rate is still a rate above what the real prospects of war can create, public tests are all set up for the interception to succeed, everything is pre-planned for give the missile a better chance of kill, this situation is far from ideal in a real world with a salvo of ICBM and SLBM being launched. For example, if you search public sources you will find that the chances of intercepting a Patriot are above 75-80%, but a source I know who is in one of the US armed services claims that the Patriot's hit rate it's about 40% and American troops don't feel protected with that system.

This isn't something anyone that could be threatened by US first strike should ever underestimate or take their word for.

Reported success rate could be well under actual capabilities. I've no doubt the US can easily intercept missiles from every military except China's and Russia's due to the sophistication of delivery systems and the number of warheads and delivery systems.

 

[clockwork]

This isn't something anyone that could be threatened by US first strike should ever underestimate or take their word for.

Reported success rate could be well under actual capabilities. I've no doubt the US can easily intercept missiles from every military except China's and Russia's due to the sophistication of delivery systems and the number of warheads and delivery systems.

Isn't the success rate of GBI obtained by its tests? Is it possible for them to conduct a successful interception and mislead other countries into thinking it failed? Though I guess they could also conduct a few legit tests that succeed and then intentionally miss on others if they really wanted to fudge the rate like that.

Apparently the Aegis BMD (SM-3) has only demonstrated one successful intercept (out of one attempt) in 2020 against an "ICBM-representative target". Not to say the US doesn't still have the most advanced BMD efforts in the world, I don't think any other country has demonstrated midcourse ICBM interception capability at all.

If China ever gets the political will to try to develop an impenetrable missile defence shield against nuclear attack over the country, they should also conduct a bunch of "unsuccessful" intercept tests, to avoid alarming the other nuclear states and maintain a facade of mutual vulnerability.

 

[Suetham]

Apparently the Aegis BMD (SM-3) has only demonstrated one successful intercept (out of one attempt) in 2020 against an "ICBM-representative target". Not to say the US doesn't still have the most advanced BMD efforts in the world, I don't think any other country has demonstrated midcourse ICBM interception capability at all.

If China ever gets the political will to try to develop an impenetrable missile defence shield against nuclear attack over the country, they should also conduct a bunch of "unsuccessful" intercept tests, to avoid alarming the other nuclear states and maintain a facade of mutual vulnerability.

In fact, 4 countries have the capability to perform mid-course interception. They are: USA, Russia, China and India. Precisely the little club of the 4 countries that have ASATs capabilities. In theory, since they can successfully shoot down orbiting satellites, there is a considerable chance of a successful intercept midway through a missile's ballistic trajectory. But in factual terms, only China and the US have successfully tested anti-ballistic interception.

I will ignore the other countries and focus on China. I don't know if the Americans have the most advanced BMD in the world, but the fact is that China is leaning on the Americans in anti-ballistic capabilities.

Around mid-course ballistic capabilities we have:

HQ-19 [THAAD counterpart]
HQ-26 [SM-3 counterpart]

All three missiles are designed for long-range anti-ballistic missile capabilities. China's native anti-missile systems are now approaching maturity, even anti-ballistic ones. For example, China's first major achievement was the successful test in 1999 of a kinetic death vehicle (KKV) designed to destroy enemy missiles via impact, hit-to-kill. Meanwhile, China has developed two distinct anti-missile systems – the HQ-19 and HQ-26 – that employ KKVs. The first system, the HQ-19, was designed as a Chinese equivalent of the THAAD and was deployed in 2018, but testing began in 2003. The HQ-26 entered development a little later, but reportedly entered flight tests in 2016. .

The HQ-26's range claims to be 2000 km, this range places it as an interceptor second only to the Block IIA version of the SM-3 which has a range of 2500 km. A US diplomat claims that China has deployed some missiles to the Nansha Islands and Yongxing Island. Some analyzes reported that the comprehensive air defense system was integrated via CSA-6B, HQ-9 and HQ-26 in the South China Sea, increasing its power to deal with US forces in the region. The HQ-26 is a missile that can be installed aboard the Type 055, which guarantees a maritime interceptor similar to the SM-3.

The range of the HQ-19 claim to be 1000-3000 km, which I quite debatable. A range of 2000 km I even consider, above that I have my doubts, but I point out that the development of this missile dates back to the 1990s and its X-band phased array radar can detect targets at a distance of 4000 km. This range still manages to perform an intermediate and terminal intercept, which puts it above the THAAD, a factor in favor of the HQ-19 is that it has KKV vehicles. The HQ-19 is armed with a dual-purpose KKV warhead that has the ability to shoot down missiles as well as satellites. As far as I know, China carried out a 4th land-based missile intercept test on its territory on February 5, 2018, and reported that it achieved the objective.