China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[plawolf]

But how will the interceptor track the maneuvering enemy HGVs ? It's already difficult to communicate with a HGV itself.
Old Article (2015).

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"When a re-entry vehicle is unable to be connected, the only thing you can do is pray for it," said Xiaotian Gao, a physicist at the Harbin Institute of Technology in China.

Gao and his colleague Binhao Jiang have proposed a new way to maintain communication with spacecraft as they re-enter the atmosphere. The approach might also be applied to other hypersonic vehicles such as futuristic military planes and ballistic missiles.

Communication blackouts with hypersonic vehicles occur because as the craft zips along at five or more times the speed of sound, an envelope of hot ionized air, called a plasma sheath, surrounds it. This plasma sheath will reflect electromagnetic signals under most conditions, cutting off connection with anything outside of the vehicle. However, under certain special conditions, a plasma sheath can actually enhance the radiation from a communication antenna.Gao and his colleagues reasoned that it would be possible to replicate these special conditions in ordinary hypersonic flight by redesigning the antenna. The researchers first analyzed earlier experiments and found that the special signal enhancement could be explained by a resonance, or matched electromagnetic oscillations, between the plasma sheath and the surrounding air. They propose adding a "matched layer" to ordinary communication antennas to create the desired resonant conditions during normal hypersonic flight.

The matched layer works because it acts as like a capacitor -- a type of electrical energy storage unit -- in the antenna circuit, Gao explained. The plasma sheath, on the other hand, acts like an inductor, which resists changes in an electric current passing through it. When a capacitor and an inductor are paired together, they can form a resonant circuit. "Once the resonance is reached, the energy can be exchanged between them steadily and losslessly, like real capacitance and inductance do in a circuit," Gao said. "As a result, the electromagnetic radiation can propagate through the matched layer and the plasma sheath like they do not exist."For the resonance to work, the thickness of the matched layer and the plasma sheath must be smaller than the wavelength of the electromagnetic waves used to communicate, so the approach would be ineffective if the antenna frequency were too high, Gao noted.
The properties of the plasma sheath can change during flight, but Gao and his colleagues believe their matched layer can adjust for these changes if it is made from a material whose electromagnetic properties can be tuned with an electrical signal. "We don't need to know exactly the properties of the plasma layer, but we need to know the ranges for these properties. The matched layer will be adjusted by an automatic control system, so we only need to know the ranges to make sure this whole system can work appropriately," Gao said.

The team is not the first to try to solve the communication blackout problem, but their approach has advantages over other attempts. For example, the equipment needed to implement the matched layer is much lighter than the equipment required by other methods, such as trying to control the electrons in the plasma with an applied magnetic field, or injecting a liquid into the plasma to reduce its electron density. The matched layer approach also doesn't rely on a particular shape of vehicle to work, doesn't consume additional energy and can adapt to changes of the plasma sheath.

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This is just communication. Now imagine detection, active tracking and discernment required to connect a maneuvering warhead with an incoming maneuvering HGV.

This test had nothing to do with tracking. I said this test potentially offers a very useful component technology when applied to interceptors, not that this is a completed interceptor. As such, it seems a bit of a tangential and stretched ask.

 

[Xizor]

This test had nothing to do with tracking. I said this test potentially offers a very useful component technology when applied to interceptors, not that this is a completed interceptor. As such, it seems a bit of a tangential and stretched ask.

Oh, very well. But it'd be a very demanding ask technologically as well as on a cost basis if they plan to counter HGVs. Maybe China should focus on neutering attacks from less technologically advanced countries and adopt a different strategy towards advanced adversaries.

 

[Suetham]

I think the reduced detection horizon against ground based radar is really an incidental and largely peripheral benefit when modern and next gen early warning and tracking are increasingly going the space based route.

All of the space-based architecture network for hypersonic missile tracking will be in LEO, so an ICBMs that typically peaks at 1200 km will not be tracked by this array of space sensors, but will have a weakness due to altitude and radar based on land can track and discriminate and provide target designation for anti-ballistic missiles.

An ICBM with a depressed trajectory still maintains the advantage of a parabolic ICBM, at its apogee, because its maximum altitude will be 800 km, depending on the configuration of the trajectory of an ICBM and disregarding technical aspects in this assessment, an ICBM will hypothetically have an apogee of 400 km will be 3x stealthier because of its altitude compared to a parabolic ICBM that reaches a peak of 1200 km, the latter being much more easily tracked.

An ICBM with depressed trajectory still maintains the stealth of space-based radar (LEO) due to its apogee, and still takes advantage of land-based radar because of the same altitude advantage, making the ABM system more difficult to track, discriminate the target, and offer firing solution for anti-ballistic missiles.

Comparing:

An ICBM with a depressed trajectory that makes its flight in the atmosphere will be continuously tracked by sensors in space.

A depressed trajectory ICBM that travels out of space, maintaining a depressed altitude but making a space-based tracking solution impractical, will also offer the difficulty of detecting ground-based radar.

I'm even disregarding things like speed, an atmospheric trajectory "ICBM" will lose speed due to drag, but the flight time is shorter. An ICBM with a depressed trajectory in space will have more speed, but its flight time is longer.

Appropriate comparisons are restricted to:

ICBM parabolic trajectory: 10-20% of the trajectory in the atmosphere, more speed, more "flight" time, easier to be tracked both by sensors at sea and on land and to be shot down.

Atmospheric trajectory "ICBM": 80-100% flight in the atmosphere, it will be the vehicle with the lowest speed among those mentioned, it will be the missile with the shortest flight time, the most difficult to be tracked by sensors at sea and on land, it will be continuously tracked by sensors in space.

Depressed space trajectory ICBM: Will fly longer in the atmosphere than the parabolic trajectory missile but will be much shorter than the atmospheric trajectory ICBM, will have more speed than the atmospheric trajectory ICBM, but will have a slower speed than the parabolic trajectory ICBM, it will be much more difficult to track by space-based systems than the atmospheric trajectory ICBM and will maintain the same advantage as the parabolic trajectory ICBM over space sensors, but will have a shorter tracking interval per land- and sea-based systems than the parabolic trajectory ICBM but longer than the atmospheric trajectory ICBM.

 

[Andy1974]

If you wanted to deliver a spaceplane at max velocity to the upper atmosphere, from a vertical takeoff, in as short a time as possible you would use a depressed trajectory like this.

The spaceplane would hit upper atmosphere as the booster, now descending, runs out of fuel. It would then continue it’s journey inside the atmosphere before landing.

 

[tiancai8888]

The trajectory is indeed very low.

 

[birdlikefood]

I watched a video where this idea was discussed. This was seriously considered by PLA but was ruled out because:

• HSR are all electrified, the overhead wires are a huge pain in the ass for missile train. It would be possible to build a device to brush the wires aside to let the missile through but it invariable leads to more maintenance headache both for the missile force as well as the railway department
• missile train depends on the availability of long sections of railway with little traffic for constant discreet relocation for survivability. Russia has that in plentiful supply in the far east but railway are extremely busy in China with very complex schedule. To suddenly get other train out of the way to let a missile train through is a huge headache for railway traffic control. The amount of civilians involved in shuffling trains to let the missile train roam the network would be so great that it would be fairly vulnerable to discovery by foreign agents

I don’t think it’s necessary to support the wires like the Russians, but to use telegraph poles with the function of laying down sideways in the appropriate sections.

 

[clockwork]

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Another funny and rabid warmongering propaganda piece. I reject the premise entirely, because I think the war cannot last long as all US forces will be destroyed very rapidly in the opening stages, but one thing I found interesting is the revelation that they are preparing tactical nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on their submarines to use against China. Indeed, their subs are the one asset in my model that survives and would remain as an available platform to deploy TNWs from, as the USN surface ships are all sunk by ASBMs/DF-17s/ASCMs/PLAN subs and their bases likewise flattened by the PLARF.

This relates to another question, does anyone know if the PLARF has enough conventional S/M/IRBMs to completely destroy all Asian US bases? I believe they do, but it shouldn't be too hard to calculate this if one takes the total area covered by infrastructure on all those bases and divides it by the average blast radius of a conventional warhead for the number needed for total coverage (denser coverage may be needed on runways to make repair impossible), then compare the result to the current missile force stockpile. If it's sufficient, China has to think in advance what other targets to retaliate against for US first use of TNWs, given there will already be nothing left of those bases. ICBMs may have to be used because there aren't any other US targets within range of IRBMs. E.g. low-yield warheads against Pearl Harbor maybe? Even then likely more than just that one target would be needed, especially if the US carries out a major tactical nuclear assault on Chinese forces as I believe they likely will after such a conventional humiliation.

 

[Xizor]

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Another funny and rabid warmongering propaganda piece. I reject the premise entirely, because I think the war cannot last long as all US forces will be destroyed very rapidly in the opening stages, but one thing I found interesting is the revelation that they are preparing tactical nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on their submarines to use against China. Indeed, their subs are the one asset in my model that survives and would remain as an available platform to deploy TNWs from, as the USN surface ships are all sunk by ASBMs/DF-17s/ASCMs/PLAN subs and their bases likewise flattened by the PLARF.

This relates to another question, does anyone know if the PLARF has enough conventional S/M/IRBMs to completely destroy all Asian US bases? I believe they do, but it shouldn't be too hard to calculate this if one takes the total area covered by infrastructure on all those bases and divides it by the average blast radius of a conventional warhead for the number needed for total coverage (denser coverage may be needed on runways to make repair impossible), then compare the result to the current missile force stockpile. If it's sufficient, China has to think in advance what other targets to retaliate against for US first use of TNWs, given there will already be nothing left of those bases. ICBMs may have to be used because there aren't any other US targets within range of IRBMs. E.g. low-yield warheads against Pearl Harbor maybe? Even then likely more than just that one target would be needed, especially if the US carries out a major tactical nuclear assault on Chinese forces as I believe they likely will after such a conventional humiliation.

Nah. US won't dare to use them. All propaganda that US employed leading to the conflict and during the conflict will crash down if US fires it. China will win the war. All of this "putting TNW in subs" thingy is tickling. Btw, If US uses TNW, it must go all the way and use WMDs. No other way to win the war. Readers in the forum may settle down and think about it.

And I don't think all this will spare TW or spare US interests/allies from China's counter attack. Most importantly, with HGVs and FOBS, US itself would not be spared. China's web of connections is quite far reaching.

 

[clockwork]

Nah. US won't dare to use them. All propaganda that US employed leading to the conflict and during the conflict will crash down if US fires it. China will win the war. All of this "putting TNW in subs" thingy is tickling. Btw, If US uses TNW, it must go all the way and use WMDs. No other way to win the war. Readers in the forum may settle down and think about it.

And I don't think all this will spare TW or spare US interests/allies from China's counter attack. Most importantly, with HGVs and FOBS, US itself would not be spared. China's web of connections is quite far reaching.

Virtually the entire US populace is completely rabid towards China. They're already foaming at the mouth and chomping at the bit for a total war with the hated yellows, how do you think they'll act once China slaughters tens of thousands of their sailors and troops? Even if it's a relatively pacifist/weak leader in office at the time like Biden, retaliation will be *demanded* by their citizenry, and that will be the only option for retaliation they still have. Do you really think a country that has been so arrogant for so long would react calmly to such an unprecedented, devastating and humiliating loss?

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

China will develop its own tactical nuclear weapons and fire them using HGVs on military-industrial targets in the US homeland. There is no rung on the escalation ladder the US can climb to that China cannot match. But then, one doesn't expect a fool like Brands and a self-loathing hapa like Beckley to understand this.