China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[Overbom]

I can agree that tactical nukes are nice to have, but there needs to be a clear escalation ladder, I'd put tactical nukes pretty high up on that ladder, like right before MAD, definitely not before all conventional options has been exhausted.

A Beirut scale explosion is acceptable. Do we know what kind of radioactivity would be released by such a hypothetical tactical nuke warhead?

I think most of the public are more scared/afraid of radioactivity. If the remaining radioactivity is low enough, then I could see tactical nukes getting used a lot more often in wartime

 

[enroger]

A Beirut scale explosion is acceptable. Do we know what kind of radioactivity would be released by such a hypothetical tactical nuke warhead?

I think most of the public are more scared/afraid of radioactivity. If the remaining radioactivity is low enough, then I could see tactical nukes getting used a lot more often in wartime

It is not the yield that really matters; the "N" word is a threshold, once you cross that threshold... if 1kt is ok, how about 2kt? 10kt? Before you know it both sides starts to throw 100kt's at each other, it's a slippery road.

 

[plawolf]

No, what I wrote, was :
"In other words, I cannot see ICBM ranged HGVs being used against anyone but high capability foes at global ranges, and in such a case, I cannot see how such a weapon would not seek to overwhelmingly prioritize nuclear delivery as its primary mission."

In theory, yes, of course this weapon could have a conventional application. The possibility of such an application is above zero, yes.
But surely you must see that the most likely and most high priority, primary role of it would be as a nuclear delivery vehicle?


If China wanted the capability to conduct conventional global strikes against non-US targets, they do not need an ICBM ranged HGV.

Well I have to disagree.

If this intercontinental HGV was developed in isolation, then I would agree with your assessment that it would make most sense from a nuclear delivery standpoint.

However, in the broader context of China’s new ICBM silo fields; continued upgrading and expansion of its road mobile ICBM force; advanced stages of development of its H20 stealth bomber and ongoing modernisation of its nuclear submarine fleet, including SSBNs. Well using this new HGV as a nuclear delivery option would seem distinctly overkill.

Not only that, but by making it nuclear, China would also effectively deprive itself of its newest, and as yet, only effective conventional strike option against high value targets on CONUS itself.

I would say that it would make very little sense for China to use this HGV for nuclear delivery, when you consider it should have MAD fully covered by the massive expansion of its conventional nuclear delivery triad by the time this new HGV becomes operationally deployed.

OTOH, having the means to reach out and strike, conventionally, at basically any target it wants on the CONUS will be a complete game changer in terms of both political and operational dimensions for China and America. And will drastically increase the costs to the US of any direct military engagement against Chinese forces, which will reduce the chances of the US deciding to get into the fight directly to start with.

Hell, even from a strategic nuclear standpoint, it would make far more sense to use these new HGVs conventionally, since the US would be compelled to expend its limited BMD interceptors trying to shoot these down in the lead up to escalation to nuclear even if it knows full well the HGVs are only carrying conventional payloads.

This depletion of its BMD capabilities before escalation to nuclear will both serve as a further deterrent for the US to go nuclear; and failing that, will make the inevitable Chinese counterattack all the more successful.

 

[escobar]

I now remember this doc talking about a maritime TT&C for a high dynamic near space vehicle. It say: "the mission requires that the range of the space vehicle to cover half of the Earth with a flight altitude of 100 km:

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[BoraTas]

I can agree that tactical nukes are nice to have, but there needs to be a clear escalation ladder, I'd put tactical nukes pretty high up on that ladder, like right before MAD, definitely not before all conventional options has been exhausted.

I agree. A tactical nuclear strike on the US mainland is flirting with armageddon. But China must show/signal that it is willing to take that risk.
China has very limited means to attack the US mainland now. Because of the alliance network of the USA, it is possible for the US to bomb infrastructure in coastal Chinese cities. Doing so would damage the Chinese economy for years even after the war, which is something the USA would be very happy with. I would even say the USA may intervene in a Taiwan conflict just for that. China has no conventional capability to do the same to the USA. But China can say that any attack on its civilian infrastructure will be answered with nuclear attacks of comparable devastation.
That is a very credible and reasonable (from the eyes of statesmen not the public, the public would freak out but who cares about them) threat. To back this threat China must also grow its country-busting arsenal so that it can escalate if the US gets mad at China for avenging its civilian deaths.

I know this is not a good situation for humankind overall but nuclear blackmail is not something the USA practiced previously. The nuclear umbrella is a nuclear blackmail itself. It is basically saying "I can create vassal countries in your border and if you attack these countries and overwhelm the conventional defences there, I will nuke you even if you didn't harm my own country at all." Compared to this, what is being proposed in this thread is very reasonable.

 

[enroger]

I agree. A tactical nuclear strike on the US mainland is flirting with armageddon. But China must show/signal that it is willing to take that risk.
China has very limited means to attack the US mainland now. Because of the alliance network of the USA, it is possible for the US to bomb infrastructure in coastal Chinese cities. Doing so would damage the Chinese economy for years even after the war, which is something the USA would be very happy with. I would even say the USA may intervene in a Taiwan conflict just for that. China has no conventional capability to do the same to the USA. But China can say that any attack on its civilian infrastructure will be answered with nuclear attacks of comparable devastation.
That is a very credible and reasonable (from the eyes of statesmen not the public, the public would freak out but who cares about them) threat. To back this threat China must also grow its country-busting arsenal so that it can escalate if the US gets mad at China for avenging its civilian deaths.

I know this is not a good situation for humankind overall but nuclear blackmail is not something the USA practiced previously. The nuclear umbrella is a nuclear blackmail itself. It is basically saying "I can create vassal countries in your border and if you attack these countries and overwhelm the conventional defences there, I will nuke you even if you didn't harm my own country at all." Compared to this, what is being proposed in this thread is very reasonable.

I am definitely for having tactical nukes as an option, there's no harm in having more options. The thing is if China threaten the use of it over some cruise missile attack on Chinese cities, is the threat credible? US decision makers would wonder if China is crazy enough to do it, they may even call China's bluff, and if China follows through then we're all on a slippery ride to hell.

Conventional warheads on the other hand is much more credible, there is really no doubt China can use it nilly willy as long as China can produce enough of it. Also there is not a lot of targets that absolutely requires a 1kt warhead to demolish, conventional warhead can easily cause irreparable damage to US infrastructure and economy.

 

[escobar]

Also this old article from Henri K about CAST technological breakthrough for thermal protection against extreme temperature, for a hypersonic near space machine flying at Mach 20 which is dedicated to rapid planetary strike in 1 hour

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[ZeEa5KPul]

It is not the yield that really matters; the "N" word is a threshold, once you cross that threshold... if 1kt is ok, how about 2kt? 10kt? Before you know it both sides starts to throw 100kt's at each other, it's a slippery road.

I consider the "N" word threshold kind of thinking wholly fallacious and reject it entirely. How many kilotons is okay is determined entirely by the scale of destruction the US inflicted on China that China is responding to. If the US doesn't want its homeland touched, it doesn't touch China's. That's the whole point of this.

But I suppose there's utility to the instinctual fear people have of this. Fear means they're deterred from provoking that response.

The thing is if China threaten the use of it over some cruise missile attack on Chinese cities, is the threat credible?

Once again, consider the scale of devastation and not the physics of the weapons that caused it. It's credible when there's a credible strategic nuclear arsenal (the kinds of weapons people should really be afraid of) backstopping it. The escalation ladder is a unified whole, all the way from gray-zone radio taunts to civilization-ending nuclear strikes - every rung backstops the rung beneath it.

 

[enroger]

I consider the "N" word threshold kind of thinking wholly fallacious and reject it entirely. How many kilotons is okay is determined entirely by the scale of destruction the US inflicted on China that China is responding to. If the US doesn't want its homeland touched, it doesn't touch China's. That's the whole point of this.

But I suppose there's utility to the instinctual fear people have of this. Fear means they're deterred from provoking that response.

Once again, consider the scale of devastation and not the physics of the weapons that caused it. It's credible when there's a credible strategic nuclear arsenal (the kinds of weapons people should really be afraid of) backstopping it. The escalation ladder is a unified whole, all the way from gray-zone radio taunts to civilization-ending nuclear strikes - every rung backstops the rung beneath it.

If you're saying retaliation should match in terms of damage and not weapons then I agree. A strike on Three Gorges Dam even conventional would necessitate a nuclear response. I'm just saying you don't get trigger happy with nukes, there're a whole host of conventional response before we even reach tactical nukes.

If US cruise missile Shang Hai, China lob a one ton warhead back on wallstreet, this is a perfectly credible response that should hopefully deter them from doing so in the first place, if not then US and China may trade blows that may eventually leads to nukes, but you don't start with nukes, the other guy may not even believe you. The most credible threat is: if you hit my homeland, I'll hit yours exactly twice as hard, not 10 times, not 100 times, but exactly twice.

 

[BoraTas]

I consider the "N" word threshold kind of thinking wholly fallacious and reject it entirely. How many kilotons is okay is determined entirely by the scale of destruction the US inflicted on China that China is responding to. If the US doesn't want its homeland touched, it doesn't touch China's. That's the whole point of this.

But I suppose there's utility to the instinctual fear people have of this. Fear means they're deterred from provoking that response.

Once again, consider the scale of devastation and not the physics of the weapons that caused it. It's credible when there's a credible strategic nuclear arsenal (the kinds of weapons people should really be afraid of) backstopping it. The escalation ladder is a unified whole, all the way from gray-zone radio taunts to civilization-ending nuclear strikes - every rung backstops the rung beneath it.

French doctrine on this is quite interesting for example. To summarize if you:
-Start invading France
-Start attacking civilian targets

They first nuke your military forces doing that with around a dozen nukes. Then if you don't stop they nuke the critical infrastructure you are using to sustain your forces like railroad nodes with a dozen or so nukes. That's the last warning. If you still continue or don't retreat from the French land you invaded, they dump the rest of their arsenal on your cities. A nuclear strike on a population center triggers the highest response immediately even if it is just a few nukes. This policy applies to even non-nuclear nations.

I think a similar policy would be suitable for China. For example, the first attack on the Chinese infrastructure could be responded with a nuclear strike on the unit which conducted that attack. That would make the point clear. It would make it clear that China is not going to tolerate the killing of its civilians by foreign militaries even if that means nuclear war. Really though, why the h*ll you keep nuclear weapons if you are not going to use them for preventing or avenging the destruction of your country?