China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[escobar]

Even if China were losing a conventional war and it used nuclear weapons in response - for example if the Chinese mainland suffers devastation it may respond with nuclear strikes on its opponent's territory to equalize the devastation - that would be fully in keeping with NFU. NFU is about the scale of destruction to trigger a nuclear response, not the physics of the weapons.

What does any of this have to do with virtue signalling?

This discussion doesn't belong in this thread. If you'd like to continue it, you should do so in the appropriate thread.

You just prove my point: NFU is like broad ocean area targeting. Sounds good (to some), but really doesn't mean much operationally. Not having a No First Use declaration doesn’t mean you have a first use policy. And likewise, having an NFU doesn’t mean you don’t have a first use policy. So a declaration of NFU is partly a virtue signaling to being see as a "responsible state" in IR

 

[DarkStar]

I guess once the Chinese arsenal reached 1550 nukes sometimes in the 2030s, then there could be a chance for a US-CHINA-RUSSIA trilateral START III treaty to cut down to 1000 or less. I can also see reductions in all three countries regarding silo-based launch-on-warning ICBMs since these ones are the most dangerous due to their "use it or lose it" nature. However, China and Russia may not agree to any cuts in land-based mobile ICBMs because they are Beijing and Moscow's trump cards. Nor will Washington agree to cuts on the Columbia Class and Trident D5s because SLBMs are Washington's trump card. Also, bomber-based nukes are easy to cut down since bombers are slow and inefficient compared to ICBMs and SLBMs. By the time bombers (assuming they were not destroyed by initial ICBM exchanges or intercepted by SAMs and enemy fighters) are in positions to launch their ALCMs, civilizations have already been smoked.

But what would be the logic for China, after having invested all those resources to get to 1550 nukes to start cutting them the following week?
If anything, China can leverage its rate of growth of nuclear arms to get the US and even Russia to denuclearise down to match China's arsenal or else China could keep growing its nuclear stockpile until it supersedes even the soviet arsenal.

Given that Chinese nukes would be newer, with comparably longer shelf life and improved missile and warhead technology, and given that american and even russian nukes would be reaching the end of their "best by" date, this would be help China's bargaining position against the anglos when it comes to nuclear disarmament.

And on that note, if China is to reduce its nuclear arms then it should force India to also denuclearise along with the UK.

 

[LawLeadsToPeace]

But what would be the logic for China, after having invested all those resources to get to 1550 nukes to start cutting them the following week?
If anything, China can leverage its rate of growth of nuclear arms to get the US and even Russia to denuclearise down to match China's arsenal or else China could keep growing its nuclear stockpile until it supersedes even the soviet arsenal.

Given that Chinese nukes would be newer, with comparably longer shelf life and improved missile and warhead technology, and given that american and even russian nukes would be reaching the end of their "best by" date, this would be best.

In my opinion, there shouldn't be any arms control treaty (from a Chinese perspective) even if China has 1000+ or even 4000+ nuclear warheads. It only serves to benefit the US since the US has a leverage in non-nuclear might. So, until the Chinese and US have equivalent conventional strength, there shouldn't be any arms control talks.

 

[escobar]

If you are loosing in a conventional war, escalating to nuclear is only going to make you loose that much harder when your nuclear forces are only a fraction the size of you opponent’s.

So CCP will let PLA being beaten without using nuke; maybe maybe not. Which prove again NFU really doesn't mean much operationally

Chinese nuclear build up is to ensure America doesn’t get tempted to resort to nuclear blackmail or even actual tactical nuclear use when they are the ones loosing in a conventional war against China.

China’s priorities are pretty simple and logical.

True

Now that China has its basics covered, it is moving on to filling in this last gap, which was judged as an acceptable gamble since even though Chinese nuclear forces were clearly inferior, they were still powerful enough to achieve credible minimal deterrence.

I do not think CN really achieve credible minimal deterrence in the past with no EW system, nuke not mated to missile, etc...

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

I do not think CN really achieve credible minimal deterrence in the past with no EW system, nuke not mated to missile, etc...

That posture is unsuitable now, but it was acceptable in the past. Minimal deterrence is suitable for North Korea, and indeed North Koreans understand this when they refer to their country as a porcupine. The reason people don't stomp porcupines isn't just that they have spines, it's also that it's not worth it to get spines through your foot. Ultimately, killing the porcupine doesn't get you anything.

But now that China is much bigger than a porcupine and America is much more incentivized to attack it, a new defense posture matching its new stature is necessary.

 

[bustead]

Kind of late to the party but I believe that China has a few possible options/goals when it comes to nuclear deterrence.

1. Minimum deterrence. The current arsenal. To be fair, even a small arsenal like the one used by North Korea is enough to deter a direct invasion from the US. However, given the fact that the US and China are fighting over interests in the Indo-Pacific region, such a small stockpile will mean that the US will be a lot more aggressive, knowing that they have a major advantage when it comes to nuclear warfare. They may even choose to escalate a conventional conflict to a nuclear with the use of tactical nuclear weapons knowing that China would lose in a large-scale exchange.

Not recommended but technically even 1 bomb constitutes minimum deterrence.

2. Credible deterrence (countervalue). The idea is that China can build a force capable of killing a large number of Americans by nuking cities. As I have mentioned earlier in this thread, 20 4.4Mt warheads can be used to cause 160 million casualties in the US, as well as contaminating American cities and food production areas. Thus, China will need to focus on building a force survivable enough to deliver such a strike. Again, as I have said previously in this thread, China needs around 500 silos to ensure that >20 warheads will be delivered to the US in the case of a US first strike. SSBNs and TELs are great but they have a smaller payload than silo-based ICBMs, meaning that you will need more mobile ICBMs to ensure that you are delivering the same destructive power to the US.

Around 500 silo-based ICBMs, plus existing mobile ICBM launchers and SSBNs.

3. Credible deterrence (flexible response). Similar to above. Assuming killing 1/3 of American population is enough to deter the Americans from launching a full-scale nuclear war, 500 silos are needed. However, the Americans nuclear doctrine is based on the idea of flexible response, where the US would use nuclear weapons to intentionally escalate a conventional war if they are losing. The idea is that the US can use nuclear weapons to deter further aggression and force the other side to negotiate without igniting full scale nuclear exchange. To deter the US from using tactical nuclear weapons, the best way is to have a stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons of your own. It does not have to be large but it does have to be survivable. This should allow China to retaliate in kind with tactical nuclear weapons. The targets will most likely be American fleets and bases to ensure that China is not escalating the war too much. After all, nuking American cities will likely generate a lot of hate and irrational reactions. After the initial exchange, both sides can start negotiating before all things go to hell.

Around 500 silo-based ICBMs, plus existing mobile ICBMs, SSBNs and <100 tactical nuclear weapons.

4. Credible deterrence (post war deterrence). This is more of a "what-if" scenario. China may have to launch most of its nuclear weapons against the US and its nuclear forces may not be in good shape after the war. To ensure other states do not take advantage of this situation, China should keep a small stockpile of nuclear weapons in case of a turbulent post-war environment. Thus, around 20-30 mobile ICBMs should be prepared beforehand. These missiles should not be fired unless the situation is very dire. Also, tactical nuclear weapons should be kept in case of the destruction of the conventional forces of China.

Same as above but with >20 more mobile launchers kept in underground tunnels. Also 150-200 tactical nuclear weapons.

5. MAD. Simple. The number of nuclear weapons needed to glass the US. There are around 360 cities in the US with a population of above 100000. Larger cities would require more warheads to totally destroy. Thus, cities with a population of >1000000 should be attacked with 3 nuclear warheads. The top 3 cities (NY, LA, Chicago) should be attacked with 6 warheads to ensure complete destruction. In total, it will take 3*6 + 53*3 + 305*1 = 482 warheads to destroy all American cities. Additionally, around 50 ground bursting warheads should be used to contaminate food production areas. Finally, 300-400 warheads should be spared for the destruction of American military bases and fleets. Smaller installations may survive though.

Again, assuming 5% of incoming American ICBMs will fail, it will take at least 16000 (!!) silos to ensure that China can completely glass the US after an American first strike. Fortunately, China can use a large number of mobile launchers to supplement a silo force. Assuming 20% of all mobile launchers (TEL/train/SSBNs) will survive a first strike, China will need 4000 weapons in total. Somewhat larger than the current Russian arsenal but way smaller than the Soviet one during the height of the cold war.

4000 warheads deployed on mobile launchers, plus tactical nuclear weapons and a large number of decoy silos to attract enemy fire.

 

[Jono]

in my amateurish strategic thinking, the reasons for China building its nuclear arsenal probably include:
1) Needs. China has too few warheads to be respected by America, and Russia to a lesser extent. What if America subjects China to a nuclear blackmail over the Taiwan issue ? What if America loses several flat tops at a Taiwan crisis, and Americans crying for revenge with nukes ? I would tend to think that China is making preparations for an imminent (within the next 5-10 years ?) reunification campaign and taking American, Japanese, Australian and even European interventions seriously into account. With a thousand warheads or more in China's possession, the Quad will be encouraged to think twice and thrice before making any moves.
2) Status as a great superpower.
3) Arms race to force America into bankruptcy, as if America is not already bankrupt. As members have already pointed out, the nukes in American hands are decades old. Upgrading the existing nukes or making new ones are prohibitively expensive, something Uncle Sam could ill afford in its present financial state. So either Uncle Sam sits down to talk with China and make concessions to China like cutting down its own number of nukes and less antagonism to Chinese interests, or faces an expensive arms race. The same arms race trick Reagan pulled one over on the former Soviet Union.
Of course, I may be biased and being one-sided in my views. But there is no denying that China is now openly assertive, as against its more traditional culture of staying low profile and reticent. But building hundreds of new silos is a loud proclamation per se.

 

[escobar]

In my opinion, there shouldn't be any arms control treaty (from a Chinese perspective) even if China has 1000+ or even 4000+ nuclear warheads. It only serves to benefit the US since the US has a leverage in non-nuclear might. So, until the Chinese and US have equivalent conventional strength, there shouldn't be any arms control talks.

Even if Chinese and US have equivalent strength, CN should not do any arms control treaty with US. It is a trap.

 

[Overbom]

Delete

 

[sndef888]

1000 is way more than enough.

Even if somehow US destroys a third of the arsenal there's still ~333. Enough to nuke the 50 largest cities in america 5-6 times each.
No sane US president will sacrifice of his 50 largest cities even if they thought China was literally Satan respawned

Anything more is a waste of money and effort. China should be careful not to fall for the US trap of military escalation especially at this stage when China's economy is still getting its footing.