Some it will for sure. DF-11 and DF-15 are next I think.
China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread
- Thread starter peace_lover
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Wow, surprising that HGVs are so cheap. I initially thought they wouldn't replaceost ballistic missile brigades due to cost but I guess I'm wrong
escobar
Brigadier
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
Disinformation talk, hubris, feel good fanning, If they didn't know how the Chinese targeting system work. How can they counter act the missile Big humbug
escobar
Brigadier
Maybe, maybe not...
Based on the alternatives discussed in the article, they have some mitigating strategies but no magic bullet.
In any case, a war with the US would be insane for other reasons.
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
From congressional report on "China naval modernization 2021" US game plan to counter ASBM Sound like wish list, vapor ware and easier said than done
From the latest congressional report on Chia naval modernization
Appendix B.
U.S. Navy’s Ability to Counter Chinese ASBMs This appendix provides additional discussion of the issue of the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter China’s ASBMs. Although China’s projected ASBM, as a new type of weapon, might be considered a “game changer,” that does not mean it cannot be countered.
There are several potential approaches for countering an ASBM that can be imagined, and these approaches could be used in combination. The ASBM is not the first “game changer” that the Navy has confronted; the Navy in the past has developed counters for other new types of weapons, such as ASCMs, and is likely exploring various approaches for countering ASBMs. Countering China’s projected ASBMs could involve employing a combination of active (i.e., “hard-kill”) measures, such as shooting down ASBMs with interceptor missiles, and passive (i.e., “soft-kill”) measures, such as those for masking the exact location of Navy ships or confusing ASBM reentry vehicles. Employing a combination of active and passive measures would attack various points in the ASBM “kill chain”—the sequence of events that needs to be completed to carry out a successful ASBM attack.
This sequence includes detection, identification, and localization of the target ship, transmission of that data to the ASBM launcher, firing the ASBM, and having the ASBM reentry vehicle find the target ship. Attacking various points in an opponent’s kill chain is an established method for countering an opponent’s military capability.
A September 30, 2011, press report, for example, quotes Lieutenant General Herbert Carlisle, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for operations, plans, and requirements, as stating in regard to Air Force planning that “We’ve taken [China’s] kill chains apart to the ‘nth’ degree.” 98
To attack the ASBM kill chain, Navy surface ships, for example, could operate in ways (such as controlling electromagnetic emissions or using deception emitters) that make it more difficult for China to detect, identify, and track those ships.99 The Navy could acquire weapons and systems for disabling or jamming China’s long-range maritime surveillance and targeting systems, for attacking ASBM launchers, for destroying ASBMs in various stages of flight, and for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets.
Options for destroying ASBMs in flight include the SM-3 midcourse BMD interceptor missile (including the new Block IIA 98 John Solomon, “Deception and the Backfire Bomber, Part III,” Information Dissemination (), October 29, 2014; John Solomon, “Deception and the Backfire Bomber, Part IV,” Information Dissemination (), October 30, 2014. China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Congressional Research Service 57 version), the SM-6 terminal-defense BMD interceptor missile, 100 and accelerating development and deployment of the hypervelocity projectile (HVP), electromagnetic rail gun (EMRG), and solid state lasers (SSLs).101 Options for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets include equipping ships with systems, such as electronic warfare systems or systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds or radar-opaque carbon-fiber clouds, that could confuse an ASBM’s terminal-guidance radar.102
From the latest congressional report on Chia naval modernization
Appendix B.
U.S. Navy’s Ability to Counter Chinese ASBMs This appendix provides additional discussion of the issue of the U.S. Navy’s ability to counter China’s ASBMs. Although China’s projected ASBM, as a new type of weapon, might be considered a “game changer,” that does not mean it cannot be countered.
There are several potential approaches for countering an ASBM that can be imagined, and these approaches could be used in combination. The ASBM is not the first “game changer” that the Navy has confronted; the Navy in the past has developed counters for other new types of weapons, such as ASCMs, and is likely exploring various approaches for countering ASBMs. Countering China’s projected ASBMs could involve employing a combination of active (i.e., “hard-kill”) measures, such as shooting down ASBMs with interceptor missiles, and passive (i.e., “soft-kill”) measures, such as those for masking the exact location of Navy ships or confusing ASBM reentry vehicles. Employing a combination of active and passive measures would attack various points in the ASBM “kill chain”—the sequence of events that needs to be completed to carry out a successful ASBM attack.
This sequence includes detection, identification, and localization of the target ship, transmission of that data to the ASBM launcher, firing the ASBM, and having the ASBM reentry vehicle find the target ship. Attacking various points in an opponent’s kill chain is an established method for countering an opponent’s military capability.
A September 30, 2011, press report, for example, quotes Lieutenant General Herbert Carlisle, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for operations, plans, and requirements, as stating in regard to Air Force planning that “We’ve taken [China’s] kill chains apart to the ‘nth’ degree.” 98
To attack the ASBM kill chain, Navy surface ships, for example, could operate in ways (such as controlling electromagnetic emissions or using deception emitters) that make it more difficult for China to detect, identify, and track those ships.99 The Navy could acquire weapons and systems for disabling or jamming China’s long-range maritime surveillance and targeting systems, for attacking ASBM launchers, for destroying ASBMs in various stages of flight, and for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets.
Options for destroying ASBMs in flight include the SM-3 midcourse BMD interceptor missile (including the new Block IIA 98 John Solomon, “Deception and the Backfire Bomber, Part III,” Information Dissemination (), October 29, 2014; John Solomon, “Deception and the Backfire Bomber, Part IV,” Information Dissemination (), October 30, 2014. China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Congressional Research Service 57 version), the SM-6 terminal-defense BMD interceptor missile, 100 and accelerating development and deployment of the hypervelocity projectile (HVP), electromagnetic rail gun (EMRG), and solid state lasers (SSLs).101 Options for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets include equipping ships with systems, such as electronic warfare systems or systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds or radar-opaque carbon-fiber clouds, that could confuse an ASBM’s terminal-guidance radar.102
Equation
Lieutenant General
If not...than why worry about it and than talk about it in the first place? Let the PLA do their own thang to see if it's true in the end.
Strange to hear this kind of things from a person whom most likely participated in the F-35 specification / planning process : )
I am sure he is as capable to take apart the kill chain like to specify the requirements for a new fighter jet, and most likely he has the same capability to evaluate the success of both project.
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