?
Basic working principle of the nuclear weapon making:
Three way to go, U235, PU239 or U233.
First require ONLY enrichment , but the U235 is the WORST possible weapon material.
It needs 52kg of critical mass vs 10kg of Pu239, means the weapon will be heavy,and expensive to deliver ( and the delivery system generated 90% of the weapon cost historically ).
Second needs enrichment AND reactors AND reprocessing.
You making highly enriched seeder roads, preferably with very high u235 content(80%) , and surround them with depleted uranium blanket.
You have to remove in every few weeks the blanket, and reprocess it , otherwise there will be too much non fissionable Pu240 in the bomb material.
The third one is with thorium instead of the depleted uranium, it is a bit more expensive than thee Pu way, and the blanket can be contaminated with high gamma emitters.
So, China first Pu reactor is here :
40°14'06.17" N 97°22'20.37" E
The second one, is here :
32°29'41.73" N 105°35'28.89" E
West to it you can see the reprocessing plant.
if you check it with the google earth then on the 2004 pic four cooling water reservoir visible, on the new only two.
There is visible activity on the reactor and reprocessing site, but there is no visible cooling water flow on any images, or any cooling water vapour ( and there is nothing that can be cooling tower anyway).
If you follow the images backwards then it is impossible to found any working water intake from the river.
I don't think that they using direct air cooling for the reactor, the first one in the desert used cooling water .
You are keep repeating a defunct plant to show that China only has 2 preprocessing plant? When she has more than 40 plant but only 1 pre processing plant?
A cursory search on google will shot your argument. Here it is
China's Nuclear Fuel Cycle
(Updated May 2018)
- China has become self-sufficient in most aspects of the fuel cycle.
- China aims to produce one-third of its uranium domestically, obtain one-third through foreign equity in mines and joint ventures overseas, and to purchase one-third on the open market.
- China's two major enrichment plants were built under agreements with Russia but much current capacity is indigenous.
- China’s R&D investment in nuclear technologies is very significant, particularly in high-temperature gas-cooled and molten salt-cooled reactors.
China has stated it intends to become self-sufficient not just in nuclear power plant capacity, but also in the production of fuel for those plants. However, the country still relies to some extent on foreign suppliers for all stages of the fuel cycle, from uranium mining through fabrication and reprocessing, but mostly for uranium supply. As China rapidly increases the number of new reactors, it has also initiated a number of domestic projects, often in cooperation with foreign suppliers, to meet its nuclear fuel needs.
The national policy is to obtain about one-third of uranium supply domestically, one-third from Chinese equity in foreign mines, and one-third on the open market. Increasingly, other stages of the fuel cycle will be indigenous. Uranium demand in 2020 is expected to be over 11,000 tU (with 58 reactors operating), in 2025 about 18,500 tU (for 100 reactors) and in 2030 about 24,000 tU (for 130 reactors). UxC reports that China imported over 115,000 tU over 2009-14, notably 25,000 tU in 2014 and 10,400 tU to July in 2015. With annual consumption currently about 8000 tU, much of this will be stockpiled.
China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) maintains a strong monopoly on the nuclear fuel cycle in China, notably the front end, forcing China General Nuclear Power (CGN) to work around this, principally with international ventures, some involving large capital outlays. With the merger of SNPTC and CPI to form SPI in 2015, so that SNPTC took over all the nuclear-related business of CPI to function as an active subsidiary of SPI, SNPTC said it intended to get into both uranium mining and fuel fabrication.
CNNC is also the main operator in the fuel cycle back end, evidenced by a series of agreements with Areva for a reprocessing plant. That in November 2015 was part of a wider agreement in relation to all aspects of the fuel cycle, and foreshadowing an intention to take equity in Areva NC (now Areva NewCo), in connection with evolving agreements to build a reprocessing plant based on Areva technology.
Following Areva’s restructuring, a new framework agreement between Areva New Co and CNNC was signed in February 2017, covering “the whole industrial chain of the nuclear fuel cycle”. In particular it supports plans for construction of a reprocessing plant in China. The commitmment was reaffirmed in January 2018 through the signing of an MoU.
As well as a long-standing close relationship with France, China has a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement (‘123 agreement’) with the USA from 1985 which was renewed in 2015. This is a prerequisite for nuclear trade in plant and materials that involves the USA.
Domestic uranium resources and mining
CNNC is the only current supplier of domestic uranium. CGN has responded energetically to this situation through its subsidiary China Guangdong Nuclear Uranium Resources Co Ltd (CGN-URC) as described below.
China now claims to be “a uranium-rich country” on the basis of some two million tonnes of uranium, though published known in situ uranium resources were 366,000 tU to $130/kg at 1/1/15, of which 173,000 tU were reasonably assured, and in situ inferred resources were 193,000 tU in the 2016 edition of the 'Red Book', which are modest in relation to the country's needs. New discoveries in the north and northwest in sandstones, and deep hydrothermal ones in southeast China have raised expectations. There is also potential in lignite, black shale and phosphates. Over 2013-14 about 71,000 tU was added to known resources in northern China – in the Yili, Erlian, Erdos, Songliao and Bayingebi basins as well as Longshoushan – and 29,000 tU in southern China in the Rouoergai and Dazhou uranium fields. The 2016 Red Book tabulates 366,000 tU in 21 deposits in 13 provinces, 39% of the total in Inner Mongolia, 21% in Jiangxi, 14% in Xinjiang and 12% in Guangdong.
As of 2012, 35% of resources were in sandstone deposits mainly in the north and northwest, 28% in vein/granite deposits in central and southeast China, 21% in volcanic deposits in the southeast, and 10% in black shale in the southeast. Most known resources are at less than 500m depth.
Domestic production was 1616 tU/yr in 2015, enough for about 7000 MWe, apart from new cores. This was approximately 530 t from sandstone by ISL, 620 t from granite-related ore and 450 t from volcanic-related ore. All production is acid-leached. By international standards, China's ores are low-grade and production has been inefficient. The nuclear power companies are not depending on the national goal of sourcing one-third of uranium domestically, and are ramping up international arrangements to obtain fuel.