China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread
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Right, just like Minuteman IIIs were upgraded to eke out another decade or two of life before they have to be replaced.
I'm not sure there is an actual bottleneck at this point. China had already conducted many tests in the early 90's to verify lower yield designs and has the supercomputing capability today to design newer small warheads if needed. Nor is it supply; China is a top 10 producer of uranium. I think that the most recent limitation until the advent of the DF-41 was the missile itself. China could have built more DF-5 ICBMs, but in addition to China not having much money back then, putting them on hundreds of DF-5s would have just meant exposing their nuclear stockpile (turned into warheads) to easy destruction since as mentioned previously these large, slow-reacting liquid-fueled missiles are not the ideal form of warhead storage and delivery. Now that the DF-41's design has been tested and verified, I think it will take the mantle of primary strategic nuclear deterrent from the DF-5. And if a "Type 096" SSBN is judged to be quiet enough to successfully hide from USN SSNs and is built in sufficient numbers, the JL-2/3 could assume the lead deterrent role from the DF-41 in the years to come. On a side note IIRC the US military considers its Trident D5s to be more survivable than its Minuteman IIIs and ALCMs and thus a more primary nuclear deterrent than either its land or air-based components. The D5 is actually far more logistically available than the number of Ohio subs would by themselves suggest since the USN double mans them with Gold and Blue crews so that they spend far more time on patrol than SSBNs of any other country.
Yep that is my interpretation of what weig2000 meant.
Though if he wants to clarify his meaning I'd be happy to hear of course.
Calling the missiles "ballistic" while identifying them as DH-10? I am being pedantic and perhaps nitpicking here.
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
Chinese rocket force work hard doing precision strike training. Let all those warmonger beware the panda come with sharp claw
You’ve probably heard that China’s military has developed a “” ballistic missile to threaten one of America’s premier power-projection tools, its unmatched fleet of aircraft carriers. Or perhaps you’ve read about China’s to the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. But heavily defended moving targets like aircraft carriers would be a challenge to hit in open ocean, and were China’s own aircraft carrier (or even two or three like it) to venture into open water in anger, the U.S. submarine force would make short work of it. In reality, the greatest military threat to U.S. vital interests in Asia may be one that has received somewhat less attention: the growing capability of China’s missile forces to strike U.S. bases. This is a time of increasing tension, with China’s news organizations . U.S. leaders and policymakers should understand that a preemptive Chinese missile strike against the forward bases that underpin U.S. military power in the Western Pacific is a very real possibility, particularly if China believes its claimed core strategic interests are threatened in the course of a crisis and perceives that its . Such a preemptive strike appears consistent with available information about China’s missile force doctrine, and the satellite imagery shown below points to what may be real-world efforts to practice its execution.
The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force: Precision Strike with Chinese Characteristics
The PLA Rocket Force originally focused on nuclear deterrence. , the force has increasingly focused on the employment of precision-guided conventional ballistic and land attack cruise missiles. The command now and was to a status co-equal to that of China’s other military services.
In terms of specific missions, Michael S. Chase of the U.S. Naval War College that PLA Rocket Force doctrine calls for a range of deterrence, compellence, and coercive operations. In the event that deterrence fails, the missions of a conventional missile strike campaign could include “launching firepower strikes against important targets in the enemy’s campaign and strategic deep areas.” Potential targets of such strikes could include command centers, communications hubs, radar stations, guided missile positions, air force and naval facilities, transport and logistical facilities, fuel depots, electrical power centers, and aircraft carrier strike groups.
Chase also stated that, “In all, Chinese military writings on conventional missile campaigns stress the importance of surprise and suggest a preference for preemptive strikes.” And while most Sinologists in a crisis without first giving an adversary a chance to back down, preemptive missile strikes to initiate active hostilities could be consistent with China’s claimed overall military strategy of “active defense.” As a of China’s anti-access strategies explained, “This paradox is explained by defining the enemy’s first strike as ‘any military activities conducted by the enemy aimed at breaking up China territorially and violating its sovereignty’…and thereby rendered the equivalent of a ‘strategic first shot.’” China analyst , “From Mao to now, the concept of the active defense has emphasized assuming the strategic defensive, while securing the operational and tactical initiative, including preemptive actions at those levels if necessary.” Thus, China could consider a preemptive missile strike as a defensive “counter-attack” to a threat against China’s sovereignty (e.g., over Taiwan or the South China Sea) solely in the political or strategic realm.
It such a strike still seems unlikely, consider that U.S. military and civilian leaders may have a blind spot regarding the capabilities of the PLA Rocket Force. The bulk of the PLA Rocket Force — the conventionally armed precision-strike units — have no real counterpart in the U.S. military. American long-range ballistic missiles are all nuclear-tipped and therefore focused on nuclear deterrence, and the Army’s short-range tactical ballistic missiles are designed for battlefield use. Also, per the with Russia, the United States fields no medium- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles of any kind, nor any ground-launched land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). When Americans think of preemptive strike, they likely think of weapons launched by air or sea-based platforms, discounting the viability of a different paradigm: ground-based precision-strike missiles used for the same mission.
Coming of Age
A said that by 2017 (i.e., now) China could field about 1,200 conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles (600-800 km range), 108 to 274 medium-range ballistic missiles (1000 to 1500+ km), an unknown number of conventional intermediate-range ballistic missiles (5,000 km), and 450-1,250 land attack cruise missiles (1500+ km). RAND also estimated that improvements in the accuracy of China’s ballistic missiles may allow them to strike fixed targets in a matter of minutes with an accuracy of a few meters. RAND assesses that key U.S. facilities throughout Japan could already be within range of thousands of difficult-to-defeat advanced ballistic and cruise missiles. Even U.S. bases on the island of Guam of a smaller number of missiles (See Figure 1).
Fig. 1: PLA Rocket Force Missile ranges vs. U.S. bases in Asia.
In recent years, the PLA Rocket Force appears to have been making real the specific capabilities necessary to support execution of the preemptive strike discussed above. As examples, a of open-source literature suggested that would likely be used against missile launchers, parked aircraft, fuel tanks, vehicles, air defense weapons, and ships in port. would be used against airfield runways, aircraft shelters, and semi-underground fuel tanks. In terms of sequencing, the study suggested that an initial wave of ballistic missiles would neutralize air defenses and command centers and crater the runways of military air bases, trapping aircraft on the ground. These initial paralyzing ballistic missile salvos could then be followed by waves of cruise missiles and Chinese aircraft targeting hardened aircraft shelters, aircraft parked in the open, and fuel handling and maintenance facilities.
You’ve probably heard that China’s military has developed a “” ballistic missile to threaten one of America’s premier power-projection tools, its unmatched fleet of aircraft carriers. Or perhaps you’ve read about China’s to the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. But heavily defended moving targets like aircraft carriers would be a challenge to hit in open ocean, and were China’s own aircraft carrier (or even two or three like it) to venture into open water in anger, the U.S. submarine force would make short work of it. In reality, the greatest military threat to U.S. vital interests in Asia may be one that has received somewhat less attention: the growing capability of China’s missile forces to strike U.S. bases. This is a time of increasing tension, with China’s news organizations . U.S. leaders and policymakers should understand that a preemptive Chinese missile strike against the forward bases that underpin U.S. military power in the Western Pacific is a very real possibility, particularly if China believes its claimed core strategic interests are threatened in the course of a crisis and perceives that its . Such a preemptive strike appears consistent with available information about China’s missile force doctrine, and the satellite imagery shown below points to what may be real-world efforts to practice its execution.
The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force: Precision Strike with Chinese Characteristics
The PLA Rocket Force originally focused on nuclear deterrence. , the force has increasingly focused on the employment of precision-guided conventional ballistic and land attack cruise missiles. The command now and was to a status co-equal to that of China’s other military services.
In terms of specific missions, Michael S. Chase of the U.S. Naval War College that PLA Rocket Force doctrine calls for a range of deterrence, compellence, and coercive operations. In the event that deterrence fails, the missions of a conventional missile strike campaign could include “launching firepower strikes against important targets in the enemy’s campaign and strategic deep areas.” Potential targets of such strikes could include command centers, communications hubs, radar stations, guided missile positions, air force and naval facilities, transport and logistical facilities, fuel depots, electrical power centers, and aircraft carrier strike groups.
Chase also stated that, “In all, Chinese military writings on conventional missile campaigns stress the importance of surprise and suggest a preference for preemptive strikes.” And while most Sinologists in a crisis without first giving an adversary a chance to back down, preemptive missile strikes to initiate active hostilities could be consistent with China’s claimed overall military strategy of “active defense.” As a of China’s anti-access strategies explained, “This paradox is explained by defining the enemy’s first strike as ‘any military activities conducted by the enemy aimed at breaking up China territorially and violating its sovereignty’…and thereby rendered the equivalent of a ‘strategic first shot.’” China analyst , “From Mao to now, the concept of the active defense has emphasized assuming the strategic defensive, while securing the operational and tactical initiative, including preemptive actions at those levels if necessary.” Thus, China could consider a preemptive missile strike as a defensive “counter-attack” to a threat against China’s sovereignty (e.g., over Taiwan or the South China Sea) solely in the political or strategic realm.
It such a strike still seems unlikely, consider that U.S. military and civilian leaders may have a blind spot regarding the capabilities of the PLA Rocket Force. The bulk of the PLA Rocket Force — the conventionally armed precision-strike units — have no real counterpart in the U.S. military. American long-range ballistic missiles are all nuclear-tipped and therefore focused on nuclear deterrence, and the Army’s short-range tactical ballistic missiles are designed for battlefield use. Also, per the with Russia, the United States fields no medium- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles of any kind, nor any ground-launched land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). When Americans think of preemptive strike, they likely think of weapons launched by air or sea-based platforms, discounting the viability of a different paradigm: ground-based precision-strike missiles used for the same mission.
Coming of Age
A said that by 2017 (i.e., now) China could field about 1,200 conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles (600-800 km range), 108 to 274 medium-range ballistic missiles (1000 to 1500+ km), an unknown number of conventional intermediate-range ballistic missiles (5,000 km), and 450-1,250 land attack cruise missiles (1500+ km). RAND also estimated that improvements in the accuracy of China’s ballistic missiles may allow them to strike fixed targets in a matter of minutes with an accuracy of a few meters. RAND assesses that key U.S. facilities throughout Japan could already be within range of thousands of difficult-to-defeat advanced ballistic and cruise missiles. Even U.S. bases on the island of Guam of a smaller number of missiles (See Figure 1).
Fig. 1: PLA Rocket Force Missile ranges vs. U.S. bases in Asia.
In recent years, the PLA Rocket Force appears to have been making real the specific capabilities necessary to support execution of the preemptive strike discussed above. As examples, a of open-source literature suggested that would likely be used against missile launchers, parked aircraft, fuel tanks, vehicles, air defense weapons, and ships in port. would be used against airfield runways, aircraft shelters, and semi-underground fuel tanks. In terms of sequencing, the study suggested that an initial wave of ballistic missiles would neutralize air defenses and command centers and crater the runways of military air bases, trapping aircraft on the ground. These initial paralyzing ballistic missile salvos could then be followed by waves of cruise missiles and Chinese aircraft targeting hardened aircraft shelters, aircraft parked in the open, and fuel handling and maintenance facilities.
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Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
(cont)
These capabilities may already have been tested at a (see Figure 2) located on the . Commercial satellite images seem to show a range of test targets representing just the sort of objectives discussed in the doctrine above, including groups of vehicles (perhaps representing mobile air and missile defense batteries — see Figure 3), aircraft targets parked in the open (Figure 4), fuel depots (Figure 5), runway cratering submunition tests (Figure 6), electrical power facilities (Figure 7), and the delivery of penetrating munitions to hardened shelters and bunkers (Figure 8). Of note, the 2007 RAND study mentioned above stated that submunitions are generally not capable of penetrating the hardened shelters use to house fighter aircraft at many air bases, that China’s ballistic missiles lack the accuracy to ensure a high percentage of direct hits using unitary warheads, and thus, “fighter aircraft in hardened shelters would be relatively safe from Chinese ballistic missile attack.” This clearly appears to no longer be the case, and the demonstrated ability to precisely deliver penetrating warheads to facilities such as command centers in a matter of minutes could also provide a key capability to destroy them, with their command staffs, in the initial waves of an attack.
Fig. 2: Possible PLA Rocket Force ballistic missile impact range in Western China.
Fig. 3: Left side – Possible vehicle targets with sub-munition impact pattern, imagery dated Dec. 2013. Right side – U.S. Patriot air and missile defense battery, Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan. Scale of sub-munition pattern overlaid for comparison.
Fig. 4: Possible parked aircraft target, imagery dated August 2013. Upper left aircraft shaped target, imagery dated May 2012. Lower right – F-22 Fighter Parking Area, Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan
These capabilities may already have been tested at a (see Figure 2) located on the . Commercial satellite images seem to show a range of test targets representing just the sort of objectives discussed in the doctrine above, including groups of vehicles (perhaps representing mobile air and missile defense batteries — see Figure 3), aircraft targets parked in the open (Figure 4), fuel depots (Figure 5), runway cratering submunition tests (Figure 6), electrical power facilities (Figure 7), and the delivery of penetrating munitions to hardened shelters and bunkers (Figure 8). Of note, the 2007 RAND study mentioned above stated that submunitions are generally not capable of penetrating the hardened shelters use to house fighter aircraft at many air bases, that China’s ballistic missiles lack the accuracy to ensure a high percentage of direct hits using unitary warheads, and thus, “fighter aircraft in hardened shelters would be relatively safe from Chinese ballistic missile attack.” This clearly appears to no longer be the case, and the demonstrated ability to precisely deliver penetrating warheads to facilities such as command centers in a matter of minutes could also provide a key capability to destroy them, with their command staffs, in the initial waves of an attack.
Fig. 2: Possible PLA Rocket Force ballistic missile impact range in Western China.
Fig. 3: Left side – Possible vehicle targets with sub-munition impact pattern, imagery dated Dec. 2013. Right side – U.S. Patriot air and missile defense battery, Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan. Scale of sub-munition pattern overlaid for comparison.
Fig. 4: Possible parked aircraft target, imagery dated August 2013. Upper left aircraft shaped target, imagery dated May 2012. Lower right – F-22 Fighter Parking Area, Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
(cont2)
May 2012. Lower right – F-22 Fighter Parking Area, Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan.
Fig. 5: Possible test targets simulating above-ground fuel tanks, imagery dated September 2012. Compared to actual fuel tanks in Japan, similar scale.
Fig. 6: Possible runway cratering munition testing, imagery dated Sept. 2012.
Fig. 7: Possible mock electronic substation target, imagery dated July 2013. Note no electrical lines running to or from the target in its very remote location. While no craters are visible, disablement may be planned using other methods, such as dispersal of conductive graphite filaments.
Fig. 8: Possible hardened aircraft shelter or bunker test targets, imagery dated Oct. 2016. Penetrator sub-munition impacts visible. Lower right: Misawa Air Base, Japan, similar scale.
May 2012. Lower right – F-22 Fighter Parking Area, Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan.
Fig. 5: Possible test targets simulating above-ground fuel tanks, imagery dated September 2012. Compared to actual fuel tanks in Japan, similar scale.
Fig. 6: Possible runway cratering munition testing, imagery dated Sept. 2012.
Fig. 7: Possible mock electronic substation target, imagery dated July 2013. Note no electrical lines running to or from the target in its very remote location. While no craters are visible, disablement may be planned using other methods, such as dispersal of conductive graphite filaments.
Fig. 8: Possible hardened aircraft shelter or bunker test targets, imagery dated Oct. 2016. Penetrator sub-munition impacts visible. Lower right: Misawa Air Base, Japan, similar scale.
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
(cont3)
China has not been shy about displaying the advancing capabilities of the PLA Rocket Force. Beijing openly displayed some of its latest missiles (such as DF-26 “Guam-killer” missile) in its 70th anniversary parade in 2015 and in western characters, . The PLA Rocket Force also put out a and showing the employment of multiple coordinated missile launches, as well as the use of submunitions.
Pearl Harbor 2.0?
In 2010, Toshi Yoshihara of the U.S. Naval War College authoritative PLA publications indicated that China’s missile forces might attempt a preemptive strike to knock out the U.S. Navy in Asia by specifically targeting vulnerable carriers and warships in port. Yoshihara noted in particular that, “Perhaps no other place captures the Chinese imagination as much as Yokosuka,” the major U.S. naval base near Tokyo home to the U.S. Navy’s sole permanently forward-deployed aircraft carrier, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), as well as other ships and vital support facilities (see Figure 9). In 2012, Dr. Yoshihara :
[T]he Imperial Japanese Navy’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor remains a popular, if somewhat tired, metaphor for the dangers of unpreparedness and overexposure to risk…But the real possibility that U.S. bases in the Western Pacific could once again be vulnerable…has occasioned little publicity or debate.
Fig. 9: Home of U.S. 7th Fleet, Yokosuka, Japan.
Evidence that China may have been practicing to strike ships in port with ballistic missiles would lend credence to Yoshihara’s concerns. And such evidence exists: images taken in 2013 (see Figure 10) seem to show China testing its ability to do so.
Fig. 10: Possible moored ship and naval facility targets, imagery dated August 2013. Compared for scale with actual U.S. destroyer.
Specifically, the PLA Rocket Force appears to have been practicing on several ship targets of a similar size to U.S. Arleigh Burke-class destroyers moored in a mock port that is a near-mirror image of the actual inner harbor at the U.S. naval base in Yokosuka (see Figure 11). Note what looks like an impact crater located near the center of the three ship targets, close enough to have potentially damaged all three ships with submunitions. The display of these targets may itself constitute signaling to the United States and its allies as a long-term deterrent effort. All the same, it bears considering that the only way that China could realistically expect to catch multiple U.S. ships in port as shown above would be through a surprise attack. Otherwise, with clear signs of imminent hostilities, the United States would likely have already sent its fleet to sea. Some skeptics might say that catching the U.S. flat-footed would be unlikely, but history teaches us not to discount the possibility of successful surprise attacks.
China has not been shy about displaying the advancing capabilities of the PLA Rocket Force. Beijing openly displayed some of its latest missiles (such as DF-26 “Guam-killer” missile) in its 70th anniversary parade in 2015 and in western characters, . The PLA Rocket Force also put out a and showing the employment of multiple coordinated missile launches, as well as the use of submunitions.
Pearl Harbor 2.0?
In 2010, Toshi Yoshihara of the U.S. Naval War College authoritative PLA publications indicated that China’s missile forces might attempt a preemptive strike to knock out the U.S. Navy in Asia by specifically targeting vulnerable carriers and warships in port. Yoshihara noted in particular that, “Perhaps no other place captures the Chinese imagination as much as Yokosuka,” the major U.S. naval base near Tokyo home to the U.S. Navy’s sole permanently forward-deployed aircraft carrier, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), as well as other ships and vital support facilities (see Figure 9). In 2012, Dr. Yoshihara :
[T]he Imperial Japanese Navy’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor remains a popular, if somewhat tired, metaphor for the dangers of unpreparedness and overexposure to risk…But the real possibility that U.S. bases in the Western Pacific could once again be vulnerable…has occasioned little publicity or debate.
Fig. 9: Home of U.S. 7th Fleet, Yokosuka, Japan.
Evidence that China may have been practicing to strike ships in port with ballistic missiles would lend credence to Yoshihara’s concerns. And such evidence exists: images taken in 2013 (see Figure 10) seem to show China testing its ability to do so.
Fig. 10: Possible moored ship and naval facility targets, imagery dated August 2013. Compared for scale with actual U.S. destroyer.
Specifically, the PLA Rocket Force appears to have been practicing on several ship targets of a similar size to U.S. Arleigh Burke-class destroyers moored in a mock port that is a near-mirror image of the actual inner harbor at the U.S. naval base in Yokosuka (see Figure 11). Note what looks like an impact crater located near the center of the three ship targets, close enough to have potentially damaged all three ships with submunitions. The display of these targets may itself constitute signaling to the United States and its allies as a long-term deterrent effort. All the same, it bears considering that the only way that China could realistically expect to catch multiple U.S. ships in port as shown above would be through a surprise attack. Otherwise, with clear signs of imminent hostilities, the United States would likely have already sent its fleet to sea. Some skeptics might say that catching the U.S. flat-footed would be unlikely, but history teaches us not to discount the possibility of successful surprise attacks.
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
It is by far the biggest construction work in China "The great underground wall" it started 40 years ago and still ongoing With their blast trap and blow vent It is huge undertaking Henri K report on this subject. This tunnel in the work is specially designed for mobile missile
Try to take this one out. It is not easy. they make all kind of provision to mitigate the enemy attack
It is interesting that they reveal the work now another veiled message. They once did show video of the underground tunnel years ago
In the organization of the Chinese rocket forces, formerly known as the "Second Artillery Corps," there is a rather special brigade. Their main weapons are neither missiles or nuclear warheads, but shovels, concrete and explosives.
The Chinese underground network estimated by the United States (Source: The Washington Post)
Since the late 1970s, tens of thousands of soldiers of this brigade have built a vast network of silos, tunnels and fortifications, which stretches several thousand kilometers under the mountains, in the four corners of China , To house the country's ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.
This strategic priority program has several names, but the best known of all is the "Great Underground Wall". Declassified documents have spoken from the bottom of some silos of launching which is almost 100 meters under the rocks.
And nearly 40 years after the launch of the project, the works are still in progress, at least that's what they suggest several videos recently broadcast on the military channel of local television CCTV-7, Following.
Indeed, journalists of the chain were able to enter one of the sub-networks that is currently under construction, even during the Chinese New Year period. For obvious reasons of confidentiality, the exact location of the work was not revealed, but the commentator says it is southern China. It can also be seen in relation to the vegetation and the clothing of the people filmed.
The videos in themselves are not particularly interesting, we see the technicians, sometimes of naked torsos given the heat that emerges during the solidification of the cement, who work to construct tunnels of different size.
But based on two revealing elements that have been mentioned in these reports, it is believed that the place is designed to house mobile ballistic missiles.
The first element is a " room of tests that may contain missiles erect " appeared 02 to 00 minutes of video. If we use the concrete mixer truck which generally measures 4 meters high as a reference object, the height of the room actually did nearly 14 meters, enough for a TEL type MRBMs DF-16 and DF-21 see an ICBM DF-31 , stands inside.
The test room for ballistic missiles in erection (Source: CCTV)
Then, around 3:07 in the video appeared " the diffusion chamber ", also in full work. The commentator points out at that time the importance of this piece, which is used to " reduce the power of the enemy weapons ". It is therefore believed that this is a network of chambers and tunnels to channel and reduce the shock wave generated by the assault weapons explosions.
Finally, although the television reports do not specify the exact location where they were shot, given the revealed clues and the current location of launch sites for Chinese rocket forces, it is assumed that they are either Base No. 53 based in Yunnan Province with DF-21 or Base No. 55 stationed south of Hunan Province. Both are found in mountainous regions.
The known launch sites of Base No. 53 and Base No. 55.
If the elements indicated in the videos are accurate, we are inclined towards the hypothesis that it is a part of the "Great Underground Wall" for Base 53, especially when we know that certain brigades this basis are now equipped with DF-21D , the ballistic missile anti-ship, the scope from its sites covers about half of the South China sea.
To be continued.
Henri K.
Share this article
Try to take this one out. It is not easy. they make all kind of provision to mitigate the enemy attack
It is interesting that they reveal the work now another veiled message. They once did show video of the underground tunnel years ago
In the organization of the Chinese rocket forces, formerly known as the "Second Artillery Corps," there is a rather special brigade. Their main weapons are neither missiles or nuclear warheads, but shovels, concrete and explosives.
The Chinese underground network estimated by the United States (Source: The Washington Post)
Since the late 1970s, tens of thousands of soldiers of this brigade have built a vast network of silos, tunnels and fortifications, which stretches several thousand kilometers under the mountains, in the four corners of China , To house the country's ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.
This strategic priority program has several names, but the best known of all is the "Great Underground Wall". Declassified documents have spoken from the bottom of some silos of launching which is almost 100 meters under the rocks.
And nearly 40 years after the launch of the project, the works are still in progress, at least that's what they suggest several videos recently broadcast on the military channel of local television CCTV-7, Following.
Indeed, journalists of the chain were able to enter one of the sub-networks that is currently under construction, even during the Chinese New Year period. For obvious reasons of confidentiality, the exact location of the work was not revealed, but the commentator says it is southern China. It can also be seen in relation to the vegetation and the clothing of the people filmed.
The videos in themselves are not particularly interesting, we see the technicians, sometimes of naked torsos given the heat that emerges during the solidification of the cement, who work to construct tunnels of different size.
But based on two revealing elements that have been mentioned in these reports, it is believed that the place is designed to house mobile ballistic missiles.
The first element is a " room of tests that may contain missiles erect " appeared 02 to 00 minutes of video. If we use the concrete mixer truck which generally measures 4 meters high as a reference object, the height of the room actually did nearly 14 meters, enough for a TEL type MRBMs DF-16 and DF-21 see an ICBM DF-31 , stands inside.
The test room for ballistic missiles in erection (Source: CCTV)
Then, around 3:07 in the video appeared " the diffusion chamber ", also in full work. The commentator points out at that time the importance of this piece, which is used to " reduce the power of the enemy weapons ". It is therefore believed that this is a network of chambers and tunnels to channel and reduce the shock wave generated by the assault weapons explosions.
Finally, although the television reports do not specify the exact location where they were shot, given the revealed clues and the current location of launch sites for Chinese rocket forces, it is assumed that they are either Base No. 53 based in Yunnan Province with DF-21 or Base No. 55 stationed south of Hunan Province. Both are found in mountainous regions.
The known launch sites of Base No. 53 and Base No. 55.
If the elements indicated in the videos are accurate, we are inclined towards the hypothesis that it is a part of the "Great Underground Wall" for Base 53, especially when we know that certain brigades this basis are now equipped with DF-21D , the ballistic missile anti-ship, the scope from its sites covers about half of the South China sea.
To be continued.
Henri K.
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