SinoSoldier
Colonel
Did the report mention what type of missile was used? HQ-19, HQ-26, HQ-29, or DN-1/2/3?
three types of missiles:It seems that there were two types of missiles. Maybe one was the target?
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three types of missiles:
targets: df-11 & df-15 (china built too many of these two types)
interceptor: hq-19
In the second nuclear age, no less than the first, there are no realistic prospects for banning multiple-warhead missiles. China has started to deploy such missiles, and India and Pakistan are likely to cross this threshold as well. The motivations behind these steps will determine how extensively nuclear arsenals will grow and how pernicious the effects of stockpile growth will become.
Success in dampening the negative repercussions of multiple-warhead missiles will rest on two foundations. The first is improved bilateral relations among the contestants. The second foundation for dampening the negative consequences of multiple-warhead missiles in Asia is to resist a progression from countervalue to counterforce targeting strategies of nuclear deterrence. This metric, as with the willingness to improve bilateral relations, is measurable in several ways, including: the retention of no first use doctrines by China and India; proceeding slowly with limited numbers of multiple-warhead missiles; and being more transparent about strategic modernization plans and programs.
If the growth of warhead totals and missile accuracy presages moves by Beijing and New Delhi toward warfighting strategies of deterrence, then the second nuclear age will become far more dangerous, and prospects for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons on international affairs will be undermined. If decisionmakers in China, India, and Pakistan wish to avoid repeating the missteps of the United States and the Soviet Union during the first nuclear age, they will limit the extent to which multiple warheads are placed atop missiles, they will proceed at a slow pace, and, most important, they will reject the lure and pitfalls of counterforce targeting strategies.
Free book: The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age
Writers speak about their book.
It will be interesting to see if China and India end up in full blown MIRV race unwillingly.
India is in no position technologically or financially to get into an arms race with China.
China spends more on defence now than India could realistically muster and sustain in arms race mode.
India's near total reliance on imported weapons and technology will not only further erode their defence spending power (can really enjoy PPP gains) and weaken their economy (money China spends on defence stays in the Chinese economy, creating jobs and growth, whereas money India spend on imported arms leaves their economy).
Not to mention the fact that all nuclear weapons technologies and long range ballistic missiles are categorically banned for sale to India, so it cannot rely on its normal means of importing to bridge the technological gap between their indigenous technology levels Chinese technology levels.
The impact and role of India on China's strategic decision making is minimal at best.
'How the Indians might react' is unlikely to be a question Chinese leaders would ask, expect maybe as an afterthought.
India might be obsessed with China,by the reverse is most certain not true.
Not to mention the fact that all nuclear weapons technologies and long range ballistic missiles are categorically banned for sale to India, so it cannot rely on its normal means of importing to bridge the technological gap between their indigenous technology levels Chinese technology levels.