Researched analysis of current naval strike capability
OPINION/OVERVIEW
Iran has a modest naval presence characterized by outdated warships mixed with asymmetrical warfare doctrines which promise all manner of death and destruction to any and every other naval force on the planet.
I described it as modest because that’s what it is. I wouldn’t go so far as to say it’s substandard or unprofessional, but it is handicapped by less good equipment. On the world stage it would barely make the top thirty naval powers in terms of overall capability, behind such obscure countries as Chile and Denmark. Even locally it cannot compete with the Saudi or UAE navies except in the area of submarines.
Its popular enemy is USA and her Western allies, notably Britain. Whilst history is littered with tails of inferior navies beating much larger forces, characterized by defeat of the Spanish Armada, it is hard to contrive a scenario in which a top-five Western navy could be so incompetent as to loose to Iran.
However, Iran does have some interesting equipment and some very potent assets that could be a long standing and very real threat even to big name navies. Normally in a Navy the big units are perceived as offering the greatest threat to an adversery. In Iran’s case this really isn’t the way it is. Ranked in order of offering the greatest threat to a top rated navy, this is Iran’s profile as I see it:
1. Shore based anti-ship missiles, particularly C-802
2. Submarine or small boat laid mines, particularly the EM52 rocket mine.
3. Kilo class conventional submarines using torpedoes, rocket torpedoes and possibly anti-ship missiles.
4. Fast Attack Craft (missile and torpedo boats)
5. Iranian Air Force fighters armed with missiles or guided bombs
6. Everything else including the larger warships
Iranian naval power is divided between the Iranian Navy and the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, more properly called the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution romanised from Farsi as Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami).
The IRGC is a separate branch of the military and has ground, air and sea branches, duplicating the main armed forces branches in function and equipment. The IRGC is differentiated from the regular armed forces by its ideological footing; it is conceptually at least fiercely loyal to the government, or rather the Islamic Revolution. Whilst this may have been true some years ago, the modern IRGC is really just another branch of the military vying for the same pool of recruits.
Externally the IRGC are generally perceived as more cavalier and amateurish than the regular Iranian Navy. This seems to hold true although military competency seems to have increased from the 1980s “tanker war”.
In general the Iranian Navy operates the larger warships whilst the IRGC operates smaller ones and less conventional types. It is the IRGC that is at the front of the popularized “asymmetrical warfare” doctrine. The IRGC is also responsible for most (all?) of the potent shore-based anti-ship missile forces.
For the purposes of this analysis I’ve lumped the Iranian Navy and IRGC equipment together. From an external viewpoint it’s all naval power.
Although the Persian Gulf is the primary area of operation, the Iran faces four seas: Persian Gulf, Caspian Sea, India Ocean and Gulf of Oman (the latter two also being called the Arabian Sea).
The Caspian Sea is very important to Iran because of oil/gas disputes, and Iran has recently bolstered and updated its forces there. A key problem is that the Caspian is landlocked and so larger warships cannot be relocated there at times of heightened tensions. This means that a standing fleet is required although many of the smaller fast attack craft of the IRGC could be transported there by road.
The combat worthy elements of the Caspian Fleet are three missile boats (SINA class, see below) and one missile armed corvette (Hamzeh class, see below). These warships have woefully inadequate air defences and given that their natural adversaries are Russia and former republics, the effectiveness of this fleet is very questionable.
LARGER WARSHIPS (CORVETTES etc)
Units
1 x Mowj Class, Iranian Navy, Iranian built
3 x Alvand Class, Iranian Navy, British built.
1x Hamzeh Class, Iranian Navy, Dutch built
2 x Bayandor Class, Iranian Navy, US built (gun armed, not illustrated)
Alvand Class Corvette
Quantity in Service: 3
Displacement: 1,540 tons full load
Dimensions: L 94.5m, W 11.7m, Dr 3.25m
Crew: 135
Speed: 40kt
Powerplant: 2 x Gas Turbines 23,000 shp plus two diesels 1900hp
Armament: 4 x C-802 “Noor” anti-ship missiles, 1 x 114mm Gun, 1 dual 35mm (manned) 3 x (manned) GAM-BO1 20mm cannon, 1 x Limbo ASW mortar (may be inoperable), 2 x triple 12.7mm lightweight torpedoes (Alvand only), 2 x 12.7mm HMGs (manned).
Of 1960s vintage, the remaining Alvand class corvettes have been partially rearmed most crucially with the generally capable C-802 anti-ship missile in place of the obsolete Sea Killer missiles.
Sensor fit and air defences are very poor by contemporary standards and the survivability of these boats in open conflict is seriously open to doubt.
Moudge Class Corvette
Quantity: 1
Displacement: 1,400 tons
Dimensions: L 94m, W 10m, Dr 3.25m (Actual dimensions may be almost exactly as per Alvand)
Crew: ??? (est 100+)
Speed: 28kt
Powerplant: 2 x 10,000hp diesels
Armament: 4 x C-802 “Noor” anti-ship missiles, 1 x 76mm Gun, 1 CIWS (20mm, indigenous?), 1 x dual AAA (35mm?), 2 x triple 12.7mm lightweight torpedoes
Helicopters: Landing pad only
Also commonly spelt Mowj and Mowaj, this indigenous corvette is essentially a reverse engineered Vosper Mk 5 (Alvand Class, see above). It has several Iranian adaptations, most significantly a purely diesel power pack which results in a significant drop in performance.
Another conspicuous difference is the addition of a helipad on the aft deck, requiring a repositioning of the anti-ship missiles to amidships. Above the bridge is what appears to be a CIWS similar to the US 20mm Phalanx. However at the rear of the ship the AAA appears to be a twin turret, possibly manned 35mm as on the Alvand class. The main gun is a reverse engineered OTO Melara 76mm automatic, an excellent general purpose medium gun albeit somewhat behind the current OTO Melara versions.
Unlike most contemporary corvettes, the Moudge does not feature a radar signature reducing hull form. In all fairness the air defences appear to be a significant improvement over the Alvands, but still someway short of the current norm for warships this size.
The Moudge does not appear to have an ASW sonar.
Hamzeh Corvette
Quantity: 1
Displacement: 580 tons
Dimensions: L 52m, W 7.65m, Dr 3.25m
Crew: ??
Speed: 15kt
Powerplant: 2 x 1,300hp diesels
Armament: 4 x C-802 “Noor” anti-ship missiles, 1 x main gun (20mm?), 2 x 12.7mm manned heavy machine guns
Originally the Government Yacht, the Hamzeh has been modified to carry C-802 anti-ship missiles and light defences. Main role probably remains training. The boat operates in the Caspian Sea alongside the SINA missile boats. Confusingly the first widespread pictures of her post-refit where accompanying an Iranian press article announcing the entry into service of the SINA type “corvette” Joshan, causing some confusion as to this boat’s identity. The pennant number appears to have changed also.
Despite a popular press photo showing an AB-212 helicopter, the Hamzeh does not appear to have a helipad.
OPINION/OVERVIEW
Iran has a modest naval presence characterized by outdated warships mixed with asymmetrical warfare doctrines which promise all manner of death and destruction to any and every other naval force on the planet.
I described it as modest because that’s what it is. I wouldn’t go so far as to say it’s substandard or unprofessional, but it is handicapped by less good equipment. On the world stage it would barely make the top thirty naval powers in terms of overall capability, behind such obscure countries as Chile and Denmark. Even locally it cannot compete with the Saudi or UAE navies except in the area of submarines.
Its popular enemy is USA and her Western allies, notably Britain. Whilst history is littered with tails of inferior navies beating much larger forces, characterized by defeat of the Spanish Armada, it is hard to contrive a scenario in which a top-five Western navy could be so incompetent as to loose to Iran.
However, Iran does have some interesting equipment and some very potent assets that could be a long standing and very real threat even to big name navies. Normally in a Navy the big units are perceived as offering the greatest threat to an adversery. In Iran’s case this really isn’t the way it is. Ranked in order of offering the greatest threat to a top rated navy, this is Iran’s profile as I see it:
1. Shore based anti-ship missiles, particularly C-802
2. Submarine or small boat laid mines, particularly the EM52 rocket mine.
3. Kilo class conventional submarines using torpedoes, rocket torpedoes and possibly anti-ship missiles.
4. Fast Attack Craft (missile and torpedo boats)
5. Iranian Air Force fighters armed with missiles or guided bombs
6. Everything else including the larger warships
Iranian naval power is divided between the Iranian Navy and the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, more properly called the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution romanised from Farsi as Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami).
The IRGC is a separate branch of the military and has ground, air and sea branches, duplicating the main armed forces branches in function and equipment. The IRGC is differentiated from the regular armed forces by its ideological footing; it is conceptually at least fiercely loyal to the government, or rather the Islamic Revolution. Whilst this may have been true some years ago, the modern IRGC is really just another branch of the military vying for the same pool of recruits.
Externally the IRGC are generally perceived as more cavalier and amateurish than the regular Iranian Navy. This seems to hold true although military competency seems to have increased from the 1980s “tanker war”.
In general the Iranian Navy operates the larger warships whilst the IRGC operates smaller ones and less conventional types. It is the IRGC that is at the front of the popularized “asymmetrical warfare” doctrine. The IRGC is also responsible for most (all?) of the potent shore-based anti-ship missile forces.
For the purposes of this analysis I’ve lumped the Iranian Navy and IRGC equipment together. From an external viewpoint it’s all naval power.
Although the Persian Gulf is the primary area of operation, the Iran faces four seas: Persian Gulf, Caspian Sea, India Ocean and Gulf of Oman (the latter two also being called the Arabian Sea).
The Caspian Sea is very important to Iran because of oil/gas disputes, and Iran has recently bolstered and updated its forces there. A key problem is that the Caspian is landlocked and so larger warships cannot be relocated there at times of heightened tensions. This means that a standing fleet is required although many of the smaller fast attack craft of the IRGC could be transported there by road.
The combat worthy elements of the Caspian Fleet are three missile boats (SINA class, see below) and one missile armed corvette (Hamzeh class, see below). These warships have woefully inadequate air defences and given that their natural adversaries are Russia and former republics, the effectiveness of this fleet is very questionable.
LARGER WARSHIPS (CORVETTES etc)
Units
1 x Mowj Class, Iranian Navy, Iranian built
3 x Alvand Class, Iranian Navy, British built.
1x Hamzeh Class, Iranian Navy, Dutch built
2 x Bayandor Class, Iranian Navy, US built (gun armed, not illustrated)
Alvand Class Corvette
Quantity in Service: 3
Displacement: 1,540 tons full load
Dimensions: L 94.5m, W 11.7m, Dr 3.25m
Crew: 135
Speed: 40kt
Powerplant: 2 x Gas Turbines 23,000 shp plus two diesels 1900hp
Armament: 4 x C-802 “Noor” anti-ship missiles, 1 x 114mm Gun, 1 dual 35mm (manned) 3 x (manned) GAM-BO1 20mm cannon, 1 x Limbo ASW mortar (may be inoperable), 2 x triple 12.7mm lightweight torpedoes (Alvand only), 2 x 12.7mm HMGs (manned).
Of 1960s vintage, the remaining Alvand class corvettes have been partially rearmed most crucially with the generally capable C-802 anti-ship missile in place of the obsolete Sea Killer missiles.
Sensor fit and air defences are very poor by contemporary standards and the survivability of these boats in open conflict is seriously open to doubt.
Moudge Class Corvette
Quantity: 1
Displacement: 1,400 tons
Dimensions: L 94m, W 10m, Dr 3.25m (Actual dimensions may be almost exactly as per Alvand)
Crew: ??? (est 100+)
Speed: 28kt
Powerplant: 2 x 10,000hp diesels
Armament: 4 x C-802 “Noor” anti-ship missiles, 1 x 76mm Gun, 1 CIWS (20mm, indigenous?), 1 x dual AAA (35mm?), 2 x triple 12.7mm lightweight torpedoes
Helicopters: Landing pad only
Also commonly spelt Mowj and Mowaj, this indigenous corvette is essentially a reverse engineered Vosper Mk 5 (Alvand Class, see above). It has several Iranian adaptations, most significantly a purely diesel power pack which results in a significant drop in performance.
Another conspicuous difference is the addition of a helipad on the aft deck, requiring a repositioning of the anti-ship missiles to amidships. Above the bridge is what appears to be a CIWS similar to the US 20mm Phalanx. However at the rear of the ship the AAA appears to be a twin turret, possibly manned 35mm as on the Alvand class. The main gun is a reverse engineered OTO Melara 76mm automatic, an excellent general purpose medium gun albeit somewhat behind the current OTO Melara versions.
Unlike most contemporary corvettes, the Moudge does not feature a radar signature reducing hull form. In all fairness the air defences appear to be a significant improvement over the Alvands, but still someway short of the current norm for warships this size.
The Moudge does not appear to have an ASW sonar.
Hamzeh Corvette
Quantity: 1
Displacement: 580 tons
Dimensions: L 52m, W 7.65m, Dr 3.25m
Crew: ??
Speed: 15kt
Powerplant: 2 x 1,300hp diesels
Armament: 4 x C-802 “Noor” anti-ship missiles, 1 x main gun (20mm?), 2 x 12.7mm manned heavy machine guns
Originally the Government Yacht, the Hamzeh has been modified to carry C-802 anti-ship missiles and light defences. Main role probably remains training. The boat operates in the Caspian Sea alongside the SINA missile boats. Confusingly the first widespread pictures of her post-refit where accompanying an Iranian press article announcing the entry into service of the SINA type “corvette” Joshan, causing some confusion as to this boat’s identity. The pennant number appears to have changed also.
Despite a popular press photo showing an AB-212 helicopter, the Hamzeh does not appear to have a helipad.