RAAN tanker Sirius with 2 Perry/Adelaide
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and (dated September 29, 2017) Minister rejects report that sub project is high risknow noticed Australia facing submarine capability gap, report suggests
Posted on September 27, 2017
Defence Minister Marine Payne has rejected a report saying that Australia’s future submarine (FSM) project is “extravagantly expensive, highly risky and, in an era of heightened tensions in the Asia Pacific, compromises the future defence of Australia”.
The report says that the proposed acquisition will be Australia’s biggest ever defence acquisition project, will cost far more than necessary and, because of its extended delivery schedule, will probably leave a very serious capability gap of several years when Australia may have no operational submarines at all.
Gary Johnston, a Sydney businessman and owner of the website Submarines for Australia, published (27 Sep 2017) the independent report on the FSM that he commissioned from Insight Economics – Australia’s Future Submarine: Getting this Key Capability Right.
“I have been very concerned about Australia’s defence acquisition process for a long time,” Mr Johnston said. “The Super Seasprite helicopters failed completely at a cost of $1.4 billion, enough to pay for two teaching hospitals.
“When I saw last year that the government proposed to spend $50 billion on twelve new French submarines with only a design concept and no proper evaluation or competitive tender process, I thought ‘enough is enough’. I decided to commission a thorough investigation of the acquisition process for the FSM and see if there wasn’t a better way forward, with a lower cost and fewer risks.
The report was launched by ANU Professor of Strategic Studies Hugh White and former Public Service chief Dr Michael Keating at the National Press Club.
They warned there was a serious danger of a capability gap if the new boats weren’t delivered in time before the present subs leave service.
They said Australia needed to urgently make some trade offs and obtain some less-than-optimal vessels in order to make sure we have some submarines at all. Australia should acquire a fleet of six off-the-shelf modified submarines along with a mothership to re-service them that could be based at Christmas Island and Cocos Keeling.
Minister Payne dismissed the report “as beat up”.
“The consistent advice from Defence and actual experts in the field is that there are no military-off-the-shelf submarine options that meet Australia’s unique capability requirements,” she said. “A ‘modified off-the-shelf’ submarine is an oxymoron.”
She said modifying an existing submarine to substantially extend its range would involve a complex and risky redesign process.
The President of the Submarine Institute of Australia (SIA), Mr Mark Sander, said, “Australia has a positive plan in place for the Future Submarine Program. A competent and professional designer partner and combat systems integrator have been selected by the Australian Government.
“The program is backed by a professional organisational structure within the Department of Defence and both the Minister for Defence Industry and the Shadow Minister for Defence, among many others, have publicly supported the significant financial investment in submarine capability.
“While effective management of the program will continue to be important, Defence understands the need and the challenge to ensure there will not be a gap in Australia’s submarine capability during the transition from the Collins-class submarines to the future submarines.
“As for suggestions about different submarine designs, there is no ‘off-the-shelf’ design which meets Australia’s requirements and any modification of an existing submarine platform will, in itself, incur unacceptable risk.”
Mr Johnston said, “The Insight Economics team has consulted very widely in Australia and overseas with strategic experts, admirals, former submarine commanding officers, engineers, shipbuilders and former Defence officials.”
Mr Johnston said that it was clear that governments from both sides of politics were to blame for the situation we currently are in. To quote from the report:
“‘In 2009, the Rudd/Gillard governments talked a good game in terms of acquiring 12 advanced submarines and then did virtually nothing over the following four years to begin the acquisition process. The Abbott and Turnbull governments approved a grossly inflated acquisition budget for the submarines, established a flawed process that resulted in the costliest and most risky acquisition approach possible over an unacceptable timeframe and then, for political reasons, stated that the submarines must all be built in Adelaide, regardless of cost.’
“The report shows that by selecting a design partner rather than a platform, Defence was able to avoid being subject to all the checks and balances that had been established so carefully over the years to reduce the risk of procurement disasters. There was no competitive process between two or three contractors for a project definition and fixed price contract, no off-the shelf option to be considered and, as far as we can tell, limited scrutiny by Ministers and other departments of State.
“And the decision to build all the submarines in Adelaide regardless of cost was made by one Minister on the hop. Defence and the government-owned naval shipbuilder have not performed well recently. Three air warfare destroyers have cost us three times as much as they should have done and will be delivered three years late. On the other hand, local industry has provided value for money in past naval projects that were managed competitively with the private sector mainly building the ships with fixed price contracts.
“The cost of the 12 submarines beggars belief,” said Mr Johnston. “The report estimates a whole of life cost, including acquisition, sustainment and a life extension for the Collins class, of $180 billion. The current forecast acquisition cost of each new submarine is $3 billion, over four times that of the latest Japanese submarine, a relatively large platform like Collins, which cost under $700 million.
“The report sets out in vivid detail the high risks surrounding the acquisition. Based on painful experience, it is almost certain that, as a new design, the cost and delivery will blow out substantially. There are major technical risks in building such a big, developmental submarine and significant risks in operating it ‘up threat’ in North Asia.
“The government says the FSM will be ‘regionally superior’. It will not. For a start, the waters to our north will be teeming with nuclear submarines in the 2030s. It is also highly disturbing that the FSM reportedly will not deploy air-independent propulsion or Lithium-Ion batteries, two breakthrough technologies that can allow conventional submarines to remain totally submerged for up to three weeks.
Mr Johnston said that the greatest risk was of a capability gap. “The report shows that there is a strong possibility that the first FSM won’t be operational until 2040. With the Collins class reaching the end of their lives in 2026 to 2033, this is a terrible situation. The government is looking to extend the six Collins boats for ten years – at a reported cost of $15 billion, enough to buy 18 new submarines with a thirty-year life. Experience shows that upgrades to 1980s designed platforms just don’t work.
“So in a time of a heightened strategic threat, we may lack any credible submarine capability for a decade or more. And it takes a long time to restore that capability, not just by building platforms but in retaining personnel and being able to train new people.
“The report proposes a way forward to address the capability gap in the future and, by introducing some competition, provides an insurance policy against the excessive cost and risks around the Shortfin Barracuda in the longer term.
“The way forward would not require the government to change existing policy decisions.
“First, rather than extend Collins, take urgent steps to acquire six off-the-shelf submarines, modified to extend their range and built in Adelaide if cost-effective. And also, because of the long transits to the Navy’s areas of operations, acquire a submarine tender – a mother ship – that could be forward based on Australian territory and provide a better amenity for the crews. Together this should cost under $10 billion.
“Second, bring forward the review of future submarine technologies flagged in the 2016 Defence White Paper. The review would consider whether we should either acquire more, much cheaper, modified off the shelf submarines; or build the Shortfin Barracuda; or set in motion the lengthy and costly process to acquire nuclear submarines. The criteria would be capability requirements and value for money.
Mr Johnston said that in his view two of the prime responsibilities of government were to provide for the effective defence of Australia and to spend taxpayers’ money in a considered and responsible manner.
“Government has failed badly on both counts in the submarine acquisition. It urgently needs to lift its game.”
For Australia to continue to treat China as the enemy is to create a self-fulfilling prophecy of Australia’s own worst nightmare, because if you keep treating someone as your enemy, it will only be a matter of time before they return the favour.
Australia doesn’t have any skin in the great game being played between China and the US in the Pacific. Rather than being the unappreciated lapdog of the US who needlessly tries to pick fights with China, Australian national interest would be far better served by remaining neutral while playing China and America against each other for Australia’s own benefit.
Does Chinese government sound she even care about the Aussies when the Aussies aren't exhibiting hostile intentions? Anyone truly believe China will ever invade Australia?
There is much more to foreign relations than existential questions of national survival. Australia is more concerned with China than with Indonesia because China is our largest trading partner as well as a major source of investment and tourism. Australia has significant numbers of citizens of Chinese descent and many Chinese students study here. Australia's future economic and social prospects are deeply entwined with China, and this raises all sorts of questions for us here: questions about ownership of infrastructure and agriculture, investment properties, political donations, coordination on criminal justice matters, etc.
The rise of China is a major paradigm shift for Australia that will affect our nation in many ways, large and small. It will challenge us to examine who we are as a nation, and the things that are important to us. Many of our often unspoken ideas about the world and our place in it that were useful or at least comforting in the eras of American and before that British supremacy, will be challenged. Hopefully Australian society, from the grassroots to its intellectuals, institutions, and political figures, have the wisdom, maturity and foresight to meet these challenges in the coming decades and to guide our nation to continued peaceful prosperity.
You wrote a report introduction and conclusion but skipped the entire main body.
The 2016 defence white paper, and the accompanying integrated investment program, signalled much more capable naval and air combat capabilities for the future Australian Defence Force, but left a capability gap in terms of conventional deterrence capabilities.
The lack of long-range naval and air land-strike capability prevents us from undertaking this vital role. It’s time that Australia gets serious about acquiring an independent conventional deterrent capability.
The nation currently relies on US-provided extended nuclear deterrence security guarantees against nuclear threats. However, it can do much more below the nuclear threshold to hold an adversary’s vital interests at risk.
Developing a conventional deterrent capability would also contribute directly to burden- sharing with the US in a much more unpredictable and contested Indo-Pacific region.
Deterrence seeks to prevent an adversary from acting in ways inimical to a nation’s interests, by making the cost unacceptably high to the adversary.
Given the nature of the emerging security outlook, that requirement implies long-range power projection and strike capabilities for the ADF which it lacks in planned force structure, at least in the short term.
The future submarines certainly will do long-range deterrence tasks, but won’t arrive until the early 2030s, and Australia won’t have a credible force of future submarines until the mid-2040s. The future frigates won’t start appearing until the late 2020s, and they’ll face much more potent anti-ship threats at that point. In particular, Chinese anti-access and area denial is steadily pushing out further into the western Pacific, making shorter range platforms and weapons less credible as options.
The air force is already investigating Kongsberg’s Joint Strike Missile for internal carriage on the F-35, but that has only a 280-kilometre range. The F-35, along with the F/A-18F Super Hornet, could also carry the Lockheed Martin long-range anti-ship missile (LRASM) which has a dual-role anti-ship and land attack capability and offers a substantial 926km range.
All air-delivered options are constrained by the range of the launching platform. The F-35 depends either on forward basing in host nations (which may not be available in a crisis) or forward tanker support for undertaking long-range strike, even with standoff weapons such as LRASM. China’s counter-air doctrine targets combat enabler platforms like Wedgetail and airborne refuellers, making getting within range of vital targets difficult for even a stealthy but short-range F-35.
A better option may lie with naval-based land-attack cruise missiles for the Hobart-class AWDs and potentially the Collins-class submarines. This option should be designed for minimal cost and risk through acquiring weapons via US foreign military sales (FMS) with the weapon of choice being mature and preferably in operational service.
The obvious candidate would have to be the 1852km range Tomahawk land-attack missile (TLAM), which is due to remain in the US inventory through to the 2040s, and is being upgraded to Block IV status, which will offer more flexibility in targeting, and a long-range anti-ship capability.
Given commonality between RAN and US Navy vertical launch systems and Aegis, TLAMs could be easily integrated with navy’s AWDs, so Australia would just need to buy the missiles, as well as additional software known as the Tomahawk weapons control system module, as part of any Aegis update.
The AWDs’ vertical launch system would be enabled to launch TLAMs as part of this process. Britain has TLAMs on its submarines which can be launched through torpedo tubes, and this potentially could be an option for Collins, and also the future submarine.
The LRASM also comes in a ship-launched variant, and that would offer a very advanced and stealthy dual-role anti-ship and land strike capability for the navy. However, whether it is TLAM or ship-launched LRASM, the
challenge in realising long-range land-attack capability is surface ship survivability in a contested operational environment.
The navy’s move towards SM-6 naval air defence missiles and enhanced Baseline 9 Aegis for its AWDs enhances, but does not guarantee, the likelihood that an AWD will survive the types of advanced anti-ship cruise missiles likely to be available to future adversaries by the late 2020s. Those are likely to include hypersonic weapons.
Land-attack cruise missiles such as TLAM or LRASM represent an entirely new type of capability for the ADF, which would enable Australia to act more independently to deter and dissuade a major power in Asia. That would be a valuable contribution to coalition operations, as well as reinforcing defence self-reliance. Acquiring such a capability would also strengthen US-Australian defence co-operation.
That final benefit may strengthen our deterrence capability most of all.
Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull said on Tuesday nine war ships set for construction in 2020 will be fitted with long-range anti-missile defense systems to counter the threat of rogue nations.
Australia’s proposed frigates will use Aegis combat systems, produced by Lockheed Martin, in conjunction with SAAB Australia technology, Turnbull said.
Tensions in the region have spiked considerably in recent months as North Korea conducted a series of tests of its medium- and long-range ballistic missiles, some of which flew over Japan, as well as its sixth nuclear test on Sept. 3.
Pyongyang, which ultimately wants to target the U.S. mainland with a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile, has said its missiles could strike Australia.
“Recent events in our region have proven that Australia’s future frigates must be equipped to defend Australia from the threat of medium- and long-range missile attacks,” Turnbull said in a speech in Sydney.
Work on the frigates is set to begin in 2020, with BAE Systems, Navantia and Fincantieri all competing for the A$35 billion ($27.39 billion) contract.
Turnbull said the decision to award the missile defense system contract allows the three bidders enough time to incorporate Aegis technology into their bids.
Australia is expected to announce the winner of the frigate contract in early 2018.
The decision to fit the frigates - also a cornerstone of Australia’s plan to counter an expected rise in submarine activity in the region - suggests Canberra will use the ships in a dual capacity.
“The missile defense will protect Australia’s forward based forces and in a coalition scenario,” said Euan Graham, director of the national security program at the Lowy Institute, an Australian think-tank.
Countering submarines requires vessels that move freely in the region, in contrast to static vessels used for detecting missiles.
The decision to use the Aegis ballistic missile defense systems brings Australia in line with U.S., Japanese and Korean vessels, allowing international cooperation, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, Australia’s navy chief, told reporters in Sydney.
“The choice of the Aegis system allows Australia to plug into the U.S. alliance. They will be able to share data from vessels and potentially aircraft,” said Graham.
The frigates will be the next major component of Australia’s plan to increase defense spending by A$30 billion to be worth A$195 billion, or 2 percent of GDP, by 2021-2022 as Canberra seeks to protect its strategic and trade interests in the Asia-Pacific.
Australia selected French naval contractor DCNS last year to build its fleet of 12 submarines, ahead of other offers from Japan and Germany, one the world’s most lucrative defense contracts.