Lethe
Captain
Reviewing Senator Paterson's and subsequent that are the basis for the above ABC story, I think that he makes a number of legitimate points, albeit within a broader framework (i.e. "all the way with USA") with which I fundamentally disagree.
Paterson evidently perceives that the Australian submarine transition as it is currently structured under the government's "optimal pathway" -- Collins LOTE, Virginia transfers, SSN-AUKUS -- faces serious challenges. Paterson explicitly frames the B-21 Raider as filling a potential capability gap that may emerge if AUKUS does not run to schedule. The notion that AUKUS may not run to schedule is itself a significant concession from the Shadow Minister for Defence, particularly given that he is otherwise clearly pro-AUKUS and so cannot be dismissed as merely noise as so many AUKUS skeptics have been.
Paterson suggests the acquisition of B-21 Raider as a long-range strike platform as an effective if partial complement to the strike capabilities provided by SSNs. The desire to operate in China's near abroad, and to hold Chinese assets at risk there, is a consistent through-line in many of the discussions about ongoing and potential Australian defence acquisitions. Notably, Paterson asserts that "our primary security threat is not an invasion of our homeland. It is coercion leveraging our supply chain vulnerabilities." One might inquire at this juncture just how effective America's strategic bomber and submarine inventories have been at shielding the nation from supply chain disruptions, but nonetheless this point goes to the broader debate about the relative weight that is assigned to strategically defensive capabilities in our near-abroad, and strategically offensive capabilities aimed at shaping adversary behaviour at a distance.
Paterson acknowledges that there is perhaps a more obvious Plan B, but rejects it:
As this strikes at the heart of what I believe we should be doing at the present moment, I feel compelled to push back against this argument. The practical implementation of a Plan B submarine acquisition would arise from similar circumstances and proceed along same the lines as our recent acquisition of Mogami-class frigates. Consider the timeline:
April 2023: Defence Strategic Review articulates need for Tier 2 surface combatant program to supplement existing Hobart-class destroyers and Hunter-class frigate program.
February 2024: Enhanced Lethality Surface Combatant Fleet analysis published that identifies four contenders for Tier 2 frigate program: Mogami, Meko A-200, Navantia ALFA3000, Daegu II/III.
November 2024: Downselect to two contenders: Mogami and Meko A-200.
August 2025: Evolved Mogami-class frigate selected as Australia's new frigate.
April 2026: Contract signed with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries for initial three frigates, first to be delivered to RAN in 2029 with all three operational by 2034.
So, three years from articulation of requirement to contract, six and one-half years from articulation of requirement to first delivery. That's how fast one can move when the requirement is clearly discerned and pursued, and when production of a mature design occurs at a foreign shipyard with a proven record of delivery.
Those characteristics would necessarily be shared with any Plan B submarine acquisition program. Construction in Australia would be off the table. Only minimal design changes absolutely necessary for Australian operation would be entertained. The leading contenders for such a contract would probably be Japan's Taegei-class or South Korea's Jang Yeongsil-class (KSS-III Batch II) SSKs. In relation to Canada's future submarine requirement, Hanwha Ocean shipbuilding that if contracted by 2026, the first four boats can be delivered at a rate of one per year from 2032. Of course Australia has yet to even discern a requirement for such a boat, so any such procurement would take time to work through the system even if pursued with even greater alacrity than the Tier 2 frigate was, as it should be. Nonetheless, this suggests that deliveries of new SSKs to Australia should be possible from the mid-2030s, i.e. the same general timeframe in which we are currently planning to receive Virginia-class submarines. If Paterson is worried about those boats potentially being pushed back, as well he should be, the case becomes even more favourable. Of course it would've been much better to have embarked upon such a procurement at least several years ago, but such is the legacy that successive Coalition and now Labor governments have bequeathed to us.
Given that the United States Navy clearly requires each and every SSN it can get its hands on, I think one can plausible argue, adopting for the sake of argument the thoroughly establishment perspective of Australia as a valued ally of the United States who seeks to do everything to maximise our combined capabilities against the threat of China, that we have a positive obligation to pursue an alternative acquisition strategy, rather than seeking to deprive the Americans of scarce assets that they can ill-afford to part with. X number of American SSNs plus Y number of modern Australian SSKs are collectively superior to that same number of American SSNs split between USN and RAN.
In making the case for the consideration of B-21 Raider, Paterson acknowledges risks to AUKUS only in the delivery of Virginia-class SSNs to Australia. The virtue of a Plan B submarine acquisition is that it not only relieves pressure in relation to that aspect of AUKUS, but it does so also in relation to the sustainment and credibility of our existing Collins-class submarine capability, and also the development and production schedule of SSN-AUKUS. The current optimal pathway has the first SSN-AUKUS boat delivered to Australia in 2042 with subsequent boats following on at three-year intervals. With a half-dozen e.g. KSS-IIIs in the inventory, we could be much more sanguine about the entirely realistic prospect that both the delivery date of the first SSN-AUKUS and the delivery cadence of subsequent boats will fall short of those goals. Indeed, I suspect that a major unspoken argument against an acquisition of this nature is that it would open the door to scaling back our commitment to SSN-AUKUS. While I would not necessarily advocate for that in the present context, it would surely be useful for a future government of the day to have that option if circumstances warrant.
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