AUKUS News, Views, Analysis.

ACuriousPLAFan said:

Since we already have Australia as the leading example, what's going to stop the US from stationing American nuclear warheads in "allied" countries that are closer to China? Remember that both Japan and South Korea have hosted American nukes during the First Cold War.

Then, there's the Domino Effect - Would the Philippines be next to host American nukes? What about Thailand? Malaysia? Indonesia? Vietnam? Palau? Papua New Guinea? India? Maldives?

China is about to face the worst ever geopolitical threat to her utmost survival from the US since the height of the Cold War 1.0. It is of great concern that the current defense posture and MAD policy between China and the US no longer works.

Hence, China should really modify her nuclear weapons policy in response to these sorts of developments. Instead of strictly following the "No Using Nuclear Weapons Against Non-Nuclear States" policy, China should amend that policy - Such that countries that are located in the vicinity of China and are formally "allied" to the US would be excluded from said policy, given that these countries:
1. Host American nuclear warheads, and
2. Becomes the launching pad for the US military to conduct nuclear strikes against the Chinese military and the Chinese populace, whether through strategic bombers, fighters, TELs and/or SSBNs -
Even if said countries do not have nuclear weapons of their own.

For any country that allows the US to station nuclear warheads on their soil AND allows the US to launch nuclear strikes against China from their soil MUST be automatically regarded as a complicit of the US, and hence, rightfully deserves prompt and full nuclear retaliation from China.

If repeated indirect warnings to these countries by China against stationing US nuclear weapons on their own soil and potentially being used as staging grounds for US nuclear strikes against the Chinese military, the Chinese government and the Chinese people have been ignored, then only a solid, direct and stern warning like this can work.

Of course, such change in policy should be kept top secret in order to prevent panic from spreading across neighbouring countries of China. Therefore, this policy amendment can only be made public when tensions between the US and China has become insurmountable, and that the US has shown potential/imminent signs/considerations of launching nuclear attacks against China from these countries.

The end result would depend on what the governments and populace of these countries do. Either they kick out/ward off any attempt by the US to station American nukes on their soil, or they can be prepared to receive nuclear retaliation from China thanks to the parts which they played in any instances where the US launches nuclear attack on China.

The general idea is that if these countries are successful in preventing American nukes from being stationed in their countries, at least the chances of nuclear exchange between the US and China can be reduced somewhat. This is mainly because the available options for the US to launch nuclear attacks against China from anywhere around China's vicinity would be limited.

I do apologize to anyone in this forum which are from the aforementioned countries for proposing things that are cruel, but in light of the recent and possible future developments in East Asia and the IndoPac, I'm afraid that what's left for all of us to rely upon is through the power of the people in your respective countries to avert nuclear armageddon.

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Lethe said:

I think the basic concept is sound. Hypothetically, if nuclear-armed USAF bombers were to take-off from Darwin and deliver a nuclear strike against the PRC, nuclear retaliation could reasonably be directed toward both the United States and Australia.

However, I disagree that this policy should be kept secret. If the policy is secret, then it cannot perform its intended function of discouraging third-party nations from hosting US nuclear forces. Rather, I believe that nuclear doctrine should be clearly communicated so that all parties understand the potential consequences. As part of this I would include detailed communications regarding the ongoing expansion and modernisation of China's nuclear deterrent. China can formally outline the failure of the major nuclear weapons states (i.e. USA and Russia) to pursue disarmament in good faith, coupled with the USA's ongoing efforts to undermine China's deterrent via large-scale investment in anti-ballistic missile technologies, as requiring a measured and appropriate increase in China's own nuclear capabilities in order to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. Fundamentally, China's nuclear posture is quite reasonable and, clearly communicated, can withstand the light of public scrutiny.

I also think it is useful to distinguish between two different scenarios whereby US nuclear weapons are in foreign countries. The first kind is a temporary presence that could be associated with something as routine as a port visit. US armed forces operate on a policy whereby they "neither confirm nor deny" the presence of US nuclear weapons. That is to say, all US ships, submarines, and aircraft are potentially carrying nuclear weapons. This policy produced considerable

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in the US-New Zealand relationship in the 1980s when the latter passed legislation outlawing nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed vessels from its waters. In the context of the US "neither confirm nor deny" policy, this meant all US Navy ships were effectively banned from New Zealand ports, and the USA retaliated by downgrading the relationship its relationship with New Zealand across the board.

The second kind of deployment is semi-permanent, as with US nuclear weapons hosted in Turkey, Italy, and Germany. The purpose of these deployments is not to give Washington more options in conducting nuclear strikes against adversaries. Rather, these US nuclear weapons are intended to compensate the nations in question in exchange for their agreeing not to develop nuclear weapons themselves. These deployments date back to the pre-NPT era wherein any number of nations were, quite reasonably, thinking of developing their own nuclear capabilities.

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Maikeru said:

It's a bit more than that, for example B61s are also based in Belgium and Holland, neither of which would ever have contemplated their own nukes. Rather, the presence on the nukes ensures that the US has an interest in the security of those nations, in theory at least. These days the bombs in Turkey are essentially old-style 'hostages', there to cement the US-Turkey alliance, if the US ever dares move them then Turkey knows the alliance is truly over.

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Murphy: Hello, PM I want to return to Aukus if I can and sovereignty which has been a major feature of your speech today. Military history gives us plenty of examples where the interests of Australia and a major security ally have not aligned. John Curtin thrashed that out at the Lodge during World War II on a number of occasions.

So my question is quite simple. In relation to nuclear submarines, if there is a conflict between the United States, the United Kingdom and ourselves, about where these assets would be deployed during a conflict - we might have different views about where they should be - who is the decision maker? Is it us? Or is it more muddy than that? Because, will it require concurrence, because there’ll need to be operational oversight of the vessels by either the UK or the US

Albanese: Australia will maintain our sovereignty

Murphy: In all circumstances?

Albanese: Australia will maintain our sovereignty. That’s a decision for Australia as a sovereign nation, just as the United States will maintain its sovereignty and the United Kingdom will maintain its.

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Lethe said:

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This does not address the real question: if Australia were to defy Washington's wishes, and the latter retaliated by withdrawing technical support, to what extent would we be able to maintain our submarine and other military capabilities independently? For if we are reliant on ongoing American support, that gives Washington significant leverage over Canberra's decision-making process.

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Blitzo said:

That implies there are any likely situations whereby Australia's interests could significantly diverge from that of the US in terms of geopolitical or geostrategic interests. Given how closely Australia has hitched itself to the US, I think the statement from Albanese is still technically true. Australia will maintain it's sovereignty by adjusting its national interests to that of what US national interests are, if there are ever incompatibilities.

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Lethe said:

Those who think these questions are not worth asking certainly assume there is no conceivable point of departure between Australian and US policy. Not everyone in Australia is that far gone, however, hence these questions are being raised in the public sphere, however feebly.

I am mostly thinking of very sharp matters of war and peace. If some combination of the United States, China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, etc. were to march to the very brink of war, Australia should have the option to stay out of it, yet Washington may well expect us to march into the abyss with them, and be very displeased if we were to decline to do so.

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Lethe said:

Those who think these questions are not worth asking certainly assume there is no conceivable point of departure between Australian and US policy. Not everyone in Australia is that far gone, however, hence these questions are being raised in the public sphere, however feebly.

While the case of New Zealand in the 1980s that I previously outlined shows that a significant breakdown in relations can occur in peacetime, I am mostly thinking of very sharp questions of war and peace. If some combination of the United States, China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, etc. were to march to the very brink of war, Australia should have the option to stay out of it, yet Washington may well expect us to march into the abyss with them, and be very displeased if, at the moment of decision, we were to decline to do so.

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Lethe said:

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This does not address the real question: if Australia were to defy Washington's wishes, and the latter retaliated by withdrawing technical support, to what extent would we be able to maintain our submarine and other military capabilities independently? For if we are reliant on ongoing American support, that gives Washington significant leverage over Canberra's decision-making process.

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SYDNEY, March 1 (Reuters) - Australia's former defence minister said on Wednesday he favoured Australia choosing a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine over a British model in its AUKUS alliance, comments swiftly labelled "irresponsible" by the government, which expects to announce a decision within weeks [....]

"It was a proven design, it gave us interoperability with the Americans, and there'll be more American subs in the Indo-Pacific than there will be British submarines, who will concentrate, quite rightly, particularly given the Russian threat, to continental Europe," he said.

"I worry that if the government's taken a decision to go for a cheaper design, that it will delay the delivery of those submarines," he added, when asked about defence industry speculation that a British submarine would be chosen.

Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy, who last week visited the British submarine shipyard in Barrow-in-Furness, said that Dutton's comments were "incredibly irresponsible" and that his predecessor was "not privy to the latest information".

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