Ask anything Thread

[Sczepan]

Does anyone knows if china has ever detected any USN (or even russian) submarine ?

I only heard the other side:
Nov. 2004:

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Alleged chinese sub entering Japan waters first spotted by U.S. Navy

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But I am pretty sure, USN-subs are in SCS, esp. near Hainan (Sanya)[/URL][/URL]

 

[Blitzo]

I pretty much agree with your "westpac" view of PLA development and your short/medium/long term timelines. However I think your concepts are anchored upon Western notions projecting themselves on China rather than China's own notions. Though this may make it more easily understandable by an audience more familiar with Western thinking, it also has inherent bias and inaccuracy.

I would refer to your "westpac" view as "homeland defense" view for China and it would not aim for more than dominating up to the 1st island chain by military means and being able to counter threats from the 2nd island chain before these threats can meaningfully affect the aforementioned. The core Chinese concern is Taiwan, either its recovery by China or prevention of it falling under another country's orbit who can in turn use it to threaten the Chinese mainland, as Japan had done during its colonial era through WW2. The secondary concern are the ECS and SCS islands China considers its territory, again as much for their control by China as prevention of them falling under the control of others who can in turn use them to threaten the Chinese mainland. The parallel but non-territorial-per-se approach applies to the waters within the 1st island chain.

These are valid Chinese concerns as the 1st island chain countries include multiple qualitative peer and potentially near peer militaries, and hosts and potential hosts of large forward US bases with the capability to threaten the Chinese mainland. These forces already include, will soon or can easily include even more, significant expeditionary forces including carriers, amphibious air, naval, and ground assets, as well as strategic bombers, ballistic and cruise missile capable ships and subs.

Due to the quantity, immovable location, and inherent interests of these countries, it is immeasurably more effective, efficient, and realistic even for a much more developed and powerful China in the future, as it has in the past, to seek diplomatic accommodation with them rather than to attempt any sort of military domination beyond within the 1st island chain. A key exception is when 1st island chain countries host third party forces that are even more of a threat to China, but even here it makes sense for China to merely hold the local countries just as at risk as China in any conflict to deter participation in action against China in the first place rather than to outright dominate them.

For the above homeland defense needs China requires having significant expeditionary forces to operate within and along the 1st island chain. Because of the heavy military and diplomatic burden of China's homeland defense needs, a China that does not overextend itself will never bother with long distance power projection to the scale of participating in any sort of full scale conflict, which requires forward basing far beyond the scale of the first ever Chinese overseas base in Djibouti, even with a much less capable nation state. And if China achieves sufficient security through diplomatic means with local countries it is unnecessary for it to try to do so through military means unless a third country militarily threatens local countries.

Which brings us to the US threat to China, which is once again best dealt with from the Chinese point of view through diplomatic accommodation or competition. Because of China's homeland defense burden it is unrealistic for China to push deeper into the Pacific from a deterrence standpoint. It is also unnecessary as long as the ultimate hedge of nuclear MAD remains viable without China needing to move its forces further out.

I thought about describing "westpac missions" as "homeland defense" or something of the sort -- however, I also think that the realities of modern weapon systems means that "homeland defense" may incorrectly mean China would only aim to operate in the immediate proximity of its homeland such as up to the first island chain.

I suppose what I'm saying is that in the medium and longer term I believe that China will want to have the ability to operate in the western pacific in a high intensity conflict scenario up to and beyond the second island chain. Keep in mind this is something on the 15-30 year timescale.


Now, this isn't to say China will not also seek to use diplomatic means to shape the western pacific to better suit its interests and security, however I am saying that China would likely want to prepare its military to have to fight into greater depth into the pacific.


Or, if we want to put it in a different way, I see their goals vis-a-vis a hypothetical westpac high intensity war to be phased in such a way:

Short term: able to contest within 1st island chain, able to operate minimally between 1st and 2nd island chain, unable to operate beyond 2nd island chain
Medium term: able to significantly contest within 1st island chain, able to contest between 1st and 2nd island chain, able to operate minimally beyond 2nd island chain
Long term: able to dominate within 1st island chain, able to significantly contest between 1st and 2nd island chain, able to contest beyond 2nd island chain

 

[antiterror13]

I thought about describing "westpac missions" as "homeland defense" or something of the sort -- however, I also think that the realities of modern weapon systems means that "homeland defense" may incorrectly mean China would only aim to operate in the immediate proximity of its homeland such as up to the first island chain.

I suppose what I'm saying is that in the medium and longer term I believe that China will want to have the ability to operate in the western pacific in a high intensity conflict scenario up to and beyond the second island chain. Keep in mind this is something on the 15-30 year timescale.

Now, this isn't to say China will not also seek to use diplomatic means to shape the western pacific to better suit its interests and security, however I am saying that China would likely want to prepare its military to have to fight into greater depth into the pacific.

Or, if we want to put it in a different way, I see their goals vis-a-vis a hypothetical westpac high intensity war to be phased in such a way:

Short term: able to contest within 1st island chain, able to operate minimally between 1st and 2nd island chain, unable to operate beyond 2nd island chain
Medium term: able to significantly contest within 1st island chain, able to contest between 1st and 2nd island chain, able to operate minimally beyond 2nd island chain
Long term: able to dominate within 1st island chain, able to significantly contest between 1st and 2nd island chain, able to contest beyond 2nd island chain

What are your time frames of Short, Medium and Long terms ?

I think PLAN is very much able to contest (or perhaps kind of significantly) within 1st island chain

 

[Blitzo]

What are your time frames of Short, Medium and Long terms ?

I think PLAN is very much able to contest (or perhaps kind of significantly) within 1st island chain

short: now to 10 years
medium: 10-20 years
long: 20-30 years.

give or take, on a spectrum

 

[Iron Man]

What are your time frames of Short, Medium and Long terms ?

I think PLAN is very much able to contest (or perhaps kind of significantly) within 1st island chain

It's not just a matter of timeframe (i.e. "short", "medium", and "long" term), but also a matter of the strength of the opposing forces. While the USN may no longer feel comfortable sending in a single CSG into the first island chain nowadays, it may still feel comfortable sending in 3 CSGs. In time, though, even 3 CSGs will be insufficient to defeat a combined PLAAF/PLAN force; it may take 4, or 5, or even more. On the other hand, accumulating 3 CSGs into the Western Pacific takes a matter of weeks and 4-5 CSGs a matter of months, during which time a Taiwan military scenario may have already been settled and PLA/PLAMC forces already deeply entrenched. So it will not just be a matter of what the Chinese military is able to accomplish in these timeframes, but also the calculated risks that the USN and USAF will be taking in deciding how long they can afford to wait while gathering what they perceive to be the necessary forces to confront the Chinese military. As the US military decides it can no longer accumulate sufficient forces in time to defeat a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan with its current basing arrangements, it may decide to forward deploy more forces, such as to Hawaii or Guam or even Diego Garcia for a back door approach. It could also move to a 65/35 or 70/30 distribution of Pacific/Atlantic forces.

 

[Red Moon]

I've personally long conceptualized the PLAN and PLA's two main strategic directions as "westpac oriented" and "non-westpac oriented".

In the short term to medium term future (5-15 years, let's say), the "westpac oriented" direction will involve seeking the ability to fight a high intensity air-naval-missile conflict in the western pacific limited to the first and possibly second island chains. However, in this same period, the "non-westpac oriented" direction is one where China faces risks in the Indian Ocean by nation states and non-nation state actors that have the ability to threaten Chinese SLOCs, Chinese investments, and Chinese nationals, all of which exist in the Subsaharan Africa region, the MENA region, as well as the Indian Ocean -- for this "non-westpac oriented" direction, it can be basically described as needing an ability to fight a low to medium intensity conflict in blue water, where power projection will be necessary. It would be a strategic disaster if Chinese SLOCs or Chinese investments were threatened and China lacked the ability to defend them. It is important to note that the "non-westpac" direction is one where the PLA's adversary is NOT the US or a major US ally.
...

Well this is interesting in it's own right, but this is the "ask anything" thread, which means we can take it in a different direction!

In the light of this analysis, what would be the meaning of the recent rumor that the carrier program has been accelerated, and the current buzz about 03 and 04? The answer would have to lie in the leadership's assessment of current geopolitcal realities. We can observe that while the BRI has been met with a good deal of enthusiasm in Africa and most of Asia, and even Eastern Europe, there seems to be some resistance in Western Europe, and in particular, Germany. Germany fears the loss of it's primacy in the eastern part of the continent, and has also begun to fret about direct Chinese competition in high tech areas.

From the above it would follow that the maritime silk road, and connections with Africa and the Middle East take on more importance as compared to Europe. Xi Jingping's current trip through this region brings this out as well, and these things would have been planned some 3-9 months ahead of time. Of course the BRICS meeting is perfectly timed, but the emphasis this time is defense of world trade and promotion of south-south cooperation in a bigger way.

To me, this explains the accelerated need for a carrier force. In the medium term 4 carriers may be sufficient for "low intensity" protection of SLOCs to Africa and the Middle East, but perhaps not two alone, given that one is mainly for training.

 

[AndrewS]

Just one point.

Isn't the internal Chinese terminology "near seas" (westpac) versus "far seas" (non-westpac)

 

[Jura The idiot]

It's not just a matter of timeframe (i.e. "short", "medium", and "long" term), but also a matter of the strength of the opposing forces. While the USN may no longer feel comfortable sending in a single CSG into the first island chain nowadays, it may still feel comfortable sending in 3 CSGs. In time, though, even 3 CSGs will be insufficient to defeat a combined PLAAF/PLAN force; it may take 4, or 5, or even more. On the other hand, accumulating 3 CSGs into the Western Pacific takes a matter of weeks and 4-5 CSGs a matter of months, during which time a Taiwan military scenario may have already been settled and PLA/PLAMC forces already deeply entrenched. So it will not just be a matter of what the Chinese military is able to accomplish in these timeframes, but also the calculated risks that the USN and USAF will be taking in deciding how long they can afford to wait while gathering what they perceive to be the necessary forces to confront the Chinese military. As the US military decides it can no longer accumulate sufficient forces in time to defeat a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan with its current basing arrangements, it may decide to forward deploy more forces, such as to Hawaii or Guam or even Diego Garcia for a back door approach. It could also move to a 65/35 or 70/30 distribution of Pacific/Atlantic forces.

yeah:

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as of
July 27, 2018
...
Aircraft Carriers Underway:

• USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) - Pacific
• USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) - Atlantic

Amphibious Assault Ships Underway:

���������� USS Essex (LHD 2) - Pacific

���������� USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) - 6th Fleet

and that's it

 

[PanAsian]

I thought about describing "westpac missions" as "homeland defense" or something of the sort -- however, I also think that the realities of modern weapon systems means that "homeland defense" may incorrectly mean China would only aim to operate in the immediate proximity of its homeland such as up to the first island chain.

I suppose what I'm saying is that in the medium and longer term I believe that China will want to have the ability to operate in the western pacific in a high intensity conflict scenario up to and beyond the second island chain. Keep in mind this is something on the 15-30 year timescale.

Now, this isn't to say China will not also seek to use diplomatic means to shape the western pacific to better suit its interests and security, however I am saying that China would likely want to prepare its military to have to fight into greater depth into the pacific.

Or, if we want to put it in a different way, I see their goals vis-a-vis a hypothetical westpac high intensity war to be phased in such a way:

Short term: able to contest within 1st island chain, able to operate minimally between 1st and 2nd island chain, unable to operate beyond 2nd island chain
Medium term: able to significantly contest within 1st island chain, able to contest between 1st and 2nd island chain, able to operate minimally beyond 2nd island chain
Long term: able to dominate within 1st island chain, able to significantly contest between 1st and 2nd island chain, able to contest beyond 2nd island chain

Again, whenever there is talk about anything other than MOOTW or low intensity operations beyond the 1st island chain, that is a US construct and projection of colonial powers behavior on China. Pretty much every post by everyone else above supports my earlier points but the key conceptual one is this:

Just one point.

Isn't the internal Chinese terminology "near seas" (westpac) versus "far seas" (non-westpac)

Just look at the basing and/or alliance requirements for any sort of meaningful power projection, China just doesn't have it. If commercial ports are to be counted towards China's network then commercial ports, colonies, and territories that are little more than back up military bases are also to be counted towards other countries' networks such as that of the US, UK, France, Spain, even the Netherlands.

Again, looking at security in China's immediate periphery, no matter how powerful China becomes its homeland defense will take up so much of its bandwidth and has so much downside potential that China will always be both constrained and reticent with power projection other than MOOTW.

 

[Iron Man]

Again, whenever there is talk about anything other than MOOTW or low intensity operations beyond the 1st island chain, that is a US construct and projection of colonial powers behavior on China. Pretty much every post by everyone else above supports my earlier points but the key conceptual one is this:



Just look at the basing and/or alliance requirements for any sort of meaningful power projection, China just doesn't have it. If commercial ports are to be counted towards China's network then commercial ports, colonies, and territories that are little more than back up military bases are also to be counted towards other countries' networks such as that of the US, UK, France, Spain, even the Netherlands.

Again, looking at security in China's immediate periphery, no matter how powerful China becomes its homeland defense will take up so much of its bandwidth and has so much downside potential that China will always be both constrained and reticent with power projection other than MOOTW.

Nah, some day China will have naval basing arrangements in the Indian Ocean and/or Middle East. IMO it would be a dereliction of duty if the Chinese military didn't eventually set up these kinds of basing arrangements in this region of the world given how vital it is to Chinese economic and strategic interests, interests which will only grow with time with the BRI.