Ask anything Thread

[Red Moon]

Again, whenever there is talk about anything other than MOOTW or low intensity operations beyond the 1st island chain, that is a US construct and projection of colonial powers behavior on China. Pretty much every post by everyone else above supports my earlier points but the key conceptual one is this:



Just look at the basing and/or alliance requirements for any sort of meaningful power projection, China just doesn't have it. If commercial ports are to be counted towards China's network then commercial ports, colonies, and territories that are little more than back up military bases are also to be counted towards other countries' networks such as that of the US, UK, France, Spain, even the Netherlands.

Again, looking at security in China's immediate periphery, no matter how powerful China becomes its homeland defense will take up so much of its bandwidth and has so much downside potential that China will always be both constrained and reticent with power projection other than MOOTW.

I agree with this, but I also think that simply these MOOTW operations, and the existence and occasional presence of Chinese aircraft carriers will prevent incidents of the sort that raises insurance rates to the point where shipping no longer takes place.

Even at some future point when China may have lots of aircraft carriers, 150 plus major surface combatants and boomers in every ocean, I would not expect China to use "power projection" against developing countries, i.e., interventionism, as this type of crap just doesn't work. I might add that whatever it is that China is quietly doing today to solve it's problems in these countries, apparently does work, so why change in the future?

 

[PanAsian]

I agree with this, but I also think that simply these MOOTW operations, and the existence and occasional presence of Chinese aircraft carriers will prevent incidents of the sort that raises insurance rates to the point where shipping no longer takes place.

Even at some future point when China may have lots of aircraft carriers, 150 plus major surface combatants and boomers in every ocean, I would not expect China to use "power projection" against developing countries, i.e., interventionism, as this type of crap just doesn't work. I might add that whatever it is that China is quietly doing today to solve it's problems in these countries, apparently does work, so why change in the future?

I hope that by whatever China is quietly doing you mean development and diplomacy.

 

[Red Moon]

I hope that by whatever China is quietly doing you mean development and diplomacy.

Of course I do, but it has to be qualified in that Chinese diplomacy is rather different from the Western variety. I know of several cases where the Chinese government has maintained contacts and negotiated with "insurgents", "terrorists", or otherwise enemies of a regime and reached agreements, all with the knowledge and approval of the government in question. They did this in Sudan, and I believe in Egypt. In Pakistan, they no longer consider the Baloch nationalists a threat to CPEC, as another example. China has brokered a "development" deal between Pakistan and Afghanistan as well. The TAPI pipeline (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India) plan was Uncle Sam's wish and baby from before 2001, and yet they were not able to pull it off. But as soon as it is in China's interest, magic happens, and not only the four countries, but also the Taliban has signed on to it. China is not a party and is not mentioned, but who else would be able to prevail on those who previously opposed the project? And I can't resist another example because it is unprecedented: the deal brokered in Zimbabwe between Mugabe and the Emmerson Mnangagwa, the new president. They avoided big problems, and possibly even a civil war through that deal, and preserved the legacy of the liberation struggle in the process.

Maybe instead of "development and diplomacy" I would call it "development diplomacy". Through this strategy, China aligns its own interests with the counterparty's interests. It doesn't work as well with countries that are already developed, of course, but nobody's perfect!

 

[Blitzo]

Again, whenever there is talk about anything other than MOOTW or low intensity operations beyond the 1st island chain, that is a US construct and projection of colonial powers behavior on China. Pretty much every post by everyone else above supports my earlier points but the key conceptual one is this:

I don't understand what you mean.

When you say "anything other than MOOTW or low intensity operations beyond the 1st island chain" you are effectively saying "high intensity operations beyond 1st island chain," yes?

So when you say that such an idea "is a US construct and projection of colonial powers behavior on China," are you suggesting that China has no need to be capable of conducting such operations?

Just look at the basing and/or alliance requirements for any sort of meaningful power projection, China just doesn't have it. If commercial ports are to be counted towards China's network then commercial ports, colonies, and territories that are little more than back up military bases are also to be counted towards other countries' networks such as that of the US, UK, France, Spain, even the Netherlands.

Again, looking at security in China's immediate periphery, no matter how powerful China becomes its homeland defense will take up so much of its bandwidth and has so much downside potential that China will always be both constrained and reticent with power projection other than MOOTW.

Well there is power projection and then there is power projection.

One one hand, you can talk about power projection from China to more distant regions of the world like the IOR, or around MENA.

On the other hand, there is also "closer" power projection from China that can be done beyond the first island chain and second island chain, eastwards, say to Hawaii.


Closer homeland defense will of course take up Chinese resources and capabilities, but the way I see it is as Chinese military capabilities grow, the amount of resources or capabilities they will need to satisfactorily conduct the homeland defense mission will reduce, and that will free up more resources to invest in higher end and longer range scenarios beyond the first island chain in the western pacific.

Keep in mind that "high intensity westpac" missions by extension is an euphemism for a conflict against the US and their allies.
The idea that my previous post was trying to convey, is that in the long term China will likely seek the capabilities to rapidly and effectively strike and neutralize many regional bases and staging areas and other assets in short order (i.e.: having the ability to "dominate" within the first island chain), and then after that is done, to have the ability to more freely deploy into the overall western pacific to face the forces that the US may seek to deploy against China at longer distances away from the Chinese mainland.

 

[Blitzo]

Just one point.

Isn't the internal Chinese terminology "near seas" (westpac) versus "far seas" (non-westpac)

The westpac is a big place, and I'm not sure if the Chinese terminology for "near seas" is including the entirety of the western pacific (from first island chain out to beyond the first island chain, say up to Hawaii?), or if it is only limited to the first island chain.

that's why I used the more geographical westpac vs non-westpac terms

 

[PanAsian]

I don't understand what you mean.

When you say "anything other than MOOTW or low intensity operations beyond the 1st island chain" you are effectively saying "high intensity operations beyond 1st island chain," yes?

So when you say that such an idea "is a US construct and projection of colonial powers behavior on China," are you suggesting that China has no need to be capable of conducting such operations?

Indeed I am saying no to both capability and strategy.

Though if you want to debate capability vs intent, I will say that blindly looking at capability is objective to a degree but also out of context to another. The same forces used for an amphibious landing in Taiwan can be used for an amphibious landing in the Philippines, but China is not going to do the latter. The same forces used for an escorted/secured evacuation of citizens from say a civil war in Africa can be used for an intervention in that civil war but China is not going to do the latter.

Well there is power projection and then there is power projection.

One one hand, you can talk about power projection from China to more distant regions of the world like the IOR, or around MENA.

On the other hand, there is also "closer" power projection from China that can be done beyond the first island chain and second island chain, eastwards, say to Hawaii.

Agreed, in that I am saying China's carriers are intended for deterrence even closer to home, to maintain a conventional MAD balance with mainland Japan and perhaps also needed for South Korea to prevent their intervention or escalation in any scenario that does not directly involve them, such as a Taiwan scenario.

Again as above, the same carrier forces or capability that is required for China to reliably hold eastern Japan at risk in any conflict may be very similar to one for an attack on northern Australia but China is not going to do the latter. However such capability is far from what it would take to hold for example the US west coast at risk in any conflict.

Closer homeland defense will of course take up Chinese resources and capabilities, but the way I see it is as Chinese military capabilities grow, the amount of resources or capabilities they will need to satisfactorily conduct the homeland defense mission will reduce, and that will free up more resources to invest in higher end and longer range scenarios beyond the first island chain in the western pacific.

Keep in mind that "high intensity westpac" missions by extension is an euphemism for a conflict against the US and their allies.
The idea that my previous post was trying to convey, is that in the long term China will likely seek the capabilities to rapidly and effectively strike and neutralize many regional bases and staging areas and other assets in short order (i.e.: having the ability to "dominate" within the first island chain), and then after that is done, to have the ability to more freely deploy into the overall western pacific to face the forces that the US may seek to deploy against China at longer distances away from the Chinese mainland.

Fair enough but I don't think that will be the driver for long distance Chinese carrier deployment into the Pacific towards the US. The driver is Chinese inability or inconfidence in maintaining land based or home territory/periphery based nuclear MAD deterrence with the US, thereby necessitating it to further develop, deploy, and escort the naval and air legs of its nuclear triad to be in closer range and more confident delivery to the US mainland. THAAD deployment in South Korea as well as the ABM and ASW capabilities of US and allied naval forces no doubt pushed China in this direction. Though it involves expeditionary forces this is actually part of homeland defense.

 

[gelgoog]

Indeed I am saying no to both capability and strategy.

Though if you want to debate capability vs intent, I will say that blindly looking at capability is objective to a degree but also out of context to another. The same forces used for an amphibious landing in Taiwan can be used for an amphibious landing in the Philippines, but China is not going to do the latter. The same forces used for an escorted/secured evacuation of citizens from say a civil war in Africa can be used for an intervention in that civil war but China is not going to do the latter.

Agreed, in that I am saying China's carriers are intended for deterrence even closer to home, to maintain a conventional MAD balance with mainland Japan and perhaps also needed for South Korea to prevent their intervention or escalation in any scenario that does not directly involve them, such as a Taiwan scenario.

Again as above, the same carrier forces or capability that is required for China to reliably hold eastern Japan at risk in any conflict may be very similar to one for an attack on northern Australia but China is not going to do the latter. However such capability is far from what it would take to hold for example the US west coast at risk in any conflict.

Fair enough but I don't think that will be the driver for long distance Chinese carrier deployment into the Pacific towards the US. The driver is Chinese inability or inconfidence in maintaining land based or home territory/periphery based nuclear MAD deterrence with the US, thereby necessitating it to further develop, deploy, and escort the naval and air legs of its nuclear triad to be in closer range and more confident delivery to the US mainland. THAAD deployment in South Korea as well as the ABM and ASW capabilities of US and allied naval forces no doubt pushed China in this direction. Though it involves expeditionary forces this is actually part of homeland defense.

Perhaps an invasion of the Philippines is highly unlikely. But an invasion of Taiwan, marine incursions into Vietnam, or Korea aren't that farfetched in some scenarios. Think of it as China's own Incheon landings. This is particularly applicable in Vietnam where the Chinese, last time they tried to invade them, got bogged down in the swamps in the border.

 

[H2O]

Question about leisure time onboard a frigate/destroyer type surface ships while underway. I've been looking at the Type 055 and other ships using these "stealth shape" designs. I can't help but wonder how difficult it is to enjoy the view. Are off-duty sailors allowed to wander off to the Weatherdeck? Or, are they stuck inside until authorized? I know there are a few ex-USN people here, and maybe others from other countries. I'm interested on what the policies are for each Navy. If I had to guess, it would be no as it might make it easier for their ship to be detected by others.

 

[kwaigonegin]

Question about leisure time onboard a frigate/destroyer type surface ships while underway. I've been looking at the Type 055 and other ships using these "stealth shape" designs. I can't help but wonder how difficult it is to enjoy the view. Are off-duty sailors allowed to wander off to the Weatherdeck? Or, are they stuck inside until authorized? I know there are a few ex-USN people here, and maybe others from other countries. I'm interested on what the policies are for each Navy. If I had to guess, it would be no as it might make it easier for their ship to be detected by others.

If there are no flight ops then yes..

 

[H2O]

If there are no flight ops then yes..

What about non-carrier ships especially when not in carrier group?