Sort of like shooting off an IR flare except it's a radio transmitter. I guess using a rocket to stay in the air is cheaper than a big RC quadcopter.
A Nulka launch in wartime will be a last ditch attempt to stop leakers when the multi layered defences are pierced. I wonder how disruptive this counter measure will be on any surrounding AEGIS while it is still performing track and scan.
I think there are two fundamental points we have to agree to disagree. Firstly is accountability towards the success or otherwise of program management and execution. A complex program such as the Ford class is put together after vigorous design and technical reviews together with appropriate costing based on certain assumptions. The build assumptions used were simply way too unrealistic against builder estimates, past history and just plain common sense and that is knowing there were a number of immature technologies when building started. That is simply misfeasance. The Oct 2015 GAO states :Not necessarily. it depends on the nature of the project and the nature of the new technology trying to be developed.
Certainly, if mismanagement, corruption, or incompetence is involved, that is so...but that is not always the issue.
As I sad, when bringing so much new technology to the fore, the costs are going to be high.
But the US, as it has done in the past, will slug through and produce them.
Certainly good program management and good cost awareness is essential.
But do not make the mistake of thinking that just because it is higher than thought, that this is the result of either mismanagement or poor cost measures.
Sometimes new technologies are simply more difficult to bring forward.
The Ford-class aircraft carrier’s lead ship began construction with an unrealistic business case. A sound business case balances the necessary resources and knowledge needed to transform a chosen concept into a product. Yet in 2007, GAO found that CVN 78 costs were underestimated and critical technologies were immature—key risks that would impair delivering CVN 78 at cost, on-time, and with its planned capabilities. The ship and its business case were nonetheless approved.
Sorry, knowing how these things work and having been a part of them, it is rarely...very, very rarely that the issues dip into any characterization like lacking common sense or misfeasance.I think there are two fundamental points we have to agree to disagree. Firstly is accountability towards the success or otherwise of program management and execution. A complex program such as the Ford class is put together after vigorous design and technical reviews together with appropriate costing based on certain assumptions. The build assumptions used were simply way too unrealistic against builder estimates, past history and just plain common sense and that is knowing there were a number of immature technologies when building started. That is simply misfeasance.
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And when those political fires get burning, the relevant data like that mentioned above is left unsaid, or purposely misstated...particularly when the press is willingly used as a tool in the political with hunt, instead of being used to get all of the facts on the table.
Sorry, knowing how these things work and having been a part of them, it is rarely...very, very rarely that the issues dip into any characterization like lacking common sense or misfeasance.
Sorry, knowing how these things work and having been a part of them, it is rarely...very, very rarely that the issues dip into any characterization like lacking common sense or misfeasance.
And I certainly do not believe for an instant that either of those things apply in the case of the Ford development.
Of course there are significant design analysis and program reviews all along on the path to construction and ultimate placement in service.
But when bringing forward these technologies, despite the best efforts of everyone involved, you can run into delays, issues, etc. As I say, this does not necessarily mean anyone mismanaged anything. With cutting edge systems, you are not going to be able to be completely accurate in forecasting all the time.
When such things happen, the commitment of the program, and particularly the commitment of the institutions, including the political ones and ultimately the people can certainly be tested.
There is nothing wrong with that either...as long as an accurate depiction of what has happened and what the true stakes are is presented, and then a decision is made accordingly.
Generally, the overall numbers actually needed will still create a significant cost benefit over the life of the program...or, in this case, with ten projected vessels, the savings in crew reduction, less overhauls, etc, will lead to the same.
The biggest problem is that over the last 30+ years, all too often that has not been the case, and almost always for political reasons.
And when those political fires get burning, the relevant data like that mentioned above is left unsaid, or purposely misstated...particularly when the press is willingly used as a tool in the political with hunt, instead of being used to get all of the facts on the table.
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ATLANTIC OCEAN (July 10, 2007) An MV-22 Osprey prepares to land aboard the Royal Navy aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious (R 06). This was first time that an Osprey has embarked in a non-U.S. ship. U.S. Navy photo by Darby Allen (RELEASED)