On July 20, 1997, as part of JTFEX 97-2, USS Nimitz with Commander, Carrier Group Seven (CCG-7) and Carrier Airwing Nine embarked began a high intensity strike campaign. When they completed flight operations four days later, they had generated 771 strike sorties and had put 1,336 bombs on target.
The Surge, as it has come to be known, was unprecedented. It demonstrated the entire process required to put bombs on target in a littoral warfare scenario; it incorporated all facets of strike warfare – from weapons buildup in the magazines to bombs on target. In the post-Vietnam era, no other carrier and embarked airwing have ever generated as much firepower in ninety-eight hours.
Following that six-day period, operations paused for 16 hours, and USS Nimitz and CVW-9 made several preparations for “The Surge” including personnel augmentation, planning augmentation, and replenishment to insure the carrier was fully prepared for the exercise. The resulting average of 192 sorties was touted by the Navy as the benchmark for carrier operations. At the time, this was very important, because naval aviation had taken a hit following the 1991 Gulf War with critics citing low aircraft carrier sortie rates as a reason to reduce the number of aircraft carriers.
While there were obviously agendas at play for the exercise, the lessons learned from that exercise have clearly been demonstrated in Kosovo, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in which, during these operations naval aviation has certainly redeemed itself of the skepticism that may have lingered from the Gulf War. In fact, it was “Surge 97″ that highlighted the remarkable reliability of the F-18 Hornet, a significant metric that highlights the high durability and high sustainability of the aircraft. However, in order for the USS Nimitz to achieve the daily 197 sortie rate sustained for 5 straight days of 24/7 flight operations, almost all sorties were conducted a range less than 200 nautical miles, with a large number conducted under 100nms. As real world operations have since demonstrated, that is not realistic. Regardless, sortie rates under strict conditions remain very useful for comparison purposes.
For “Surge 97″ USS Nimitz had 14 F-14As, 36 F/A-18Cs, 4 EA-6Bs, 8 S-3Bs, 2 ES-3As, and 4 E-2Cs, but of those aircraft only 9 F-14As, 32 F/A-18Cs, 4 EA-6Bs, 5 S-3Bs, 0 ES-3As, and 4 E-2Cs were mission capable on the first day. I think it is important to note that in real world operations, in this case an aircraft carrier that had been engaged in six days of intense operations, an aircraft carrier could have 20% of her CVW unavailable for operations. I think it is also noteworthy that the older aircraft, F-14s and S-3s, suffered the higher downtime rates.
