09V/09VI (095/096) Nuclear Submarine Thread

[ZeEa5KPul]

@Bltizo, point taken about the Virginias. I guess the stars were uncharacteristically aligned for the Pentagon on that one.

Diesel submarines should be better viewed as the 056/A equivalent, because expecting them to operate with any sort of competitive or realistic endurance outside of the first island chain from their homeports, would give up their few advantages of being SSKs, while exposing their disadvantages.

Nevertheless, China operates a large fleet of diesel submarines and it's not going to trade them all in for SSNs. Upgrading most of them to the most advanced 039 standard and installing new technologies like lithium batteries seems a no-brainer. The batteries especially will give them much more endurance than they previously had. I believe there were rumours going around for a while that the PLAN explored using small nuclear reactors on SSK-sized submarines, do you know what became of that?

A lot of the action for the foreseeable future is going to be within the First Island Chain, so there'll be a role for SSKs - especially SSKs that can move faster for longer than the present AIP types can.

I know you think it's premature to speculate on the capability of the 09-V, and tphuang dismisses that it could be world class outright, but I take the analogy of the 055 seriously. I see the exact same pattern the PLAN adopted with its destroyers, with the current panoply of 09-III variants mirroring the 052 variants. Earlier 09-IIIs explored technologies like natural circulation, etc. while this recently pictured one might have a shrouded propulsor (the picture quality is too poor to tell) and further advancements that aren't visible (perhaps IEP).

A thing that bothers me with Chinese nuclear submarines is that they use LEU. I have no expertise in nuclear engineering, but it seems evident to me that a HEU plant with the same power output would be smaller.

 

[Blitzo]

@Bltizo, point taken about the Virginias. I guess the stars were uncharacteristically aligned for the Pentagon on that one.

The US has suffered its share of poorly managed and downright bad programs in the post cold war era, but it has also seen a large share of successes, and when they are successful, they are often world leading in both qualitative capability but more importantly in quantitative fleet size and scale.

Until China's MIC modernization began to really kick in, there was nobody in the same scale as the US.

Nevertheless, China operates a large fleet of diesel submarines and it's not going to trade them all in for SSNs. Upgrading most of them to the most advanced 039 standard and installing new technologies like lithium batteries seems a no-brainer. The batteries especially will give them much more endurance than they previously had. I believe there were rumours going around for a while that the PLAN explored using small nuclear reactors on SSK-sized submarines, do you know what became of that?


A lot of the action for the foreseeable future is going to be within the First Island Chain, so there'll be a role for SSKs - especially SSKs that can move faster for longer than the present AIP types can.

I have no issues with the PLAN continuing to maintain a respectably sized fleet of SSKs even as they increase their SSN fleet.

But I think the PLAN's future SSKs should be SSKs, and not SSKs that try to force their role into a SSN-esque mission.
Increasing acoustic stealth, increasing submerged endurance, increasing speed, improving sensors, weapons fit, etc, is all well and good, but it has to be balanced against the requirements for SSKs to not exceed a certain size and cost.

I know you think it's premature to speculate on the capability of the 09-V, and tphuang dismisses that it could be world class outright, but I take the analogy of the 055 seriously. I see the exact same pattern the PLAN adopted with its destroyers, with the current panoply of 09-III variants mirroring the 052 variants. Earlier 09-IIIs explored technologies like natural circulation, etc. while this recently pictured one might have a shrouded propulsor (the picture quality is too poor to tell) and further advancements that aren't visible (perhaps IEP).

A thing that bothers me with Chinese nuclear submarines is that they use LEU. I have no expertise in nuclear engineering, but it seems evident to me that a HEU plant with the same power output would be smaller.

I'm not inherently against speculating about the capability of the 09V, and for years I've stated that I've viewed the PLAN's SSN evolution and iteration similar to the way they've iterated their surface combatant classes and technology (namely destroyers).
My 2019 article where I wrote about the Bohai expansion basically alluded to it as well.

Comparing 09V with surface combatant equivalents is also something that isn't new -- it's been variously compared to be the "equivalent" of 055 or 052D, depending on context, and I've done so myself as well.
Again, while I'm not inherently against such comparisons, I think it opens up a whole other can of worms because it inevitably means one needs to ask how one views 055 and 052D as comparing to global other destroyers... and whether such comparisons can be applied in the same way to nuclear submarines.


Overall, I expect 09V to be in the same ballpark of technology and acoustic stealth as contemporary leading SSNs (Seawolf/Virginia, Astute, Yasen, Suffren), and it may feature some new technologies that have been alluded to like electric drive (as mentioned by Admiral Ma), while having growth capacity for future variants.

The question that was previously being asked however, was whether 09V would seek to have the same kind of large diameter 12-13m pressure hull as Seawolf or Yasen, with a large torpedo armament (8-10 tubes), and to be focused more on countering other high performance submarines, versus something perhaps slightly more economical or slightly more mass producible like a 10-11m pressure hull like Virginia or Astute with say, 6 torpedo tubes (that would be consistent with PLAN SSN norms/history).

Both options would yield competitive technology and acoustic stealth, but the larger diameter submarine would be somewhat more capable for the blue water counter-submarine mission with a higher warload of torpedoes (see how the USN has approached the SSN(X) for instance, comparing it to Seawolf).

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[Blitzo]

If someone was to ask me what my view of a prospective 09V would ideally yet realistically look like, I'd say:

- A new hullform, something similar to the new small SSK:


- Single hull or hybrid hull, with pressure hull diameter (and thus overall hull diameter) of about 11m. Overall length of 110-120m.
- Six torpedo tubes (capable of launching UUVs and missiles as well, naturally) as standard
- Comes with standard VLS of 12-14 missiles (would be better if it could be in a multi-pack system like the VPT on Virginias, or the Yasen class, rather than single tube/lids like on 688i or early Virginias)
- Ability to have plug in hull modules that can add 20-30 additional VLS as required for new variants
- Third generation natural circulation reactor
- Modern, comprehensive sonar suite (bow sonar either of dome or large aperture type, with towed sonar, flank sonar, etc, all as standard naturally)
- Modern internal acoustic quietening features that you'd expect, taking advantage of the space of a 11m pressure hull
- Possibly a pumpjet, not necessarily absolutely necessary but would be visually aesthetic
- Possibly turbo electric (primarily based on Admiral Ma's testimony from previous years)

If they are capable of mass producing such a class in their new assembly halls (recalling that the southern assembly hall has theoretical floor space for 8 SSN sized boats, and the eastern assembly hall has theoretical floor space for 12 SSN sized boats, or minus by 4 if they want to use one of the corridors for SSBN production), that would be a strategic game changer in the undersea warfare balance of power even after a half decade of consistent, "all cylinders running" production.

 

[montyp165]

If the PLAN does go for the larger hull diameter for the 09V, I'd say it would most likely be the same diameter as the 096 subs to simplify construction.

 

[Blitzo]

If the PLAN does go for the larger hull diameter for the 09V, I'd say it would most likely be the same diameter as the 096 subs to simplify construction.

I can't see 09VI SSBN having a pressure hull diameter under 13m (which is what Ohio and Columbia class have, with dreadnought having 12.8m).

Thus sharing the same pressure hull (assuming 13m minimum) isn't impossible, but I think it would pose some difficulties in terms of building two submarines of such a diameter alongside each other in each corridor of the assembly hall, when mounted on the 7.34m rail set -- potentially halving the number of SSNs that can be built simultaneously in terms of floor space.

I would speculate that a maximum hull diameter of 12m is probably the limit from that perspective, and I can't see 09VI having a hull diameter that small...


edit: that said, it depends on the specifics of how much horizontal clearance there needs to be between two adjacent submarines.

 

[Jason_]

I question the utility of cruise missiles on submarines for China. For the land attack role, cruise missile launched from the Chinese mainland or from bombers are far more numerous and economical. For the anti-ship role, submarines are completely dependent on off-board sensors for targeting, at which point bomber launched standoff missiles are once again superior.

Cruise missiles on submarines cannot be reloaded, takes up vast volumes of very valuable hulls space, seems to be poorly compatible with angular shaping of stealth missiles, and at the end of day are not very numerous. The Virginia Block V with VPM carries 40 Tomahawks. In contrast, 2 B-1s can carry 48 LRASM (and reload and come back with 48 more ad infinitum).

At a time when Chinese SSNs are in numerical and qualitative disadvantage, cruise missiles and multirole capabilities are a luxury.

 

[tphuang]

I would be surprised if 096 is not wider than 095. I'd be curious what kind of cooperation they have with the Russians and see if the 095 design will look similar to Yasen-M, but without VLS as large. I'd expect them to have 1 large spherical bow sonar in the front with torpedoes on the side, large flank array sonar and very long TAS.

The importance of 095 cannot be overstated. I think they probably could've built something comparable to Akula/LA class with 11m beam back in 2015 to 2020 time range and slowly improved their stealth technology over time to be comparable to late Akula/LA class boats by the end of 2020s. I think 095 hasn't come out sooner, because they wanted to wait until they can build something that's close to Virginia class in capabilities before mass production. Having something on the same level as 688I by 2029 doesn't really help their blue water goals.

If someone was to ask me what my view of a prospective 09V would ideally yet realistically look like, I'd say:

- A new hullform, something similar to the new small SSK:
View attachment 88447

Yes, I would be happy with this as general hull form for 095. I think pump jet wouldn't be absolutely necessary, but considering the requirement to operate with a nuclear powered carrier, it would be a disappointment if they don't have it.

 

[Blitzo]

I question the utility of cruise missiles on submarines for China. For the land attack role, cruise missile launched from the Chinese mainland or from bombers are far more numerous and economical. For the anti-ship role, submarines are completely dependent on off-board sensors for targeting, at which point bomber launched standoff missiles are once again superior.

Cruise missiles on submarines cannot be reloaded, takes up vast volumes of very valuable hulls space, seems to be poorly compatible with angular shaping of stealth missiles, and at the end of day are not very numerous. The Virginia Block V with VPM carries 40 Tomahawks. In contrast, 2 B-1s can carry 48 LRASM (and reload and come back with 48 more ad infinitum).

At a time when Chinese SSNs are in numerical and qualitative disadvantage, cruise missiles and multirole capabilities are a luxury.

The bolded part is important, IMO.

The reason you described is exactly why Chinese SSNs up to now have not had dedicated facilities for VLS, and it is a rational one.

However, we are describing a situation whereby the 09V is likely to be qualitatively competitive with global leading SSNs, with the potential to be produced in large numbers.
40, 50, or even more such SSNs could be produced over a matter of a decade or more, depending on how quickly they get the new Bohai halls going.

With such a prospective fleet going into the future, and the relatively long endurance and relative stealthiness of SSNs operating in the open ocean, imagine a dozen 09Vs operating with warloads of 30-40 SLCMs or the new YJ-21/AShBM in the second island chain and above, with the ability to conduct prompt, short warning conventional strikes against US land bases in the region or to contribute to anti shipping missions -- that of course is all in conjunction with land based long range strike capabilities (AShBMs, IRBMs, HGVs, long range cruise missiles, bombers with ALCMs), and surface naval strike capabilities (CSGs with their organic aerial strike capabilities, and the contribution of surface combatants as part of said CSGs or SAGs).

Putting it another way, I believe those strike capabilities are all complementary, and that undersea launched land attack and anti ship weapons are an important contributor alongside very robust land based long range strike and surface naval and carrier long range strike, all of which have their own strengths and weaknesses.

I would be surprised if 096 is not wider than 095. I'd be curious what kind of cooperation they have with the Russians and see if the 095 design will look similar to Yasen-M, but without VLS as large. I'd expect them to have 1 large spherical bow sonar in the front with torpedoes on the side, large flank array sonar and very long TAS.

Regarding spherical bow sonars -- they are not necessarily superior in this day and age.
Large aperture arrays are now the norm for Virginias, while offering lower construction costs without sacrificing capability.

The Yasen-Ms are thought to have a large aperture array rather than a spherical array.

 

[Jason_]

The bolded part is important, IMO.

The reason you described is exactly why Chinese SSNs up to now have not had dedicated facilities for VLS, and it is a rational one.

However, we are describing a situation whereby the 09V is likely to be qualitatively competitive with global leading SSNs, with the potential to be produced in large numbers.
40, 50, or even more such SSNs could be produced over a matter of a decade or more, depending on how quickly they get the new Bohai halls going.

With such a prospective fleet going into the future, and the relatively long endurance and relative stealthiness of SSNs operating in the open ocean, imagine a dozen 09Vs operating with warloads of 30-40 SLCMs or the new YJ-21/AShBM in the second island chain and above,

Simple arithmetic would give total weapon count of this load out to be at maximum 480, which quite frankly isn't a lot, doubly so considering this load out cannot be replenished for weeks or months. In the same time frame, the US could build 100 B-21, each with two rotary launcher carrying 16 missiles. Note that Virginia Payload Modules (28 Tomahawks) costs $500 million each, which is supposed to be the cost of one B-21.

with the ability to conduct prompt, short warning conventional strikes against US land bases in the region or to contribute to anti shipping missions -- that of course is all in conjunction with land based long range strike capabilities (AShBMs, IRBMs, HGVs, long range cruise missiles, bombers with ALCMs), and surface naval strike capabilities (CSGs with their organic aerial strike capabilities, and the contribution of surface combatants as part of said CSGs or SAGs).
Putting it another way, I believe those strike capabilities are all complementary, and that undersea launched land attack and anti ship weapons are an important contributor alongside very robust land based long range strike and surface naval and carrier long range strike, all of which have their own strengths and weaknesses.

As we expect the US' anti-cruise missile defense to be very robust, in a major conflict cruise missile usage must emphasize numbers, both in terms of single wave to achieve over-saturation and total aggregate number to exhaust interceptors. Submarine launched missiles fare very poorly in these metrics.

While cruise missile strike capability from submarines is indeed complementary, it is complementary in an inefficient and redundant way. True complementariness should stress the comparative advantages of each platform, which for the SSN is its effectiveness in hunting other subs and the one shot one kill firepower of torpedos. An SSN's payload compartment could be more fruitfully devoted to things like UUVs and submarine deployed mines, which are unique to SSN.

Submarine launched missile could have a niche in a non-major conflicts like the US cruise missile strike on Syria. However, the fundamental flaw of the inability to reload would in my mind limit the utility of submarine launched missiles in any major conflict.

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As BoraTas argued a few pages back, the practice of putting a lot of cruise missile (and even more egregiously special forces) on US subs originate from the submarine service's plea for continued relevance post Cold War, when its original missions disappeared. It is the undersea equivalent of the Zumwalt's main guns (i.e. overpriced capability that can be better performed via aircrafts).

I should also note the original Tomahawk and the P-700/800 in the Cold War era were nuclear tipped and had a very different cost calculus to conventional weapons. Nuclear tipped SSG could make a lot of sense for North Korea, Pakistan or Israel.

 

[Blitzo]

Simple arithmetic would give total weapon count of this load out to be at maximum 480, which quite frankly isn't a lot, doubly so considering this load out cannot be replenished for weeks or months. In the same time frame, the US could build 100 B-21, each with two rotary launcher carrying 16 missiles. Note that Virginia Payload Modules (28 Tomahawks) costs $500 million each, which is supposed to be the cost of one B-21.

The inability to be replenished is more than made up for by the fact that they can be prepositioned much closer to their targets for long durations and enable multi-axis attacks, and that they would be intended to be part of a first wave strike.

As we expect the US' anti-cruise missile defense to be very robust, in a major conflict cruise missile usage must emphasize numbers, both in terms of single wave to achieve over-saturation and total aggregate number to exhaust interceptors. Submarine launched missiles fare very poorly in these metrics.

If those submarine launched missiles were launched in isolation, yes.
However, they would be part of a comprehensive first strike alongside long range land based strike systems (IRBMs, HGVs, bombers with stand off missiles), naval surface strike systems (carrier based strike and surface combatants with LACMs/AShBMs/HGVs).
Not to mention they would have EW/ECM support.

While cruise missile strike capability from submarines is indeed complementary, it is complementary in an inefficient and redundant way. True complementariness should stress the comparative advantages of each platform, which for the SSN is its effectiveness in hunting other subs and the one shot one kill firepower of torpedos. An SSN's payload compartment could be more fruitfully devoted to things like UUVs and submarine deployed mines, which are unique to SSN.

Submarine launched missile could have a niche in a non-major conflicts like the US cruise missile strike on Syria. However, the fundamental flaw of the inability to reload would in my mind limit the utility of submarine launched missiles in any major conflict.

I disagree, I believe that the major reason why submarine launched weapons can be complementary to land based and naval surface strike systems, is because submarine launched weapons can be deployed much closer to the target in a manner that the enemy cannot easily detect, and in turn enable multi-axis and multi-distance first wave strikes in conjunction with land and naval surface strike systems.

The inability to be immediately replenished is fine, because their land attack or anti-surface warload would be intended for contributing to a first wave strike before retreating and conducting undersea warfare missions. They would not be expected to carry out an entire strike campaign by themselves, heck they wouldn't even be expected to carry out an entire first wave strike by themselves, perhaps only 25% of the first wave at most, if not less. However, by being able to be launched closer to the enemy and in other directions outside of the major axis of attack, it can augment the effectiveness of the overall first wave strike mission.

As BoraTas argued a few pages back, the practice of putting a lot of cruise missile (and even more egregiously special forces) on US subs originate from the submarine service's plea for continued relevance post Cold War, when its original missions disappeared. It is the undersea equivalent of the Zumwalt's main guns (i.e. overpriced capability that can be better performed via aircrafts).

I should also note the original Tomahawk and the P-700/800 in the Cold War era were nuclear tipped and had a very different cost calculus to conventional weapons. Nuclear tipped SSG could make a lot of sense for North Korea, Pakistan or Israel.

I disagree with BoraTas argument, and I think the utility of a large warload of submarine launched long range land attack/anti ship weapons deployed from acoustically stealthy and technologically competitive nuclear submarines cannot be understated, when viewed in context of an overall air-naval-missile campaign.

(In terms of using SSNs as special forces insertion, I do agree that it is a much more niche capability and relatively unimportant)