09V/09VI (095/096) Nuclear Submarine Thread

[SEAD]

I think the 095 will be built in many different versions, call it 095A, B, C, D for example,

First version may be torpedo tubes only, a reduced complexity version that validates hull, propulsion, sensors.
Next version may add VLS, hopefully a submarine version of the surface fleets UVLS system.
Next version may add advanced submarine technology missing from earlier versions.
Other versions might experiment with different hulk forms and tail configurations, even propulsion systems.

With this planned and expected from the very beginning we may see a much more varied fleet than many expect.

I also hope they have less lines in the new facilities dedicated for mass submarine production and more for experimenting and unique builds.

The first batch of ships built in the new facility may be the last batch before the impending war. They have no time to build them one by one if the 2027 rumor is true.

on the other hand, China have spent enough time on subsystems so we may assume they have been carefully tested. In 2000, both PLAN DDGs and submarines were at 1970s level, however now their DDGs are advanced while submarines are still at 1980s level. Considering China spent similar resources to those fields, it’s unreasonable. IMO we will see a big jump just like what happened from 051B to 052D, or even 055.

 

[Maikeru]

I think the 095 will be built in many different versions, call it 095A, B, C, D for example,

First version may be torpedo tubes only, a reduced complexity version that validates hull, propulsion, sensors.
Next version may add VLS, hopefully a submarine version of the surface fleets UVLS system.
Next version may add advanced submarine technology missing from earlier versions.
Other versions might experiment with different hulk forms and tail configurations, even propulsion systems.

With this planned and expected from the very beginning we may see a much more varied fleet than many expect.

I also hope they have less lines in the new facilities dedicated for mass submarine production and more for experimenting and unique builds.

They can use them still operational old Western hall for that.

 

[Blitzo]

Can't the same capabilities (closeness to target, multi-axis attack, EW/ECM support) be more adequately achieved by stealth VLO bombers and air launched ballistic missiles?

They most certainly cannot.

The capability that a large fleet of competitive SSNs with large cruise missile loads enables for the PLA -- which bombers witb ALBMs cannot offer -- is near-permanent/round the clock deployment of a large number of munitions in relatively close range to second island chain region (including and beyond Guam), from a variety of axes of attack relative to potential targets.

I will describe to you my CONOPs for a "12-15 SSN/SSN-G in second island chain" strategy. (Keep in mind, the numbers below can be altered depending on how much one wants to deploy SSNs to the central or eastern pacific or elsewhere on the globe -- but those theaters would be relatively lower priority or require a relatively small number of SSNs).

First, I'll describe my fleet vision.
I will project a fleet of some 60 competitive SSNs, of which 45 are equipped with larger VLS loads (let's call them SSN-Gs, because they're not quite traditional SSGNs but rather SSNs with augmented guided missile capabilities) -- let's say 40 VLS for a SSN-G, and each VLS able to carry either a LACM, AShM or YJ-21 pattern AShBM/HGV. The standard SSNs (15 of the 60) will have 12 VLS.
Now, during peacetime, I will seek to deploy a third of the total SSN fleet in the western pacific -- using the classic 1:3 ratio of deployed force : total fleet size.
Now, note that the 1:3 ratio is typically used for blue water missions and in this case, the operational SSNs will be deployed mostly to the western pacific, relatively closer to the their homeports compared to US or UK deployments, meaning that the 1:3 ratio here is a bit conservative, but I digress.

Now, of those 20 (one third of 60) deployed SSNs, I would seek 15 of them to be SSN-G, and 5 to be traditional SSNs. I would seek to deploy 3/4 of the 20 deployed SSNs to the second island chain area, depicted on the map below.
So, that's 15 SSNs. Of those 15 SSNs, I would seek at least 12 to be SSN-Gs. The other three would be either standard SSNs or perhaps they could be SSN-Gs as well. For the purposes of this illustration, let's say those are 12 SSN-Gs.

12 SSN-Gs, each with 40 VLS tubes -- 480 VLS tubes. That of course is in addition to their standard SSN role, which will not be meaningfully inferior to the standard SSN variant.
Okay, let's look at the map -- I've marked out some areas around the second island chain, centred around Guam there. The five yellow dots correspond to approximate areas of roaming where my second island chain SSNs would operate -- essentially a large crescent from the north, curving east, south, and slightly southwest around Guam, in a radius of anywhere from a few hundred km away to 1000km away. That would be their "fire when ready" location during periods of heightened tension or during periods of conflict.

During standard peacetime, they would be able to roam much more freely and wider.





So, think about it -- that is up to 15 SSNs (of which at least 12 are SSN-Gs) carrying at least 480 VLS tubes between them, very hard to detect and track, virtually permanently in the second island chain, anywhere between 1000km to a few hundred km of Guam and other US installations in the second island chain.
That is to say, virtually at every moment of every day, able to launch their payloads on short notice. (During times of increased tension or build up to conflict, of course more SSNs will be surged.)

So, the comparison with bombers isn't really accurate, because think about how many bombers and support aircraft you'd need to do the same thing?

Let's say a H-20 can carry 16 equivalent weapons to what a VLS tube on a SSN/SSN-G can carry. Okay.
Then let's consider that the requirement, is for you to have 480 equivalent weapons in the air, within 1000km to a few hundred km of Guam/in the second island chain, 24/7 (i.e.: virtually every moment of every day, for years if not decades on end), in a manner that is very hard for the enemy to detect and track.

To get 480 weapons in the air, you'd need 30 H-20s. Not too bad right? And they can totally fly within 1000km to a few hundred km of Guam, based on how big we expect H-20 to be.

But the problem arises with the 24/7 part, and the detect/track part.

For the 24/7 part -- basically, the challenge you face is needing to permanently have 30 H-20s in the air on station within 1000km of Guam for years if not decades. Yes, that is achievable, but you'd probably need to produce many hundreds if not a few thousand H-20s to maintain that kind of sortie rate for years/decades. It'll be a veritable conga line of H-20s constantly having to leave China, loiter on station 1000km from Guam for maybe 3-4 hours, then fly back just as another H-20 arrives to replace it on station, multiplied by 30, ongoing 24/7 for years/decades.

For the detect/track part -- this comes down to the nature of bombers (even stealth bombers) versus submarines, namely that bombers loitering in an area 24/7 will be much more easily detected and tracked -- even visually by an intercepting pilot with a Mk-1 eyeball, than a stealthy submarine can.
The threat posed by SSNs is just that much greater, which will place more demands on monitoring and countering them than persistent bombers that are permanently in the air.


Now, I want to emphasize that my proposed "12-15 SSN-G in 2IC" idea isn't intended to be a single action by the SSN-Gs alone. Instead, they achieve two things in relation to their effects against the opfor on land/surface:

1. During peacetime, significantly complicate opfor strategic defense measures and force them to expend money, base infrastructure, and place operational pressure on ASW missions and to force them to defend against the prospect of a multi-axis missile attack -- all of which will result in much greater divided resources, planning, and attention, to both ASW and AAW, in a multi-axis large area manner.

2. During wartime, participate as part of a first wave of a multi-domain missile strike against land and/or naval targets in the second island chain -- alongside friendly land based strike systems (bombers with ALCMs and ALBMs, long range land based AShBMs/IRBMs/HGVs/LACMs), and friendly naval surface strike systems (carrier based strike aviation, surface combatant launched AShBMs/HGVs/LACMs/AShMs). The submarine VLS weapons would exploit their relative stealthy nature and forward positioning of the SSN-Gs, allowing them to launch their weapons at closer ranges to the enemy than friendly land based and naval surface strike systems (thus reducing reaction times of the enemy) as well as from axes where the enemy may be less focused on and/or forcing them to widen their surveillance and defenses to a 360 degree manner rather than focusing mostly on their western flank (which is where PLA land and surface naval strikes would inevitably approach from).



..... So, can VLO bombers like H-20 do the same thing as SSN-Gs with large VLS counts?
In theory yes.
In practice, no, not unless one finds a way to permanently have 30 H-20s in the air operating in the second island chain, virtually 24/7, for years or decades on end.

I think we have very different assumptions about the cost of putting VLS tubes on submarines. From I am able to find,

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

. That is $18M per Tomahawk (ignoring the acoustics and hydrodynamic drag implications for the SSN itself). I can't imagine how this is preferable to additional bombers which would be just as survivable and easily forward positioned when launching standoff missiles as submarines.

See above.

 

[SEAD]

They most certainly cannot.

The capability that a large fleet of competitive SSNs with large cruise missile loads enables for the PLA -- which bombers witb ALBMs cannot offer -- is near-permanent/round the clock deployment of a large number of munitions in relatively close range to second island chain region (including and beyond Guam), from a variety of axes of attack relative to potential targets.

I will describe to you my CONOPs for a "12-15 SSN/SSN-G in second island chain" strategy. (Keep in mind, the numbers below can be altered depending on how much one wants to deploy SSNs to the central or eastern pacific or elsewhere on the globe -- but those theaters would be relatively lower priority or require a relatively small number of SSNs).

First, I'll describe my fleet vision.
I will project a fleet of some 60 competitive SSNs, of which 45 are equipped with larger VLS loads (let's call them SSN-Gs, because they're not quite traditional SSGNs but rather SSNs with augmented guided missile capabilities) -- let's say 40 VLS for a SSN-G, and each VLS able to carry either a LACM, AShM or YJ-21 pattern AShBM/HGV. The standard SSNs (15 of the 60) will have 12 VLS.
Now, during peacetime, I will seek to deploy a third of the total SSN fleet in the western pacific -- using the classic 1:3 ratio of deployed force : total fleet size.
Now, note that the 1:3 ratio is typically used for blue water missions and in this case, the operational SSNs will be deployed mostly to the western pacific, relatively closer to the their homeports compared to US or UK deployments, meaning that the 1:3 ratio here is a bit conservative, but I digress.

Now, of those 20 (one third of 60) deployed SSNs, I would seek 15 of them to be SSN-G, and 5 to be traditional SSNs. I would seek to deploy 3/4 of the 20 deployed SSNs to the second island chain area, depicted on the map below.
So, that's 15 SSNs. Of those 15 SSNs, I would seek at least 12 to be SSN-Gs. The other three would be either standard SSNs or perhaps they could be SSN-Gs as well. For the purposes of this illustration, let's say those are 12 SSN-Gs.

12 SSN-Gs, each with 40 VLS tubes -- 480 VLS tubes. That of course is in addition to their standard SSN role, which will not be meaningfully inferior to the standard SSN variant.
Okay, let's look at the map -- I've marked out some areas around the second island chain, centred around Guam there. The five yellow dots correspond to approximate areas of roaming where my second island chain SSNs would operate -- essentially a large crescent from the north, curving east, south, and slightly southwest around Guam, in a radius of anywhere from a few hundred km away to 1000km away. That would be their "fire when ready" location during periods of heightened tension or during periods of conflict.

During standard peacetime, they would be able to roam much more freely and wider.

View attachment 88487



So, think about it -- that is up to 15 SSNs (of which at least 12 are SSN-Gs) carrying at least 480 VLS tubes between them, very hard to detect and track, virtually permanently in the second island chain, anywhere between 1000km to a few hundred km of Guam and other US installations in the second island chain.
That is to say, virtually at every moment of every day, able to launch their payloads on short notice. (During times of increased tension or build up to conflict, of course more SSNs will be surged.)

So, the comparison with bombers isn't really accurate, because think about how many bombers and support aircraft you'd need to do the same thing?

Let's say a H-20 can carry 16 equivalent weapons to what a VLS tube on a SSN/SSN-G can carry. Okay.
Then let's consider that the requirement, is for you to have 480 equivalent weapons in the air, within 1000km to a few hundred km of Guam/in the second island chain, 24/7 (i.e.: virtually every moment of every day, for years if not decades on end), in a manner that is very hard for the enemy to detect and track.

To get 480 weapons in the air, you'd need 30 H-20s. Not too bad right? And they can totally fly within 1000km to a few hundred km of Guam, based on how big we expect H-20 to be.

But the problem arises with the 24/7 part, and the detect/track part.

For the 24/7 part -- basically, the challenge you face is needing to permanently have 30 H-20s in the air on station within 1000km of Guam for years if not decades. Yes, that is achievable, but you'd probably need to produce many hundreds if not a few thousand H-20s to maintain that kind of sortie rate for years/decades. It'll be a veritable conga line of H-20s constantly having to leave China, loiter on station 1000km from Guam for maybe 3-4 hours, then fly back just as another H-20 arrives to replace it on station, multiplied by 30, ongoing 24/7 for years/decades.

For the detect/track part -- this comes down to the nature of bombers (even stealth bombers) versus submarines, namely that bombers loitering in an area 24/7 will be much more easily detected and tracked -- even visually by an intercepting pilot with a Mk-1 eyeball, than a stealthy submarine can.
The threat posed by SSNs is just that much greater, which will place more demands on monitoring and countering them than persistent bombers that are permanently in the air.


Now, I want to emphasize that my proposed "12-15 SSN-G in 2IC" idea isn't intended to be a single action by the SSN-Gs alone. Instead, they achieve two things in relation to their effects against the opfor on land/surface:

1. During peacetime, significantly complicate opfor strategic defense measures and force them to expend money, base infrastructure, and place operational pressure on ASW missions and to force them to defend against the prospect of a multi-axis missile attack -- all of which will result in much greater divided resources, planning, and attention, to both ASW and AAW, in a multi-axis large area manner.

2. During wartime, participate as part of a first wave of a multi-domain missile strike against land and/or naval targets in the second island chain -- alongside friendly land based strike systems (bombers with ALCMs and ALBMs, long range land based AShBMs/IRBMs/HGVs/LACMs), and friendly naval surface strike systems (carrier based strike aviation, surface combatant launched AShBMs/HGVs/LACMs/AShMs). The submarine VLS weapons would exploit their relative stealthy nature and forward positioning of the SSN-Gs, allowing them to launch their weapons at closer ranges to the enemy than friendly land based and naval surface strike systems (thus reducing reaction times of the enemy) as well as from axes where the enemy may be less focused on and/or forcing them to widen their surveillance and defenses to a 360 degree manner rather than focusing mostly on their western flank (which is where PLA land and surface naval strikes would inevitably approach from).



..... So, can VLO bombers like H-20 do the same thing as SSN-Gs with large VLS counts?
In theory yes.
In practice, no, not unless one finds a way to permanently have 30 H-20s in the air operating in the second island chain, virtually 24/7, for years or decades on end.





See above.

Why PLA(or anybody) needs 24/7 capability? Meanwhile if you just want to attack Guam with 480 missiles, building more DF-26/17 is much much cheaper and more reliable, after all Guam has no more defense than Iron Dome for now.

 

[Blitzo]

Why PLA(or anybody) needs 24/7 capability? Meanwhile if you just want to attack Guam with 480 missiles, building more DF-26/17 is much much cheaper and more reliable, after all Guam has no more BMD than Iron Dome for now.

Because being able to launch weapons closer to the enemy and on a more varied flight profiles (including lower flight profiles), and in other directions, results in a higher likelihood of mission success than simply adding more weapons of the same type in the same direction that the enemy is already surveilled towards, having to launch from the Chinese mainland and providing significant early warning to the enemy.

 

[SEAD]

Because being able to launch weapons closer to the enemy and on a more varied flight profiles (including lower flight profiles), and in other directions, results in a higher likelihood of mission success than simply adding more weapons of the same type in the same direction that the enemy is already surveilled towards, having to launch from the Chinese mainland and providing significant early warning to the enemy.

If you just want multi axis, bombers+ALCM/ALBM can definitely do that. On the other hand, 4*480 or 8*480 MRBMs are still much cheaper than SSNs.
24/7 makes me really confused, why it's so important?

 

[Blitzo]

If you just want multi axis, bombers+ALCM/ALBM can definitely do that. On the other hand, 4*480 or 8*480 MRBMs are still much cheaper than SSNs.
24/7 makes me really confused, why it's so important?

It isn't only about a multi-axis attack.

It is about being able to conduct a multi-axis attack with reduced warning time.
The 24/7 presence is about enabling that reduced warning time.


The ability to conduct a successful defense is contingent on a few factors -- one of those factors is time, or to be more precise, early warning.

The nature of geography means that missiles launched from China towards the second island chain will have early warning radars located in East Asia (i.e.: first island chain) as well as naval based radars (Aegis BMD ships) on top of air and missile defense systems on or stationed near Guam itself. Those radars and sensors in the first island chain, will be able to provide early warning, support continuous tracking of targets, greatly improving the ability of Guam's defenses to successfully discriminate and thus target the incoming missiles.
Heck, depending on the system, some of the first island chain radars may have accompanying BMD capabilities to shoot down some of the missiles China shoots.

The same issue applies for VLO bombers -- because to get within range of Guam to launch their payloads, the VLO bombers would have to fly from Chinese airspace to within range of Guam (depending on the weapon, that may be anywhere from 2000km or more). That is 2000km of flying in international airspace over ocean, past the first island chain and against US and their allies' fighters and surveillance aircraft operating from bases and/or carriers, where they will again not only provide early warning to Guam, but they can also actively seek to intercept and shoot down Chinese VLO bombers on the way to and on the way back from their launch point.


Now one may ask -- as part of an overall westpac air-naval-missile conflict, wouldn't the PLA seek to destroy/degrade US radars, air bases and carriers in and around the first island chain, thus greatly reducing the ability for early warning to be provided to Guam?
Well yes, the PLA would absolutely seek to do that.
However, that sort of operation would also take time, time which Guam would have to better organize their defenses. More importantly, as part of that operation, it is likely that PLA land bases will also suffer attacks from the US, and the PLA's own long range bombers and/or even some missile bases may be adversely affected and degraded, in turn reducing the PLA's ability to conduct long range strikes against Guam.


So where does that leave the 24/7 presence of SSNs? Well, during this whole process, they are able to remain on station, undetected, able to launch some 480 missiles at the opfor's base in the 2IC with far shorter warning time and thus with a higher likelihood of successful penetration, than PLA long range missiles and VLO bombers operating from China, because they do not have to run a 3000km+ gauntlet of US radars, air bases, and naval forces that have to be thinned out first.


During peacetime, the 24/7 presence of SSNs in the 2IC will pose a clear and present threat to Guam that the US would be forced to dedicate immense resources to pursuing and tracking, or they will have to accept that during a time of tension or conflict that there may be many missiles launched from submarines that have a much higher likelihood of penetrating their defenses due to being launched from a much closer distance.



Also, we are not comparing spending money on "SSNs" with "additional MRBMs and/or bombers".
We are comparing spending money on "additional VLS tubes" with "additional and/or bombers".

Because the PLAN will need 60 competitive SSNs going into future decades anyway, and they will be deployed extensively in the deep waters of the second island chain and pacific anyway. The entire "standard SSN" and its mission profile would already paid for.
All I am proposing is a lengthened hull plug additional VLS tubes, for 3/4 of the overall fleet of SSNs.

 

[Lethe]

There is clearly some value in submarines being able to launch land-attack and anti-ship guided missiles, though how much value is open to debate according to the roles and requirements we anticipate for PLAN's nuclear submarine force. In any case, the available models are as follows:

1. SSNs with no VLS e.g. Seawolf, Astute.
2. SSNs with modest VLS capacity e.g. Improved Los Angeles, Virginia Block I-IV.
3. SSNs with considerable VLS capacity e.g. Yasen, Virginia Block V.
4. Dedicated SSGNs with large VLS capacity such as the Ohio conversions and Oscar-class.

 

[Broccoli]

There is clearly some value in submarines being able to launch land-attack and anti-ship guided missiles, though how much value is open to debate according to the roles and requirements we anticipate for PLAN's nuclear submarine force. In any case, the available models are as follows:

1. SSNs with no VLS e.g. Seawolf, Astute.
2. SSNs with modest VLS capacity e.g. Improved Los Angeles, Virginia Block I-IV.
3. SSNs with considerable VLS capacity e.g. Yasen, Virginia Block V.
4. Dedicated SSGNs with large VLS capacity such as the Ohio conversions and Oscar-class.

Frances new Barracudas are in category 1 even thought their subs do carry cruise missiles.
Now they gotta sacrifice torpedos for missiles.

 

[tphuang]

The first batch of ships built in the new facility may be the last batch before the impending war. They have no time to build them one by one if the 2027 rumor is true.

on the other hand, China have spent enough time on subsystems so we may assume they have been carefully tested. In 2000, both PLAN DDGs and submarines were at 1970s level, however now their DDGs are advanced while submarines are still at 1980s level. Considering China spent similar resources to those fields, it’s unreasonable. IMO we will see a big jump just like what happened from 051B to 052D, or even 055.

Okay, let's not alarm anyone with the 2027 rumor. That's just to have the capability, but not to actually carry anything out. Keep in mind that strategic investments like carrier and nuclear subs help a Taiwan scenario but they are more for longer term strategic goals of securing SLOC for the future.

In 2000, PLAN SSN fleet consisted of 091s and 092, so it was more like early 1950s level. Keep in mind that when they first developed the submarine reactor for 091, it 2 decades before they connected their first domestic Qinshan nuclear reactor onto the grid. I would not dare to spend prolonged period of time next to a 091 reactor. the current PWR technology vs back in 2000 is night and day. If you just look at

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

, the domestic nuclear reactor technology really only reached 2nd generation with CNP600 in 2010 and only reached 3rd generation with Hualong One in 2021.

I'm quite intrigued by this ACPR50S to be built by Bohai shipyard. Not saying this is what's going into Type 095. It certainly looks like something that can adopted for naval use.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

You can see that if they finalized on a nuclear submarine reactor design in 2011, they'd basically be using a reactor utilizes 2nd generation technology and then it will take another 3 years to launch the boat and 3 more years after that for it to join service. So if they have a modern reactor designed in 2020 with 200 MWt, then it probably won't be on a boat that's in service until 2027.